Chapter XII — On vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. The true interpretation of this reservation

I. Concerning the number of vows which are reserved to the Pope, there is not a single opinion among authors. Richard (Bk. IV, dist. 38, art. 9, q. 1) restricts these vows to three, namely, of chastity, of religious life, and of pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Others contend there are two — namely, the vow of chastity, and of religious life; for they judge the vows of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Rome, and Compostela not to be absolutely reserved to the Pope, but only when they are made in aid of these same places; not so, if they are made for the sake of devotion. This they gather from the chapter "From much," and the chapter "Concerning this," on vows. Panormitanus, on the said chapter "From much," n. 4; Angles (s.v. Votum, 4, n. 6); the Gloss on the said chapter "From much," s.v. "Incumbit" — which Passerini also notes (q. 187, art. 1, inspect. 4, n. 6).

II. Others have declined to the other extreme, extending the vows reserved to the Pope beyond the number five. For Navarrus, to the vows of chastity, of religious life, and of the threefold pilgrimage, added the vow of taking up the cross in any expedition proclaimed by the Pontiff. Some have added the vow of converting one's own money, entrusted for the aid of the Holy Land, and lent, to another purpose; Rosella (s.v. Votum, 8, n. 3). Others have added the vow of never sinning, which Cajetan says would be an unbreakable and indispensable vow, if the discussion concerns the obligation arising from law; Hostiensis, in his Summa, tit. on vows, ch. "Qualiter," n. 12. Some, moreover, add the vow of the Loreto pilgrimage: commentary 1, n. 11, on... this is true; but not so, if the obligation is specifically that which a vow induces.

III. The most common opinion is that only five vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — namely, the simple vow of perpetual continence, of religious life, and of the threefold pilgrimage, to Jerusalem, Rome, and Compostela. That these five vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff is gathered from the Extravagant "Etsi dominici," on penance and remission, §3, where those who presume to relax these vows are excommunicated. There they are held as reserved, though not expressly reserved. This reservation, as Passerini notes (loc. cit., n. 408), is by disposition of the Church, not by the intention of the one vowing. Wherefore, even if the one vowing made any vow whatsoever, beyond those assigned, or to be assigned, with this express intention, that it should be reserved to the Pope, it would not therefore be reserved — since the one vowing cannot restrict the ordinary power of Bishops. Hence it is inferred that no vow, other than the five mentioned, is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — since it is gathered from no law, nor from legitimate custom, that either the vow of the Loreto pilgrimage, or any other of those we have reviewed, is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Except, however, those simple vows which are made in certain religious orders concerning not seeking, nor accepting, dignities — for these vows of Religious too are comprehended, as Passerini excellently notes (n. 609). Wherefore the vows reserved to the Pontiff are more than five.

IV. You will object: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 88, art. 12, ad 3) enumerates only two vows reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — namely, of chastity, and of the pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Response: There are those who answer that St. Thomas wished, in the vow of continence, to comprehend also the vow of religious life, and, in the vow of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, to comprehend simultaneously the vow of pilgrimage to Rome and Compostela. But this response seems to us altogether arbitrary. Cajetan, and Sylvius there, answer that the holy Doctor wrote thus because, in St. Thomas's time, only those two vows were reserved. But this response is not sufficiently solid either. Since, as is gathered from the following considerations, at least three were reserved even in St. Thomas's own time — namely, chastity, religious life, and pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Concerning the threefold pilgrimage, doubt can perhaps stand. We say, then, that St. Thomas did not enumerate all the reserved vows. This is openly established from his manner of speaking: "The greater vows (namely, of continence, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land) are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff." By these two vows he gives an example. Elsewhere he lists the vow of religious life. Nowhere, however, does he expressly enumerate all five. Wherefore it is probable enough that, at that time, the threefold pilgrimage was not yet reserved.

V. It is also customarily objected that all perpetual vows are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — which seems to be gathered from St. Thomas (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 4, qc. 2): "In those vows which do not easily admit dispensation, nor frequently, but rarely — such as the vow of religious life, and other such perpetual vows — only the Pope can dispense." Which he repeats (II-II, q. 184, art. 6, and q. 189, art. 7): "It pertains to the Pope alone," he says, "to dispense in perpetual vows." Response: The common opinion of theologians is that not all perpetual vows are reserved to the Pontiff — such as perpetual vows of abstaining from wine, from meat, and the like. Commentators commonly answer this authority of St. Thomas by saying that he is speaking of those vows which, by their own kind, have perpetuity almost annexed to them — such as the vows of religious life, and of chastity, and those which Bishops make, when they undertake the burden of the Episcopate, of caring for their subjects. This is established clearly enough from what he writes (II-II, q. 185, art. 4): "Only the Pope can dispense in a perpetual vow, by which someone, undertaking the Episcopate, has bound himself..."

VI. Question I. Are oaths made to God, in the same manner as vows, reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — those, namely, of chastity, of religious life, and of the threefold pilgrimage? Response: Ledesma denies this (tract. 11, ch. 4, dub. 8), Tabiena (s.v. Iuramentum, q. 20, n. 21), López de Texeda (Bk. III, controv. 6, n. 229), Antonio a Spiritu Santo (in the Directorium, tract. 2, disp. 3, sect. 2, n. 16), and several others. The more probable opinion holds that the aforesaid oaths are reserved, no less than vows — either because it includes the same thing... , or the same is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff — since a promissory oath, as will be said in its proper place, is reckoned a vow; for it is a sworn promise made to God, just as an oath made to a man is a sworn promise offered to him. St. Antoninus (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §2), Cajetan (II-II, q. 89, art. 9), Sotus (Bk. VIII, q. 1), Leander (tract. 1, n....).

VII. Question II. Can Bishops, and Prelates having quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, dispense in the aforesaid five vows? Response: The common opinion affirms this, urgent necessity pressing. A distinction, however, is needed. Bishops can dispense in the aforesaid vows when danger exists of violating the vow, of infamy, of scandal, or of some other grave harm, whether temporal or spiritual, all of which are rare enough. You have violated a virgin, bound by a vow of chastity: for the sake of that honor, and to repair it, marriage is necessary, lest the dispensation be delayed. Impediments to be raised by some parties are to be feared, if you should delay the marriage. Likewise, a man near death, bound to chastity by vow, cannot otherwise, in view of a woman's honor — who enjoys the best reputation, and with whom you have had shameful relations — provide for her, except by contracting marriage. In these and similar cases, grave necessity presses. Wherefore the Bishop can dispense with his subjects in reserved vows. This is indeed expedient for the governance of the Church; nor is it to be presumed, since it would come with such danger to souls, that the Pontiffs wished to reserve the aforesaid vows to themselves even when urgent necessity, and danger from delay, exist. It must be judged otherwise of regular Prelates. For just as they do not have the faculty of dispensing in vows not reserved absolutely, much less will they be able to dispense in reserved vows. Theologians commonly teach the first part: Sylvester (s.v. Votum, 4, q. 40, dub. 18, n. 126), Suárez (Bk. VI, on vows, ch. 26), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 40, n. 44), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 8), Prado (ch. 31, q. 14, n. 92), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 15), Barbosa (on the power of the Bishop, Part II, alleg. 37, n. 5), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 17, q. 117), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 17, ch. 3, punct. 12, n. 110), and others commonly.

VIII. This same privilege the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit.) and Croix ascribe to Regular Prelates in Rule of St. Francis, ch. 7, sect. 29. But when the said five vows are true, and perfect, and consequently altogether reserved, that regular Prelates cannot dispense in them, even given any case of necessity whatsoever, is manifest from our teaching above set forth. This opinion is held by Suárez (Bk. VI, ch. 26, n. 18), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 43, n. 5), Barbosa (on the power of the Bishop, alleg. 37, n. 16), Passerini (q. 187, art. 1, inspect. 4, n. 618), La Croix (Bk. III, tract. 2, part 2, n. 463), and others commonly — since, by virtue of privileges, no faculty is granted them over reserved vows. Excluding privileges, then, they have no faculty at all either of commuting, or of dispensing, in vows. This holds all the more forcefully in our own opinion — for we have demonstrated that Regulars can, by virtue of privileges, only commute vows, and by no means dispense in them. In the five reserved vows, then, they have the power neither of commuting, nor of dispensing.

IX. In the aforesaid cases of necessity, however, in which we have taught that Bishops can dispense, it is worth noting that the dispensation ought not to exceed the limits of necessity. Wherefore, if the harm can be prevented by suspending the execution of the vow, only this should be granted — not an absolute and full dispensation from the vow. Whence, when, on account of the aforesaid grave necessity, dispensation is granted from a vow of chastity, so that marriage may be contracted, the bond of the vow is not absolutely removed; for, the marriage being dissolved on account of the necessity for which it was contracted, the vow would revive, and would again oblige. Likewise, if, during the time of the marriage contracted, one who had made a vow of chastity should pollute himself, or commit fornication or adultery, he would sin against the vow.

X. In the aforesaid cases, moreover, of true and grave necessity, the Bishop can dispense, even if a Legate or Nuncio of the Pontiff were in the province — since these, by ordinary right, do not have greater power than the Bishops themselves, as Suárez, Sánchez, and Layman teach in the places cited. It must be judged otherwise, if the Legate or Nuncio had a special power delegated by the Pontiff over the aforesaid vows; for then access to the Pontiff would be easy through his own ministers, and therefore the Bishop would possess no faculty of dispensing or commuting such vows, as the cited authors teach.

XI. Question III. Is this reservation of vows to be interpreted broadly, or strictly? Response: That it is to be interpreted strictly, since it is full of odium, and contrary to the ordinary power of Bishops, authors commonly and rightly hold. Wherefore, in order for the said vows to be reserved, they must be absolute, certain, express, and perfect. Whatever falls short in any respect, and admits doubt, whether concerning consent, or perpetuity, or some attached condition, is not reserved; and thus Bishops will have the power of dispensing in them, and privileged Regulars will be able to commute them. And here matters are common ground.

XII. Question IV. Do vows of chastity, or of religious life, made with the express intention of binding oneself only under venial fault, need to be reserved to the Pontiff? Response: They need not — for they would not be whole and perfect vows. Indeed, I showed above that such vows cannot be made in this manner. That they would not, then, be reserved, is clear from the teaching given. This is the common opinion.

XIII. Question V. If the aforesaid vows were made out of fear, even light fear, would they still be called reserved? Response: Whether they were made out of grave fear, falling upon a steadfast man, or out of light fear, they would not be reserved in either case — since they would not be entirely perfect.

XIV. Question VI. If there is doubt about some such vow, or its reservation, must it be judged that the vows are not reserved? Response: Authors commonly teach that they are not reserved. For, although in doubtful matters the absolutely safer part is to be chosen, in the present question a peculiar reason applies: since only perfect and certain vows are reserved to the Pontiff; but a doubtful vow is not a perfect vow. If, however, the vow is certain, and subject to no doubt, and it is only doubted whether it is reserved or not, even then it is not to be held reserved — because the reservation is odious, and injurious to ordinary power; and therefore it is strictly to be interpreted. When, then, it is doubted, whether by reason of consent, or by reason of the whole matter, or for any other reason, whether a vow is reserved, it must always be judged, by the general rule, not to be reserved. This is the most common opinion; from which, however, nothing can be inferred in favor of Probabilism.

XV. Question VII. Is a vow of not contracting marriage reserved? Response: It is plain that this vow is not reserved, on account of a defect of the whole matter — for it does not exclude fornication, pollution, and other acts contrary to chastity. For a vow to be reserved, it must be whole, such that it comprehends and exhausts the whole matter. Wherefore vows of not fornicating, of not receiving sacred orders, and the like, are not reserved — since these vows are not whole and perfect as regards the matter, although they may be such as regards the deliberation. The former are not reserved, since they do not exhaust the universal matter. The vow, however, of receiving sacred orders...

XVI. Question VIII. Can a Bishop, by force of custom, grant the faculty of requesting the conjugal debt to one who, bound by a vow of not touching a woman, of not requesting the debt, or of preserving chastity for a defined time, contracts marriage — this not being a vow of chastity already made, but one to be made? Response: They commonly affirm that such a custom holds. Since this, being a matter of fact, cannot otherwise be proven except by usage itself, it must be seen whether Bishops actually do grant such a dispensation.

XVII. Question IX. Is a vow of conjugal chastity reserved? Response: It is certain, first, that the vow is not reserved, if made by one spouse without the other's knowledge. The difficulty presses when the spouses have made the vow by mutual consent. Sánchez affirms this to be reserved (Bk. VIII, on marriage, disp. 11, n. 12), with others whom he cites, and consequently that the spouses are then bound to separate from each other, so that whatever... danger of incontinence would arise, if they continued to live together. Others teach that the Bishop can always dispense, since the danger of incontinence would always be present, even if they lived apart. They add, moreover, that a custom prevails, by force of which Bishops dispense in such a vow. If this custom really holds, there is no difficulty. This opinion seems to me probable enough, on account of the danger of incontinence. Nor is a vow of preserving chastity between spouses reserved, since it is not absolute.

XVIII. Question X. Is a vow of an unapproved religious order reserved? Response: The common opinion is negative — since it is not a true vow of religious life absolutely. Just as the vow of poverty, and of obedience, outside the religious state, is not reserved. Concerning the vows of the Knights of Alcántara, Calatrava, St. James, St. Stephen, and the like, there are two opinions. In the opinion of those who maintain that these are true Religious, the vow is reserved; not so in the other opinion, which teaches that they are not true Religious.

XIX. Question XI. How are the reserved vows of the threefold pilgrimage to be understood? Response: They are reserved when made not absolutely out of devotion, but toward the aforesaid places themselves. If someone, out of his own indefinite devotion, made a vow of going to Rome, Compostela, Jerusalem, so as to visit some particular Church, or image, or to converse with a man of exceptional piety — the vow would not be reserved: because the cause of such a vow would not have been a special devotion toward those sacred places. When, then, someone makes a vow of going to Rome, to visit the church of St. Peter, to Jerusalem, to visit the places consecrated by Christ the Lord, to Compostela, to visit and venerate the body of St. James — then the vow is reserved. This is the common opinion.

XX. Question XII. If a vow made with some circumstance is reserved, does it remain whole once the circumstance is removed? Response: The common opinion affirms this. You vowed a pilgrimage to Rome on foot. The Bishop can dispense in the circumstance of the manner of performing the journey — namely, on foot; but not in the vow of pilgrimage itself, which you can carry out otherwise than on foot, or dressed in a sack, or begging alms by request. The same is commonly said of a vow of entering a stricter religious order, since the Bishop can dispense so that the one vowing may embrace a laxer one. This holds true, if by "laxer" is meant a milder religious order, which otherwise keeps its own Rule exactly; not so, if it is understood as a religious order collapsed from regular observance, which is customarily called relaxed, or lax. For no one can grant anyone license to enter such a religious order. A vow of not seeking dispensation from anyone but the Supreme Pontiff is not reserved, as is clear from what has been said.

XXI. Question XIII. Is a disjunctive vow reserved? Response: Before either part is chosen, the matter remaining whole, it is common opinion that it is not reserved — since it is within your will to choose either part; therefore the Bishop can dispense in the whole disjunctive vow. The difficulty is whether the part selected by the one vowing becomes reserved, and subject to episcopal jurisdiction. You vowed religious life, or alms; chastity, or fasting: you chose chastity. Leander (tract. 1, disp. 18, q. 108), Tamburini (Bk. III, on the Decalogue, ch. 16, §4 and 5), and others teach that the vow becomes dispensable by the Bishop. Sánchez denies this, on the contrary (Bk. VIII, on marriage, disp. 12, n. 14; Bk. IV, ch. 21, n. 43), Castropalao (disp. 2, punct. 12, n. 6). The theologians of Salamanca (n. 107) report both opinions as probable, neither affirming nor denying — which manner of treating rules of morals, adopted after the birth of Probabilism, and used everywhere, displeases us. Patritius Sporer (sect. 3, ch. 3, n. 60) says that it is reserved, if the one vowing determined himself to the reserved part by a new vow; not so, if he chose the same by a simple determination. This distinction is empty; for the reservation cannot be called into doubt, when, by a new absolute vow, the one vowing promises the reserved matter. It seems to us, then, more probable that the vow is reserved — since the one vowing, with deliberate mind, chooses the reserved part which he had vowed under a disjunctive vow; for then the vow becomes absolute, and whole.

XXII. Question XIV. Are the following vows reserved: "If I fall into sin, I vow chastity"; "If my father dies, I will enter religious life"? Response: Concerning the third vow, it is fairly agreed among authors that it is reserved — since the vow is, in its object, absolute, and only apparently expresses a condition; for the sense is: "When my father dies, I will enter religious life." Concerning the first two, which are called penal, there is difficulty. Some absolutely affirm that they are reserved, the condition having been fulfilled. Others maintain that vows joined with a condition are not reserved, whether before or after the condition is fulfilled. Others hold that they are dispensable by the Bishop, whether before or after the fulfilled condition. The more probable, and more common, opinion is that, the condition fulfilled, they are reserved; not so, before the condition is fulfilled. The reason which Leander (loc. cit.) adduces to the contrary is of no weight at all. For he says that such vows are penal, and do not arise from love of chastity, or of religious life. This supposition is false. For, unless an affection toward chastity and religious life had preceded, he would not have vowed this rather than something else — say, alms, fasting, prayers. But he vowed chastity, because, more than other things, it pleased him equally well. The same must be said of the other vow: "I vow religious life, if I recover from this illness"; the condition fulfilled, it is reserved; not so before.

XXIII. The contrary opinion is defended at length by the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit., n. 114). I will dispatch everything in a few words. They preface many things about conditional vows, all of which, however, are clear from what has been said above. For when the condition is either necessary, or concerns the present, or the past, or is general, and inseparably attached to the thing — as, "If I live," "if my father dies," "if I complete my course of studies" — the vow is absolute, since the whole condition consists in mere words. The aforesaid theologians of Salamanca further maintain that whatever vows are truly conditional, concerning a future contingent matter, whether before or after the condition is fulfilled, are not reserved — provided the one vowing has not, by new and deliberate consent, confirmed it once the condition is fulfilled: for then it would be a new absolute vow of chastity and religious life, which would undoubtedly be reserved. They prove their opinion: both because in conditional vows the consent is quite imperfect, as depending on a condition, which always remains imperfect, even the condition fulfilled, since it always remains the same; and because, whether the vow be penal or conditional, it does not arise from love of chastity, or of religious life.

XXIV. This second reason has already been exploded above against Leander, and is again refuted. The vow of chastity, and the vow of approved religious life, are absolutely reserved, when they are whole and perfect, for whatever reason they are made. It was indeed said above that, if someone made a vow of going to Rome, or Compostela, or Jerusalem, for some particular reason of the one vowing, and not for the cause of visiting the sacred places themselves, or the church of St. Peter, or of St. James — the vow would not be reserved; because in that case the vow would not have, as its object, the reserved matter, which is the true subject of the reservation — for those sacred places are the true matter of reserved vows. For this reason, if someone should vow to visit such sacred places, led by whatever affection, the vow would be reserved. But the vow of chastity, or of religious life, is absolutely reserved. Therefore, by whatever reason moved, the one vowing utters it, provided it is whole and perfect, it will be reserved. The condition fulfilled, moreover, the vow becomes absolute, and perfect. The first reason they oppose is of no weight at all. For the consent of a conditional vow includes, with respect to the promised matter, no other imperfection than the suspension of execution, until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, this imperfection removed, the vow is perfect in every respect. For the attached condition does not infect the consent; nor indeed does it directly regard it at all, but only its execution. Wherefore what the aforesaid theologians of Salamanca urge is altogether false — namely, that a conditional vow arises from an imperfect and diminished consent, an imperfection which is not removed even when the condition is fulfilled. False, I say, is this teaching. For, the cause removed, the effect is removed. The whole cause of the imperfection found in a conditional vow is the condition which suspends the execution of the vow. Therefore, the condition removed, or fulfilled, the vow becomes most perfect. Do not all conditional contracts, once the conditions are posited, become absolute, and produce the same effects which absolutely unconditional contracts produce? This opinion is defended by Sotus (Bk. VII, on justice, q. 3, art. 1, ad 4), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 19, q. 13), Pontius (Bk. VIII, on marriage, ch. 9, n. 130), Bonacina (disp. 4, punct. 5, §4, n. 53), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 4, ch. 8, n. 10), Pietro Passerini (q. 187, art. 1, dub. 18, n. 651 and following), Lessius (Bk. II, ch. 4, n. 7), and several other authors not a few.

XXV. Question XV. When the Supreme Pontiff commutes a reserved vow into another pious work — say, of chastity into a fast — does that fast become reserved? Response: The common opinion denies this, and rightly. Since the aforesaid five vows are not absolutely reserved, but only insofar as they present the generic character of that matter. Therefore, the matter having been commuted, the Bishop will be able to dispense in the fast... by reason of chastity; but the fast, on this account, will not be reserved, and privileged Regulars will be able to commute it.

XXVI. Question XVI. When the aforesaid five vows are not reserved, because they fall short in some respect, whether of consent, or of condition, or of the whole matter, are they subject to the power of regular Confessors? Response: When the said five vows are not reserved on some ground, privileged regular Confessors can relax them, by commuting, not by dispensing, for the reasons already given above.

XXVII. Question XVII. Can one who receives the faculty, by a bull, or jubilee, of dispensing, or of commuting, all vows, relax even reserved ones? Response: The common opinion denies this, unless the faculty over reserved matters is expressly stated — since this is openly gathered from the Extravagant "Etsi dominici," on penance and remission, where it is established that the said vows can be relaxed by no one, save the Roman Pontiff, except by special license, and by our certain knowledge. And in the same title, in the chapter "Si Episcopus," a general rule is assigned, both for vows and for reserved cases, in these words: "For in a general grant, those things are not included which one would probably not have granted" (on the rules of law in the Sixth Book, rule 81). If the faculty is granted indefinitely over reserved matters, all reserved matters are comprehended; if one or another is excepted, all the rest can be relaxed — since the exception confirms the rule as to the contrary. Wherefore, if some of the reserved matters are excepted, those not excepted can be relaxed. The faculty of relaxing the vow of chastity does not comprehend the vow of religious life, or the reverse. All this is common ground among nearly all authors.