Risking or shortening one's life for a good reason

It is not unlawful to do something which will cause one’s own death provided that the action has some other immediate and good effect of great importance, which counterbalances the loss of human life, and this is not intended. This is merely an application of the principle of a double effect which was explained in the Book on Human Acts. The captain of a man-of-war, for example, which in time of war is in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, might blow up the ship in order to prevent so great a disaster befalling his country, although the act would cause his own death and that of others in the ship. He does not intend the destruction of human life; the immediate effect of his action is to prevent the ship falling into the enemy’s hands. The public advantage counterbalances the loss.

Similarly, for good reason I may undertake dangerous work, go to unhealthy climates, or lead a kind of life which will lessen the number of years that I shall live. Somebody must do such things; they are useful to the community or to myself, and I do not intend the shortening of my life. It would be wrong to expose my life to probable danger merely for the sake of getting money or notoriety; such reasons do not justify us in seriously risking human life.

302. 1. Principle: It is not licit to kill oneself indirectly, or to do or omit something from which death is foreseen as going to follow, unless from a proportionately grave cause.

This is clear from what was said in the Treatise on Human Acts, where voluntary indirect action was treated. For indirect suicide is nothing other than an act good of itself, or at least indifferent, from which death follows per accidens and beyond the intention; now an act of this kind is indeed not licit when there is no sufficient reason, because to posit the cause of some grave evil, without a sufficient motive, is something gravely sinful; but if a proportionate cause is present, it becomes licit; for the evil effect is not intended, but only permitted, and otherwise is compensated for by the good effect directly intended.

303. 2. What cause is proportionately grave? The general principle is that a greater cause is required the nearer and more certain the danger of death is. Let us run through the principal causes:

(A) The public good is a sufficient cause for someone to expose himself to a danger even proximate and certain of death; thus it is licit for soldiers to set fire to a ship, or to explode a fortress, in order to submerge or destroy enemies, although their own death would certainly follow from this; but this of itself is not licit merely in order to avoid captivity, unless some hope shines forth of avoiding death. - The fulfillment of the duties of one's state can be referred to the public good; thus priests, physicians, and other men to whom by office the care of others belongs can, and sometimes ought, to expose themselves even to proximate danger of death, in order to procure the salvation, life, or security of others.

304. (B) A good of a superior order, even individual, such as the exercise of charity, faith, chastity, justice, and other Christian virtues, is a sufficient reason for going to meet even certain danger of death.

Thus, for the sake of charity, someone can expose himself to danger of death in order to save the life of parents, a spouse, a friend, a neighbor; e.g., in shipwreck it is licit to yield to another a plank already seized, although it is foreseen that death will follow from this. For the sake of faith, it is licit not only to bear death bravely, but also not to flee, even if an opportunity offers itself, - indeed to present oneself to judges, if this is judged necessary for strengthening others in the faith. For protecting chastity, a virgin upon whom violence is inflicted can flee, and in fleeing can cast herself headlong from a high cliff or from a window, even if death can follow from this, yet not altogether certainly, because not death itself, but the keeping of virginity, is intended.

From love of justice, evildoers can offer themselves to judges to be condemned and killed; indeed, when someone has been found guilty of death, more probably he can, at the judge's command, take poison with his own hands (as is narrated of Socrates), because then he does nothing other than execute a just sentence; yet not a few contradict this, because it is repugnant to equity that the guilty man be compelled to kill himself.

305. (C) In order to avoid a more certain danger of death, or a more cruel kind of death, it is licit to expose oneself to a morally certain danger to life; thus it is licit to leap from a window, with very probable loss of life, in order to flee flames; to cast oneself headlong from a tower, even with certain danger of death, in order to flee a more atrocious death which evildoers are actually about to inflict.

306. (D) When there is question of a danger to life not certain, but more or less probable, a lesser cause suffices. Thus it is licit to serve those laboring under a contagious disease, even if there is a great danger of contracting the plague; craftsmen can exercise a dangerous art, e.g., ascend the roofs of buildings, even with probable danger of death, when this is useful for the support of themselves and their family. - But if there is question of arts less necessary and more dangerous, e.g., of taming wild beasts, penitents indeed should be kept away from these, insofar as this can be done; but if they have exercised these arts for a long time, and, because of the special skill with which they are endowed, the danger is not so proximate, and on the other hand they can scarcely otherwise provide for themselves and their own, they are not to be compelled to abandon their art.

307. When something is done or omitted from which life is shortened by several years, a less grave reason suffices; for the danger of death is not so proximate.

(a) Hence it is licit for workers to blow glass, gild metals, and exercise other arts by which life is rendered shorter; for the good, both private and public, demands that sometimes human life be shortened, whether for one's own support, or for the progress of industrial or mechanical affairs. Nevertheless an effort must be made that, in the best way possible, works entrusted to craftsmen be rendered less dangerous.

(b) Regularly no one is bound to use extraordinary means in order to live longer; for the law of prolonging life for a long time does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. Thus those who inhabit a region not very healthy are not bound to seek a healthier one by going to a distant region; those who could live longer by abstaining from a certain drink or food are not bound under grave sin to abstain from these, provided they observe the laws of temperance; nor is it necessary to undergo a dangerous operation in order to prolong life, unless per accidens this is necessary for the good of the family or of the State.

177. Corollary. - From what has been said it is understood why and how far it is illicit voluntarily to expose oneself to danger of acting badly or sinning: for this is not sufficiently avoiding the evil effect, or even it is placing the cause of an evil effect. That danger can be from an internal cause (as is a depraved imagination or passion) or an external one (namely, an occasion, such as a thing enticing to evil); absolute, that is, commonly for all, or relative to such a determinate person; proximate or grave, which in many cases or at least frequently is connected with sin, or remote or light, which is rarely connected. Now:

1. It is illicit without a just and proportionate reason to expose oneself to a proximate or grave danger of acting badly. For one who without sufficient reason wills a thing, by that very fact imputably wills everything which is probably connected with it, and therefore one who intends to incur the danger of acting badly, by that very fact wills the evil probably connected with it. And one who is bound altogether to avoid sin is also bound to avoid the means which probably leads to it. Hence one who does not avoid such a danger, when he can, is convicted of not sufficiently avoiding but loving that evil whose danger he loves (Eccli. III, 27). Hence everyone is bound under grave obligation to avoid a proximate danger of committing a grave evil; a proximate danger of committing a light evil, under light obligation.

2. It is licit from a just reason proportionately grave, namely, of a compensating good effect, to expose oneself to the danger, even grave and proximate, of acting badly. The reason is that one who from a just reason exposes himself to danger does not love the evil, but the good cause on account of which he so acts, nor properly exposes himself to danger, but rather unwillingly undergoes the danger. Understand this with the restriction: provided there is a founded hope of overcoming the danger and suitable precautions are applied for this, by which the danger becomes remote; for certain sin is absolutely to be avoided.

3. To expose oneself without reason to a light and remote danger (of some moment), even of committing grave evil, is illicit but lightly; yet it is licit from any reasonable cause, even a light one: for some disorder against reason is had in this, that someone without cause places a useless action, with which in addition a danger of evil is joined.

352. Thesis II. Indirect killing of oneself is illicit, unless there accedes a just and proportionate cause, that is, a greater good which follows immediately from the action itself and not by means of the killing.

It is proved. For it is illicit by one's action or omission to cause an evil effect, unless four conditions are verified: a) that the action or omission in itself is not evil; b) that equally immediately from it there follows also a good effect, and that this is not obtained by means of the evil; c) that the good effect is proportionate to the evil; d) that only the good effect, not the evil, is intended. Therefore indirect killing of oneself will not be licit unless 1) the action or omission from which it follows is not evil in itself; 2) another effect, a good one, follows equally immediately, and this is not procured by means of the killing; 3) the good effect is greater than or equal to the danger of life and thus compensates it; whence it must be greater in proportion as that danger is greater, more certain, nearer; 4) death is not intended, but only the good effect.

The proportionate compensating good is threefold:

1. A public good, for the common good is preferable to a private good.

Thus even with proximate danger of death priests, physicians, and others upon whom it is incumbent can take care for the salvation, life, or security of others; soldiers can refuse to desert the assigned place, or burn a ship or blow up a citadel for submerging or destroying enemies, or lest the enemy obtain it with grave detriment of the republic; but not for avoiding captivity, since the public good does not require this.

2. The spiritual good of virtue, or of science and art, or the progress of culture.

Thus aviators or navigators with danger of life seeking new routes or exploring unknown regions. Likewise for the sake of faith, missionaries, even with danger of life, can preach the Gospel, if utility is hoped therefrom; and the faithful can not only bear death bravely, but even not flee, indeed present themselves before judges, if this is judged useful for confirming others in the faith, unless, however, greater evils are feared. Likewise from charity someone can expose himself to danger of death or offer himself to the blow of an assailant, or not take care for his own safety (for example, yield a plank in shipwreck), or not defend himself, in order to preserve, if it is hoped, the life of parents, spouse, friend, neighbor, a fortiori for their eternal salvation (indeed this can be a precept); but not cast himself into the sea or a river even for baptizing an infant, because evils are not to be done so that goods may come. Likewise from love of justice malefactors can offer themselves to be condemned and killed: for death is not from the omission of flight but from the sentence of the judge. And for protecting chastity a virgin, upon whom violence is actually being inflicted, can by fleeing throw herself down from a high rock or from a window with only danger of death, while there is some hope of escape; but not with certain death, because then it would be direct killing, which would be chosen as a means for avoiding another evil. But she can permit herself to be killed rather than violated, although she is not bound to this.

3. A bodily good resulting from the fact that a more certain danger of death or a more cruel kind is avoided.

Thus it is licit to cast oneself down from a tower for fleeing, not indeed captivity, but a certain capital sentence or a more atrocious death which malefactors are actually about to inflict; or to leap from a window for fleeing flames actually burning: provided, however, that there is hope of escape; otherwise it would be direct killing which would be chosen as a means for avoiding a greater evil, in the same way as the taking of poison. Namely, one thing is to expose oneself to certain danger of death, even proximate, another to incur certain death.

353. Corollaries. - From the doctrine set forth it is concluded:

1. for incurring a danger of death not certain, but probable or remote, a lesser cause suffices, yet always a grave one, especially if necessity is present; for example, it is licit to serve those laboring under a contagious disease, indeed from charity to visit them, even with great danger of contracting the plague, likewise to exercise a dangerous art (for example, to climb roofs) for the support of oneself and one's own or the utility of others;

2. for incurring a danger of indirectly shortening life even by several years, a less grave reason suffices: thus for the sake of exercising virtue it is licit to do moderate penances by fasts, vigils, mortifications; for the restraint of concupiscence presents compensation; likewise for one's own support or for the progress of an industrial or mechanical thing, it is licit for workers to blow glass, gild metals, handle fire daily, and exercise other arts shortening life, although as far as possible one must try that works committed to craftsmen be rendered less dangerous;

3. nevertheless, for incurring a danger of death a futile reason does not suffice, for example, to fight because of vain glory, bear extraordinary burdens, let oneself down, or prolong a very long fast for the sake of a wager alone;

4. a fortiori it is not licit to procure the utility of others or one's own gain from a sought-out danger of death, but only to expose oneself to danger, by doing an act useful otherwise and of itself.

Hence they sin gravely a) who for light causes throw themselves into danger of death, as any rash tightrope walkers, gladiators, body-tumblers, bullfighters, showmen who tame wild beasts or take poisons, unless by long experience or suitable preparation they are certain concerning their dexterity or the efficacy of the remedies;

b) who gravely harm health or notably hasten death for themselves by gluttony, drunkenness, immoderate passion of lust, by abuse of morphine, cocaine, opium, or by immoderate penances;

c) who refuse to take ordinary means for recovering health or preserving life safe; but not those who are unwilling to employ extraordinary, refined, unusual, more costly, very difficult means, as to leave one's country and seek a healthier region, to undergo a very laborious or dangerous operation, or a notable amputation: for the law of prolonging life does not obligate with so great an inconvenience. Today, however, several operations which formerly were considered difficult and dangerous are accomplished very easily and safely, and thus have already become ordinary means;

d) a fortiori those who abstain from taking necessary foods, even for an excellent end, for example, the liberation of the fatherland. For this is direct killing, for, as St. Thomas says, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2: "not to take food... would be to kill oneself." And the good is hoped for from an evil means; but evils are not to be done so that goods may come.

354. Observations. - 1) The principles are clear and there is no difficulty in them; but in fact, in the application of principles, namely, whether in a case such killing is direct or indirect, there can be room for doubt or even subtle consideration, because a priori it is not always easy to determine this. But the various modes indicated among authors (cf. Tanquerey, n. 304 sq.; Billuart, diss. X, a. 3) can be held as only indirect killing, or at least are not certainly proved to be direct killing; and consequently in practice they can be considered as licit, because probably and from the common apprehension of men they are only indirect killing. But if to someone they evidently seem to be direct killing, from this he could not extend the principles and say that direct killing is licit also in other similar cases; but he could only conclude that the application of principles is not being made rightly, and in the case the killing action is also direct and therefore illicit.

2. The desire of one's own death is not necessarily unjust toward God, because he who wishes death for himself can await it as to be inflicted on him by God. Indeed such a desire can be ordered and in conformity with reason, if it arises from a motive of obtaining a good which is better than life, or of escaping an evil which is worse than death. Hence the desire:

a) is licit if it arises from the motive of a better good, for example, of desiring conjunction with God, of loving God more perfectly, of sinning no more, etc., as in the Apostle, Phil. I, 23;

b) is illicit if it arises from a wicked motive, for example, because with rebellion against the divine will someone wishes death or from impatience does not wish to tolerate the ordinary troubles of the present life. This of itself is gravely evil if it is done from perfect deliberation; often, however, it is not sufficiently deliberate because of disturbance or anger, or is not seriously willed;

c) of itself it is not sinful if someone so abhors a grave earthly evil, for example, grave disease, hard imprisonment, a very hard state of life, troublesome vexations and snares, that he would prefer death, because, as Scripture says (Ecclus. XXX, 17), death is better than bitter life; nevertheless it is imperfect, because man, by patiently tolerating most grave evils, will obtain a precious reward which by premature death he loses.

The FIRST opinion is, that it is mortal to use penances imprudently applied, which one has recognized will gravely harm, even if life be shortened on account of satisfying God. So D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 147. art. 5., Tolet. lib. 5. summae, cap. 6. concl. 4., Navar. summa Lat. cap. 15. num. 12., Petrus Navarrus lib. 2. restit. cap. 3. num. 88., Couar. lib. 1. variar. cap. 10., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 5. ad 5., Lopez p. p. instruct. cap. 64., Sayrus lib. 7. cap. 9., Bassaeus V. Homic. 1. num. 8., Diana part. 5. tract. 4. Resol. 33., Pasqual. de ieiunio, disp. 27.

Fagundez SUBSCRIBES, num. 18., that it is deadly to feed on raw herbs, or on other gravely harmful foods, and he cites Victoria num. 43., Aragonius, and Lopez above; yet these excuse one who does not advert to it.

Indeed I am lifted up in wonder, and moved by unblemished examples, when I read through the life of the saints, who pleased God most of all, and among them the Seraphic Father Francis; of whom S. Bonaventura relates in the legend, especially cap. 5., that the most holy Patriarch so crucified, through the whole course of his penitential life, his flesh with its concupiscences, that he scarcely ever in sound health admitted cooked foods, and when he did admit them, he finished them with ashes, or spoilt them with water. And of water he never dared to drink as much as nature would suffice: the bare earth was his bed, wearing a hairshirt, his clothing torn, trembling in the utmost rigor of winter, and he continually devised other new kinds of penance. Now on a certain night, when he was passing the night at the hermitage of Sarthianus, he heard a voice calling him three times: FRANCIS, FRANCIS, FRANCIS. To which he: What? The voice answered: There is no sinner whom God does not spare; but whoever kills himself with harsh penance will not find mercy in eternity: Immediately the man of God perceived the voice of the enemy, and recognized the cunning of the veteran serpent, for he was so inflamed by the temptation of the flesh: But the Holy Father, suddenly stripping himself and scourging himself sharply, thus addresses his body: Come, brother ass. Thus it befits you to undergo the scourges. Soon indeed he rolled among the snows; then he composed seven great heaps of snow, and said: See, this household must be fed by you: this is the wife; these the sons; these the daughters to be clothed; but if this care oppresses you, return; and serve God.

For thus he called his body brother ass, as if to be subjected to laborious burdens, to be beaten with frequent scourges, and to be refreshed with vile fodder. This is D. Bonaventure.

The same Saintly Doctor in the Diaeta, tit. 2. cap. 6., commends gravely the fasting of Elias and of other saints, and says it was instituted by the true Hippocrates, God.

And in Lib. 4. of the Pharetra, cap. 45., he relates of D. Bernard, sermone 66. in Cantica: Abstinebo a vino, quia in vino luxuria est, aut si infirmus sum, medico utar, iuxta consilium Apostoli. Abstinebo a carnibus, ne dum mihi nimis carnem nutriunt, simul et carnis nutriant vitia, etc.

But in the sermon on S. John the Baptist, he observes the austerity of S. John, Matth. 3. erat in deserto ab aetate tenella, vestimentum e pilis camelorum, cibus locustae, ac mel Sylvestre, et Lucae primo insinuatur: Vinum, et siceram non bibet.

Praebuit hirtum tegumen camelus Artubus sacris, strophium bidentes Cui latex haustum sociata pastum Mella Locustis.

Likewise in cap. 7. it is said: Venit Ioannes, non manducans panem; neque bibens vinum, Et tamen aequaliter nunquam peccavit. Sane maior esse debet poenitentia peccatorum, and D. Gregorio homil. 20. in Euangelia, and he subjoins: si Ioannes, et Elias, et omnes SS. P. P. in desertis AEgypti, tantis se vigiliis, et ieiuniis macerarunt, tam aspera, et inculta vestimenta portaverunt, quidnos pleni peccatis omnibus facere debemus? These words of the Saintly Doctor: certainly those Anchorites and Monks fed on herbs and water, and were nourished by them.

The Saintly Doctor confesses in the Apologia pauperum that now indeed more is required on account of weaker natures, but one must beware of self-love, which is accustomed to indulge itself too much.

The FIRST opinion is negative. So Durandus 4. dist. 17. quaest. 6., Paludanus dist. 15. q. 3. art. 2. contr. 3., Petrus Navat. de restit. lib. 2. cap. 3. disp. 3. num. 41., and it seems to be D. Augustine's in the Lib. de mendacio, cap. 6. It is alleged by Fagundez Lib. 5. cap. 12. num. 6., and by D. Bonavent. 3. dist. 19. quaest. 3., because he said that those are fools who neglect their own temporal life on account of the corporal life of another. But the Saintly Doctor speaks in another way, and in another sense; for he says: Those are considered fools who neglect their own salvation, so that they may procure another's; but he speaks according to the phrase of Christ: Quid prodest homini, si universum mundum lucretur, animae vero suae detrimentum patiatur? The Seraphic Doctor elegantly discusses this on this passage of Lucae 9.

Moreover, in dub. 1. litt. he says this is licit for a just cause, and in dub. 5. he says it belongs to perfect Charity. Wherefore he holds the affirmative opinion with D. Thom. 3. dist. 29. quaest. 15. art. 5. ad 3., and Lib. 1. de regimine Principum, cap. 10., and 2. 2. quaest. 26. art. 4 ad 3., and art. 5. ad 3. So Victoria relect. de homicidio, ad 5. num. 27., Sotus Lib. 5. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 6., Bannes 2. 2. quaest. 26. art 4. dub. 3., Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 64. art. 5. ad 5., Aragon. ibi ad 4., Valentia Tom. 3. disp. 3. quaest. 4. puncto 3., Corduba lib. 1. quaest. 38. ad 4., Tolet. lib. 5. sum. cap. 6., Sà V. homic., Sayrus lib. 7. cap 9. num. 23., Fagundez Lib. 5. cap. 12. num. 7.

The REASON of D. Bonaventure, which the others use, is, that in this case he does not love his neighbor more than himself; but on account of the honor of the virtue of friendship, and for God, on account of some preeminent cause of honesty (S. Bonaventure adds), he prefers the life of his friend.

I have treated of this also in the Tract. de Charitate, disp. 8. quaest. 34., in which disputation I have also treated, in quaestione 30., when we are held to undergo death on account of the spiritual good of others.

IT IS CERTAIN that in many cases we are bound to undergo death for the salvation of souls, according to John 3: And we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure on John 15, from those words of Christ: This is my commandment, that you love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love than this no man hath, than that a man lay down his life for his friends. St. Augustine confirms this in tractate 84 on John. And he observes with St. Gregory, homily 27 on the Gospels, that under the name of friends, in the precept of charity, even enemies are included.

That this is a precept, Christ himself asserts, when he adds: You are my friends, if you do the things that I command you. Secondly, for the defense of the honor of FAITH, we are bound to face death.

IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure on Luke 9: For whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed, when he shall come in his majesty. He also cites 1 Kings 2: Whosoever shall glorify me, him will I glorify: but they that despise me, shall be ignoble, that is, on the day of judgment. For God spoke thus, threatening eternal destruction to Heli, who had not reproved the horrible sins of his sons. Ecclesiasticus 4 adds the same: For the sake of thy soul be not ashamed to speak the truth. Hence also in Romans 1 the Apostle says: I am not ashamed of the Gospel.

From these passages the Saintly Doctor shows that a learned man is bound to speak if ignominy threatens Christ, as for instance if heretics were from this to boast that their sects are the true ones, and that the Christian Catholic Religion is false. So too Sayrus, Book 7, cap. 9, num. 17; Toletus, Book 5 of the Summa, cap. 16; Soto, Book 5 on Justice, question 1, article 7; Fagundez, Book 5, cap. 12, num. 10.

THE PRECEPT of confessing the faith, certainly, at that time most of all compels, as is said in Romans 10: For, with the heart, we believe unto justice: but, with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation, as he implies in the Dieta, title two, chapter three, and as I said in disputation 1, question 16.