Species of the Sin of Hatred

Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.—(a) Hatred of God and hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is wished to a neighbor as evil—that is, one wishes another evil in general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, such as damnation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on another, adds malediction to hate.

Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful at all.

(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of resignation to the divine will.

(b) “Dislike of the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus, a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse himself of sinful dislike.

(c) “Wishing evil to the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify one’s desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would defeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his friend.

Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as follows: (a) when they add a new species—thus, the person hated (e.g., one’s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

I. Matter to be treated. - There are several sins which harm reputation, honor, friendship, such as false testimony brought forth against the neighbor, detraction and calumny, whispering, contumely, derision and cursing, namely injuries of words, which generally are prohibited by the eighth precept. For the most part they arise from hatred, concerning which therefore before all things a brief word must be said.¹

¹ There may be consulted: St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. II, n. 28-30; l. III, n. 962 sq.; Aertnijs, Th. M., I, l. II, n. 56 and 36 sq.; l. III, n. 530 sq.; Th. P., n. 88-90; Lehmkuhl, Th. M., I, n. 369-375; Genicot, Th. M., I, n. 229-230; Marc, Th. M., I, n. 498-503; Noldin, Th. M., II, n. 100 and 81-85; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 78-79 and 228-230; Berardi, Praxis-conf., n. 194-195; Mechlin Theology, De Poenitentia, (4) n. 75.

II. Notions. - Hatred is a movement of the appetite by which we are evilly affected toward someone. It is distinguished as twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or of quality, by which we turn away from the neighbor, not according to himself but according to some quality of his disagreeing with us, as evil and harmful to us (or to others);

2. hatred of malevolence and enmity or of the person, by which we turn away from someone according to himself, and from that displeasure will evil to him insofar as it is evil to him, namely so that it may be ill with him and by resting in his evil.

It is said: insofar as it is evil, both because it is not hatred, nor against charity, to will evil insofar as it is impeditive of a greater evil or insofar as it procures a greater good; and because hatred differs in this from envy, since it tends toward evil as evil, while envy tends toward the good of the neighbor as diminishing our own excellence. Therefore hatred is to will evil to someone as evil, and to rejoice concerning this evil, and likewise to grieve concerning the good of the neighbor precisely as it is good.

Hatred ordinarily arises from offense, and manifests itself externally by denial of signs of love.

III. Principles. - 1. Hatred of enmity, by which we will evil to the neighbor or refuse to love an enemy, is a grave sin from its genus, because it is directly opposed to charity; nevertheless it is light if a light evil is desired or only a light offense is betrayed. Hatred of abomination, however, of itself is indifferent, but in fact is good or evil according to object and circumstances.

Therefore it will be evil if the neighbor is hated according to something good; on the contrary it will be good if he is hated according to something evil, unless nevertheless the hatred exceeds the just proportion of that evil, or gradually is converted into hatred of the neighbor himself. Hence the common saying: You will hate the vice and love the person.

2. The precept of loving enemies imposes no special obligation diverse from that by which we are bound toward all men;² for special love is not of the necessity of charity except according to preparation of soul, insofar as we ought to be prepared to love them especially if it is necessary. Hence they sin from hatred:

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 8.

a) who wish evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil to him, or repay evil for evil, or take vengeance or foster a mind of vengeance;

b) who refuse pardon to an enemy, or do not accept a fitting satisfaction or demand more than is fair, or rejoice concerning an enemy's evil;

c) private persons who, turned away from another, flee him, if they do this so that they may deprive him of conversation and solace and thus sadden him, so that it may be ill with him.

On the contrary, they do not sin from hatred:

a) who wish temporal evils to the neighbor insofar as it is good for him, or insofar as it is good for the community or for another innocent person, the order of charity being preserved; nevertheless one must beware lest these desires arise from hatred;

b) who do not wish to remit the reparation which is owed to them for injury and damage;

c) who flee the neighbor, wishing no evil, but because he is troublesome, and not without reason, provided contempt and scandal are absent.³

³ Reuter, Neo-confessarius, n. 79, puts the conclusions: "Hence 1. you illicitly wish death to the neighbor, so that you may avoid particular temporal damage. 2. You illicitly wish death to yourself, so that you may be freed from a cough, a moderate headache. 3. A son illicitly rejoices concerning the death of his father or wishes it on account of the rich inheritance that will come to him, because the lesser good is preferred to the greater. 4. A father licitly wishes death to a son now existing in the state of grace, whom he certainly foresees will turn out wicked. 5. I licitly wish death rather to a persecutor of the Church than that he conquer and prevail, because spiritual good prevails over temporal, public over private. 6. I licitly wish death to another, from whom I certainly foresee that otherwise I will be unjustly killed (understand: by comparing my death with his). 7. I licitly wish death to myself, foreseeing that otherwise I will suffer a grave evil of soul. 8. Someone can licitly wish death for himself, lest he further offend God, lest he be delayed so long from beatitude, that he may avoid misery more bitter than death, for example perpetual prison, spoliation of all goods. Namely, it is lawful to wish these things, speaking of themselves, when the evil to be avoided is preponderating, at least if the order of charity is preserved even among persons, which requires that I love more those who are more joined to me. The reason for these is that thus evil is not wished as evil, but insofar as it impedes a greater evil."

3. Of themselves there are owed to enemies the common signs of love and common benefits, but not special ones, except per accidens. Hence we are bound of ourselves to return greeting to an enemy greeting us, to respond to one asking and writing, to sell exposed goods to one wishing to buy, not to exclude him from common prayers and alms, to render him common services, and, if it can easily be done, to avert damage from him; because to do otherwise of itself and ordinarily is a sign of hatred. Per accidens for a time we are not bound when charity or justice asks something else and a reasonable cause excuses.

Thus a) charity, if from denied signs the enemy is hoped to be amended, if it is believed that he will interpret them badly, if from speech it is feared that quarrels will be repeated.

b) Justice, if parents or superiors for just punishment and correction deny to a son, for example because of an unworthy marriage, or to subjects, because of an infamous crime, sight, speech, entrance into the house, even after a petition for pardon, provided that such a penalty does not exceed the gravity of the crime and lasts only for a time.

c) A reasonable cause, for example, if they are omitted for a short time, not from hatred but from great sadness. Hence Lehmkuhl says, Th. M., I, n. 624: To exhibit a positive sign of rancor, or to look with grim eyes, to pass by with contempt, is never lawful. To avoid an enemy deliberately for a longer time can often denote a mind of hatred and vengeance, if it proceeds from a will to avoid occasions in which common signs of benevolence are to be exhibited. But if there is a just cause on the part of the enemy, for example a contentious man, it is not sin but prudent caution.

VIII. Observation: concerning womenfolk who mutually offend one another in families and thus live in continual discord. Concerning these Berardi again notes, l. c., n. 196, III:

"Those mutual offenses, although in themselves they would be light, can have great weight because of the consequences; for they can 1. beget and foster grave internal malevolences, and perhaps also produce habitual hatred and thus altogether break the bond of charity; 2. gravely disturb the peace of the family, furnish occasion of blasphemies to husbands, and perhaps also give grave scandal to children; 3. that woman especially, who is the more powerful cause of discord, can contract grave guilt because of the very disturbance which she furnishes to the other woman: for continual disturbance is wont to be something very troublesome. In practice nevertheless for the most part women do not contract grave guilt from this last head, because they do not advert to it. But if on one side grave hatred is not present or is altogether put away, and on the other side the peace of others is not gravely disturbed, then mortal sin will by no means be present."

To no one is it doubtful that hatred is a sin against Charity, as the S. Doct. shows at length on 15. Ioannis. Therefore he rebukes there the haters of God: They have hated me, and my Father. And the haters of the neighbor: But because you are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you. Levit. 19. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. Prima Ioan. 3. He who hateth his brother, is a murderer. Therefore the haters of the neighbor are rebuked, Amos 5. Proverb. 9. as S. Bonaventure reports there on 15. Ioan. Whence D. August. tract. 5. in primam Ioan.: He has not moved his hand to kill a man, and already he is held a murderer by the Lord. That one shall live; and this one is already judged an assassin. I said, however, that hatred whose material object is God, or man, is a sin; for if hatred be borne toward the sinner, as such, it is not evil, as D. Bonaventure notes on 15. Ioan., which that Psalm 138 proves: With perfect hatred I hated them, where D. Gregory in the Pastorali, p. 3. cap. 1. admon. 23.: Perfect hatred, whereby vice is hated and nature loved.

Or, if even our dear ones stand in the way of the divine service, they are to be hated, Lucae 14. If anyone come to me, and hate not Father, and Mother, as S. Bonaventure observes on that passage. But hatred against God, who is Light, Truth, and the Highest Good, is most grave and monstrous, as the S. Doct. expounds at length on 15. Ioan., ruminating those words: If I had not done among them the works which no other hath done, they would not have sin. But now both they have seen, and have hated me, and my father.

I assert first, that hatred of God is the gravest sin.

It is proved by D. Bonav. loc. cit. first with the reasoning of D. August. tract. 92. in Ioan. and Chrysost. homil. 72. in Ioan., taken from that cited Ioan. 15.: They have hated me without cause. For where is the highest good, outside of which there is no good, and in which nothing evil is to be found, it would necessarily, as to specification, be to be loved; and it is most monstrous to hate it. It is confirmed from Aristotle 8. Eth. cap. 10.: That is worst which is contrary to the best. But hatred of God is contrary to Charity, which is the highest virtue, since it is borne toward the Highest Good insofar as it is the Highest Good: Therefore.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonav. in the Incendio amoris, and Stimulo amoris, because, as it is the greatest duty to love the Highest Goodness, from which there come to us Being, Life, and all good things; so it is the greatest abomination and iniquity, to be carried in hatred against that goodness, and to will its destruction.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonav. in the places cited, and elsewhere everywhere, with the reasoning which D. Thom. also uses, art. 2.: because as Charity is best, because the whole adheres wholly to God, as God is; so hatred of him is worst, because it turns the whole away from God, and in every way. With these and similar arguments all the works of the Seraphic Doctor are filled.

S. Bonaventure notes, however, that wayfaring men ordinarily do not hate God explicitly, but only implicitly, insofar as they are turned away from him, that they may be converted to a changeable good; and therefore all sins virtually contain hatred of God, as Valentia also notes, disp. 3. quaest. 11. puncto 2.

I assert secondly, that to hate the neighbor is a most grave sin.

It is proved by the S. Doct. ad cap. 15. Ioan. and collat. 70. homi. de enim., where those are called haters of the neighbor, as I said. There he brings forward many Fathers asserting hatred to be detestable: Gregory homil. 27. in Evang. and D. August. saying: To hold hatred against a brother is to stop up the fountain of Charity.

Hence the S. Doct. lib. 1. de profectu religiosi, cap. 29., among the remedies of hatred, puts first to consider seriously that God does not spare him who does not spare, as is said Matth. 18. Whence he who wishes to be saved must lay aside hatred, and it is better to do this with certainty; now it is always of its genus a mortal sin; but per accidens it can be venial, first from imperfection of deliberation. Secondly, when he wishes the neighbor the greatest evil. So Suarez de Charitate, tract. 3. disp. 6. sect. 1. Azorius Tom. 3. lib. 2. cap. 20. Sylvester v. odium. Fagundez in 10. praecept. Decalogi, lib. 10. cap. 2. num. 22.

Nay, of its genus it is the greatest sin, among those things which are done against the neighbor. So D. Thom. quaest. 34. art. 4. and Suarez. For although the harms inflicted on the neighbor aggravate other sins above hatred; yet this is worse by the disordination of the will, because it turns one altogether from the Neighbor, the object of Charity, by the natural and Divine law of loving.

It is not placed, however, among the capital vices, because other sins do not proceed first from it, but it is rather the dregs of other sins — Envy, Anger, etc. — from which dregs others then crawl. So D. Thom. art. 5. Fagundez num. 24.

From what has been said you have that hatreds against God and against the neighbor are diverse in species, because the objects are diverse; nor have they of themselves that one should be for the sake of the other, as we said in Charity with D. Bonavent. 3. dist. 27. quaest. 2.

Nay, each hatred seems to be doubled, insofar as they turn away from the natural and supernatural Divine good; likewise also that of the neighbor, as Bannes said, art. 6.; but Valentia puncto 2. assents to the opposite.