Question V: Concerning Hatred of Neighbor, Which Is the Cause of Harming Reputation, Honor, and Friendship

I. Matter to be treated. - There are several sins which harm reputation, honor, friendship, such as false testimony brought forth against the neighbor, detraction and calumny, whispering, contumely, derision and cursing, namely injuries of words, which generally are prohibited by the eighth precept. For the most part they arise from hatred, concerning which therefore before all things a brief word must be said.¹

¹ There may be consulted: St. Alphonsus, Th. M., l. II, n. 28-30; l. III, n. 962 sq.; Aertnijs, Th. M., I, l. II, n. 56 and 36 sq.; l. III, n. 530 sq.; Th. P., n. 88-90; Lehmkuhl, Th. M., I, n. 369-375; Genicot, Th. M., I, n. 229-230; Marc, Th. M., I, n. 498-503; Noldin, Th. M., II, n. 100 and 81-85; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 78-79 and 228-230; Berardi, Praxis-conf., n. 194-195; Mechlin Theology, De Poenitentia, (4) n. 75.

II. Notions. - Hatred is a movement of the appetite by which we are evilly affected toward someone. It is distinguished as twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or of quality, by which we turn away from the neighbor, not according to himself but according to some quality of his disagreeing with us, as evil and harmful to us (or to others);

2. hatred of malevolence and enmity or of the person, by which we turn away from someone according to himself, and from that displeasure will evil to him insofar as it is evil to him, namely so that it may be ill with him and by resting in his evil.

It is said: insofar as it is evil, both because it is not hatred, nor against charity, to will evil insofar as it is impeditive of a greater evil or insofar as it procures a greater good; and because hatred differs in this from envy, since it tends toward evil as evil, while envy tends toward the good of the neighbor as diminishing our own excellence. Therefore hatred is to will evil to someone as evil, and to rejoice concerning this evil, and likewise to grieve concerning the good of the neighbor precisely as it is good.

Hatred ordinarily arises from offense, and manifests itself externally by denial of signs of love.

III. Principles. - 1. Hatred of enmity, by which we will evil to the neighbor or refuse to love an enemy, is a grave sin from its genus, because it is directly opposed to charity; nevertheless it is light if a light evil is desired or only a light offense is betrayed. Hatred of abomination, however, of itself is indifferent, but in fact is good or evil according to object and circumstances.

Therefore it will be evil if the neighbor is hated according to something good; on the contrary it will be good if he is hated according to something evil, unless nevertheless the hatred exceeds the just proportion of that evil, or gradually is converted into hatred of the neighbor himself. Hence the common saying: You will hate the vice and love the person.

2. The precept of loving enemies imposes no special obligation diverse from that by which we are bound toward all men;² for special love is not of the necessity of charity except according to preparation of soul, insofar as we ought to be prepared to love them especially if it is necessary. Hence they sin from hatred:

² Cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 25, a. 8.

a) who wish evil to the neighbor insofar as it is evil to him, or repay evil for evil, or take vengeance or foster a mind of vengeance;

b) who refuse pardon to an enemy, or do not accept a fitting satisfaction or demand more than is fair, or rejoice concerning an enemy's evil;

c) private persons who, turned away from another, flee him, if they do this so that they may deprive him of conversation and solace and thus sadden him, so that it may be ill with him.

On the contrary, they do not sin from hatred:

a) who wish temporal evils to the neighbor insofar as it is good for him, or insofar as it is good for the community or for another innocent person, the order of charity being preserved; nevertheless one must beware lest these desires arise from hatred;

b) who do not wish to remit the reparation which is owed to them for injury and damage;

c) who flee the neighbor, wishing no evil, but because he is troublesome, and not without reason, provided contempt and scandal are absent.³

³ Reuter, Neo-confessarius, n. 79, puts the conclusions: "Hence 1. you illicitly wish death to the neighbor, so that you may avoid particular temporal damage. 2. You illicitly wish death to yourself, so that you may be freed from a cough, a moderate headache. 3. A son illicitly rejoices concerning the death of his father or wishes it on account of the rich inheritance that will come to him, because the lesser good is preferred to the greater. 4. A father licitly wishes death to a son now existing in the state of grace, whom he certainly foresees will turn out wicked. 5. I licitly wish death rather to a persecutor of the Church than that he conquer and prevail, because spiritual good prevails over temporal, public over private. 6. I licitly wish death to another, from whom I certainly foresee that otherwise I will be unjustly killed (understand: by comparing my death with his). 7. I licitly wish death to myself, foreseeing that otherwise I will suffer a grave evil of soul. 8. Someone can licitly wish death for himself, lest he further offend God, lest he be delayed so long from beatitude, that he may avoid misery more bitter than death, for example perpetual prison, spoliation of all goods. Namely, it is lawful to wish these things, speaking of themselves, when the evil to be avoided is preponderating, at least if the order of charity is preserved even among persons, which requires that I love more those who are more joined to me. The reason for these is that thus evil is not wished as evil, but insofar as it impedes a greater evil."

3. Of themselves there are owed to enemies the common signs of love and common benefits, but not special ones, except per accidens. Hence we are bound of ourselves to return greeting to an enemy greeting us, to respond to one asking and writing, to sell exposed goods to one wishing to buy, not to exclude him from common prayers and alms, to render him common services, and, if it can easily be done, to avert damage from him; because to do otherwise of itself and ordinarily is a sign of hatred. Per accidens for a time we are not bound when charity or justice asks something else and a reasonable cause excuses.

Thus a) charity, if from denied signs the enemy is hoped to be amended, if it is believed that he will interpret them badly, if from speech it is feared that quarrels will be repeated.

b) Justice, if parents or superiors for just punishment and correction deny to a son, for example because of an unworthy marriage, or to subjects, because of an infamous crime, sight, speech, entrance into the house, even after a petition for pardon, provided that such a penalty does not exceed the gravity of the crime and lasts only for a time.

c) A reasonable cause, for example, if they are omitted for a short time, not from hatred but from great sadness. Hence Lehmkuhl says, Th. M., I, n. 624: To exhibit a positive sign of rancor, or to look with grim eyes, to pass by with contempt, is never lawful. To avoid an enemy deliberately for a longer time can often denote a mind of hatred and vengeance, if it proceeds from a will to avoid occasions in which common signs of benevolence are to be exhibited. But if there is a just cause on the part of the enemy, for example a contentious man, it is not sin but prudent caution.

IV. Rules to be observed in reconciliation. - They are the following:

1. If injuries intervened on one side only, the one offending is bound to seek reconciliation by himself or through another, and to repair damages if there are any; likewise if between two offenders one has offended more gravely or first. Exception is made if a legitimate reason excuses, for example if the offense was not grave, or the offended person is absent, or does not care for the petition of pardon, or does not accept it, or for another reason he is judged to have been satisfied.

2. If injuries from both sides were morally equal and simultaneous, each is bound, when occasion is given, to begin reconciliation by greeting, conversation, benefit, etc., according to the case, for example that one first who passes before the other or comes upon him.

3. An opportune time is to be sought; for although the offended person is bound from the beginning to condone the offense, nevertheless he is not bound, at least under grave obligation, to suffer it with such calm spirit that he is immediately prepared for reconciliation. That seems as it were violent and above human frailty.

V. Practical observations for confessors. - 1. Unworthy of absolution is he who positively does not wish to put away deliberate and gravely sinful hatred, i.e., who deliberately wishes grave evil to another under the aspect of evil and by resting in the evil itself; likewise he who negatively does not wish to love as the law of God commands, for example to wish the good of one's own beatitude, to forgive a personal injury, to furnish the common and necessary signs of love, in those circumstances in which denial is held as a sign of grave hatred or causes grave scandal: for he injures charity in a grave matter.

But a) penitents who accuse themselves of hatred are not at once to be charged with sin, especially grave sin: for often they confuse hatred properly so called, of malevolence, with horror and recollection of a true or apparent offense committed by the neighbor, or with the wishing of evil from an honorable end, or also with natural and invincible antipathy toward the person of the neighbor, so that they cannot see him without vehement disturbance. These do not sin gravely, provided that they do not desire notable evil nor refuse the ordinary signs of love; but then there is danger that a passage may easily be made to true hatred, concerning which danger the confessor should warn them.

b) Therefore when someone accuses himself of hatred against the neighbor, let the confessor diligently inquire whether the discourse is about true hatred. For there are those who accuse themselves of hatred, and nevertheless do not labor under hatred; there are also those who foster hatred and nevertheless say that they desire every good to those by whom they have been offended. Therefore those accusing themselves of this are to be examined. If the one examined has none of those things by which hatred is expressed, although he complains that he experiences aversion against someone and that his blood is moved when he meets the other, or that he cannot forget, look at, or speak to him, he is not detected as laboring under voluntary hatred: for there can be a movement of the sensitive appetite which precedes reason, although the free will does not consent. Nevertheless the penitent is to be warned that he pray for the other, seek speech with him, speak well of him among others, excuse his defects, etc.; for thus the aversion or displeasure, which, if secretly preserved, is fostered and remains, will soon be dissipated.

c) Those who on the contrary say that they condone, but refuse to speak to the enemy and to furnish other common and owed signs and offices of charity, cast suspicion of hatred upon themselves: with them let the confessor proceed cautiously lest he absolve unduly. Likewise, those who before promised to seek reconciliation and to exhibit common signs of charity to the adversary and did not do this, ordinarily ought not to be absolved, but absolution generally is to be deferred for them.

2. Men implicated in hatred and enmity are wont to be hard in spirit. In treating a penitent of this kind, much patience and prudence are needed.

Therefore first of all let the confessor beware of every austerity of words; rather let him strive kindly to sympathize with the penitent on account of the injury received, let him permit him to complain, exaggerate, etc., lest the penitent be exasperated; let him beware lest he seem to act as advocate of the adversary, but rather let him show that he seeks the good of the offended person.

3. The obligations of one guilty of hatred are to be declared to him, once the cause is well known from responses to these or similar questions: from what time he has fostered hatred, whether he has wished evils, whether he has wished to inflict them, what ones, whether he has not rejoiced concerning the evils of the other, whether he has not grieved concerning goods, whether he has denied the common signs of charity: whether he has spoken to the adversary, whether he has responded to one greeting him, etc.

Let the confessor warn the penitent that satisfaction can be exacted, that it is not lawful to will evil to the neighbor so that it may be evil to him, that the common signs of love are to be exhibited, and that every sign of enmity is to be taken away.

4. The penitent is to be induced to perform this by various reasons, such as: the necessity for salvation, the Lord's Prayer, the example of God forgiving sin and especially of Christ forgiving on the cross, the good which follows from forgiveness, namely peace of conscience and consequent joy, glory before God and men in such an exercise of virtue, utility, because it opens the door of divine mercy, the consideration of human frailty and of the disposition of divine providence which permits such things to happen for our good, forgiveness to be made to Christ asking this, who took all sins upon Himself and said: What you have done to one, you have done to me (Mt. XXV, 40).

Briefly: a) the necessity of forgiving and of satisfying charity, according to what we ask in the Lord's Prayer: forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Mt. XVIII, 35); b) how glorious it is to forgive, for it is the greatest victory and a sacrifice most pleasing to God (Mk. XII, 33); c) the utility of forgiveness and the consequent delightfulness (Mt. V, 7; 44, 45); d) the example of God forgiving our sins and desiring that we forgive our enemies, likewise of Christ praying for His adversaries on the cross.

But if the penitent does not yield to these, let it be said that he cannot be absolved nor hope for pardon from God unless he forgives.

5. Let the confessor indicate the means for putting away hatred, namely prayer for the enemy and for grace for himself, and services of charity.

VI. Concerning vengeance Berardi asks, Praxis confessariorum, n. 195: "When, whether in desire or in joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, or in avenging injuries received, will sin be present?

Resp. In practice the more common cases are the following.

1. If this is done from a cause not honorable or not at all reasonable, for example from envy, as Cain acted against innocent Abel..., or from impatience, weariness, and anger, as those act who wish death to their own querulous, tedious, sick relatives, etc.

2. If vengeance is... excessive: namely if between the injury received and the quantity of punishment inflicted or desired there is no proportion, for example by extending signs of indignation too long; by exceeding too much in rebukes, in blows, or in other deeds having the character of vengeance; by from the heart imprecating most grave evils, for example death, hell, etc., against him who has inflicted on you a damage not so grave.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 158, a. 2; q. 159, a. 1.

3. If vengeance is indeed just, but induces scandal of the little ones: for in this case care will have to be taken that, at least by explaining the matter, scandal be removed.

4. If one wishes vengeance to be done by private authority, even in those cases in which this is altogether not lawful, namely a) if it can be obtained by means of tribunals; b) if it is too great; c) if it is useless, namely if it is no longer apt to protect our rights, but rather to provoke new injuries and to effect that discords and suits never have an end, as too frequently happens in practice.

5. If vengeance is done or sought either from profound hatred, or from an end not so much of obtaining reparation and protection of one's own rights, as of delighting oneself concerning the punishment of the neighbor. Moreover this is wicked. St. Thomas said⁵ that vengeance indeed is lawful, but not with the intention of harming; truly, with the intention of removing harms. It is also to be noted that delight concerning the punishment of the neighbor can degenerate into cruelty and savagery."⁶

⁵ II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

⁶ Ibid., q. 159, a. 2.

VII. Practical notes concerning sins against honor and reputation. - Concerning sins of the tongue, or injuries of words, and other things which can harm honor and reputation, just as they can dissolve friendship and peace, and which frequently arise from hatred, it is useful to observe a few things.

A. Imprecations against one's own offenders:

1. are not grave if they are uttered by mouth alone without full advertence, or, as among the rude, are understood as uttered without mind; unless nevertheless they cause grave scandal, as could happen in parents imprecating before children, who would be moved from this to sin gravely;

2. on the contrary, they are mortal sin if they are pronounced from the heart, from hatred or excessive vengeance.

B. Contumelies, namely those which unjustly harm honor:

1. among the rude are not always held grave;

2. if they are truly grave, especially if they concern secrets, they constitute mortal sin. Thus if they are false; if they are done against one who brought forth no injury; if by one offended, but in such a way that the limits of indignation are exceeded.

C. Rash judgment also is mortal sin:

1. if it is greatly important to the person that it not be formed;

2. if it proceeds from hatred;

3. if it is done with great malevolence;

4. if it is in great contempt of a superior or otherwise has grave consequences.

But it is required that it be formed with great temerity and be perfectly rash, i.e., that there be great disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that firm assent is furnished by light motives.

D. Detraction, or the unjust blackening of another's reputation by hidden words, can be done in many ways, whether directly: by falsely imputing evil, or exaggerating it, or revealing what is occult, or attributing good to an evil intention; or also indirectly: by denying good, or maliciously keeping silent about it, or diminishing it, or praising coldly. Nor are the direct modes always more efficacious, but the indirect modes of speaking or keeping silent sometimes are more malicious.

But detraction is mortal sin from its genus, and not only against charity but also against justice; its gravity is to be weighed from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation.

But to manifest to another who is ignorant of it a public crime is not against justice:

a) in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a judicial sentence promulgated for this region;

b) also in the place where it is notorious by notoriety of fact alone, unless the delinquent has recovered reputation;

c) also in another place in which it is foreseen that it is soon to be legitimately manifested.

Otherwise a public crime, just like an occult one, cannot be manifested except for a grave and indeed proportionate reason.

E. Of itself there is an obligation of restoring reputation unjustly taken away, especially if the injury redounds upon others, just as also of repairing other damages which are strictly and of themselves connected with defamation.

Nevertheless, per accidens there is no obligation of restoring reputation:

1. if reputation remained uninjured, as if faith was not given to the detractor, or his detraction was not understood or not spread;

2. if the other has recovered reputation, or infamy has now been deleted by oblivion;

3. if the other inflicted a greater injury which he does not care to repair;

4. if by prudent estimation the other is judged to have condoned;

5. if reputation either cannot be compensated at all, or only with a much greater inconvenience; in which case nevertheless a certain compensation is to be made in some better manner, whether by honoring the other, or by saying good of him.

Restitution of reputation sometimes is done more opportunely through a third person of great authority.

Those cooperating in detraction, who in some way induce the detractor to defaming, are subsidiarily bound, just as he himself is, to restitution; but not those who only internally approve the defamation, or merely take delight in it, or only do not impede it.

F. Nevertheless there is an obligation of charity to impede detraction as far as one can; nevertheless in practice this will rarely be grave. It will be grave if three conditions are verified: a) another is certainly detracting unjustly; b) there is a founded hope of impeding the detraction; c) this can be done without relatively grave inconvenience; which conditions are rarely present.

Often it will be more opportune to employ indirect means of impeding rather than direct ones, unless the matter concerns superiors who can intervene authoritatively.

G. A sin most damaging to the neighbor is false testimony brought forth in judgment, which is wont to contain a threefold deformity: against legal justice, namely as harmful to public justice and to the good of the community; against commutative justice, because it is apt to cause unjust damage to the neighbor; and against religion, if it is done under oath, because then it is perjury strictly so called.

A false witness is bound to revoke the testimony and to reparation of damage following from it.

VIII. Observation: concerning womenfolk who mutually offend one another in families and thus live in continual discord. Concerning these Berardi again notes, l. c., n. 196, III:

"Those mutual offenses, although in themselves they would be light, can have great weight because of the consequences; for they can 1. beget and foster grave internal malevolences, and perhaps also produce habitual hatred and thus altogether break the bond of charity; 2. gravely disturb the peace of the family, furnish occasion of blasphemies to husbands, and perhaps also give grave scandal to children; 3. that woman especially, who is the more powerful cause of discord, can contract grave guilt because of the very disturbance which she furnishes to the other woman: for continual disturbance is wont to be something very troublesome. In practice nevertheless for the most part women do not contract grave guilt from this last head, because they do not advert to it. But if on one side grave hatred is not present or is altogether put away, and on the other side the peace of others is not gravely disturbed, then mortal sin will by no means be present."