Stuprum (Seduction)

By the name stuprum here is understood intercourse with an unmarried woman, whether a widow or not a widow, whether honorable or corrupt.

I. If the young woman freely consented, the man committing stuprum per se is held to nothing. He is not held with respect to the young woman, because no injury is done to one who knows and wills, if there is question of a right which someone can validly renounce. But the young woman could validly renounce the right that no one use her body. Nor is he held to anything with respect to the parents, even if, so that the daughter may marry equally well, they must increase the dowry. The reason is that the young woman herself, since with respect to marriage she is in her own right, can close off for herself access to more honorable marriages without being unjust with respect to her parents; but of the damage which the parents perhaps will suffer from the fact that they increase her dowry, she is the occasion rather than the cause. Therefore, if the young woman, consenting to the man committing stuprum, does not act unjustly with respect to her parents, neither does the man committing stuprum, who enticed her to consent (St. Alphonsus, III, 641, doubt 2).

I have said per se; for if the man committing stuprum has divulged the hidden stuprum, he is held to repair the damages that will follow from his unjust detraction, whether toward the young woman or toward the parents, for example by increasing the dowry so that the daughter can marry equally well, or by procuring honorable marriage.

II. If the young woman was unjustly violated, by fraud, fear, or force, he is held to compensate all damages that will follow from the injustice, except the damage of perhaps injured virginity, which cannot be repaired. Hence he is held either to marry the young woman or, if she rejects marriage, which is free to her, to take care in some way that she can marry equally well as if she had not been violated (St. Alphonsus, III, 641, doubt 2).

Corollary I. Entreaties and gifts do not bring with them the obligation just mentioned. But the obligation follows: 1° "if threats or reverential fear are joined with the entreaties; 2° if the entreaties were so importunate and frequent that the young woman judged that harassment a greater detriment than the loss of virginity: for then solicitation so importunate is compared to force ... this nevertheless happens very rarely, since a woman can easily, by conceived anger or otherwise, free herself from the one soliciting her. ... 3° if a man begins by touches and kisses to bring force upon the young woman, even if afterward she freely consents to be deflowered; because through that antecedent violence the man placed her in proximate danger of consenting to intercourse; ... 4° if the man is unwilling to leave, and the virgin consents because otherwise she fears being defamed if she is found alone with him by others. Yet in these and similar cases, the Salmanticenses say that the violator is held only to a part, not to the whole reparation of damages" (St. Alphonsus, III, 641, question 2).

Corollary II. If the man committing stuprum is going to compensate the damages inflicted with money, let him enter into a contract with those who have suffered the damage, and let him pay the established sum at one time, lest dangerous intercourse be continued.¹

Corollary III. The man committing stuprum is held to nothing, or to restoring only a part, if damages have followed in no way or only partially, as if the young woman can now marry equally well, or if offspring has not followed (St. Alphonsus, III, 641, question 1).

III. If the young woman was led to intercourse by a promise of marriage, the following must be said:

1. If the promise was made seriously, the man committing stuprum, according to what was said in n. 833, sufficiently probably is not held from justice to contract marriage, because a contract of this sort, namely about base matter, is sufficiently probably invalid and remains invalid even if the other party has furnished her part (St. Alphonsus, III, 712). I have said from justice, because per se he is held from piety toward the offspring, if perhaps one has been conceived, as will be explained in the scholion. Moreover, if it is evident that the promise was made under a suppositive condition, the man committing stuprum, according to what was said in n. 849, once the condition has been fulfilled, or intercourse granted, seems to be held from justice to marriage.

2. If the promise was made fictitiously, the man committing stuprum is held to prevent or compensate all damages arising from the intercourse; indeed he is held to fulfill the fictitious promise, or to marry the young woman. For the deceiver is held to furnish that for which the deceived party so furnished her part that the matter can no longer be reduced to its former state; otherwise the injury inflicted is not repaired. But in our case the deceived party furnished her part for obtaining marriage, and the matter can no longer be reduced to its former state. Therefore it remains that the deceiver offer marriage to the deceived party (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 46, a. 2, ad 4; St. Alphonsus, III, 642). Besides, note:

a) True deception, and consequently the obligation of entering marriage, is lacking if the young woman could easily have understood from the circumstances that the promise was not serious; for example, "if the betrothed man is of much better condition, or if there was some evident sign of fraud; because it can probably be presumed that the betrothed woman was not deceived, but feigned that she was being deceived" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). But if in the case the young woman was ignorant of the man's condition, not even then does the one promising seem to be held to marriage, because the young woman did not think of a promise of such value, and sought only consent of lesser value. "And therefore he who promised is not held to marry her; but it suffices if he repairs the damage by endowing her or by providing for marriage" (St. Alphonsus, III, 642, doubt 2). Finally, the man committing stuprum is not held by the fictitious promise if the young woman also deceived him, for example by pretending that she was a virgin when she was not such; in that case injury is compensated by injury.

b) If the young woman refuses the offered marriage, the man committing stuprum is held to nothing. If only the parents contradict it and are unwilling to hand over the young woman, it is disputed whether the man committing stuprum is freed. Some affirm it, because then he is not held by reason of the fictitious promise, since by it he is held only to marriage; because then the damage does not arise from his fraud, but from the opposition of the parents. Others with St. Alphonsus deny it, because the fictitious promise of marriage was made for this sole end, that the damage be compensated; hence, if marriage cannot be entered, the damage must be compensated in another way (St. Alphonsus, III, 647).

Corollary. The man committing stuprum, in the case in which per se he is held to marriage, is excused from marrying the young woman: 1° "if the worst outcome is feared from the marriage, as if the young woman is known to be too inconstant ... if great scandals or quarrels are feared among the blood-relatives of those contracting ...; 2° if from such a marriage disgrace would come upon the man's family, by reason of disparity of condition" (St. Alphonsus, III, 644); 3° "if the man knew the woman, thinking she was a virgin, but found her corrupt" (St. Alphonsus, III, 646). But much more probably he is not excused on account of a vow of chastity or another similar thing, nor generally on account of another dispensable canonical impediment. In the case he is held to take care that the impediment be removed, since a means of this sort is ordinary and therefore does not bring with it a cause of excusing (St. Alphonsus, III, 649, 650).

What if the young woman was induced by a promise of marriage only to touches?

Response. If the promise was serious, the seducer is not held to marriage, unless again it is evident that the promise was made under a suppositive condition; he is held if it was made fictitiously. Or, theoretically, the same things hold as in the case in which the young woman was led to intercourse by a promise of marriage. But in practice, as regards a fictitious promise, note that commonly true deception, and consequently the obligation of marriage, is lacking, namely because the young woman can scarcely admit that the promise of so great a good, made for touches alone, is serious (St. Alphonsus, III, 645).

¹ Aertnys-Damen, I, n.^†.

I. Notion. Stuprum can be taken in a broad and in a strict sense. Taken in the broad sense, it is defined: intercourse with a woman - whether a virgin or deflowered - who consents in no way or not freely, for example with one resisting, sleeping, insane, or consenting from fraud or fear. Taken in the strict or canonical sense, it is: intercourse with a virgin who consents in no way or not freely (St. Alphonsus III, 443); moreover, by the name of virgin here is understood one who retains the seal of virginity, even if perhaps she has sinned.

II. Morality. Stuprum is opposed not only to chastity but also to justice, because it involves the use of the body against the free will of the one to whom that use belongs. Indeed, if the woman who is forced to intercourse is a virgin, another injustice is added, and this more probably grave; it consists in the fact that the virginal seal is taken from the virgin, which, as a grave sign of immunity from intercourse, for example in order to the state to be undertaken, seems in itself to be of grave importance.

The former injustice ceases if the woman freely grants the use of her body; for although in that case, since she is not married, she acts illicitly, nevertheless she does not act invalidly, because God has granted to each person a right of using his or her own body.

It is disputed whether the other injustice also ceases if a virgin consents to her own defloration. Now St. Alphonsus (III, 443), with others, rightly affirms against many that it does. For, as we have said, God has granted to each person a right in the use of the body, so that a virgin, by granting the use, acts illicitly indeed, but not invalidly. But to the use of a virginal body belongs the injury of the virginal seal. Therefore she can validly grant it. Hence intercourse with a consenting virgin lacks every injustice and is equivalent to mere fornication; nevertheless "there can be a special sin from another source, namely by reason of infamy, or the grief of parents, or quarrels, hatred, and so forth" (St. Alphonsus III, loc. cit.).

Note 1. Stuprum, if it is reserved, likewise stuprum liable to ecclesiastical penalty, is understood as stuprum taken in the strict sense, unless something else is expressly signified.

Note 2. A girl oppressed by force is bound positively to resist the oppressor, and only on account of danger of death or of another harm equivalent to it is it permitted for her to remain passive, provided, however, that the danger of consent is removed. Since that danger of consent can easily be present in the case, it should be advised that the virgin rather allow herself to be killed than violated (St. Alphonsus III, 368). Likewise, "a woman oppressed by force... can, indeed must, turn herself and interrupt intercourse, even if the man's semen were to be poured out, because this would happen by accident and by reason of the man's malice alone" (St. Alphonsus VI, 954, doubt 1).

Note 3. It is disputed whether it is licit for a woman oppressed by force to expel the male semen received. With St. Alphonsus (loc. cit.) and others we think it must be denied. For since semen as such exists only on account of the good of the species, and the good of the species is subordinated to no created good but to God alone, every disposition concerning semen as such which directly impedes the good of the species is intrinsically evil. But the oppressed woman of whom we are speaking expels the semen as such, and by that expulsion directly impedes the good of the species. Therefore the expulsion is intrinsically evil. It is added that, if this argumentation is rejected, it is not seen by what reasoning that way of acting, of which there is discussion in nn. 108-109, namely the constriction of the mouth of the uterus, can be proved intrinsically evil.

Seduction.—Having discussed scandal, which leads others into sin by bad example, we shall now consider, first, solicitation or seduction, which leads others into sin by moral inducement, and, secondly, cooperation, which assists another to sin (see 1460).

Seduction is some external act (words, writing, signs or gesture) by which one directly and explicitly seeks to win the consent of another to sin. There are various modes of solicitation.

(a) There is command to sin, which is an authoritative direction to commit sin imposed by a superior on his subject. Command is given expressly, as when a father tells his son to steal; or implicitly, as when he tells his son that it will please him if the son steals.

(b) There is counsel to sin, which is direct persuasion to do evil made through argument that sin is lawful, or through instruction on the ways of committing sin, or through advice, request, promises, threats, etc., as when one writes in praise of suicide to a person who is very discouraged, and recommends it.

(c) There is enticement which is an indirect persuasion to sin made through flattery, insinuation, calumny, narratives, etc. Thus, Absalom worked on the people of Israel and beguiled them into rebellion against his father (II Kings, xv. 1-6). Those who ridicule temperance and so lead others to drink excessively, entice to drunkenness. A host who offers little except fine meats on a Friday entices to the violation of abstinence.

The Malice of Solicitation.—(a) The gravity of this sin according to its nature is mortal, but it may be venial on account of imperfect deliberation or smallness of matter (see 1473). Thus, it is a mortal sin to command one’s son to commit grand larceny or perjury, a venial sin to command him to commit petty theft or tell a harmless lie. (b) The circumstances of the sin that aggravate or extenuate are the greater or less degree of deliberation and malice, the greater or less evil of the sin to which one induces one’s neighbors, etc. (see 1473, 1474). (c) The species of the sin of solicitation is twofold; there is the sin of scandal, opposed to charity, inasmuch as a neighbor is led to sin, and there is also the sin which one persuades a neighbor to commit (see 1468 sqq.).

Applications to Confession and Satisfaction.—(a) Since the seducer willed the species of sin to which he induced his neighbor, it does not suffice that he tell in confession that he induced another to sin; he must also tell the species of sin (e.g., theft), to which he induced or attempted to induce another. (b) Since the seducer is guilty of injustice against the person seduced, if he employed fraud, traps, violence, etc., it does not suffice in such cases merely to confess that he seduced; he must also tell that he used unjust means to seduce. (c) Since the seducer is guilty of spiritual damage, he is bound to make reparation for scandal given (see 1488 sqq.). (d) Since the seducer is responsible for temporal damages that are due to his influence (e.g., when he commands A to steal from or calumniate B), he is held to restitution for any such damages (see Vol. II on Justice).

In confessing a sin whose nature implies an accomplice (e.g., obscene conversation), is it necessary to mention the circumstance that one seduced the other party? (a) If the seduction includes a special malice against charity or against justice, it should be mentioned. Thus, if the party seduced had been innocent and was scandalized, or was trapped into sin, the fact of seduction should be mentioned. (b) If the seduction includes no special malice against charity or justice, it seems there is no obligation to mention it. Thus, if the party solicited had been living a life of sin and consented to the solicitation without any detriment to ideals or any unwillingness, no scandal is given and no injustice committed by the solicitation, as far as that party is concerned, and there seems to be no reason why the circumstance of seduction must be confessed.

Seduction is incitement to sin, and so differs from mere permission of sin in another. It is never lawful to incite to sin, but it is lawful for a sufficient reason to permit sin in others, as was said above in reference to Pharisaic scandal (see 1477, 1482, 1483). But, in applying this principle to concrete cases, it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between incitement and mere permission. We shall discuss now the following cases in which this difficulty occurs: (a) when one requests another to do something which one knows will be a sin for him; (b) when one advises another to commit a less rather than a greater evil; (e) when the opportunity for another to commit sin is not removed, or is prepared.

Is it lawful to ask another to do something, when one knows that he will not consent without sinning?

(a) If the thing requested is sinful in itself, the request is also sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask a thief to sell the goods he has stolen, nor is it lawful to request absolution from a priest who lacks jurisdiction.

(b) If the thing requested is lawful in itself, but there is no sufficient reason for the request in view of the fact that the other will sin by granting it, the request is sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask baptism from a person who is in the state of sin, when one can easily obtain it from another person who is in the state of grace.

(c) If the thing requested is lawful, and there is a sufficient reason for the request, one does not sin by making the request. Hence, it is lawful for the sake of the common welfare to require that witnesses take an oath, even though one knows that one of them will commit perjury.

Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in preference to a greater evil?

(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is not lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to steal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a species of seduction.

(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and the lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one prevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it is virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had already decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing $100, Balbus is not guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only $10. We are supposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is out of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.

(c) If the person in question has decided on the greater sin and the lesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to recommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For, if one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt of the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the lesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius, it is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill Claudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from murder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus planned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to point out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to advise accordingly.

Not all theologians accept the last solution just given. (a) Some reject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue that what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce it or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm that will be done, and they confirm their argument from scripture (Gen., xix. 8). According to this opinion, then, which has some good authorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order to dissuade another from the greater evil of murder. (b) Others modify the solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is lawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not attempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.

Is it lawful so to prearrange circumstances that an occasion of sin will seem to offer itself to another?

(a) If the end and the means used are good, this is lawful; for there is no scandal or seduction, but sin or the danger of sin is permitted for a proportionately grave reason. Examples: Sempronius knows that someone is robbing his desk, and it is important that he discover the thief. He leaves the desk open and watches from concealment to see whether a suspected person who is coming to the room will steal. Claudius is quite certain that Titus is stealing his chickens, but he needs evidence in order to have Titus convicted and deterred from future stealing. So, he leaves doors open and hides himself with witnesses that Titus may be caught in the act.

(b) If the end or means is bad, it is not lawful to prepare an opportunity for sin, because in either case one intends something sinful. Examples: Sempronius knows that his wife Titia has been unfaithful and he threatens to leave her. She, wishing to have a countercharge to make or to secure evidence to discredit his word, hires various dissolute females to lay traps for him and his friends. Claudius out of revenge wishes that Caius be sent to jail, and he therefore employs agents to provoke Caius into something criminal in word or deed that will justify incarceration. Balbus knows that Mercurius is a dangerous character, and he frames a scheme by which Mercurius will be invited to participate in an act of banditry and be captured. Titia and Claudius sin, because their purpose is wrong; Balbus sins because he uses wrong means. All three are guilty of seduction, at least in intention.

Seduction was described above (see 1496) as an inducement to sin through such manifest means as command, counsel, or enticement. But there is also a more subtle form of seduction, which does not appeal directly to the intellect or will, but makes a physical approach by acting upon the body, senses, or imagination. This is a more cunning, but none the less guilty form of seduction, examples of which are the following:

(a) Seduction through bodily states is exemplified in those who minister secretly to others drinks or drugs or foods that will produce emotional disturbances or mental confusion and make them more susceptible to temptation.

(b) Seduction through the senses is exemplified in those who surround others with pictures, companions, music, examples, etc., that continually speak of the desirability of vice or the undesirability of virtue.

(c) Seduction through the imagination is seen in hypnotism or suggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of something dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity which demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where there should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than commit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to drunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.

57. Stuprum is sometimes taken for every illicit intercourse; but more commonly by this word a special sin of lust is designated. The theologians, however, do not agree among themselves concerning the nature of this sin. Father Gury, 425, says stuprum is violation or oppression of a woman, against her will. But commonly theologians place stuprum in the defloration of a virgin. Some hold that the proper character of stuprum simply consists in the illicit defloration of a virgin; others hold that it consists in violent intercourse with a virgin, so that intercourse with a consenting virgin is not a sin distinct from simple fornication. - But by the name of virgin in either opinion is understood not she who has preserved the virtue of virginity so that she has been stained by no sin of lust, but she who retains the seal of virginity intact, although she has been polluted even voluntarily and therefore has irrevocably lost the virtue of virginity. Cf. here n. 1, 3, 4; L. 443; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 6.

58. Proposition. It is certain among all that violent defloration of a virgin, besides grave sin against chastity, also involves a grave sin against justice, necessarily to be explained in confession. And this circumstance of violence, as is clear of itself, must be expressed even if the woman were not a virgin, but corrupted or married. - Moreover, "by violence here is understood not only physical violence, but also moral violence, such as fraud and fear; likewise importunate prayers and flatteries which, according to the judgment of prudent men, especially in this matter, are morally reckoned as violence; such are those which are accompanied by great promises, kisses, touches which are incentives of venery, and in one word all those by which an ingenuous woman cannot easily resist." Billuart, de Temper., Diss. 6, art. 3, I say first; Struggl, 28, 29. But although force or violence is not had, certainly notable fraud is had, and therefore a special malice against justice to be declared in confession, if someone were to fornicate with a woman who was insane, drunk, or sleeping, because she is violated without her consent, and therefore a grave injury is inflicted on her. - Sporer, 606; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 6; L. 430, 433.

But whether the illicit defloration of a virgin voluntarily consenting is a species of lust distinct from simple fornication is disputed, and each opinion is at least extrinsically probable. It seems that the negative opinion must altogether be adhered to: the reason is that that circumstance of physical virginity or integrity bears itself merely materially with respect to the virtue of chastity, and therefore the sin against chastity is not changed in species. Hence, what is consequent, this circumstance of virginity in whatever sins committed by a female or male virgin will not have to be necessarily explained in confession; unless perhaps on occasion of reservation, or censure, or another extrinsic circumstance, for example if it culpably became known and dishonor and harm occurred which must be repaired. The dishonor of the virgin herself and of her parents is repaired by satisfaction for the injury inflicted; the harm, however, by restitution, namely by sufficiently providing a dowry, or by marrying. Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 3, I say second seqq.; L., l. 3, n. 640 seqq.; l. 6, n. 874; Suarez, de Poenit., d. 22, s. 4, n. 4-6; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, s. 4, Sect. 7; de Iust. et Iur., d. 12; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 1, 4.

59. Does stuprum, if the deflowered virgin consents, contain at least a special malice of injustice with respect to the parents in whose custody she was?

R. Negatively. "The reason is that if the girl herself, since she is mistress of her own body, inflicts no injury on her father if she consents to defloration, using her own right, much less does the deflowerer inflict it. Only she will sin, and consequently also the violator, against the piety owed to her father, and also against obedience, if she has had from her father an express prohibition about such a crime, as Lugo says, n. 226." L., l. 3, n. 641.

60. What are the penalties against those who commit stuprum?

R. There are various penalties of fines, prison, detention, forced labors, French Penal Code, l. 3, 331-333; Italian Penal Code, art. 331-336.

425. • Stuprum is the violation or oppression of a woman against her will. Thus commonly ¹. - According to others, under the name of stuprum comes only the deflowering of a virgin who does not consent. Any illicit intercourse is also called stuprum in a broad sense.

¹ In this place the Author takes stuprum not in the theological sense, but rather from the norm of civil law, indeed also in a certain broader signification. For civil law, by the name of stuprum, insofar as it is a crime distinct from others and to be punished by a special penalty, understands the violent oppression of a virgin or widow living honorably; but the Author comprehends the oppression of any woman whatsoever, even one not honorable, or even one joined in marriage, as is clear from the second resolution; namely he extends stuprum to all cases in which force is brought upon a woman, and therefore the crime of injustice accedes to the sin of immodesty.

But Theologians and Canonists do not so take it; although they note that stuprum in a certain broad sense is taken for any illicit intercourse, nevertheless in the proper and strict sense they take it for the illicit violation of a virgin according to c. Lex illa, 2, § fin., caus. 36, q. 1, where it is said: "Stuprum properly is the illicit deflowering of virgins"; and they find that the species of stuprum to be expressed in confession is only in the unjust deflowering of a virgin. Yet they distinguish this very thing as twofold, namely violent and voluntary. Violent, indeed, when she is subjected and oppressed by force and physical violence. But voluntary, not indeed when the virgin consents freely and of her own accord (in which case according to the more common opinion of the Doctors, as regards the species to be expressed in confession, it is judged mere fornication), but when a virgin, induced by deceit or another unjust reason, consents to deflowering, as happens 1. through reverential fear, 2. through fear falling upon a constant girl, 3. through a fraudulent promise of marriage or of a great dowry for another marriage, 4. through repeated importunate prayers, at least if threats are joined to these. See Struggl, Th. moral., tr. 7, q. 4, n. 28.

Now when there is question either of reservation of cases or of penalties to be inflicted on a violator by the sacred canons, stuprum is always taken in that strict sense which we have said was received by Theologians, nor does St. Alphonsus, alleged here by the Author, have anything else.

Stuprum, besides grave sin against chastity, also involves grave fault against justice, necessarily to be opened in confession. - St. Lig., n. 443.

426. Resolves. - 1. It is stuprum to fornicate with a woman who is insane, drunk, or sleeping, because she is violated without her consent, and therefore grave injury is brought upon her.

2. It is stuprum to bring force even upon a woman already corrupted or upon a widow; because it consists in the violence and injury which is brought upon a woman by oppressing her against her will. Consequently if someone oppresses a married woman, he commits adultery and stuprum at the same time.

3. It is not stuprum to fornicate with a virgin plainly consenting, even if she is corrupted for the first time; because she is mistress of her own body and freely yields her right.

4. The circumstance of the virginity of a girl who has been violated, if she herself consented to the matter, is not necessarily per se to be declared in confession, because stuprum more probably consists only in violence brought upon a woman, not in the violation of virginal integrity.

39. 2. Concerning rape. Rape is distinguished as threefold: in the strict, or canonical, sense, it is the defloration³ of a virgin, she being unwilling; in the less strict sense, it is the defloration of a virgin, even if she is consenting; in the broad sense, it is intercourse with any woman whatever, she being unwilling.

³ A virgin is deflowered when through first carnal intercourse she loses the flower of virginity.

(A) Rape is called violent not only when a woman is oppressed by force, but also when intercourse is extorted by threats or by fear unjustly inflicted, or by deceit or fraud, e.g., by abusing the ignorance of a girl, by falsely promising marriage, by carnally knowing a woman in sleep or drunkenness. Now every violent rape, even with a woman who is not a virgin, includes a twofold malice, one against chastity and the other against justice, since the right of the woman over her own body is violated.

(B) But rape which is punished by canonical penalties is the defloration of a virgin, she being unwilling, unless another thing is expressly noted. - When a virgin is deflowered with her consent, there is indeed a notably aggravating circumstance, but the species of the sin is not changed.

(C) Related to rape is abduction, or the violent carrying off of a person, for the sake of fulfilling lust. Therefore it differs from the impediment of abduction, which is incurred when the carrying off is done for the sake of entering marriage. It likewise includes a twofold malice, namely against justice and chastity.

N. B. A woman to whom violence is brought is always held not only to resist internal delectation, but also exteriorly to manifest dissent, by crying out and, according to her strength, by repelling the aggressor; nevertheless she is not held to resist in that external manner which exposes her to danger of death or infamy, provided the proximate danger of internal consent is absent.

318. - When the assent of the other party is lacking, a grave malice against justice is committed by fornication, which will be either stuprum or abduction. We have already spoken of adultery.

First let us speak of stuprum.

1. In moral theology, stuprum is the lustful oppression of an unwilling person: whether copulation or obscenity has been extorted by open force, or by fraud, for example by a deceitful promise of matrimony, by deception concerning the nature or malice of the act, as if the seducer were to abuse the girl's ignorance or trust; or by threats or entreaties so importunate that they are equated with violence ¹.

¹ Palmieri, Opus theologicum, vol. 6, no. 1010.

Furthermore, if the fornication redounds to the disgrace of the woman's family and to the grave sorrow of her parents, it will contain a grave fault against charity. And a woman then consenting will gravely offend against the very piety owed to her parents.

Moreover, one who oppresses a virgin is twice injurious, since, besides the abuse of her body, he also takes from her the seal of virginity. Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 7, disputation 14, no. 7; Noldin, De sexto, no. 24.

2. Stuprum is not so rarely a reserved sin and is punished by canonical penalties. Cf. canons 2357, § 1, and 2359, § 2, which will be recited below, after the other external sins against the sixth precept.

Stuprum is then, according to the opinion of the older authors, understood only of the defloration of an unwilling virgin. But she is considered a virgin who, although she perhaps has sinned, has nevertheless preserved the seal of virginity ². Cf. Noldin, De sexto, no. 24.

² Gratian, however, at canon Lex 2, Cause XXXVI, question 1, defined stuprum as "the illicit defloration of a virgin," and says that it is illicit when it takes place at least against the will of the father. And so the condition of an unwilling virgin entered the canonical essence of stuprum only afterward.

3. Fornication committed with a virgin who knows and consents contains no new malice, at least no grave one, from the removal of virginity: no injury is done to one who consents. Yet to cooperate in defloration through sin seems lightly to be opposed to charity.

319. - 1. While in stuprum the injury is committed by the very lustful act, the exterior act of the abductor alone is opposed to justice. For, in moral theology, abduction is: the injurious deprivation of liberty inflicted upon some person for the fulfillment of lust.

And so that person can be male or female, married or unmarried. Force can be inflicted both upon the person himself or herself who is deprived of liberty and upon those under whose authority that person is. And one who is deprived of liberty by guile and fraud is also considered morally to be abducted.

2. If a girl of full age willingly departs with a lover, without the knowledge of her parents, there is not properly abduction but elopement, which of itself adds no new species to fornication. Concerning a girl who is a minor, attention must now be given to canon 2353, to be alleged below.

3. Canonically, abduction which constitutes an impediment of matrimony must be distinguished: it concerns only a woman and supposes the intention of matrimony - this is treated in the treatise on matrimony - from abduction which is a crime to be punished in the external forum.

The crime of abduction requires the violent or fraudulent carrying away of an honorable woman from one place to another, whether for the purpose of entering matrimony or of fulfilling lust. According to canon 2353, it is committed even if a consenting girl who is a minor is carried away without the knowledge of, or against the will of, her parents or guardians. And fraud is equated with force, as had already been answered by the Sacred Congregation on January 24, 1608, and August 27, 1864.

Therefore, for the crime of the external forum, a carrying away is required; the deprivation of liberty alone is not sufficient. But it is already consummated if lust is fulfilled on the journey itself. When a prostitute has been carried away, the crime is not regularly committed. Indeed, according to several ³, who argue from canon Cum causa 6, De raptoribus, etc. (5, 17), 2, one who has carried away his betrothed woman, indeed a woman with whom he had entered into negotiations concerning matrimony, is immune from the crime. For thus reads the chapter mentioned: "We respond that abduction is said to be admitted where nothing has previously been done concerning nuptials: this man ought not to be called an abductor, since he had the woman's assent and had betrothed her before he knew her, although the parents protested." The earlier words sufficiently openly favor this opinion, but the later words, where the woman is said to have consented, weaken the force of the argument. Therefore, the matter is uncertain.

³ For example Palmieri, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 1013, after St. Thomas, II-II, question 154, article 7, reply to objection 4, and Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, no. 70, against Wernz, De matrimonio, no. 280, note 32.

Canon 2353 describes and sanctions abduction in these words: "One who, with a view to matrimony or for the purpose of fulfilling lust, has carried away by force or fraud an unwilling woman, or indeed a consenting woman who is a minor but without the knowledge of, or against the will of, her parents or guardians, is by the law itself to be held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and, in addition, is to be punished with other penalties according to the gravity of the fault ⁴."

⁴ That a carrying away is still required even now can be gathered from the opposition of canon 1074, § 3, which expressly denies that a carrying away is required where there is question of the impediment of matrimony. But legitimate acts are: the office of godfather in baptism or confirmation; administration, by virtue of an office, of ecclesiastical goods; the act of a judge, auditor, relator, defender of the bond, promoter of justice and of the faith, notary and chancellor, usher and apparitor, advocate and procurator in ecclesiastical causes; a vote in elections; the exercise of the right of patronage.

But according to canon 2354, § 1: "A layman legitimately condemned for the crime of... abduction... is by the law itself to be held excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any office, if he has any in the Church, without prejudice to the burden of repairing the damages." According to § 2, a cleric is to be punished, according to the gravity of the fault, with various penalties, even deposition.

320. - Those who, because of an office undertaken or an agreement entered, must take care of the spiritual or moral good of certain persons by an obligation of justice from which the consent

of those persons cannot release them, if they sin carnally with these persons, at the same time gravely violate commutative justice.

Such an obligation is held by a bishop in relation to his diocesans, a pastor in relation to his parishioners, the instructor or superior of a college in relation to the pupils entrusted to him by their parents, and a guardian in relation to his ward.

But the assistants of pastors, or coadjutor vicars, and of the director of a college, or masters and prefects of discipline, do not participate in this obligation; but they will usually already be gravely scandalous for this reason, because they have defamed the priestly order or the religious state, and have weakened religion itself in the soul of the accomplice.

Concerning a confessor who sins with a penitent, there has been doubt. It is indeed certain that one who has abused the occasion of confession, or even knowledge obtained from confession, in order to sin will be guilty of grave sacrilege; indeed, so will one who has sinned in those circumstances in which irreverence or detriment would redound from the sin upon the sacrament ⁵. But inquiry is made concerning a confessor who sins apart from every relation to confession.

⁵ Cf. Cardinal de Lugo, De sacramento paenitentiae, disputation 16, no. 355.

And there were those who affirmed this, relying either upon decrees which specially prohibited sins of the flesh to confessors, or upon some bond of spiritual relationship which would be contracted from this sacrament. Thus Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 7, disputation 55, nos. 3 and 4.

But with Cardinal de Lugo ⁶ and most of the more recent authors, this must be denied. St. Alphonsus ⁷ considers this opinion more probable. For today there certainly are no positive decrees; the bond of spiritual relationship is affirmed gratuitously, since from confession, as such, no stable relation arises between confessor and penitent ⁸.

⁶ De sacramento paenitentiae, disputation 16, no. 357; cf. no. 359.

⁷ Book 3, no. 451.

⁸ Cf. de Lugo, in the cited place, no. 357.

There are, even now, those who affirm of a habitual spiritual father, even one chosen by the penitent, what they deny of a confessor. Lugo thinks that this can rather easily be conceded ⁹. But we consider that it should instead be denied. Certainly, even an elected spiritual father is bound in justice to give no fraudulent counsel and not to abuse his authority. But if, as an equal to an equal, he has proposed the sin and it is accepted, the office ceases or is interrupted by mutual consent, and here too that saying holds true: no injury is done to one who consents. Yet we do not on this account disapprove the peculiar horror which a sin of this kind produces; but that horror demonstrates the enormous scandal and easy abuse of authority which usually accompany that sin.

⁹ In the same place, no. 358.

But a more severe judgment must be made concerning one who is appointed by legitimate authority to exercise the properly so-called office of spiritual father, such as the spiritual director of a monastery is accustomed to hold. No forgiveness by a spiritual daughter can then exempt the man from his special obligation.

321. - Because of what we wrote in no. 48, at the end of p. 43 and on p. 44, concerning an anointing by which infection with venereal disease can be avoided, you will ask:

1. Whether one who applies an antiseptic ointment before fornication so that he may be immune from infection formally sins or not;

2. Whether the use of this ointment can be advised or not;

3. Whether it is lawful for pharmacists to have this ointment for sale or not?

To 1. Although, as it seems (cf. Times, January 1917), certain Anglicans in England scrupulously distinguished between a use which precedes the sin and one which follows it, and prohibited the former but approved the latter, it must not be doubted that even an anointing performed by one about to sin is to be called formally blameless. We do not touch upon the case of a woman who by an anointing of this kind renders copulation infertile.

The intention of fornication is certainly evil, just as it is always evil to sin and to will to sin; but it is not evil, while sinning, at the same time to seek means which are indifferent in themselves for avoiding the harmful consequences of the sin.

To 2. One would certainly sin if, by revealing the medicine or advising its use, he were to induce someone to sin; but nothing prevents him from indicating to one who has resolved to sin a means by which he may sin with less bodily harm.

To 3. The sale would certainly have to be refused if men would abstain from fornication for this reason. But there are so many who expose them- selves to the danger of infection that such a fruit cannot be hoped for from refusing the sale. Again, this must not be concealed: ready availability of the preventive medicine will remove from many the fear of fornication. But since venereal disease threatens not only the sinner but also many innocent persons, so that it can be called a common evil, there is a most just cause for permitting this temptation of many. Moreover, the uprightness of one who is restrained from sin by fear of disease alone is slight. Add that this remedy can also benefit spouses, so that its use may accompany an altogether honorable action.

I. Stuprum (viol, verkrachting, maagde- of vrouweschennis), as a distinct species of lust, is violent concubitus. And indeed:

1. by more recent authors it is taken in the stricter sense, and is the violent or unjust defloration of a virgin, she being unwilling;

2. among the ancient scholastics, as Saint Thomas, it is taken in a less strict sense, as the illicit defloration of a virgin existing under paternal power, even when she herself consents;¹

¹ II-II, q. 154, art. 6. The etymology of the name, which indicates violent concubitus, is nevertheless preserved; for there is a physical breaking of the seal of virginity. Violence is done to the body, not to the consenting person.

3. but in a broad sense, it is so called as the oppressive or injurious seduction of an honorable and unmarried woman, even one not a virgin or not a minor.

But in the aforesaid cases a virgin is understood not in the moral sense, but in the physical sense, as one who, although perhaps she has sinned, preserves the seal of virginity.

II. Stuprum exercised with violence, even with one not a virgin, is evidently a distinct species of lust, because it imports grave injustice, since the right of the woman over her own body is violated; but if the woman is a virgin, a twofold injury is committed, since the seal of virginity is violently taken away. Stuprum is called violent not only when the woman is oppressed by physical force, but also when other unjust means are employed, as if copulation is extorted by threats or by fear unjustly inflicted, or by touches brought about by force, or by prayers so importunate that they are equivalent to violence, or by deceit or fraud, for example by abusing the ignorance of a girl who did not know copulation to be illicit, by fictitiously promising marriage, by oppressing a woman in sleep or in drunkenness, and so forth; but not if it is obtained by mere prayers, persuasions, blandishments, gifts.

III. Stuprum in the less strict sense, according to Saint Thomas,² is also a distinct species of lust, both because it is against paternal power, which exercises solicitude concerning the guarding of the virgin, and thus tends to the dishonor and grief of the father; and because the girl can be impeded from legitimate marriage and is placed on the road to fornicating further and acting as a prostitute, from which she was drawn back by the seal of virginity. Hence, even if the father were to consent and renounce his right, to which, moreover, he cannot fully renounce, this other malice would still remain.

² Ibid., a. 6.

Yet because the virgin herself consented, stuprum is not proved to import a new grave malice; and therefore it seems to be only a venial species, which per se does not have to be declared necessarily in confession.

699. 2. Stuprum is taken in a threefold sense: 1. for the illicit defloration of a virgin (with her consenting);¹³⁵⁴ this is the common acceptation among the older authors; 2. for the defloration of a virgin against her will; thus several older and modern authors, for example, Dominic Soto, Sanchez, Lessius, Noldin, etc.; 3. for intercourse with any woman whatsoever against her will; in this sense civil laws are wont to take stuprum.¹³⁵⁵

Stuprum taken in the first sense, when, namely, a virgin voluntarily consents to her own violation, is indeed an aggravating circumstance of fornication, to which, however, it does not add a mortal malice necessarily to be declared in confession. Thus holds the common opinion of modern authors.¹³⁵⁶ The reason is that the physical integrity of virginity is indeed a great good, but nevertheless no special injury is committed against a virgin freely consenting. Stuprum taken in the second and third senses includes, besides the sin of fornication, a grave sin of injustice, because it implies unjust violence. By violence, however, is understood not only physical but also moral violence, such as fraud or fear; likewise altogether importunate entreaties and blandishments which are equivalent to moral violence, such as, for example, those which are accompanied by great gifts or lustful kisses or touches. In one word: This moral violence is everything which a respectable woman can scarcely resist.¹³⁵⁷ He also commits stuprum who violates a woman altogether drunk, sleeping, or hypnotized. - Special ecclesiastical penalties are inflicted upon laity and clerics perpetrating stuprum taken in the second and third senses.¹³⁵⁸

In order that a woman oppressed by force may be immune from every sin, she is bound not only inwardly to resist venereal pleasure, but also outwardly to repel the violator with all her strength; but she is not bound to cry out if grave inconvenience thereby threatens her.

¹³⁵⁴ Entjungferung [defloration].

¹³⁵⁵ Notsucht, viol [rape].

¹³⁵⁶ Cf. Billuart, De temperantia diss. 6, a. 3, dico 3; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 443. St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 154, a. 6) teaches: "It is manifest that stuprum, which implies the illicit defloration of virgins existing under the care of their parents, is a determinate [Leonine edition: determinately] species of lust." But it is not so certain whether the Angelic Doctor taught that this determinate species of stuprum contains a mortal malice added to simple fornication, so that it must necessarily be declared in confession. And in truth the sin of lust committed, for example, by a virgin fifty years of age now altogether free and incapable of bearing children, or that committed by a virgin eighteen years of age still existing under paternal care, does not seem to be diverse in species. The older authors thought that in the defloration of a virgin there was always a bodily violation, namely, destruction of the hymen, and that such bodily violation was always evil outside legitimate marriage, just as any other bodily mutilation made without a sufficient cause was also illicit. Modern physiologists, however, rightly deny that such violation is always present, since in some virgins the hymen is absent or is not ruptured even by carnal intercourse; but if it is present, they assert that the violation is minimal.

¹³⁵⁷ Cf. Billuart, l.c.

¹³⁵⁸ Code of Canon Law, canon 2357 ff.

383. Stuprum is unjust or not, according as unjust means are employed or are not employed. In the present place, however, an unjust perpetrator of stuprum is considered as one who by an unjust means oppressed or seduced an unwilling honorable woman. It is required

a) that he has used some unjust means whatever, namely, force, fear, fraud, deceit, or deception. Whence by these words are understood not only violent oppression of the woman, whether in the state of wakefulness or in the state of sleep or drunkenness, but also threats unjustly inspired, very importunate prayers, for example, of a superior, on account of which from shame she would not dare to dissent, touches and kisses brought by force even if afterwards she consents, fear of infamy from the fact that the man would not wish to leave, deceptions or fictitious promises especially of marriage, and other things of this kind by which the woman, as if unwilling, is induced to copula; - but not flatteries, gifts, mere prayers or accustomed persuasions, because they contain nothing unjust;

b) toward an honorable woman, whether she is a virgin, or widow, or merely unmarried, provided that by public estimation she has preserved good reputation and is held chaste; otherwise no damage of itself is inflicted on her.

384. Principles. - I. An unjust perpetrator of stuprum

a) on account of the stuprum itself: of himself is held to restore nothing, unless the judge imposes compensation on him;

b) on account of temporal damage (inability or difficulty of marrying, defamation of the girl and dishonoring of the parents, syphilitic infection, etc.), if it was inflicted by him:

1. Toward the woman or also the parents: from justice he is held to repair all damages that have followed both to the woman, especially a virgin, and to her parents, provided that from such an action they come upon them of themselves and consequently are judged to have been foreseen in confusion: for he is an unjust damager. But he ought to repair even by marrying the woman, if he promised even fictitiously, or if the damage cannot otherwise be repaired, and greater evils are not prudently feared; - otherwise by dowering her or increasing a dowry, taking care that she can marry according to her condition, concurring toward her support, etc., according as damage was inflicted and it is possible to compensate it. Therefore:

a) He is not held to marriage 1. from an invalid promise, by reason of the promise, but only by reason of deceit to be removed; 2. nor from invalid espousals as such, since they are void in both forums (can. 1017, § 1), but insofar as they were an instrument of fraud and deception; 3. nor if the girl had already been dishonorably corrupted, because to enter marriage with such a woman is esteemed much more than that which the perpetrator of stuprum received from her; 4. nor if she pretended herself a virgin and herself deceived; 5. nor if from the circumstances, as from the tenor of the words or too great inequality of condition, she could easily have understood that the promise was not serious, because then deception was not present but she deceived herself; - not however on account of a diriment impediment, in which dispensation is usually granted.

b) The obligation of marrying ceases: 1. if the woman has freely renounced her right or has fully condoned the injury; 2. if she has fornicated with a third party, because faith should be broken with one breaking faith; 3. if from the marriage greater evils would follow: enmities, scandals, an unhappy outcome.

c) Compensation is not owed if the woman in fact has suffered no damage, namely 1. if she has already married well according to her state; 2. if she has entered religion; 3. if she could not or would not have married; 4. if she has been defamed because she herself indiscreetly manifested the stuprum; 5. if she has already died by premature death. - Unless, however, an agreement has already been entered into; and therefore if the corrupted woman has already received something, she can retain it.

2. Toward offspring born, if the father is certain, he ought to provide from justice for the whole support and education, according to the condition of the mother, until the offspring can suffice for himself; - if the father is uncertain, because several have had copula, he is held to restore for the rate of doubt, at least if by common counsel or knowingly they acted thus, because he is a voluntary cause of the uncertainty of the father, which is already a great damage for the mother and offspring; otherwise it is not certain that he is held to restore anything, since the mother is rather the cause that it cannot be established concerning the father.

II. A perpetrator of stuprum who is not unjust:

1. Toward the girl or parents, of himself is held to restore nothing: not to the girl, because to one knowing and consenting no injury is done; not to the parents, because the daughter is not held from justice to impede this damage from her parents; - per accidens he is held concerning damage following from infamy, if he himself has manifested the delict.

2. Toward offspring born, if the father is certain, he is held from piety to half the support of the offspring, according to the condition of the mother, even if civil law prohibits inquiry concerning an illegitimate father; but he is held in solidum with the mother, so that, if she provides nothing, he ought to provide for the whole. But if there are several uncertain fathers, he is held to half the support by proportionate part, at least if by common counsel or knowingly they acted thus; otherwise it is not certain that he is held to restore anything.

Thus considered under natural law alone. In some regions civil law, or a civil judge when asked, is accustomed to determine the quantity of support to be paid by the illegitimate father,¹ which then has force in conscience.

¹ Thus the German Code (a. 1708 sq.) establishes that the illegitimate father is held to furnish suitable support up to the child's 10th year. Cf. Austrian Code, a. 166-171; Spanish Code, a. 143; Swiss Code, 8. 317-319. The French Code imposed no obligation of support upon the illegitimate father, since it prohibited inquiry concerning the illegitimate father (a. 340); - but in Belgium, by the law of 6 Apr. 1908, this was changed somewhat; in France by the law of 16 Nov. 1912, likewise in the Netherlands in the year 1909 (Dutch Code, a. 344).

385. Remarks. - 1. From piety and charity there is an obligation of acknowledging the offspring, and of legitimating it through marriage, unless graver inconveniences stand in the way.²

² Cf. C.C., a. 331 and 334.

2. In the case in which the perpetrator of stuprum is going to compensate damage by money, it is expedient that he agree concerning the amount of the sum with those who have suffered damage and that he soon pay the whole sum, lest perhaps dangerous commerce be continued or payment of the debt be omitted.

3. Vermeersch wisely warns, Th. M. II, n. 633: "Before he declares the obligation of making restitution or advises the manner,... let the confessor weigh all things well... For crafty women know how to entice an inexperienced young man in such a way that he considers himself the seducer while he merely falls into a snare prepared by women. But when the sin has been committed, they complain that they have conceived from him, when either they are not pregnant at all or have sinned with several. Then the money which someone has given for impeding disclosure of the matter or for redeeming the vexation of accusers and barkers is easily converted into an argument of guilt, so that it furnishes occasion for long-lasting servitude."

1008. Defloration (viol; verkrachting), according to more recent authors, is violent intercourse, so that, if a virgin consents, it is not properly defloration; hence it is the violent or unjust defloration of a virgin. But according to St. Thomas and the ancients it is every illicit defloration of a virgin, whether she consents or does not consent. A virgin is understood in the physical sense, one who retains the seal of virginity. Now:

1. Defloration of an unwilling virgin, or violent defloration of a virgin, adds to simple fornication a mortal malice distinct in species, not only by reason of the violence by which she is compelled to fornicate, such as can exist with respect to a corrupted woman, but also by reason of the natural integrity which is violently taken from an unwilling woman. For this integrity violently taken away is of sufficient moment to constitute in the violator a grave sin of unjust damaging.

Violence is understood not only as physical, but also as moral, such as fraud, fear, importunate prayers and blandishments, such as those which are accompanied by great promises, kisses, touches, and incentives of venery, which a freeborn woman cannot easily resist.

2. Defloration of a virgin consenting of her own accord is a distinct species of luxury. For where, concerning the matter of some vice, some special deformity occurs, there a determinate species of that vice must be placed. But in the defloration of a virgin, even one consenting of her own accord, there is a special deformity concerning the matter of luxury: a) on the part of the girl, who, from the fact that she is corrupted, is impeded from legitimate marriage and is placed on the path of prostitution, from which she was held back lest she lose the signet of virginity; b) on the part of the father, who bears solicitude for her custody.

Hence if it happens that the parents consent, nevertheless defloration would remain, because the same reasons would remain on the part of the virgin; moreover, parents cannot consent to this.

Yet it seems more probable that the defloration of a virgin consenting of her own accord does not add to simple fornication a mortal malice which must be explained in confession, because injury is not done to one knowing and consenting, but only a venial one.

1009. Rape, as it is a species of luxury, is force inflicted upon any person whatever, or upon that person's parents, for the sake of fulfilling lust; while moderns take it more restrictively, defining it as the violent abduction of any person whatever for the sake of fulfilling lust (enlevement; oplichting). But the former definition is more conformable to St. Thomas, who says, a. 7: in whatever way violence is present, and therefore even without abduction, the account of rape is preserved.

For it is not of the account of rape as such that the thing taken be led away from place to place, but only that it be violently taken away in the presence of the lord or guardian, or while he resists, even if it is not led away, but is consummated in the same place, or detained by force, so that violence alone is essential to rape and distinguishes it from theft. Thus, for example, he who by force took bread or wine from someone present and resisting and consumed it in the same place would be a true robber and not merely a thief.

In the definition it is said:

1. Force inflicted, or violence, by which is understood not only force or physical violence properly so called, but also fear which is judged grave, at least relatively to the person, for example, reverential fear with respect to a girl; but not fraud or importunate prayers, because he is not properly called a robber who extorts another's property by deceit or importunate prayers, but one who does so by open force or at least by grave fear unjustly inflicted.

2. Upon any person whatever, because here the question is not, as in defloration, of a virgin alone, but whether she is a virgin or corrupted, unmarried or married, male or female, indeed in a word whatever the person may be, there is matter of rape, which is graver according as the person taken brings in graver qualities. Thus if she is married, there is rape and adultery; if sacred to God, rape and sacrilege; if of the same sex, rape and sodomy, etc.

3. Or upon that person's parents, because for the account of rape, as it is in the species of luxury, it is not necessary that violence always be done to the person taken. It suffices that it be done to the parents or guardians, or to custodians constituted by them, under whose care the person taken exists, namely a minor, because then violence is had. But in whatever way violence is present, the account of rape as a species of luxury is preserved. Therefore whether the one taken consents to the taker while the parents resist, or whether the parents consent while the one taken resists, there is rape.

But if the one taken or led away consents while the parents do not know, it is not properly rape, because there is no violence, in which the account of rape essentially consists. It is called by some the rape of seduction, but by others it is better called flight; nevertheless it can be reduced to rape, because, although it happens without violence, it nevertheless does not happen without injury to the parents.

4. For the sake of fulfilling lust, because if it is from another motive, for example, that the person taken become a slave or maidservant, or be sold, it will not be a species of luxury, but another species of rape, which is called kidnapping. Although lustful rape has its complement through the fulfillment of lust, nevertheless there will be true rape from the intention alone, even if copulation does not follow.

Hence if it is done solely with a view to marriage, rape is not a sin of luxury; but then it is an impediment diriment of marriage, as long as it endures (can. 1074).

That rape constitutes a distinct species in the sin of luxury is manifest from this, that it implies a grave personal injury, or violent violation of the person taken or of that person's parents.

1010. Remarks. - 1. A woman upon whom violence is inflicted cannot bear herself merely passively, but is bound to resist internally and externally: namely by dissenting and by manifesting her dissent outwardly, and by crying out and repelling the aggressor according to her strength. Yet she is not bound to resist in that mode which would expose her to danger of death or infamy, provided the proximate danger of internal consent is absent.

2. An oppressed woman can and ought to move and turn herself and in every way impede and break off copulation lest she receive seed, although it is to be poured out, because she has the right and obligation of impeding copulation, and the effusion of seed is to be ascribed solely to the malice of the man.

3. Whether she can also expel seed already received before conception, as pleases some modern authors according to an opinion recently introduced, because they say the seed has the manner of an unjust aggressor?

a) Certainly she cannot, if she has admitted copulation altogether voluntarily; or even if she was deceived by fraud or deceit, or yielded to force or fear, so that the oppression began by force, deceit, or threats, to which subsequent consent was added: for then there will no longer be place for inculpable defense, since the woman ought to have used other licit means. Hence the disputed question does not have much bearing on practice, since the case in which the oppression of the woman is to be attributed to violence alone and was altogether involuntary is very rare.

b) But even then we hold it illicit to expel the seed, both because man does not have dominion over seed, and therefore every action which is exercised directly concerning seed is illicit, except that which is intended by nature, namely conjugal copulation; and because, if it were licit directly to expel seed, this would also be licit concerning the fetus after conception, because in the case it would be more an aggressor and unjust; and because it is a greater injury against human generation and the common good to expel seed from its final seat destined by nature for this, than to procure pollution by which it is expelled from its instrumental seat. But this is always illicit; therefore also the first.

c) Besides, the argument brought by those affirming this does not hold. For it is licit to repel aggression during the action of copulation, but not after copulation has been posited, because then the aggression has ceased and the seed is already in its place to which it is destined by nature. But copulation is finished by the very introduction of seed into the vessel of the woman, because once the seed has been ejaculated, the voluntary work of man ceases and the work of nature alone begins, by which it happens that the seed naturally penetrates more deeply into the organs of the woman for fecundation. But to break off the work of nature in human generation is illicit.

Stuprum, taken strictly among theologians, is the deflowering of a virgin. - But a virgin is said to be deflowered who, by the natural congress of a man and by a consummated act, is corrupted for the first time, against her will. I said strictly among theologians, for according to the norm of civil law stuprum imports the violation of any unmarried and honorable woman, and in a broader sense of any unmarried woman.

I say 1st. Stuprum, in whatever sense accepted, always contains a grave malice diverse in species. The reason is that, violation being supposed, whatever finally is the woman who is violated, now besides chastity another virtue is injured, namely justice.

I say 2nd. Although the circumstance of virginity is not necessarily to be disclosed in confession, because it is only aggravating, nevertheless if the sin of stuprum is reserved, then it will have to be manifested, because the word stuprum is to be taken strictly whenever it concerns reservation and the penalties laid against those committing stuprum in canon law.

I say 3rd. For stuprum it is not required that force or physical violence be inflicted; for it is enough that the consent of a girl otherwise unwilling be extorted by threats, fraud, deceit, or repeated and importunate entreaties which overcome her constancy. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 443. - Baller., note (b), p. 315.

It is defined by D. Bonaventure p. p. Centil. sect. 24. and in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 21: Stuprum is lust by which the incorruption of Virgins is violated, or they are deflowered. He defines it thus also in 4. dist. 41. dub. 4. littera, where he compares stuprum with adultery, and says adultery is the greater by reason of the injury, or injustice, inflicted on the spouse and on the Republic; nevertheless on the other side stuprum is graver, because it violates the virginal enclosure.

Some, however, define stuprum thus: It is the intercourse of a man by force with a Virgin woman.

Hence, when the Virgin consents spontaneously, they say it is not stuprum. So Peter Navarr. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 3. num. 433. Sotus in 4. dist. 18. quaest. 2. art. 4. Vasquez prima secunda, disp. 112. cap. 2. Lessius lib. 2. cap. 10. dub. 1. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 14. Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 4. Suarez de poenit. disp. 22. sect. 4. Coninch. disp. 7. num. 19. It is the more common opinion and seems to be gathered from the decretal of Gregory extra de adulteriis, apud D. Bonav., to be cited, where it is said: Falix deceived a certain Virgin by stuprum, but deception is equivalent to force, as I shall say in dub. 10. See Bass. V. stuprum.

The opposite opinion, however, is that even if she consents spontaneously, it is stuprum. So D. Bonaventure locis adductis, D. Thom. art. 4. Cajetan quaest. 154. art. 6. Henriquez lib. 2. de poenit. cap. 8. Filliucius tract. 3. in 6. praecepto, cap. 3. de stupro, Azor cap. 11. quaestio 5. Tolet. lib. 3. cap. 18. Rodriquez tom. 1. sum. cap. 28. Guttier. lib. 1. qq. can. cap. 37. Farinacius Tom. 4. quaest. 146. Graff. lib. 2. cap. 79. Bonacina de matrim. quaest. 4. puncto 17. Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 154. art. 6.

These, indeed, nearly all take the reason from the injury inflicted on the future husband, and especially on the parents, under whose power she is.

I argue ad hominem. Every act to which the laws impose penalties is evil, having a special malice: But voluntary stuprum of a girl is punished by Civil and Canon law, as the adversaries concede: Therefore. The major is evident, for a special penalty is inflicted for a special fault. The minor is proved from the Laws.

By Canon law the ravisher of a violated Virgin is compelled to endow her and to take her to himself in marriage, even if he is unwilling to marry her after the constitution of the dowry; he is beaten with rods through the streets of the city, cap. 2. de adult., and many teach this with Fagundez num. 21., and D. Bonav. reports it in Confessionali, cap. 3. particula 56. Excommunication to be imposed is added, and confinement in a monastery.

But if the deflowerer is married, he will be bound to endow her, and will be beaten with cudgels, or punished with a fine at the judge's discretion. If he is a Clerk in Holy Orders, he will be bound to endow her, and will otherwise bear penalties at the judge's discretion, such as suspension, deposition, etc. That this penalty for the ravisher of a spontaneous Virgin obtains in the use of all tribunals of both fora, Fagundez num. 27., Julius Clarus §. stuprum, Farinacius tract. 4. quaest. 147. teach.

IN CIVIL law, if the ravisher is noble, half his goods are published (confiscated); if of humble station, he is beaten with rods and punished with exile, according to the text in §. Lex Iulia, Institut. de public. Iudic. Now, however, only the Canonical penalty is in use in the whole world, as Fagundez num. 27. Farinacius, Clarus, and others above say.

NOW indeed this condition is no longer imposed, that she be under the power of her father, or wish to marry. Therefore it is a sign that it is given on account of the violated enclosure of the Virgin.

I ADD the penalties imposed on a violent ravisher, which by civil law are capital punishment, leg. 1. §. finali, ff. de extraord. crim. §. qui puero, where the ravisher of a boy and of a girl are treated as equal. See Farinacius Tract. 4. quaest. 147. and others apud Fagundez num. 28.

The same penalty the civil laws inflict on one who violates an honest widow by force.

BUT IF an honest widow consents spontaneously, she is punished according to some with a pecuniary penalty, as many say apud Fagundez num. 31., but others teach that no penalty is due.

MOREOVER, the deflowerer of a consenting virgin is held in conscience to restore to her parents the loss resulting from it, by supplying the increase of the dowry: It seems so to D. Thom. quaest. 154. art. 6., Cajetan there, Abulensis in cap. 5. Matth. quaest. 201. Many sustain it expressly apud Fagundez lib. 6. cap. 5. num. 3. Others, however, cited by him num. 5., say he is not held, unless he has defamed her.

BUT IF he violated her with a prior promise of marriage, he is bound to take her, or to repair the loss. So many apud Fagundez num. 3.; much more if he deflowered the Virgin by force, fraud, or importunate entreaties; for he is held in conscience either to marry her or to repair the loss; but it suffices if he only add in gifts as much as she needs, because she is corrupted. So Nauar. summa, cap. 16. Sanchez lib. 7. de matrim. disp. 1. Valentia 2. 2. disp. 9. quaest. 3. puncto 3. §. an, et quando, Lessius Tom. 1. de iust. lib. 2. cap. 10. dub. 1. Sylvester V. luxuria, quaest. 5. Some say this is true if the entreaties are joined to threats, or reverential fear.

BUT IF the girl, deflowered in the manner said, finds marriages equally advantageous, and consequently suffers nothing, I judge with Lessius num. 15. Fagundez num. 8. that nothing is owed, because restitution is for a loss inflicted.

BUT IF he corrupted her under the hope of marriage, or by a promise.

IT IS ANSWERED, that he is held to marry her, provided the disparity is not so great that it would persuade the contrary. So D. Thom. in 4. dist. 28. quaest. unic. art. 2. ad 4. Lessius Tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 10. de iniuriis per stuprum, dub. 3. Sanchez lib. 1. de matr. disp. 10. num. 6. Sayrus lib. 11. cap. 1. Sotus 4. dist. 27. quaest. 1. art. 3. Nauar. sum. c. 16. Richardus 4. dist. 28. art. 1. quaest. 3. Palud. q. 1. art. 2. D. Antonin. p. p. tit. 5. cap. 6. Rosella V. matrim. 4. Angel. V. stuprum, 1. Sylvester V. Luxuria, quaest. 5. Tabiena verbo restit. quaest. 22. Armilla num. 22. Victoria sum. de matrim. num. 266. Ledesma 2. part. 4. quaest. 18. art. 2. Veracruz 3. part. speculi, art. 19. Corduba in summa, quaest. 50. et lib. 1. qq. quaest. 13. Beia sum. casu 18. Lopez p. p. Instruct. cap. 76. Rodriquez tom. 1. cap. 208. Copua lib. 2. decis. cap. 78. Spino spec. rest. glos. 15. Fagundez in 6. praecep. lib. 5. num. 12. cum D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 28. quaest. 1. See also Bassaeus.

THE REASON is, because it is a contract, and when she on her part has fulfilled the contract, the other party is held too; whence by that union she acquired a right.

IF, however, there is a grave disparity, which she herself knew, and could judge to the contrary, he is not held. So Sanchez cited num. 6. Rodriquez tom. 1. cap. 208. Sylvester V. matrim. 4. Fagundez num. 15. and others apud these.

BUT IF she was ignorant of the disparity, and had no external cause for suspecting fraud, the deflowerer will be bound to marry her. So Lessius Tom. 1. de Iust. lib. 2. cap. 10. Petrus Nauar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 5. from num. 444. Sanchez lib. 1. de matrim. disp. 10. Fagundez num. 14.

IF stuprum is not a species distinct from fornication, it would not be necessary to specify it in confession; but say the opposite with D. Bonaventure.