The cause of grace

41. Notions. - A cause is a principle influencing the being of another. An extrinsic cause is twofold: for either it influences by acting or operating, and then it is efficient; or it influences by way of object, insofar as it is known, and then it is a good moving an agent that for its sake he do something, and this is final.

An efficient cause is divided:

a) on the part of the power by which it acts, into principal, which by its own proper and complete power operates an effect similar or proportioned to itself; and instrumental, which, by exercising its proper action and producing an effect proportioned to itself, is at the same time moved by a principal agent, and thus cooperates toward its effect: the operation of an axe is to cut, but insofar as it is moved by the craftsman, it cuts artfully;

b) on the part of the mode by which it attains the effect, into perfecting, which effects the ultimate perfection of the thing, as an animal generates an animal; and disposing, which effects some disposition requiring from another the introduction of the ultimate perfection: thus the action and seed of the father do not effect the human soul, but a disposition in the matter which requires the infusion of the soul.

A moral or occasional cause is that which, by bringing forward a motive, for example by its dignity, excites, attracts, and thus moves an intelligent cause to produce an effect; it is called moral because, according to the common estimation, the effect of the intelligent cause is rightly imputed to it. By some it is called an efficient cause, because it moves the person to effecting; but it can be called efficient only metaphorically and improperly, for the motive moves, not indeed by producing something, but by way of object, insofar as it is known and someone acts for its sake; and therefore it is reduced rather to the causality of end than to the causality of efficiency.

Now it is asked whether the sacraments are merely occasional or also moral causes, or rather truly efficient instrumental causes, or even physical causes, and how their causality can be understood. In this question it will be difficult to arrive at true certitude; wherefore it is permitted to us in this matter to speak by reporting or opining, rather than by disputing or deciding.

St. Thomas III, q. 62, a. 1 and 3; on IV Sentences, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4; Disputed Question On Truth 27, a. 4.

42. State of the question. - A. Some have said that the sacraments are not efficient causes of grace per se, because they operate something, but causes per accidens, because God, once the sacraments have been placed, operates the effect.

Thus many of the older authors at the time of St. Thomas, then Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, Gabriel Biel, the Nominalists, and others; St. Bonaventure also favors it, although he speaks hesitantly. St. Thomas attacked this opinion, because the sacraments would not be true and properly so-called causes, but only signs and conditions without which grace would not be produced; which seems repugnant to the sayings of Sacred Scripture and especially of the Holy Fathers:

"Some say that they are not a cause of grace by operating something, but because God, the sacraments having been employed, operates grace in the soul; and they set down the example of one who, bringing a leaden denarius, receives a hundred pounds from the ordinance of the king: not that that denarius operates anything toward having the aforesaid quantity of money, but the will of the king alone operates this... But if someone considers rightly, this mode does not transcend the ratio of sign; for the leaden denarius is nothing except a certain sign of the royal ordinance concerning this, that money be received by this man... According to this, therefore, the sacraments of the New Law would be nothing more than signs of grace; whereas nevertheless from many authorities of the Saints it is held that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but cause grace" (q. 62, a. 1).

Although this opinion was not expressly proscribed by the Councils of Florence and Trent, nevertheless it cannot admit in the proper sense their doctrine, which is nothing other than the voice of tradition: namely, "that the sacraments of the New Law differ from the ancient ones in that they contain and confer grace, while the sacraments of the Old Law did not cause it." Whence from this time it was abandoned by theologians.

B. More recent authors have changed that opinion somewhat: the sacraments are administered in the name of Christ, and consequently are morally actions of Christ, just as the actions of an ambassador are judged rather actions of the king than of himself. But the actions of Christ have merit, an objective infinite dignity. Therefore the sacraments participate in this dignity, insofar as Christ derives merits into them and presents them to God for obtaining and demanding our sanctification. Now the merits of Christ by their dignity have the power of moving God to bestowing grace. Therefore the sacraments are moral causes of grace as truly as the merits of Christ themselves: this is the only difference, that the merits have their own proper dignity, while the sacraments have dignity derived from them; whence the sacraments are moral causes, not principal but instrumental.

Melchior Cano, Molina, Becanus, Vasquez, and many others of the Society of Jesus attribute moral causality to the sacraments; especially Lugo, Franzelin, and Pesch, who proposed it better.

43. Are the sacraments to be called moral causes? - This manner of speaking is less approved, for various reasons:

1. If the sacraments were only moral causes, they would not be properly so-called efficient and instrumental causes, and therefore what the Holy Fathers and Councils assert of them would not be verified in the proper sense.

2. Granted that they were instruments of Christ as man, nevertheless they would not be instruments of God, whom they move and by whom they are not moved for obtaining grace, for otherwise God would pray to Himself.

3. They would be impetratory causes. But impetration is a causality proper to sacrifice, which is the sign of internal prayer; but the ratio of sacrifice differs essentially from the ratio of sacrament. Therefore the impetrative causality of sacrifice is not to be attributed to the sacraments.

4. They would not be true causes but only signs: a) Sacramental actions are not from the very person of Christ, but are only morally judged to be His actions. But merit is the value of a personal action and therefore inseparable from it. Therefore the sacraments do not have intrinsically the dignity of the merits of Christ, but only extrinsically are judged to have this dignity. - b) That which in the sacraments causes grace is not so much the operation of the minister as the external sign itself. But this cannot have moral dignity, but at most represent merits as the price by which grace is acquired. Therefore they are only signs of the merits of Christ and of grace.

5. Whence this moral causality does not sufficiently distinguish them from the sacraments of the Old Law, which also represent the merits of Christ, as will be said in a. 4: for the fact that the merits are past or future does not change the mode of causality.

44. Are the sacraments true efficient instrumental causes? - If the sacraments are not moral causes, it follows that they are true efficient causes: not indeed principal causes, because of their own nature they do not have supernatural power proportioned to grace or to other supernatural effects; whence the effect produced is not assimilated to them but to God; - but instrumental causes, which from the influx of God express order to grace.

Hence it is understood in what sense the sacraments are said to contain grace: not as if it were in them as an accident in a subject, a thing in a place, or liquid in a vessel, as the Protestants falsely impute to Catholics; but as in a sign and in an efficient cause: for it is necessary that the effect be somehow pre-contained in the power of the cause.

St. Thomas III, q. 62, a. 1-4; q. 63, a. 6, ad 3; q. 66, a. 1; q. 68, a. 8; q. 73, a. 1 and 6; q. 84, a. 1; Supp., q. 30, a. 3; q. 34, a. 2; q. 42, a. 1 and 3; IV Sentences, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4; Disputed Question On Truth 27, a. 4.

45. The origin of the question is of the historical order. In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas proposes that the sacraments are instrumental dispositive causes of grace, insofar as they cause in the soul a disposition, namely, character or some other adornment, which is a necessity or title demanding that grace be caused by God; but in the Summa Theologica he does not mention this, but simply says that the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace. Hence it is asked whether St. Thomas changed his opinion and left behind dispositive causality, as Cajetan maintains; or, on the contrary, whether in the Summa he holds the same opinion but explains it more briefly, not explicitly mentioning the disposition because that was sufficiently known, while all who in his age attributed true causality to the sacraments understood it as merely dispositive: thus, for example, William, St. Albert the Great, Innocent V.

The older Thomists for almost three centuries interpreted St. Thomas in this latter way, such as Paludanus, Peter of Tarentaise, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Deza, Sylvester Prierias, Dionysius the Carthusian; indeed Cajetan himself as a younger man wrote thus. But in the Commentary on the Summa Theologica, Cajetan lays down that St. Thomas there expounds a new opinion proper to himself, namely, that the sacraments are instruments by which, under the motion of God, a physical power is attributed for effecting grace itself; and in this way afterward the Thomists rather generally interpreted the holy Doctor. In more recent time Billot returned to the older authors, and contends that St. Thomas never changed his opinion but was constant in asserting merely dispositive causality; which, however, he himself understands not as physical but as intentional, namely, one which produces something of the moral and juridical order, which does not exist except dependently on the intention and ordination of the practical intellect, such as right, title, dignity, moral power, deputation to office, etc. Several followed Billot, while certain others defended physical dispositive causality.¹

¹ On this question see Billot, On the Sacraments of the Church, I, th. 6 and 7; Pegues in Revue Thomiste, 1904; Hugon in the dogmatic work, and in the little work La causalite instrumentale en theologie; Richard, La causalite instrumentale, in Revue Neo-scolastique, 1909; Leroux, Les Sacrements causes dispositives intentionnelles de la grace, in Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege, 1914-15; Tuyaerts, Utrum S. Thomas causalitatem Sacramentorum mere dispositivam unquam docuerit, in Angelicum, 1931; Simonin and Meersseman, De Sacramentorum efficientia apud Theologos Ord. Praed., 1936.

They observe: a) that St. Thomas after the commentary on the Sentences wrote the Disputed Questions On Truth, and in q. 27, a. 4, explains the causality of the sacraments with respect to grace without mentioning any disposition caused by them; and nevertheless in the reply to 3 this is again indicated, and again in the Question On Power 3, a. 4, ad 8, which nevertheless is of later composition; - b) that he never explicitly retracted the doctrine on dispositive causality; - c) and that neither in the Summa did he in any way refute it, which nevertheless would have been altogether necessary for one denying it, since in the Schools it was then universally received.

Yet these arguments are by no means convincing; and therefore generally the Thomists continue to affirm that the silence of the holy Doctor in the Summa sufficiently manifests that dispositive causality is to be abandoned and that it is sufficiently refuted implicitly, in the replies to objections.

Hence it is asked: 1. whether the sacraments are in some sense instrumental dispositive causes, namely, effecting a disposition to grace; 2. whether, even given this, they are besides instrumental perfective causes effecting grace itself.

Both can be admitted, for even those who say that the sacraments effectively and physically cause grace itself can admit that they previously cause some disposition to grace.²

² Hugon testifies to this, Dogmatic Treatise, III, on the Sacraments, q. 3, a. 2, n. xx.

46. Are the sacraments instrumental dispositive causes toward grace? - Thus it seems to be affirmed: The sacraments truly produce some effect, for example character in Baptism, which effect is a disposition, which not only removes impediments to grace, for then it would not be a true cause, but which requires from God the infusion of grace.

According to the manner of speaking of St. Augustine, distinguishing between the sacrament or sign and the reality or effect of the sacrament,³ three things are to be distinguished in the sacraments:⁴ 1) the external sign, composed of matter and form, which is rightly called sacramentum tantum, because it signifies and is not signified; 2) the grace conferred, which is called the res sacramenti, because it does not signify but is only signified; 3) the necessitating disposition to grace, which at least by nature precedes grace and, as an intermediate between the two, is called res et sacramentum, because on the one side it is the reality signified by the external sign, and on the other side it is a sacrament or sign signifying grace. Now the sacraments truly effect that which is res et sacramentum, and this is the disposition or title to the infusion of grace.

³ Questions on the Heptateuch, III, 84.

⁴ The distinction is already in use in the twelfth century and is found in Hugh of St. Victor, William of Auxerre, the Master of the Sentences, and Innocent III, c. 6, X, III, 41, de celeb. Missae, c. cum Marthae. It is handed down by St. Thomas, q. 63, a. 6, ad 3; q. 66, a. 1; q. 73, a. 1 and 6; q. 84, a. 1; Supp., q. 30, a. 9; q. 34, a. 2; q. 42, a. 1.

It is proved: The sacraments effect that which they figure as to be conferred by them. But they directly and immediately signify some effect distinct from grace, and only mediately and dependently on that effect do they signify the very conferral of grace. Therefore the sacraments directly and immediately effect the disposition on which the conferral of grace depends.

The minor is proved: The words of the form, on which the signification of the matter depends, directly and immediately signify something diverse from grace:

1. In the Eucharist they evidently signify the presence of the body and blood of Christ, and only mediately the spiritual refreshment of the soul, insofar as the body and blood of Christ are received.

2. In Matrimony the contract signifies the conjugal bond, which requires grace insofar as it represents the union of Christ with the Church.

3. In Order there is signified sacred power or character, whose office cannot fittingly be exercised without grace.

4. Likewise in Confirmation.

5. Likewise in Baptism, in which the sense of the form is: I confer to thee the sacrament, that is, the sign of washing. For Baptism can be valid and not produce grace on account of an obstacle; but a practical sign which does not effect that which it immediately signifies is invalid; therefore Baptism does not immediately signify grace, but character, which is the internal sign of washing and interior renovation.

6. In Extreme Unction, the deprecative form signifies that the sick man is committed into the hands of God, whose indulgence is expected; whence the sick man receives something by which he is internally devoted to God and by which he has a right to the reception of alleviating grace.

7. Penance was instituted by way of judgment; but in human judgment, absolution from prison signifies a right given to liberation; therefore also the words: I absolve thee from sins, are rightly said to signify: I give thee a right to liberation from sins. Whence the res et sacramentum is interior contrition signified by the acts of the penitent, insofar as through absolution it becomes a title to grace which frees from sins.⁵

⁵ In conformity with St. Thomas, who thus explains the form of Penance, q. 84, a. 3, ad 5.

47. Observations. - 1. A sacrament, since it is a sign for men, is necessarily external; whence the disposition or title to grace is called a sacrament not properly, but only analogically, insofar as it is sensible through another; for this it is required that it be infallibly and necessarily connected with the external sign.

I suppose as certain that the proximate final cause of habitual grace is the eternal salvation of him who has it (habitual, I say, because it is of this precisely that we inquire, and only indirectly of actual grace, insofar namely as it is a motion toward habitual grace, as toward its form and term); the remoter cause is Christ; the ultimate, God, according to that, I Cor., III, 22 and 23: All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. Moreover, the material cause is the essence itself of the soul; there is no formal cause, because grace is a simple form; the instrumental cause is the humanity of Christ together with the sacraments of the Church; angels and men are ministerial causes — angels by supplying the illuminations by which we come to grace, men not only by instructing but also by administering the sacraments; finally, the principal meritorious cause is Christ, and the less principal is just man, who can merit for himself de condigno the increase of grace, and for another de congruo first grace and then the increase of this grace ¹. These things supposed, ¹ Cfr. conc. Trid., sess. VI, cap. 7.

You will ask 1° whether God alone is the principal efficient cause of grace.

I answer. affirmatively.

It is proved 1° from Scripture. Job, XIX, 4, it is said: Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who alone art? Psal. LXXXIII, 12: The Lord will give grace and glory.

It is proved by reason. 1. Nothing can efficiently produce by its own power anything nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than itself; for the principal efficient cause is of greater or at least equal perfection with its effect. Yet grace is something nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than any created agent, since it is a participation of the divine nature, as was said above. Therefore.

It is confirmed. To produce grace by way of principal efficient cause belongs to him alone whose it is to deify, to give right to the inheritance, and to forgive sins. Yet this is proper to God alone: he only can deify others who is himself God by his own nature; he only can give right to an inheritance who is lord of the inheritance; he only forgives sins whom sin offends. Therefore.

You will ask 2° whether grace is created, or educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

Some hold that grace is created, some co-created, others, and more commonly, that it is educed from the potency of the soul. With these latter

I answer. Grace is not created, nor co-created, but is educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

The first part is proved. To be created is proper to a subsistent thing ². Yet grace is not a subsistent being, but an inhering accident. Therefore. — Prob. maj. To be created is a kind of becoming, and this becoming is ordered to esse, nay is esse begun: whence to become and be created properly belong to those alone to which esse belongs. Yet esse properly belongs to subsistents only, whether they are simple, as separate substances, or composite, as material substances. Ergo. — Prob. min. ² 1ª p., q. 45, a. 4, c; q. 27 de Veritate, a. 3, ad 9.

^{1 1} Here q. 112, a. 1, c.

To those properly belongs esse which has esse and subsists in its esse. Yet accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but because something is such by them ¹, as whiteness is called a being on that ground only because by it the subject is white: whence an accident is more properly said of a being than a being. Ergo. ¹ Here q. 110, a. 2, ad 3.

The second part is also proved, namely that grace is not co-created, and it is evident. For an inhering form is said to be co-created when it is produced by the creative action of the subject itself. Yet the action producing grace in us does not create its subject at the same time, but presupposes it, namely the soul. Ergo.

Hence the third part is proved, namely that grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul. For creation and eduction are contradictorily opposed: creation consists in a becoming from no presupposed subject; eduction, on the contrary, is a becoming from some subject presupposed. Yet grace is neither created nor co-created, as was proved above. Ergo it is educed.

It is confirmed. To be educed is to come to be dependently upon a subject. Yet grace in its connatural becoming depends upon a subject. Ergo. — Prob. min. From that from which grace depends in its esse, it depends in its coming to be; for the reason of both is the same, if it comes to be connaturally. Yet in its esse grace depends on a subject. Ergo.

You will object: Grace is said in Scripture to be created. Psal. L, 12: Create a clean heart in me, O God. Galat., VI, 15: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature, namely grace. Ephes., II, 10: We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works; which can be understood only of grace. Ergo.

I answer. that grace is said to be created quasi morally, because it presupposes no merit ². But it is not created physically; for it presupposes a subject. Whence it is also expressed in Scripture more rarely by creation, but more often by generation, vivification, reformation, resurrection, and similar terms. ² Ibid.

You will ask 3° whether some preparation or disposition on the part of man is required for grace.

I answer. 1°. As to actual grace, it is certain that no preparation is required on the part of man as preventing the divine assistance, but rather whatever preparation can exist in man is from that assistance of God moving the soul to good.

I answer. 2°. According to the common course of divine providence, there is required on the part of an adult in possession of himself a certain disposition to grace: which disposition is an act and motion of free will toward God. I said, « of an adult in possession of himself; » for it is agreed that infants do not receive grace through baptism mediated by a disposition of free will, of which they are not capable, as not either perpetual madmen.

Each part of the answer seems decided by faith by the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, in these words: « Adults however [are disposed] to justice itself, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God. » And can. 9: « If anyone shall say, that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will; let him be anathema. »

This also Sacred Scripture clearly intimates. I Reg., VII, 3: Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. Zach., I, 3: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you.

The first part is proved by reason ¹. A perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent esse, according to the common course of divine providence is not introduced into a subject unless it be disposed and prepared. Yet habitual grace is a perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent supernatural esse. Ergo. — The minor stands. The major also is evident both in natural things and in supernatural. Thus in natural things substantial forms, whether animate or inanimate, are introduced only into disposed matter; in supernatural things, the divine essence, as intelligible form, is not united to the blessed intellect except through the light of glory disposing it. ¹ Here q. 112, a. 2, c.

The second part is likewise proved by reason ¹. Grace is conferred on an adult man by God moving him. Yet God moves all things according to the mode of each; but man is by nature of free will, and therefore it is proper to him to be moved through free will. Ergo in the adult there is not made by God a motion to grace without a motion of free will. ¹ Here q. 113, a. 3, c.

It is confirmed. According to the common course of divine providence, a form is introduced only into a subject disposed according to its proper mode. Yet the proper mode by which a man in possession of himself disposes himself to good is through the act of free will. Ergo.

I said, « according to the common course of divine providence; » because it must not be denied that God of absolute power can confer grace on one not disposed, as on one sleeping, since in this there is nothing repugnant. But reasoning must be about commonly contingent things only, as constituting rule and law.

Note, that acts of free will moved by God concur to grace not effectively, but dispositively only. For the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, teaches this: « The causes of this justification are:... efficient, the merciful God;... instrumental, the sacrament of baptism. » And St. Thomas says, q. 28 de Veritate, ad 2: « The sacrament of penance has to confer grace by virtue of the keys, by which the penitent subjects himself. Contrition therefore, if considered in itself, has reference to grace only by way of disposition; but if considered inasmuch as it has the virtue of the keys in vow, thus it operates sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as appears in the adult who has the sacrament of baptism in vow only. From this therefore it is not had that contrition is the efficient cause of the remission of guilt, speaking per se, but the virtue of the key or baptism. » He teaches the same in IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 2, a. 5, quaestiunc. 1.

You will ask 4° whether grace is greater in one than in another.

I answer. affirmatively ¹. That Scripture indicates everywhere. ¹ Here q. 112, a. 4, c.

The reason is, because it is common to every subject to receive the form more or less, according as it is more or less disposed to it. The proximate reason therefore of this inequality of grace is the inequality of dispositions on the part of man; the first and remote one is the will of God, which is author not only of grace but also of the disposition to it, dividing to each as he wills, I Cor., XII, 11, and giving to each one grace according to the measure of the donation of Christ, Ephes., IV, 7. Whence, as he bestows unequal grace, so also unequal disposition to it, unto the consummation of the saints, unto the edification of the body of Christ, as is added in the same place, that is, that out of diverse grades the beauty and perfection of the Church may arise, as also in natural things he instituted diverse grades of beings, that the universe might be perfect.

You will ask 5° whether anyone can be certain he is in grace.

I answer.² Special revelation set aside, no one can be certain that he is in grace with absolute certainty, under which falsehood cannot lie, or which at least excludes all dread; but only with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural. This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists asserting that each Christian is bound to believe that he was justified, and that men are justified by this faith alone. It is also against certain Catholics, among whom Catharinus contends that a man can be certain he has grace with absolute certainty — indeed not immediately of faith, but through theological discourse; Vega, with moral certainty which excludes all dread, such as is certainty about the existence of the city of Rome. ² Ibid., a. 5, c.

The first part is proved. 1° From Holy Scripture. Eccles., IX, 1:

There are just men and wise, and their works are in the hand of God; and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred. Eccli., V, 3: Be not without fear about sin forgiven. I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord. Paul says this of himself, who certainly was then just.

2° From the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 9: « Although it is necessary to believe that sins neither are remitted nor ever were remitted, except gratuitously by divine mercy for Christ's sake; yet must it not be said that sins are forgiven or have been forgiven to anyone who boasts of his confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins, and rests on that alone... But neither must this be asserted, that they who are truly justified ought to settle within themselves without any doubt whatever that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified but he who believes with certainty that he is absolved and justified, and that by this faith alone absolution and justification are perfected: as if he who believes not this doubted of the promises of God and of the efficacy of the death and resurrection of Christ. For, as no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments; so each one, while he regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may fear and tremble concerning his own grace, since no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God. » By this decree the aforesaid errors are refuted.

3° By reason from St. Thomas. After demonstrating here q. 112, a. 3, c. that this cannot be certainly known except by revelation, if perchance it be present, he adds in what manner the same cannot be known: « In another way man knows something by himself, and this with certitude. And thus no one can know that he has grace. For certitude cannot be had of anything unless it can be judged by its proper principle; for thus certitude is had of demonstrative conclusions through indemonstrable universal principles. But no one could know that he had knowledge of any conclusion if he were ignorant of the principle. Now the principle and object of grace is God himself, who on account of his excellence is unknown to us... And therefore his presence in us and absence cannot be known with certitude, according to that, Job, IX, 11: If he shall come to me, I shall not see him; if he depart, I shall not understand. And therefore man cannot judge with certitude whether he himself has grace, according to that, I Cor., IV, 3 and 4: But neither do I judge my own self... But he that judgeth me, is the Lord. »

The second part is proved. That a man can know with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural, from signs and indications, that he is in grace, no one denies. What these signs and indications are the Angelic Doctor explains in the same place: « In a third way something is known conjecturally through certain signs. And in this way anyone can know that he has grace, insofar namely as he perceives himself to delight in God and to despise worldly things, and insofar as man is not conscious to himself of any mortal sin. According to which mode can be understood what is had Apocal., II, 17: To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna,... which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it; namely because he who receives it knows by a certain experience of sweetness, which he experiences not who does not receive it. This knowledge nevertheless is imperfect. Whence the Apostle says, I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; because, as is said in Psal. XVIII, 13 and 14: Who can understand sins? From secret ones, etc. »

Even the sweet disposition of divine providence persuades that, as man ought not to have all manner of certainty of his own justice, lest he be carried away into pride and presumption; so congruously he ought to have moral and conjectural certainty, lest he be tortured by perpetual disturbance of soul, but between fear and hope work out his salvation.