Article II: On the Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments

St. Thomas III, q. 62, a. 1-4; q. 63, a. 6, ad 3; q. 66, a. 1; q. 68, a. 8; q. 73, a. 1 and 6; q. 84, a. 1; Supp., q. 30, a. 3; q. 34, a. 2; q. 42, a. 1 and 3; IV Sentences, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4; Disputed Question On Truth 27, a. 4.

45. The origin of the question is of the historical order. In the Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas proposes that the sacraments are instrumental dispositive causes of grace, insofar as they cause in the soul a disposition, namely, character or some other adornment, which is a necessity or title demanding that grace be caused by God; but in the Summa Theologica he does not mention this, but simply says that the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace. Hence it is asked whether St. Thomas changed his opinion and left behind dispositive causality, as Cajetan maintains; or, on the contrary, whether in the Summa he holds the same opinion but explains it more briefly, not explicitly mentioning the disposition because that was sufficiently known, while all who in his age attributed true causality to the sacraments understood it as merely dispositive: thus, for example, William, St. Albert the Great, Innocent V.

The older Thomists for almost three centuries interpreted St. Thomas in this latter way, such as Paludanus, Peter of Tarentaise, Capreolus, Ferrariensis, Deza, Sylvester Prierias, Dionysius the Carthusian; indeed Cajetan himself as a younger man wrote thus. But in the Commentary on the Summa Theologica, Cajetan lays down that St. Thomas there expounds a new opinion proper to himself, namely, that the sacraments are instruments by which, under the motion of God, a physical power is attributed for effecting grace itself; and in this way afterward the Thomists rather generally interpreted the holy Doctor. In more recent time Billot returned to the older authors, and contends that St. Thomas never changed his opinion but was constant in asserting merely dispositive causality; which, however, he himself understands not as physical but as intentional, namely, one which produces something of the moral and juridical order, which does not exist except dependently on the intention and ordination of the practical intellect, such as right, title, dignity, moral power, deputation to office, etc. Several followed Billot, while certain others defended physical dispositive causality.¹

¹ On this question see Billot, On the Sacraments of the Church, I, th. 6 and 7; Pegues in Revue Thomiste, 1904; Hugon in the dogmatic work, and in the little work La causalite instrumentale en theologie; Richard, La causalite instrumentale, in Revue Neo-scolastique, 1909; Leroux, Les Sacrements causes dispositives intentionnelles de la grace, in Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege, 1914-15; Tuyaerts, Utrum S. Thomas causalitatem Sacramentorum mere dispositivam unquam docuerit, in Angelicum, 1931; Simonin and Meersseman, De Sacramentorum efficientia apud Theologos Ord. Praed., 1936.

They observe: a) that St. Thomas after the commentary on the Sentences wrote the Disputed Questions On Truth, and in q. 27, a. 4, explains the causality of the sacraments with respect to grace without mentioning any disposition caused by them; and nevertheless in the reply to 3 this is again indicated, and again in the Question On Power 3, a. 4, ad 8, which nevertheless is of later composition; - b) that he never explicitly retracted the doctrine on dispositive causality; - c) and that neither in the Summa did he in any way refute it, which nevertheless would have been altogether necessary for one denying it, since in the Schools it was then universally received.

Yet these arguments are by no means convincing; and therefore generally the Thomists continue to affirm that the silence of the holy Doctor in the Summa sufficiently manifests that dispositive causality is to be abandoned and that it is sufficiently refuted implicitly, in the replies to objections.

Hence it is asked: 1. whether the sacraments are in some sense instrumental dispositive causes, namely, effecting a disposition to grace; 2. whether, even given this, they are besides instrumental perfective causes effecting grace itself.

Both can be admitted, for even those who say that the sacraments effectively and physically cause grace itself can admit that they previously cause some disposition to grace.²

² Hugon testifies to this, Dogmatic Treatise, III, on the Sacraments, q. 3, a. 2, n. xx.

46. Are the sacraments instrumental dispositive causes toward grace? - Thus it seems to be affirmed: The sacraments truly produce some effect, for example character in Baptism, which effect is a disposition, which not only removes impediments to grace, for then it would not be a true cause, but which requires from God the infusion of grace.

According to the manner of speaking of St. Augustine, distinguishing between the sacrament or sign and the reality or effect of the sacrament,³ three things are to be distinguished in the sacraments:⁴ 1) the external sign, composed of matter and form, which is rightly called sacramentum tantum, because it signifies and is not signified; 2) the grace conferred, which is called the res sacramenti, because it does not signify but is only signified; 3) the necessitating disposition to grace, which at least by nature precedes grace and, as an intermediate between the two, is called res et sacramentum, because on the one side it is the reality signified by the external sign, and on the other side it is a sacrament or sign signifying grace. Now the sacraments truly effect that which is res et sacramentum, and this is the disposition or title to the infusion of grace.

³ Questions on the Heptateuch, III, 84.

⁴ The distinction is already in use in the twelfth century and is found in Hugh of St. Victor, William of Auxerre, the Master of the Sentences, and Innocent III, c. 6, X, III, 41, de celeb. Missae, c. cum Marthae. It is handed down by St. Thomas, q. 63, a. 6, ad 3; q. 66, a. 1; q. 73, a. 1 and 6; q. 84, a. 1; Supp., q. 30, a. 9; q. 34, a. 2; q. 42, a. 1.

It is proved: The sacraments effect that which they figure as to be conferred by them. But they directly and immediately signify some effect distinct from grace, and only mediately and dependently on that effect do they signify the very conferral of grace. Therefore the sacraments directly and immediately effect the disposition on which the conferral of grace depends.

The minor is proved: The words of the form, on which the signification of the matter depends, directly and immediately signify something diverse from grace:

1. In the Eucharist they evidently signify the presence of the body and blood of Christ, and only mediately the spiritual refreshment of the soul, insofar as the body and blood of Christ are received.

2. In Matrimony the contract signifies the conjugal bond, which requires grace insofar as it represents the union of Christ with the Church.

3. In Order there is signified sacred power or character, whose office cannot fittingly be exercised without grace.

4. Likewise in Confirmation.

5. Likewise in Baptism, in which the sense of the form is: I confer to thee the sacrament, that is, the sign of washing. For Baptism can be valid and not produce grace on account of an obstacle; but a practical sign which does not effect that which it immediately signifies is invalid; therefore Baptism does not immediately signify grace, but character, which is the internal sign of washing and interior renovation.

6. In Extreme Unction, the deprecative form signifies that the sick man is committed into the hands of God, whose indulgence is expected; whence the sick man receives something by which he is internally devoted to God and by which he has a right to the reception of alleviating grace.

7. Penance was instituted by way of judgment; but in human judgment, absolution from prison signifies a right given to liberation; therefore also the words: I absolve thee from sins, are rightly said to signify: I give thee a right to liberation from sins. Whence the res et sacramentum is interior contrition signified by the acts of the penitent, insofar as through absolution it becomes a title to grace which frees from sins.⁵

⁵ In conformity with St. Thomas, who thus explains the form of Penance, q. 84, a. 3, ad 5.

47. Observations. - 1. A sacrament, since it is a sign for men, is necessarily external; whence the disposition or title to grace is called a sacrament not properly, but only analogically, insofar as it is sensible through another; for this it is required that it be infallibly and necessarily connected with the external sign.

2. Grace, although it is the root and seed of glory, cannot be called a sacrament of glory, because it is not connected infallibly with the external sign.

3. Almost all theologians admit the existence of that which is called res et sacramentum, but they do not agree in assigning it: for Penance some indicate peace of conscience and serenity of soul, and for Extreme Unction the alleviation of soul and confirmation against the dangers of death. Yet not rightly: a) because they are not immediately signified by the external sign; b) because they are produced through the mediation of grace and because they are not connected infallibly with the external sign, for the sacraments can be valid and not produce these effects. Therefore just as grace cannot be called a sacrament, so neither can those things.⁶

⁶ Cf. John of St. Thomas, On the Sacraments, disp. 33, a. p. 5.

48. Are the sacraments also instrumental perfective and physical causes producing grace itself? - Let it suffice in this scholastic question to hand down the principal arguments which are brought forward on each side.

A. Those who deny physical causality productive of grace argue thus:

1. "A secondary instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the higher cause except insofar as by something proper to itself it operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent: for if it acted there in no way according to that which is proper to itself, it would be employed for acting in vain; nor would determinate instruments of determinate actions need to exist" (I, q. 45, a. 5). Therefore the sacraments operate only dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent, God; and consequently they produce only an effect previous to grace, which is caused by God.

2. Grace is properly created, or at least is produced by an action which is equivalent to creation, because it is a participation of the divine nature for which no creature has a positive capacity; whence the production of grace requires infinite power, which cannot be communicated to a creature. Therefore just as no creature can be an instrument of creation, so neither can it be an instrument attaining grace itself.

3. An instrument ought to cooperate with the principal agent: for by exercising its proper action it ought to act instrumentally, just as an axe by cutting wood produces the form of a bench. Whence the instrumental action ought to be in the same line as the proper action of the instrument, of which it is the modification and elevation. But the action proper to the sacraments is to signify; yet no physical causality belongs to the action of signifying, whence it is said that they cause by signifying.

4. The sacraments confer grace when and where they do not exist, for those which are received with an obstacle, once the obstacle has been removed, confer grace (n. 57), and matrimony can be valid even if entered by proxy or if consent is not renewed. But a) a physical cause does not act except when and where it exists; b) in the aforesaid cases the sacraments do not cause grace except by a disposition left in the soul; therefore likewise in other cases, because the Holy Fathers speak of causality in the same way for all circumstances. Therefore the sacraments are not physical causes of grace itself.

5. The sacraments operate in the same mode as Christ performed miracles. But the humanity of Christ only designated by sign or gesture certain things by divine command, and thus produced an exigency that miraculous works be done in them; the divinity physically effected them. Therefore the sacraments produce only an exigency in the soul, so that in it God Himself would physically effect grace.

6. The Fathers compare the causality of the sacraments to human generation. But parents do nothing except dispose matter; God infuses the principle of life, which is the soul. Therefore the sacraments produce only a disposition to the principle of supernatural life, which is grace; God alone infuses it.

Thus the older authors cited above; more recently Billot and his disciples, such as Van Noort, Horace Mazzella, Richard, De Smet, Blondiaux, Leroux, Bittremieux, de la Taille, who nevertheless hold intentional dispositive causality, while others maintain physical dispositive causality, such as Delval, De Bellevue, and Gonthier.

B. Those who hold that the sacraments physically produce grace itself and attain it directly and immediately, answer thus, while at the same time arguing to the contrary:

1. Instruments are said to operate dispositively either on the part of the thing operated, insofar as they effect a previous disposition, or at least on the part of the mode of operating, by modifying the action of the principal agent so that they are not pure means but truly act; whence it is not always required that they have a term distinct from the principal effect.

2. Grace is not properly created, but is educed from the potency of the soul; whence nothing prevents it from being caused through an instrument: indeed, to effect grace by one's own power requires infinite divine power, but not to do this by derived and instrumental power.

3. In the instruments of creatures the action must be accommodated to the effect to be produced, but in the instruments of God the action need not necessarily be accommodated, because God can effect anything by the action of any instrument whatever. And yet by exercising their proper action the sacraments act instrumentally: as when water touches the body, it at the same time washes the heart (q. 62, a. 1, ad 2).

4. In the sacraments there is present divine power, which is simultaneously present to all places and times; moreover sacraments validly received leave in the soul a disposition or vestige, which God can use as a physical instrument for afterward conferring grace.⁷

⁷ There are several ways explanatory of the reviviscence of the sacraments in the opinion of physical causality, as can be seen in Billuart, Hugon, Marin-Sola, in Divus Thomas, 1925; Haynal, in Angelicum, 1927.

5. The humanity of Christ physically cooperates with the Word, and is a physical instrument in performing miracles and producing supernatural effects. Therefore the sacraments too are physical instruments in the production of grace.

6. The Holy Fathers, if their words are taken in the proper and full sense, cannot be understood except of true power, efficacy, and physical causality. Wherefore this causality altogether befits the excellence and dignity of the Sacraments of the New Law as celebrated in the tradition of the Church.

Thus not only the Thomists generally after Cajetan, such as John of St. Thomas, Nugno Cabezudo, Sylvius, the Salmanticenses, Gonet, Gotti, Billuart, but also Suarez, St. Bellarmine, Valentia, the Conimbricenses, and the Sorbonne doctor Ysambert; and most recently Oswald, Bucceroni, Mattiussi, Hugon, Nepveu, Casajoana, Heinrich-Gutberlet, and others.⁸

⁸ Especially worthy of reading is Hugon in the cited work, p. 47, note 1.

From these things it is clear that Thomists are by no means compelled to abandon the opinion of physical causality, but that it can seem to them more probable, and indeed deservedly.