Article — Billuart, Summa Summae · from Schola Thomistica
On the cause of grace
I suppose as certain that the proximate final cause of habitual grace is the eternal salvation of him who has it (habitual, I say, because it is of this precisely that we inquire, and only indirectly of actual grace, insofar namely as it is a motion toward habitual grace, as toward its form and term); the remoter cause is Christ; the ultimate, God, according to that, I Cor., III, 22 and 23: All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's. Moreover, the material cause is the essence itself of the soul; there is no formal cause, because grace is a simple form; the instrumental cause is the humanity of Christ together with the sacraments of the Church; angels and men are ministerial causes — angels by supplying the illuminations by which we come to grace, men not only by instructing but also by administering the sacraments; finally, the principal meritorious cause is Christ, and the less principal is just man, who can merit for himself de condigno the increase of grace, and for another de congruo first grace and then the increase of this grace 1. These things supposed, 1 Cfr. conc. Trid., sess. VI, cap. 7.
Suppono ut certum, causam finalem gratiae habitualis proximam esse salutem aeternam habentis illam (habitualis, inquam, quia de hac praecise quaeritur, et nonnisi indirecte de gratia actuali, quatenus scilicet est motus ad habitualem, ut ad formam et terminum); ulteriorem esse Christum; ultimam Deum, juxta illud, I Cor., III, 22 et 23 : Omnia vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei. Insuper, causa materialis est ipsa essentia animae; causa formalis nulla est, quia gratia est simplex forma; causa instrumentalis est humanitas Christi, cum sacramentis Ecclesiae; angeli et homines sunt causa ministerialis, angeli subministrando illustrationes quibus perveniamus ad gratiam, homines non solum instruendo, sed et ministrando sacramenta; tandem causa meritoria principalis est Christus, et minus principalis homo justus, qui et sibi potest mereri de condigno augmentum gratiae, et alteri de congruo primam gratiam et deinde incrementum hujus gratiae 1. His suppositis, 1 Cfr. conc. Trid., sess. VI, cap. 7.
You will ask 1° whether God alone is the principal efficient cause of grace.
Petes 1° utrum Deus solus sit causa principalis efficiens gratiae.
It is proved 1° from Scripture. Job, XIX, 4, it is said: Who can make clean him that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who alone art? Psal. LXXXIII, 12: The Lord will give grace and glory.
Probatur 1° ex Script. Job, XIX, 4, dicitur : Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? Nonne tu qui solus es? Psal. LXXXIII, 12 : Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus.
It is proved by reason. 1. Nothing can efficiently produce by its own power anything nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than itself; for the principal efficient cause is of greater or at least equal perfection with its effect. Yet grace is something nobler, more perfect and of a higher order than any created agent, since it is a participation of the divine nature, as was said above. Therefore.
Probatur ratione 1. Nihil potest propria virtute efficienter producere aliquid quod sit nobilius, perfectius et altioris ordinis quam ipsum sit; causa enim principalis efficiens est majoris seu saltem aequalis perfectionis cum effectu. Atqui gratia est quid nobilius, perfectius et altioris ordinis quam quodvis agens creatum, cum sit participatio divinae naturae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo.
It is confirmed. To produce grace by way of principal efficient cause belongs to him alone whose it is to deify, to give right to the inheritance, and to forgive sins. Yet this is proper to God alone: he only can deify others who is himself God by his own nature; he only can give right to an inheritance who is lord of the inheritance; he only forgives sins whom sin offends. Therefore.
Confirmatur. Illius solius est producere gratiam per modum causae principalis efficientis, cujus est deificare, dare jus ad haereditatem et peccata dimittere. Atqui id Dei solius est proprium : ille enim solus potest alios deificare, qui per seipsum Deus est; ille solus potest dare jus ad haereditatem, qui haereditatis est dominus; ille solus peccata dimittit, quem peccatum offendit. Ergo.
You will ask 2° whether grace is created, or educed from the obediential potency of the soul.
Petes 2° utrum gratia creetur, vel educatur de potentia obedientiali animae.
Some hold that grace is created, some co-created, others, and more commonly, that it is educed from the potency of the soul. With these latter
Quidam tenent gratiam creari, quidam concreari, alii et communius educi de potentia animae. Cum his posterioribus
I answer. Grace is not created, nor co-created, but is educed from the obediential potency of the soul.
Resp. Gratia non creatur, nec concreatur, sed educitur de potentia obedientiali animae.
The first part is proved. To be created is proper to a subsistent thing 2. Yet grace is not a subsistent being, but an inhering accident. Therefore. — Prob. maj. To be created is a kind of becoming, and this becoming is ordered to esse, nay is esse begun: whence to become and be created properly belong to those alone to which esse belongs. Yet esse properly belongs to subsistents only, whether they are simple, as separate substances, or composite, as material substances. Ergo. — Prob. min. 2 1ª p., q. 45, a. 4, c; q. 27 de Veritate, a. 3, ad 9.
Probatur prima pars. Creari est proprium rei subsistentis 2. Atqui gratia non est ens subsistens, sed accidens inhaerens. Ergo. — Prob. maj. Creari est quoddam fieri, et hoc fieri ordinatur ad esse, imo est esse inchoatum : unde illis solis proprie convenit fieri et creari, quibus convenit esse. Atqui esse proprie convenit solis subsistentibus, sive sint simplicia, ut substantiae separatae, sive composita, ut substantiae materiales. Ergo. — Prob. min. 2 1ª p., q. 45, a. 4, c; q. 27 de Veritate, a. 3, ad 9.
To those properly belongs esse which has esse and subsists in its esse. Yet accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but because something is such by them 1, as whiteness is called a being on that ground only because by it the subject is white: whence an accident is more properly said of a being than a being. Ergo. 1 Here q. 110, a. 2, ad 3.
Ii proprie convenit esse, quod habet esse et in suo esse subsistit. Atqui accidentia non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed quia eis aliquid est tale1, ut albedo ea tantum ratione dicitur ens, quia ea subjectum est album : unde accidens magis dicitur entis quam ens. Ergo. 1 Hic q. 110, a. 2, ad 3.
The second part is also proved, namely that grace is not co-created, and it is evident. For an inhering form is said to be co-created when it is produced by the creative action of the subject itself. Yet the action producing grace in us does not create its subject at the same time, but presupposes it, namely the soul. Ergo.
Probatur etiam secunda pars, nempe quod gratia non concreetur, et patet. Forma enim inhaerens concreari dicitur, quando producitur per ipsam actionem subjecti creativam. Atqui actio producens in nobis gratiam, non creat simul ejus subjectum, sed supponit illud, scilicet animam. Ergo.
Hence the third part is proved, namely that grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul. For creation and eduction are contradictorily opposed: creation consists in a becoming from no presupposed subject; eduction, on the contrary, is a becoming from some subject presupposed. Yet grace is neither created nor co-created, as was proved above. Ergo it is educed.
Probatur hinc tertia pars, scilicet quod gratia educatur de potentia obedientiali animae. Creatio enim et eductio contradictorie opponuntur : creatio consistit in fieri ex nullo praesupposito subjecto; eductio, e contra, est fieri ex aliquo subjecto praesupposito. Atqui gratia non creatur nec concreatur, ut supra probatum est. Ergo educitur.
It is confirmed. To be educed is to come to be dependently upon a subject. Yet grace in its connatural becoming depends upon a subject. Ergo. — Prob. min. From that from which grace depends in its esse, it depends in its coming to be; for the reason of both is the same, if it comes to be connaturally. Yet in its esse grace depends on a subject. Ergo.
Confirmatur. Educi est fieri dependenter a subjecto. Atqui gratia in suo fieri connaturaliter dependet a subjecto. Ergo. — Prob. min. Ab eo gratia dependet in fieri, a quo dependet in esse; utriusque enim eadem est ratio, si connaturaliter fiat. Atqui in esse gratia dependet a subjecto. Ergo.
You will object: Grace is said in Scripture to be created. Psal. L, 12: Create a clean heart in me, O God. Galat., VI, 15: In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature, namely grace. Ephes., II, 10: We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works; which can be understood only of grace. Ergo.
Objicies : Gratia dicitur in Scriptura creari. Psal. L, 12 : Cor mundum crea in me, Deus. Galat., VI, 15 : In Christo Jesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet, neque praeputium, sed nova creatura, scilicet gratia. Ephes., II, 10 : Ipsius sumus factura, creati in Christo Jesu in operibus bonis; quod de gratia tantum intelligi potest. Ergo.
I answer. that grace is said to be created quasi morally, because it presupposes no merit 2. But it is not created physically; for it presupposes a subject. Whence it is also expressed in Scripture more rarely by creation, but more often by generation, vivification, reformation, resurrection, and similar terms. 2 Ibid.
Resp. gratiam dici creari quasi moraliter, quia nullum meritum praesupponit2. At non creatur physice; nam subjectum praesupponit. Unde etiam rarius in Scriptura exprimitur per creationem, saepius vero per generationem, vivificationem, reformationem, resuscitationem, et similes terminos. 2 Ibid.
You will ask 3° whether some preparation or disposition on the part of man is required for grace.
Petes 3° utrum ad gratiam requiratur aliqua praeparatio seu dispositio ex parte hominis.
I answer. 1°. As to actual grace, it is certain that no preparation is required on the part of man as preventing the divine assistance, but rather whatever preparation can exist in man is from that assistance of God moving the soul to good.
Resp. 1°. Quantum ad gratiam actualem, certum est quod nulla praeparatio requiratur ex parte hominis, quasi praeveniens divinum auxilium, sed potius quaecumque praeparatio qua in homine esse potest, est ex illo auxilio Dei moventis animam ad bonum.
I answer. 2°. According to the common course of divine providence, there is required on the part of an adult in possession of himself a certain disposition to grace: which disposition is an act and motion of free will toward God. I said, « of an adult in possession of himself; » for it is agreed that infants do not receive grace through baptism mediated by a disposition of free will, of which they are not capable, as not either perpetual madmen.
Resp. 2°. Juxta communem providentiae divinae cursum, requiritur ex parte hominis adulti sui compotis quaedam dispositio ad gratiam : quae dispositio est actus et motus liberi arbitrii in Deum. Dixi, « hominis adulti sui compotis ; » nam constat infantibus non conferri gratiam per baptismum mediante dispositione liberi arbitrii, cujus non sunt capaces, sicut nec amentes perpetui.
Each part of the answer seems decided by faith by the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 6, in these words: « Adults however [are disposed] to justice itself, when, excited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God. » And can. 9: « If anyone shall say, that the impious is justified by faith alone, so as to understand that nothing else is required which cooperates toward obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is in no way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the motion of his own will; let him be anathema. »
Utraque pars responsionis videtur de fide decisa a concilio Trid., sess. VI, cap. 6, his verbis : « Disponuntur autem [adulti] ad ipsam justitiam, dum excitati divina gratia et adjuti, fidem ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum. » Et can. 9 : « Si quis dixerit, sola fide impium justificari, ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requiri quod ad justificationis gratiam consequendam cooperetur, et nulla ex parte necesse esse eum suae voluntatis motu praeparari atque disponi ; anathema sit. »
This also Sacred Scripture clearly intimates. I Reg., VII, 3: Prepare your hearts unto the Lord. Zach., I, 3: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you.
Id etiam aperte innuit S. Scriptura. I Reg., VII, 3 : Praeparate corda vestra Domino. Zach., I, 3 : Convertimini ad me, dicit Dominus exercituum, et convertar ad vos.
The first part is proved by reason 1. A perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent esse, according to the common course of divine providence is not introduced into a subject unless it be disposed and prepared. Yet habitual grace is a perfect and complete form, giving fixed and permanent supernatural esse. Ergo. — The minor stands. The major also is evident both in natural things and in supernatural. Thus in natural things substantial forms, whether animate or inanimate, are introduced only into disposed matter; in supernatural things, the divine essence, as intelligible form, is not united to the blessed intellect except through the light of glory disposing it. 1 Here q. 112, a. 2, c.
Probatur prima pars ratione1. Forma perfecta et completa, dans esse fixum et permanens, juxta communem providentiae divinae cursum non introducitur in subjectum, nisi sit dispositum et praeparatum. Atqui gratia habitualis est forma perfecta et completa, dans esse supernaturale fixum et permanens. Ergo. — Minor constat. Major etiam patet, tam in naturalibus quam in supernaturalibus. Sic in naturalibus, formae substantiales, sive animatae sive inanimatae, non introducuntur nisi in materiam dispositam ; in supernaturalibus, divina essentia, ut forma intelligibilis, non unitur intellectui beato nisi per lumen gloriae disposito. 1 Hic q. 112, a. 2, c.
The second part is likewise proved by reason 1. Grace is conferred on an adult man by God moving him. Yet God moves all things according to the mode of each; but man is by nature of free will, and therefore it is proper to him to be moved through free will. Ergo in the adult there is not made by God a motion to grace without a motion of free will. 1 Here q. 113, a. 3, c.
Probatur secunda pars item ratione1. Confertur gratia homini adulto a Deo movente ipsum. Atqui Deus movet omnia secundum modum cujusque ; homo autem est secundum naturam liberi arbitrii, ideoque proprium est illi moveri per liberum arbitrium. Ergo in adulto non fit a Deo motio ad gratiam sine motu liberi arbitrii. 1 Hic q. 113, a. 3, c.
It is confirmed. According to the common course of divine providence, a form is introduced only into a subject disposed according to its proper mode. Yet the proper mode by which a man in possession of himself disposes himself to good is through the act of free will. Ergo.
Confirmatur. Secundum communem divinae providentiae cursum, forma non introducitur nisi in subjectum juxta proprium modum dispositum. Atqui proprius modus quo homo sui compos se disponit ad bonum, est per actum liberi arbitrii. Ergo.
I said, « according to the common course of divine providence; » because it must not be denied that God of absolute power can confer grace on one not disposed, as on one sleeping, since in this there is nothing repugnant. But reasoning must be about commonly contingent things only, as constituting rule and law.
Dixi, « secundum communem divinae providentiae cursum ; » quia negari non debet quin Deus de potentia absoluta possit conferre gratiam non disposito, ut dormienti, cum in hoc nulla sit repugnantia. Sed de communiter contingentibus tantum, utpote regulam et legem constituentibus, ratiocinandum est.
Note, that acts of free will moved by God concur to grace not effectively, but dispositively only. For the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, teaches this: « The causes of this justification are:... efficient, the merciful God;... instrumental, the sacrament of baptism. » And St. Thomas says, q. 28 de Veritate, ad 2: « The sacrament of penance has to confer grace by virtue of the keys, by which the penitent subjects himself. Contrition therefore, if considered in itself, has reference to grace only by way of disposition; but if considered inasmuch as it has the virtue of the keys in vow, thus it operates sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as appears in the adult who has the sacrament of baptism in vow only. From this therefore it is not had that contrition is the efficient cause of the remission of guilt, speaking per se, but the virtue of the key or baptism. » He teaches the same in IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 2, a. 5, quaestiunc. 1.
Nota, actus liberi arbitrii a Deo motos, non effective, sed dispositive tantum ad gratiam concurrere. Nam concilium Trid., sess. VI, cap. 7, hoc docet : « Hujus justificationis causae sunt :... efficiens, misericors Deus ;... instrumentalis, sacramentum baptismi. » Et D. Thomas dicit, q. 28 de Veritate, ad 2 : « Poenitentiae sacramentum habet conferre gratiam ex virtute clavium, quibus se poenitens subjicit. Contritio igitur, si secundum se consideretur, non se habet ad gratiam nisi per modum dispositionis ; sed, si consideretur in quantum habet virtutem clavium in voto, sic sacramentaliter operatur in virtute sacramenti poenitentiae, sicut et in virtute baptismi, ut patet in adulto qui habet sacramentum baptismi in voto tantum. Ex hoc igitur non habetur quod contritio sit causa efficiens remissionis culpae, per se loquendo, sed virtus clavis vel baptismus. » Idem docet in IV Sentent., dist. 17, q. 2, a. 5, quaestiunc. 1.
You will ask 4° whether grace is greater in one than in another.
Petes 4° utrum gratia sit major in uno quam in alio.
I answer. affirmatively 1. That Scripture indicates everywhere. 1 Here q. 112, a. 4, c.
Resp. affirmative1. Id passim indicant Scripturae. 1 Hic q. 112, a. 4, c.
The reason is, because it is common to every subject to receive the form more or less, according as it is more or less disposed to it. The proximate reason therefore of this inequality of grace is the inequality of dispositions on the part of man; the first and remote one is the will of God, which is author not only of grace but also of the disposition to it, dividing to each as he wills, I Cor., XII, 11, and giving to each one grace according to the measure of the donation of Christ, Ephes., IV, 7. Whence, as he bestows unequal grace, so also unequal disposition to it, unto the consummation of the saints, unto the edification of the body of Christ, as is added in the same place, that is, that out of diverse grades the beauty and perfection of the Church may arise, as also in natural things he instituted diverse grades of beings, that the universe might be perfect.
Ratio est, quia commune est omni subjecto ut plus vel minus formam recipiat, secundum quod est plus vel minus dispositum ad illam. Proxima ergo ratio hujus inaequalitatis gratiae est inaequalitas dispositionum ex parte hominis ; prima et remota est voluntas Dei, quae non solum gratiae, sed etiam dispositionis ad illam est author, dividens singulis prout vult, I Cor., XII, 11, et unicuique dans gratiam secundum mensuram donationis Christi, Ephes., IV, 7. Unde, sicut inaequalem gratiam, ita et inaequalem dispositionem ad illam tribuit, ad consummationem sanctorum, in aedificationem corporis Christi, ut ibidem additur, id est, ut ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio Ecclesia consurgat, sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus diversos gradus entium instituit, ut esset universum perfectum.
You will ask 5° whether anyone can be certain he is in grace.
Petes 5° utrum aliquis possit esse certus se esse in gratia.
I answer.2 Special revelation set aside, no one can be certain that he is in grace with absolute certainty, under which falsehood cannot lie, or which at least excludes all dread; but only with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural. This is against the Lutherans and Calvinists asserting that each Christian is bound to believe that he was justified, and that men are justified by this faith alone. It is also against certain Catholics, among whom Catharinus contends that a man can be certain he has grace with absolute certainty — indeed not immediately of faith, but through theological discourse; Vega, with moral certainty which excludes all dread, such as is certainty about the existence of the city of Rome. 2 Ibid., a. 5, c.
Resp.2 Seclusa speciali revelatione, nemo potest esse certus se esse in gratia certitudine absoluta, cui non possit subesse falsum, aut saltem quae excludat omnem formidinem ; sed solum certitudine secundum quid, morali et conjecturali. Est contra Lutheranos et Calvinistas asserentes unumquemque christianum credere teneri se fuisse justificatum, et hac sola fide homines justificari. Est etiam contra quosdam catholicos, inter quos Catharinus contendit hominem posse esse certum se habere gratiam certitudine absoluta, non quidem fidei immediate, sed mediante discursu theologico ; Vega vero certitudine morali quae omnem excludat formidinem, qualis est certitudo de existentia urbis Romae. 2 Ibid., a. 5, c.
The first part is proved. 1° From Holy Scripture. Eccles., IX, 1:
Probatur prima pars. 1° Ex S. Scriptura. Eccles., IX, 1 :
There are just men and wise, and their works are in the hand of God; and yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred. Eccli., V, 3: Be not without fear about sin forgiven. I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; but he that judgeth me, is the Lord. Paul says this of himself, who certainly was then just.
Sunt justi atque sapientes, et opera eorum in manu Dei ; et tamen nescit homo utrum amore an odio dignus sit. Eccli., V, 3 : De propitiato peccato noli esse sine metu. I Cor., IV, 4 : Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc justificatus sum ; qui autem judicat me, Dominus est. Hoc de seipso dicit Paulus, qui tunc certe justus erat.
2° From the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 9: « Although it is necessary to believe that sins neither are remitted nor ever were remitted, except gratuitously by divine mercy for Christ's sake; yet must it not be said that sins are forgiven or have been forgiven to anyone who boasts of his confidence and certainty of the remission of his sins, and rests on that alone... But neither must this be asserted, that they who are truly justified ought to settle within themselves without any doubt whatever that they are justified, and that no one is absolved from sins and justified but he who believes with certainty that he is absolved and justified, and that by this faith alone absolution and justification are perfected: as if he who believes not this doubted of the promises of God and of the efficacy of the death and resurrection of Christ. For, as no pious person ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments; so each one, while he regards himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may fear and tremble concerning his own grace, since no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God. » By this decree the aforesaid errors are refuted.
2° Ex concilio Trid., sess. VI, cap. 9 : « Quamvis necessarium sit credere, neque remitti neque remissa unquam fuisse peccata, nisi gratis, divina misericordia, propter Christum ; nemini tamen fiduciam et certitudinem remissionis peccatorum suorum jactanti, et in ea sola quiescenti, peccata dimitti vel dimissa esse dicendum est... Sed neque illud asserendum est, oportere eos qui vere justificati sunt, absque ulla omnino dubitatione apud semetipsos statuere se esse justificatos, neminemque a peccatis absolvi ac justificari, nisi eum qui certo credat se absolutum et justificatum esse, atque hac sola fide absolutionem et justificationem perfici : quasi qui hoc non credit, de Dei promissis deque mortis et resurrectione Christi efficacia dubitet. Nam, sicut nemo pius de Dei misericordia, de Christi merito, deque sacramentorum virtute et efficacia dubitare debet ; sic quilibet, dum seipsum suamque propriam infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia formidare et timere potest, cum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, cui non potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecutum. » Hoc decreto supradicti errores conficiuntur.
3° By reason from St. Thomas. After demonstrating here q. 112, a. 3, c. that this cannot be certainly known except by revelation, if perchance it be present, he adds in what manner the same cannot be known: « In another way man knows something by himself, and this with certitude. And thus no one can know that he has grace. For certitude cannot be had of anything unless it can be judged by its proper principle; for thus certitude is had of demonstrative conclusions through indemonstrable universal principles. But no one could know that he had knowledge of any conclusion if he were ignorant of the principle. Now the principle and object of grace is God himself, who on account of his excellence is unknown to us... And therefore his presence in us and absence cannot be known with certitude, according to that, Job, IX, 11: If he shall come to me, I shall not see him; if he depart, I shall not understand. And therefore man cannot judge with certitude whether he himself has grace, according to that, I Cor., IV, 3 and 4: But neither do I judge my own self... But he that judgeth me, is the Lord. »
3° Ratione ex S. Thoma. Postquam hic q. 112, a. 3, c. demonstravit hoc certo sciri non posse nisi per revelationem, si forte adsit, addit secundum modum quo idem sciri nequit : « Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsum, et hoc certitudinaliter. Et sic nullus potest scire se habere gratiam. Certitudo enim non potest haberi de aliquo, nisi possit dijudicari per proprium principium ; sic enim certitudo habetur de conclusionibus demonstrativis per indemonstrabilia universalia principia. Nullus autem posset scire se habere scientiam alicujus conclusionis, si principium ignoraret. Principium autem gratiae et objectum ejus est ipse Deus, qui propter sui excellentiam est nobis ignotus... Et ideo ejus praesentia in nobis et absentia per certitudinem cognosci non potest, secundum illud, Job, IX, 11 : Si venerit ad me, non videbo eum ; si autem abierit, non intelligam. Et ideo homo non potest per certitudinem dijudicare utrum ipse habeat gratiam, secundum illud, I Cor., IV, 3 et 4 : Sed neque meipsum judico... Qui autem judicat me, Dominus est. »
The second part is proved. That a man can know with certainty secundum quid, moral and conjectural, from signs and indications, that he is in grace, no one denies. What these signs and indications are the Angelic Doctor explains in the same place: « In a third way something is known conjecturally through certain signs. And in this way anyone can know that he has grace, insofar namely as he perceives himself to delight in God and to despise worldly things, and insofar as man is not conscious to himself of any mortal sin. According to which mode can be understood what is had Apocal., II, 17: To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna,... which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it; namely because he who receives it knows by a certain experience of sweetness, which he experiences not who does not receive it. This knowledge nevertheless is imperfect. Whence the Apostle says, I Cor., IV, 4: I am not conscious to myself of any thing, but yet I am not hereby justified; because, as is said in Psal. XVIII, 13 and 14: Who can understand sins? From secret ones, etc. »
Probatur secunda pars. Hominem posse scire certo certitudine secundum quid, morali et conjecturali, ex signis et indiciis, se esse in gratia, nemo negat. Quae vero sint haec signa et indicia explicat Angelicus, ibidem : « Tertio modo cognoscitur aliquid conjecturaliter per aliqua signa. Et hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, in quantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo et contemnere res mundanas, et in quantum homo non est conscius sibi alicujus peccati mortalis. Secundum quem modum potest intelligi quod habetur Apocal., II, 17 : Vincenti dabo manna absconditum,... quod nemo novit, nisi qui accipit ; quia scilicet ille qui accipit, per quamdam experientiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit. Ista tamen cognitio imperfecta est. Unde Apostolus dicit, I Cor., IV, 4 : Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc justificatus sum ; quia, ut dicitur in Psal. XVIII, 13 et 14 : Delicta quis intelligit ? Ab occultis, etc. »
Even the sweet disposition of divine providence persuades that, as man ought not to have all manner of certainty of his own justice, lest he be carried away into pride and presumption; so congruously he ought to have moral and conjectural certainty, lest he be tortured by perpetual disturbance of soul, but between fear and hope work out his salvation.
Suadet etiam suavis divina providentiae dispositio ut, quemadmodum non oportuit ut homo omnimodam suae justitiae certitudinem haberet, ne in superbiam et praesumptionem efferretur ; ita congruebat ut moralem et conjecturalem certitudinem haberet, ne perpetua animi turbatione cruciaretur, sed inter timorem et spem salutem suam operaretur.