The Comparison of Sins with One Another

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, 8, 9, 10.

441. Principle I. Not all sins are equal. - For sin is not a pure and simple privation, but retains something of the order of reason to good; whence, just as sickness is greater or lesser according as it deprives more or less of health, so sin is more or less grave according as it recedes more or less from the rectitude of reason.

It is of faith against the Stoics and Jovinian (cf. proposition 20 of Baius).

It is proved: 1) from the Scriptures: John XIX, 11; I John V, 16; Matt. V, 22; Ezech. XVI; Jerem. VII; Lam. IV;

2. from the unequal punishments of sins: When the punishments of sins are unequal, the sins themselves are also unequal, because inequality of punishment supposes inequality of fault. But punishments are unequal; therefore also sins (cf. Deut. XXV; Luke X, 12-14);

3. from the unequal species of sins: Species stand as numbers. But sins are distinct in species. Therefore they are unequal in the notion of sin, and therefore their gravity is not the same (a. 2).

442. Principle II. The fundamental or principal gravity of sins:

1. Is taken immediately from the objects from which sins have fundamental morality or their first species. For just as sickness is graver in proportion as it injures a nobler principle or organ of life, so sin is graver in proportion as action is against a nobler end or object (a. 3).

Hence sins directly against God are according to themselves or according to species (that is, other things being equal, circumstances not being considered) graver than sins against Christ as man; and these than those which are done against worship and sacred things; and these than those which are done against oneself and one's neighbor. Moreover suicide is greater than homicide, and this than adultery and fornication, which are against the propagation of life alone, and these than theft, which is against exterior goods.

2. It is taken mediately from opposition to virtues. Hence a) those sins are according to themselves graver which, concerning the principal object of the virtues, are directly repugnant to the more worthy virtues, so that the highest sin against a more worthy virtue is greater than the greatest sin against an inferior virtue. Therefore the greatest sin is hatred of God, which is against charity; there follow sins directly against faith, against hope, against religion, against penance, and against the cardinal virtues in order (a. 4).

We said: which are directly repugnant to the principal object; for indirect opposition to a more worthy virtue, or direct opposition concerning a secondary object, can be less than direct opposition to the primary object of an inferior virtue, for example, omission of an act of charity, or scandal or envy is less than heresy; reading a heretical book, than despair.

b) Among sins which are repugnant to the same virtue, those are according to themselves graver which recede more from the principal inclination of the virtue; whence avarice is a greater sin than prodigality, timidity than audacity, intemperance than insensibility, and generally a sin of commission than one of omission, for example, perjury than violation of an oath.

c) Likewise those are according to themselves graver which are opposed to a greater rectitude, good, or office of the same virtue, for example, homicide than adultery, and this than detraction, and this than theft; similarly blasphemy is graver than perjury, and this than sacrilege.

3. It is also taken mediately from opposition to precepts: sins are according to themselves graver if they are opposed to more worthy precepts, that is, precepts enacted from a nobler motive or by a nobler legislator, or more necessary precepts; for example, other things being equal, a sin against divine law is greater than one against human law.

443. Principle III. The accidental and secondary gravity of sins, by which it can happen that a sin graver from its object is in fact less grave, and vice versa, is taken from circumstances (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7):

1. on the part of the agent or cause: sin is graver in proportion as the free will, which is the proper cause of sin, is greater; the sign of this is often the intensity and duration of the act (a. 6). Hence sins from malice, because they are more from the will, are graver than sins from infirmity or passion, and these than sins done from ignorance;

2. on the part of the act, whether the circumstances change the species (for example, theft of a sacred thing; various sins of lust according to nature), or multiply the reason of sin in the same species (as the prodigal who gives when and to whom he ought not, or he who says diverse contumelies), or increase or diminish the deformity of sin (as he who steals much, scandalizes several, or absolves several sacrilegiously, omits several hours of one day): for sin is from the defect of some due circumstance (a. 7).

Hence a) sin is aggravated according to the condition and dignity of the person against whom it is committed, because this person is as it were the object of sin; whence sins against persons more joined to God or to the sinner or to several are graver (III Kings XIX, 14; Mic. VII, 6). Examples are: the killing of a priest (Zach. II, 8), of a father (Ecclus. XIV, 5), or of a king or public person (Exod. XXII, 28), whose injury redounds upon several (a. 9).

b) Deliberate sins are graver in a person of greater knowledge or virtue, both because he resists sin more easily, and on account of ingratitude and scandal, and on account of the special repugnance of sin to such a person, for example, injustice in a king, fornication in a priest, idolatry in a believer. But sins which are done by subreption on account of the infirmity of human nature are lesser, because such a person less neglects to repress sins of this kind (a. 10).

c) Sins against neighbor are graver in proportion as greater harm follows from them, especially if it was intended for its own sake; also if it was not intended in itself but nevertheless foreseen at least confusedly, and there was no just cause for permitting it (a. 8).

1. Thus summarily. St. Thomas more distinctly: 1) if greater harm is distinctly foreseen and intended, it directly increases the sin; 2) if the harm is distinctly foreseen but is not intended, and there was not a just cause of neglecting it, it indirectly increases, "namely, insofar as it proceeds from a will much inclined to sin that someone does not omit doing damage either to himself or to another, which simply he would not will"; 3) indeed, if it is neither distinctly foreseen nor intended, but follows per se from the act of sin, it directly increases the sin (provided, however, that in some way it was foreseen confusedly), "because those things which follow per se upon sin pertain in some way to the very species of sin"; but if it is related per accidens to sin, it does not increase directly.

444. Corollary. - Not every spiritual sin is of greater fault than every carnal sin; but, other things being equal, with only the difference of spirituality and carnality considered, spiritual sins are graver: 1) on the part of the subject, because carnal sins are consummated in the carnal appetite, to which it principally belongs to be converted to bodily good, and therefore they have more of conversion to created good; but spiritual sins are more in reason and will, to which it belongs to be converted to God and to be turned away from Him, whence they have more of aversion, from which fault proceeds; 2) on the part of him against whom one sins: one sinning by spiritual sin sins against God or neighbor, while one sinning by carnal sin sins per se against his own body, which he uses unduly; 3) on the part of motive: carnal sins are lesser because we are more impelled to them, which diminishes freedom. Nevertheless carnal sins are of greater infamy because they consist in a pleasure common to us and beasts, and they are of greater adherence and danger on account of the pleasure annexed (a. 5).

445. Observations. - 1. Sins are not all connected. Mortal sins indeed all contemn the same author of law, God, and agree in aversion, and therefore are contrary to charity (which is the end of the law) and deprive of grace and incur guilt of the same punishment, according to what James says, II, 10: "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all," that is, guilty of that fault and punishment which is found in all; whence one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Nevertheless the sinner does not intend to be turned away from God and to recede from that which is according to reason, but rather to tend into certain appetible goods; but goods of this kind are diverse, and are not connected, indeed sometimes they are contrary, and consequently one can be sought without another, as James himself testifies, II, 11 (a. 1).

2. From the sixteenth century many speak of four sins which in the Scriptures are said to cry to heaven, because, as several think, they are committed directly against the highest goods necessary as a foundation to every society. Yet this is not sufficiently founded either in the Scriptures or in reason, as the distinguished professor Leroux shows in Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege, May 1914.

false, and if taken only as the effect of an angry mind belching forth indifferently whatever occurs, as often happens among quarreling women, they seem to be one sin, since there is no injury of honor or of fame, but each insult, though different, tends to this, that it irritate and offend the other. But if these are reckoned to be true and are truly imputed, there will be as many sins as there are insults of different kinds.

I say 1°: All sins are not interconnected¹. ¹ Here q. 73, a. 1, o.

It is proved. Such is the difference between the intention of the agent according to virtue, and the intention of the sinner, that the intention of the agent according to virtue is that he follow the rule of reason, and therefore the intention of all virtues tends unto the same thing, and on this account all virtues, at least in the perfect state, hold connection with one another in the right reason of things to be done, which is prudence; but the intention of the sinner is not unto this, that he depart from what is according to reason, but rather that he tend toward some desirable good from which it takes its species. But goods of this kind, toward which the intention of the sinner tends and by which it is specified, are diverse, holding no connection with one another, nay sometimes contrary among themselves: as prodigality and avarice, timidity and daring, intemperance and insensibility, etc. Therefore.

You will say: In Jacob., II, 10 it is said: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. But to be guilty of all sins and to have all sins is the same. Therefore.^{2 2} Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

I answer. The Apostle speaks of sin on the part of aversion, and his sense is that he who commits one mortal sin turns away from God, despises him and incurs guilt of eternal punishment, which are common to all mortal sins.

I say 2° against the Stoics: Not all sins are equal¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 2, o.

The conclusion is of faith expressly [set forth] in various places of Scripture³. ³ Ibid., o.

In Joann., XIX, 11 Christ says to Pilate: He that delivered me to thee hath the greater sin. Jerem., VII, 26: They have done worse than their fathers. Thren., IV, 6: The iniquity of the daughter of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom. And elsewhere.

Whence Hieron., lib. II cont. Jovin., c. 16: « There are light sins, he says, there are grave: it is one thing to owe ten thousand talents, another a farthing. »

Proof by reason. Sins take their species from objects, as appears from the preceding. But not all the objects of sins are equal, as is evident per se. Therefore.

The other proof lies in the fundamental confutation of the Stoics, whereof presently in the reply to the objection.

Whence

Obj. with the Stoics: Sin is privation. But privation consists in the indivisible, nor does it admit more and less, as appears in darkness, death, blindness, etc. Therefore.

I answer. 1° sin is not pure privation, but an act deprived of due order; and it is specified not on the part of the privation, but on the part of the act, as St. Thomas taught in question 72 preceding, and we with him and all Thomists, even those who place the formal [element] of sin in the privative.

But grant that sin be pure privation,

I answer. 2º I distinguish the major. Sin is privation in a certain respect and in becoming, I concede the major; privation simply and in completed being, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the major. Privation simply and in completed being admits not more and less, I concede the minor; privation in a certain respect and in becoming, I deny the minor. There is therefore a twofold privation: one simple and in completed being, which leaves nothing of the opposite, as death and darkness; another in a certain respect and in becoming, which does not wholly take away the form of the opposite, and consequently has breadth so much greater or less, as it takes away more or less of the form opposed. As sickness, which is privation of health, admits more and less, because it does not take away totally the form opposed; for it leaves life, which is the root of health. But sin is thus privation in becoming, because it does not take away totally the form opposed; for it leaves reason and the natural inclination unto the honest good, which is the root of formal rectitude.

You will insist: Sin takes away totally the form opposed; thus e.g. in the act of lust nothing remains of the rectitude of temperance. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Sin takes away totally the immediately opposed form, I concede; mediately opposed, I deny. Granted therefore that sin takes away totally the formal rectitude to which it is immediately opposed, nevertheless it takes away not totally its root, namely the practical principles of good, synderesis, the inclination of reason unto the honest good, but only strives against it and tends against it; and therefore the more it strives against and tends against it, the graver is the sin; as, although sickness takes away health totally in the infirm part, since however it takes not away life, but only tends toward and disposes unto its destruction, therefore it admits more and less, and the graver it is, the more it disposes unto death.

I say 1°: The quantity or essential inequality of sins is derived from the object in point of gravity¹. ¹ Here q. 73, a. 3, o.

It is proved. Thence is sought the essential quantity or gravity of sin, whence its species is sought². But the species of sin is derived from the object, as we said in the places soon to be cited. Therefore. ² Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

I say 2°: The essential inequality of sins is also sought per se and caeteris paribus from the virtues to which they are opposed³; so that that sin is the more grave which is directly and principally opposed to the nobler virtue. ³ Ibid., a. 4, o.

This conclusion follows from the preceding; because, the nobler the virtue against which a sin is opposed, the more excellent is the object about which it is concerned. But it was said in the preceding conclusion that the essential gravity of sins is derived from the object. Therefore.

Understand both these conclusions 1º per se, because per accidens a sin whose object is more grave and is opposed to a nobler virtue can, by reason of the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, be venial; and another whose object is less grave and is opposed to a lesser virtue, mortal. 2º Understand it caeteris paribus, so that the vices between which the comparison is made are concerned with the primary object of the virtue to which they are opposed; so that, if a supreme vice is opposed on one side to the supreme virtue, so also on the other: for want of which, hatred of one's neighbor, for example, although opposed to charity, the most noble of virtues, is nevertheless not the most grave of sins, because it is not opposed to the primary object of charity, which is God.

I say 3°: The gravity of sin is also sought from the circumstances⁴; because each thing is apt to be increased by that from which ⁴ Ibid., a. 7, o.