Third Question: On the Comparison and Gravity of Sins

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 73; De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, 8, 9, 10.

441. Principle I. Not all sins are equal. - For sin is not a pure and simple privation, but retains something of the order of reason to good; whence, just as sickness is greater or lesser according as it deprives more or less of health, so sin is more or less grave according as it recedes more or less from the rectitude of reason.

It is of faith against the Stoics and Jovinian (cf. proposition 20 of Baius).

It is proved: 1) from the Scriptures: John XIX, 11; I John V, 16; Matt. V, 22; Ezech. XVI; Jerem. VII; Lam. IV;

2. from the unequal punishments of sins: When the punishments of sins are unequal, the sins themselves are also unequal, because inequality of punishment supposes inequality of fault. But punishments are unequal; therefore also sins (cf. Deut. XXV; Luke X, 12-14);

3. from the unequal species of sins: Species stand as numbers. But sins are distinct in species. Therefore they are unequal in the notion of sin, and therefore their gravity is not the same (a. 2).

442. Principle II. The fundamental or principal gravity of sins:

1. Is taken immediately from the objects from which sins have fundamental morality or their first species. For just as sickness is graver in proportion as it injures a nobler principle or organ of life, so sin is graver in proportion as action is against a nobler end or object (a. 3).

Hence sins directly against God are according to themselves or according to species (that is, other things being equal, circumstances not being considered) graver than sins against Christ as man; and these than those which are done against worship and sacred things; and these than those which are done against oneself and one's neighbor. Moreover suicide is greater than homicide, and this than adultery and fornication, which are against the propagation of life alone, and these than theft, which is against exterior goods.

2. It is taken mediately from opposition to virtues. Hence a) those sins are according to themselves graver which, concerning the principal object of the virtues, are directly repugnant to the more worthy virtues, so that the highest sin against a more worthy virtue is greater than the greatest sin against an inferior virtue. Therefore the greatest sin is hatred of God, which is against charity; there follow sins directly against faith, against hope, against religion, against penance, and against the cardinal virtues in order (a. 4).

We said: which are directly repugnant to the principal object; for indirect opposition to a more worthy virtue, or direct opposition concerning a secondary object, can be less than direct opposition to the primary object of an inferior virtue, for example, omission of an act of charity, or scandal or envy is less than heresy; reading a heretical book, than despair.

b) Among sins which are repugnant to the same virtue, those are according to themselves graver which recede more from the principal inclination of the virtue; whence avarice is a greater sin than prodigality, timidity than audacity, intemperance than insensibility, and generally a sin of commission than one of omission, for example, perjury than violation of an oath.

c) Likewise those are according to themselves graver which are opposed to a greater rectitude, good, or office of the same virtue, for example, homicide than adultery, and this than detraction, and this than theft; similarly blasphemy is graver than perjury, and this than sacrilege.

3. It is also taken mediately from opposition to precepts: sins are according to themselves graver if they are opposed to more worthy precepts, that is, precepts enacted from a nobler motive or by a nobler legislator, or more necessary precepts; for example, other things being equal, a sin against divine law is greater than one against human law.

443. Principle III. The accidental and secondary gravity of sins, by which it can happen that a sin graver from its object is in fact less grave, and vice versa, is taken from circumstances (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7):

1. on the part of the agent or cause: sin is graver in proportion as the free will, which is the proper cause of sin, is greater; the sign of this is often the intensity and duration of the act (a. 6). Hence sins from malice, because they are more from the will, are graver than sins from infirmity or passion, and these than sins done from ignorance;

2. on the part of the act, whether the circumstances change the species (for example, theft of a sacred thing; various sins of lust according to nature), or multiply the reason of sin in the same species (as the prodigal who gives when and to whom he ought not, or he who says diverse contumelies), or increase or diminish the deformity of sin (as he who steals much, scandalizes several, or absolves several sacrilegiously, omits several hours of one day): for sin is from the defect of some due circumstance (a. 7).

Hence a) sin is aggravated according to the condition and dignity of the person against whom it is committed, because this person is as it were the object of sin; whence sins against persons more joined to God or to the sinner or to several are graver (III Kings XIX, 14; Mic. VII, 6). Examples are: the killing of a priest (Zach. II, 8), of a father (Ecclus. XIV, 5), or of a king or public person (Exod. XXII, 28), whose injury redounds upon several (a. 9).

b) Deliberate sins are graver in a person of greater knowledge or virtue, both because he resists sin more easily, and on account of ingratitude and scandal, and on account of the special repugnance of sin to such a person, for example, injustice in a king, fornication in a priest, idolatry in a believer. But sins which are done by subreption on account of the infirmity of human nature are lesser, because such a person less neglects to repress sins of this kind (a. 10).

c) Sins against neighbor are graver in proportion as greater harm follows from them, especially if it was intended for its own sake; also if it was not intended in itself but nevertheless foreseen at least confusedly, and there was no just cause for permitting it (a. 8).

1. Thus summarily. St. Thomas more distinctly: 1) if greater harm is distinctly foreseen and intended, it directly increases the sin; 2) if the harm is distinctly foreseen but is not intended, and there was not a just cause of neglecting it, it indirectly increases, "namely, insofar as it proceeds from a will much inclined to sin that someone does not omit doing damage either to himself or to another, which simply he would not will"; 3) indeed, if it is neither distinctly foreseen nor intended, but follows per se from the act of sin, it directly increases the sin (provided, however, that in some way it was foreseen confusedly), "because those things which follow per se upon sin pertain in some way to the very species of sin"; but if it is related per accidens to sin, it does not increase directly.

444. Corollary. - Not every spiritual sin is of greater fault than every carnal sin; but, other things being equal, with only the difference of spirituality and carnality considered, spiritual sins are graver: 1) on the part of the subject, because carnal sins are consummated in the carnal appetite, to which it principally belongs to be converted to bodily good, and therefore they have more of conversion to created good; but spiritual sins are more in reason and will, to which it belongs to be converted to God and to be turned away from Him, whence they have more of aversion, from which fault proceeds; 2) on the part of him against whom one sins: one sinning by spiritual sin sins against God or neighbor, while one sinning by carnal sin sins per se against his own body, which he uses unduly; 3) on the part of motive: carnal sins are lesser because we are more impelled to them, which diminishes freedom. Nevertheless carnal sins are of greater infamy because they consist in a pleasure common to us and beasts, and they are of greater adherence and danger on account of the pleasure annexed (a. 5).

445. Observations. - 1. Sins are not all connected. Mortal sins indeed all contemn the same author of law, God, and agree in aversion, and therefore are contrary to charity (which is the end of the law) and deprive of grace and incur guilt of the same punishment, according to what James says, II, 10: "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all," that is, guilty of that fault and punishment which is found in all; whence one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Nevertheless the sinner does not intend to be turned away from God and to recede from that which is according to reason, but rather to tend into certain appetible goods; but goods of this kind are diverse, and are not connected, indeed sometimes they are contrary, and consequently one can be sought without another, as James himself testifies, II, 11 (a. 1).

2. From the sixteenth century many speak of four sins which in the Scriptures are said to cry to heaven, because, as several think, they are committed directly against the highest goods necessary as a foundation to every society. Yet this is not sufficiently founded either in the Scriptures or in reason, as the distinguished professor Leroux shows in Revue Ecclesiastique de Liege, May 1914.