Whether all sins are connected with one another, and equal?

I say 1°: All sins are not interconnected¹. ¹ Here q. 73, a. 1, o.

It is proved. Such is the difference between the intention of the agent according to virtue, and the intention of the sinner, that the intention of the agent according to virtue is that he follow the rule of reason, and therefore the intention of all virtues tends unto the same thing, and on this account all virtues, at least in the perfect state, hold connection with one another in the right reason of things to be done, which is prudence; but the intention of the sinner is not unto this, that he depart from what is according to reason, but rather that he tend toward some desirable good from which it takes its species. But goods of this kind, toward which the intention of the sinner tends and by which it is specified, are diverse, holding no connection with one another, nay sometimes contrary among themselves: as prodigality and avarice, timidity and daring, intemperance and insensibility, etc. Therefore.

You will say: In Jacob., II, 10 it is said: Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all. But to be guilty of all sins and to have all sins is the same. Therefore.^{2 2} Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

I answer. The Apostle speaks of sin on the part of aversion, and his sense is that he who commits one mortal sin turns away from God, despises him and incurs guilt of eternal punishment, which are common to all mortal sins.

I say 2° against the Stoics: Not all sins are equal¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 2, o.

The conclusion is of faith expressly [set forth] in various places of Scripture³. ³ Ibid., o.

In Joann., XIX, 11 Christ says to Pilate: He that delivered me to thee hath the greater sin. Jerem., VII, 26: They have done worse than their fathers. Thren., IV, 6: The iniquity of the daughter of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom. And elsewhere.

Whence Hieron., lib. II cont. Jovin., c. 16: « There are light sins, he says, there are grave: it is one thing to owe ten thousand talents, another a farthing. »

Proof by reason. Sins take their species from objects, as appears from the preceding. But not all the objects of sins are equal, as is evident per se. Therefore.

The other proof lies in the fundamental confutation of the Stoics, whereof presently in the reply to the objection.

Whence

Obj. with the Stoics: Sin is privation. But privation consists in the indivisible, nor does it admit more and less, as appears in darkness, death, blindness, etc. Therefore.

I answer. 1° sin is not pure privation, but an act deprived of due order; and it is specified not on the part of the privation, but on the part of the act, as St. Thomas taught in question 72 preceding, and we with him and all Thomists, even those who place the formal [element] of sin in the privative.

But grant that sin be pure privation,

I answer. 2º I distinguish the major. Sin is privation in a certain respect and in becoming, I concede the major; privation simply and in completed being, I deny the major. Similarly I distinguish the major. Privation simply and in completed being admits not more and less, I concede the minor; privation in a certain respect and in becoming, I deny the minor. There is therefore a twofold privation: one simple and in completed being, which leaves nothing of the opposite, as death and darkness; another in a certain respect and in becoming, which does not wholly take away the form of the opposite, and consequently has breadth so much greater or less, as it takes away more or less of the form opposed. As sickness, which is privation of health, admits more and less, because it does not take away totally the form opposed; for it leaves life, which is the root of health. But sin is thus privation in becoming, because it does not take away totally the form opposed; for it leaves reason and the natural inclination unto the honest good, which is the root of formal rectitude.

You will insist: Sin takes away totally the form opposed; thus e.g. in the act of lust nothing remains of the rectitude of temperance. Therefore.

I answer. I distinguish the antecedent. Sin takes away totally the immediately opposed form, I concede; mediately opposed, I deny. Granted therefore that sin takes away totally the formal rectitude to which it is immediately opposed, nevertheless it takes away not totally its root, namely the practical principles of good, synderesis, the inclination of reason unto the honest good, but only strives against it and tends against it; and therefore the more it strives against and tends against it, the graver is the sin; as, although sickness takes away health totally in the infirm part, since however it takes not away life, but only tends toward and disposes unto its destruction, therefore it admits more and less, and the graver it is, the more it disposes unto death.