The Conformity of the Human Will with the Divine Will

I. These things are to be distinguished: 1. the material thing willed, i.e., the thing itself willed; 2. the formal thing willed, i.e., the reason for willing, which is divided into proximate and ultimate. The proximate reason is the particular reason on account of which we will something; the ultimate reason is the glory of God.

II. The human will must be conformed to the divine will as follows:

1. The human will is held to be negatively conformed to the divine will in the thing willed, both material and formal; that is, it can never disapprove either that which God wills or the reason on account of which he wills it.

2. The human will is also held to be positively conformed to the divine will in the ultimate formal thing willed, but not always in the material thing willed, nor in the proximate formal thing willed.

a) It is held in the ultimate formal thing willed, because it is held always to will the glory of God; but the glory of God is the same as the ultimate formal thing willed.

b) It is not always held in the material thing willed, nor in the proximate formal thing willed; in other words, it can fail to will a thing willed by God, but under another reason. Namely, one and the same thing can, under different consideration, be good and evil; for example, the death of a robber considered by a judge as necessary for the common good is good; considered by his wife as harmful to the family, it is evil. Consequently the will by which the judge, whose role it is to attend to the common good, wills the death of the robber is good; and the will by which the wife, whose role it is to attend to the good of the family, does not will the death of her husband is also good, because the will which does not will a thing under the aspect of evil is no less good than the one which wills the thing under the aspect of good. But God as universal provider attends in willing to universal reasons, such as the common good of the universe, for which it is necessary that contrary things exist and be conserved, and the manifestation of his attributes; according to these reasons the thing willed by God is good, which nevertheless according to the particular reasons to which man must attend, and to which God wills him to attend, is evil. Therefore the human will, in order that it be right, is not held to be conformed to the divine will in the material thing willed.

The minor will become clear by an example: God, as supreme director and provider of the whole world, according to the requirement and universal reasons of the common good and of his glory, wills my father to die. That death, considered according to those universal reasons, is good, and therefore good is the will which wills it. I, a private man, whose role it is not to attend to those universal reasons, but to particular ones, whether of my own supposit according to natural inclination, which is good and from God, or of my parent according to filial piety, which, even with God commanding, I am held to follow, do not will that death. That death, considered according to those particular reasons, is evil. Therefore good is the will which does not will it, so that although on the one hand I seem to depart from the divine will, on the other hand by willing thus I am indirectly conformed to the divine will itself, because God himself wills me to will thus.

Hence St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion, c. 101: "Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will; as if a good son should will his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 9 and 10).

I suppose that the human will, in order to be good, generally speaking, ought to be conformed to the divine will ¹, because the first rule and measure of the good will of man is the divine will: for what is first in any genus is the measure of the others of that genus; but the divine will is the first and supreme good. But in what and how it ought to be conformed, there is difficulty. ¹ Here q. 19, a. 9, c.

For whose elucidation it must be noted that in the object of the will two things are to be considered: one which is quasi-material, namely the thing itself willed; another which is quasi-formal, namely the very account of willing, which is the end. Conformity with respect to the thing willed is called conformity in the materially willed; and conformity with respect to the account of willing is called conformity in the formally willed. The question proceeds concerning both, supposing however that the divine will becomes known concerning the particular work; for, if it does not become known, the will can be good without conformity with respect to this work: thus II Reg., VII, 3, David is praised because he willed to build the house of the Lord, which God nevertheless did not will.

But the divine will can become known to us in three ways, namely by revelation, by operation and by precept. For this very fact that God reveals something, or operates it, whether immediately through himself, or through secondary causes intervening, or commands it to be done, it is manifest that he wills that very thing.

These things noted and supposed,

I say: The human will, in order to be right, is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the formally willed, but not in the materially willed, unless his will become known by precept or prohibition ¹. It is common with the Author. ¹ Ibid., a. 10, c; q. 23 de Veritate, a. 8.

The first part is proved ². The formally willed element of the divine will, or its motive as ultimate reason of willing, is the common and divine good, or the common good of the whole universe, insofar as it is ultimately ordered to God himself ³ and to his glory; for the Lord made all things for himself. But the human will, in order to be right, ought to will whatever it wills for the common and divine good, as its last end. Therefore. — Proof of minor 1° The natural appetite of every part is ordered to the common good of the whole. Therefore, a fortiori, what is appetited by the rational appetite ought to be referred to the common good ³. 2° The human will could not be right except insofar as it appetites the true and honest good, as we proved above. But, in appetiting the true and honest good, it virtually and implicitly appetites the divine good, of which the honest good is the beginning and participation. Therefore. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., ad 1. ³ Ibid., ad 1.

Proof of the second part. The same thing willed which is the material object of the will can, under diverse consideration, be good and evil. E. g., the death of a robber considered by the judge as necessary to the common good, is good; considered by the wife as harmful to the family, is evil. Consequently the will by which the judge, whose duty is to attend to the common good, wills the death of the robber, is good; and the will by which the wife, whose duty is to attend to the good of the family, does not will the death of her husband, is also good; because the will that does not will a thing under the aspect of evil is not less good than that which wills a thing under the aspect of good. But God, as universal provider, attends in willing to universal reasons, such as the common good of the universe, to which contraries must be and be conserved, and the manifestation of his attributes: according to which reasons the thing willed by God is good, which nevertheless according to particular reasons, to which man ought to attend and to which God wills him to attend, is evil. Therefore the human will, in order to be right, is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in the materially willed. — The minor will become clear by example. God, as supreme director and provider of the whole world, according to the exigency and universal reasons of the common good and of his glory, wills my father to die in heresy and be damned. That death and damnation, considered according to those universal reasons, is good, and therefore good is the will that wills it. I, a private man, whose duty it is not to attend to those universal reasons, but to particular ones, whether of my own supposit, according to the natural inclination by which I am good from God, or of a parent, according to piety, which, even at the command of God, I am bound to follow, do not will that death and damnation. That death and damnation, considered according to those particular reasons, is evil. Therefore good is the will that does not will it; so that, although on the one side I seem to depart from the divine will, yet on the other, by so willing, I am conformed indirectly to the divine will itself, because God himself wills that I so will. Whence Aug., in Enchirid., c. 101, n. 26, says: « Sometimes with a good will man wills something that God does not will... Just as if a good son should will his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die. »

It is confirmed. No one of sound mind would say that I am bound to will all things harmful to me which, God willing, happen to me: hunger, sickness, the burning of house and barn, the rigor of cold, the heat of the sun, serpents, fleas, etc., as I was saying, the death and damnation of my parents; so that it would not be permitted me, as far as I can, to flee them or strive against them.

I said: « Unless the divine will becomes known by precept or prohibition; » because the willing of God commanding or prohibiting has always annexed to it the will of obliging man to will and to do what he commands, or not to will nor to do what he prohibits: which the other wills have not, whether of good pleasure, of counsel, or of permission.

For the solution of the objections against the second part of the conclusion, it must be observed that the materially willed can be considered in two ways: first, in itself and absolutely; second, formally and reduplicatively, as it underlies the formally willed or the universal end which God intends. The second part therefore of the conclusion is to be understood of the materially willed in itself, with the particular reasons attended to, not of it reduplicatively, as it underlies the formally willed and the universal end of the divine will; for this is to be conformed to it precisely in the formally willed itself.