Scholion. On the Conformity of the Human Will with the Divine Will

I. These things are to be distinguished: 1. the material thing willed, i.e., the thing itself willed; 2. the formal thing willed, i.e., the reason for willing, which is divided into proximate and ultimate. The proximate reason is the particular reason on account of which we will something; the ultimate reason is the glory of God.

II. The human will must be conformed to the divine will as follows:

1. The human will is held to be negatively conformed to the divine will in the thing willed, both material and formal; that is, it can never disapprove either that which God wills or the reason on account of which he wills it.

2. The human will is also held to be positively conformed to the divine will in the ultimate formal thing willed, but not always in the material thing willed, nor in the proximate formal thing willed.

a) It is held in the ultimate formal thing willed, because it is held always to will the glory of God; but the glory of God is the same as the ultimate formal thing willed.

b) It is not always held in the material thing willed, nor in the proximate formal thing willed; in other words, it can fail to will a thing willed by God, but under another reason. Namely, one and the same thing can, under different consideration, be good and evil; for example, the death of a robber considered by a judge as necessary for the common good is good; considered by his wife as harmful to the family, it is evil. Consequently the will by which the judge, whose role it is to attend to the common good, wills the death of the robber is good; and the will by which the wife, whose role it is to attend to the good of the family, does not will the death of her husband is also good, because the will which does not will a thing under the aspect of evil is no less good than the one which wills the thing under the aspect of good. But God as universal provider attends in willing to universal reasons, such as the common good of the universe, for which it is necessary that contrary things exist and be conserved, and the manifestation of his attributes; according to these reasons the thing willed by God is good, which nevertheless according to the particular reasons to which man must attend, and to which God wills him to attend, is evil. Therefore the human will, in order that it be right, is not held to be conformed to the divine will in the material thing willed.

The minor will become clear by an example: God, as supreme director and provider of the whole world, according to the requirement and universal reasons of the common good and of his glory, wills my father to die. That death, considered according to those universal reasons, is good, and therefore good is the will which wills it. I, a private man, whose role it is not to attend to those universal reasons, but to particular ones, whether of my own supposit according to natural inclination, which is good and from God, or of my parent according to filial piety, which, even with God commanding, I am held to follow, do not will that death. That death, considered according to those particular reasons, is evil. Therefore good is the will which does not will it, so that although on the one hand I seem to depart from the divine will, on the other hand by willing thus I am indirectly conformed to the divine will itself, because God himself wills me to will thus.

Hence St. Augustine says in the Enchiridion, c. 101: "Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will; as if a good son should will his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, aa. 9 and 10).