The Eighth Commandment

The Eighth Commandment of the Decalogue is, “ Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”¹ Primarily it forbids the giving of false evidence, especially in a court of justice, against one’s neighbour, by which his reputation is unjustly injured. But because the same effect is produced by rash judgements, calumny, tale-bearing, backbiting, contumely, lying, and the betrayal of secrets, all these sins are also forbidden by this commandment. Inasmuch as it is virtually positive, it prescribes the telling of the truth.

¹ Exod. xx. 16.

A JUDGEMENT is a firm assent of the mind to a proposition without fear of mistake, and if such an assent is given without sufficient grounds it is a rash judgement. The term, however, is used here only of judgements without sufficient reasons against the character of others, as that such a one is wicked, untrustworthy, a drunkard, and so on.

Such rash judgements, when they are formed deliberately with the consciousness that there is not sufficient ground for them, are sinful, and if the matter be serious they are gravely sinful. The reason is because all have a right to our good esteem unless they have forfeited it by their bad conduct; in judging others rashly we arrogate to ourselves an authority which we do not possess, and we use it unjustly against the character of our neighbour.” We thus violate justice, which in serious matters binds under grave sin.

Rash judgements, however, to which depraved human nature is so prone, are not usually grave sins in those who are striving to lead good lives. Rash and evil doubts, or suspicions, or opinions about others are frequent, but these, although wrong, are not as a rule gravely sinful, for they do not inflict serious harm on our neighbour’s reputation. 3° Jas. iv 11:

It is no sin to think that another is wicked or has committed a sin if we know it to be a fact. Nor are we obliged to think that all men are good until we know something to the contrary. We may suspend our judgement about such as we do not know sufficiently well to be able to say whether they are good or bad. We know, moreover, that there are many bad people in the world, and prudence suggests that we should be on our guard against all whom we do not know well, though justice and charity incline us to think no evil of anyone.

Rash judgements frequently arise from the malice of our own hearts, or from hatred and envy.¹ If we purify our own hearts from vice and wickedness, we shall think thoughts of others. kindlier

¹ Rom. ii 1.

DETRACTION, slander, or backbiting is committed by unjustly depriving another of his good name in his absence. If this is done by falsely imputing to him something which injures his reputation it is called calumny. Tale-bearing is a similar sin, and consists in making mischief between friends by telling tales to the disadvantage of one of them. All these are sins against justice and charity, for they tend to deprive our neighbour of his good name, “ which is better than great riches,” and to which he has a strict right until he forfeits it by his public conduct. Even if what is said to the disadvantage of our neighbour be true, we have no right to make it known to his discredit, as long as it is not public, for he still retains his reputation, he still has a right to it, and he must not be deprived of it without just cause. Even the dead retain their right to their good name, for death does not make them non-existent, and men are prepared to do and suffer much for the sake of leaving a reputation behind them. Besides, speaking ill of the dead frequently besmirches the living. Not only individuals but corporate bodies have each their reputation, and detraction may be committed against a Religious Order, for example, or a diocese, as well as. against individuals.

Inasmuch as detraction is contrary to justice and charity, which, as we have seen, bind under a grave obligation, it will of itself be a serious sin, though frequently only venial on account of levity of matter. The measure of the gravity of the sin will be the harm which it causes to the person whose reputation suffers. The making known of the grave but secret sin of another with malicious intent or to his serious injury will certainly be a mortal sin. The disclosure of a venial sin of another, or even of some hidden defect for which he is not responsible, as, for example, illegitimacy, may cause him serious damage and constitute a grievous sin. However, the making known of even a grievous sin of another is not always mortally sinful, for sometimes no serious harm follows from it. A notorious drunkard will not be injured appreciably if a secret sin of drunkenness is made public, nor a woman of doubtful reputation if some specific fall is mentioned. On the other hand, although a man has lost his reputation in one particular matter, he may still have one to lose in other matters, and if his secret sins in these matters be made known, a more or less grievous sin of detraction will be committed. A man may be of notoriously loose morals but with a character still to lose for honesty and uprightness.

When a man has been tried and condemned in an open court of justice, there is no wrong done him by publishing the fact in the newspapers, or telling it to those who would not otherwise have heard of it. The judicial sentence penalizes him and deprives him of the right to his reputation in the matter touched by the sentence. .This holds true of distant places and countries, and even of distant times. No injustice, then, is committed against one who has been legally convicted of crime by making this known in a place to which he has come in the hope of its not being known. Uncharitable harm might be done against such a one if he was trying to lead a good life in his new surroundings.

Similarly, the sin of detraction is not committed when a sin which is matter of common report in one place is made known in another, if the knowledge of it would be sure to penetrate there before long. It is a disputed point among theologians whether or not sin is committed in such a case if otherwise the knowledge would not penetrate to the place where it is made known. At any rate, it is advisable to keep silence about such cases unless there be some good reason for making known the truth. If someone is thinking of employing an unknown servant whom we know to have committed theft from her - former mistress in another part of the country, we are justified in making the fact known to the person concerned. It does not follow that we are justified in publishing elsewhere the sin of another which was well known indeed to a particular circle or community, but which was not really public. In such a case the right to one’s reputation with the outside world has not been lost.

The right to one’s reputation is not absolute. We are, of course, never justified in calumniating another by imputing false charges to him. But for just and sufficient reasons we may make known the secret sin of another. There are cases when this is necessary for the public good or for the protection of the rights of the innocent, and in a conflict of rights the stronger should prevail. Thus, when lawfully summoned to give evidence in a court of justice we may witness to secret crime, and generally, whenever the defence of ourselves, or of the innocent, or the good of the delinquent himself, or of our hearers, require the truth to be made known.

If by listening to a detractor we encourage him to slander another, we are formal co-operators in his sin and are as guilty as the detractor himself. If our listening is not indeed the efficacious cause of the detraction, we do not sin against justice, but we sin against charity if we could prevent the detraction and do not do so. For charity obliges us, as we saw above, to correct an erring brother and to prevent harm being done to our neighbour as far as possible. It is true that private individuals will seldom be bound by a grave obligation in this matter; frequently they could not intervene without doing more harm than good; but those in authority are more frequently and more strictly bound to correct their subjects and to defend their reputation against slander.

Inasmuch as detraction, calumny, and other sins of the like nature are contrary to justice, they will always leave the obligation of making restitution as far as possible for the unjust damage which they cause, as we saw above when treating of restitution.

Our neighbour has a right not only to his good name but also to the honour or the external marks of our esteem, befitting his qualities and position. The Apostle exhorts us to “love one another with the charity of brotherhood, with honour preventing one another,’’¹ and in another place he bids us render honour to whom honour is due.² The sin of contumely is committed by any act or word which is contrary to the honour which we are bound to show our neighbour. It may be committed by neglecting to show him the honour which is his due, or by saying or doing something in his presence which expresses our contempt of him.

¹ Rom. xii 10.

² Rom. xiii 7.

Contumely of itself is a grave sin against justice and charity, for it injures a man in what he values more than wealth, and as a rule an insult wounds the reputation, as well as the feelings of him who is insulted. Our Lord’s words show how grievous a sin is committed by treating another with contumely: “‘ Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council. And whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.”¹ Like most sins against justice and charity, contumely may be only a venial sin, for levity of matter, and chaff or banter, which is not intended to wound or irritate another, is of course harmless provided that it keeps within due bounds.

¹ Matt. v 22.

Inasmuch as contumely violates justice, proper satisfaction must be made for insults. The kind and manner of making satisfaction will depend much on the relative condition of the parties. Sometimes the person injured may be reasonably presumed not to wish the memory of the insult to be revived by formal apologies, and the danger of again arousing bitter and angry feelings may also excuse one from open acts of satisfaction.

A LIE is defined by St Thomas to be a speech contrary to one’s mind.¹ It is, then, of the essence of a lie that there should be an intention of saying what is false, that there should be a contradiction between the mind and the external expression of it. One may tell a lie, then, by saying what is true if it is believed by the speaker not to be true, and a lie is told by denying what is false if it is believed to be true. Although a liar usually has the intention of deceiving others, yet such an intention is not of the essence of a lie. A man may be well aware that he has no chance of being able to deceive another, but may say what he knows to be untrue in order to excuse himself or not to stand self-convicted. Men who are known to lie habitually do not expect others to be deceived by what they say, but still they lie when they say what is not true. One may lie to God, though he knows that he cannot deceive him.

In saying that a lie is a speech contrary to one’s mind we understand not only words but gestures, or any signs by which our thought is manifested to others. As St Augustine says: “* He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says something else by word or by any signs whatever.”² For we may and do constantly speak not only by word of mouth, but by our tone, looks, gesture, actions, and by the very circumstances in which our words are uttered. The words “I am not guilty ” in the mouth of a murderer have quite a different meaning when they are uttered in the dock and at the feet of his confessor. The words, the tone, the look may be the same; the circumstances make it a true speech in the first case and a sacrilegious lie in the second.

A lie in action is called hypocrisy or simulation, but the malice is the same as in lying words.

Lies are divided by theologians into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies, A jocose lie is told to amuse others; it is something said in joke which the speaker knows to be false, and uttered with the intention of saying what he knows to be false. If what is not true is said in joke without any intention of lying, and in such a way that ordinary hearers would understand, there is no lie. To speak ironically is not to lie.

An officious lie is a lie of excuse, or a falsehood which, while procuring some advantage, does nobody any harm.

A hurtful lie does an injury to someone.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 110, a. I.

² De Mendacio, c. 3,

According to the common Catholic teaching, lying of every kind is intrinsically wrong; so that, inasmuch as we may not do evil that good may come of it, we are never justified in telling a lie, not even if the life of another or the safety of the world depended on it. St Augustine, St Thomas, and other Catholic Doctors and theologians gather this doctrine from the teaching of Holy Scripture which in many places seems to forbid all lying as absolutely as it forbids theft or homicide. Pope Innocent III gives expression to this teaching when he says in the Decretals, “‘ Since Holy Scripture prohibits lying even to save the life of another.”¹ Reason teaches us the same doctrine. For a lie is something inordinate in itself. It is a perversion of the moral order which the law of nature prescribes should be observed between the mind and the expression of it in our intercourse with others, We are endowed with the faculty of making known our thoughts and feelings to others; right order requires that the external expression should agree with the internal thought, that the machinery should be correctly regulated, that there should be no contradiction between the parts of the same agent, as there is when a lie is told. The moral turpitude which there is in such a contradiction between the mind and its external expression is well seen in the vice of hypocrisy. When a man pretends to be other than he is, there is the same perversion of right order that there is in lying. in nature; It is like a monstrosity the parts of one whole do not fit harmoniously together; they are out of gear and offensive to the view. There is, then, a special virtue of veracity which prescribes that when we have to make known our thoughts and feelings we should do it truthfully, or, in other words, we should make the outward expression agree with the thought. This virtue of veracity exists and is of obligation apart from any right to the truth that there may be in others. Veracity is something which we owe to ourselves as well as to our neighbour. It is true indeed that society is very much interested in sincerity and veracity. Social intercourse is very much hindered by lying and the mistrust which lying generates.² But although this is true, yet lying must be avoided primarily because it is unworthy of the dignity of man; it is a perversion of right order; it is intrinsically, in itself, wrong.

Some of the Greek Fathers held a different view from the above, and thought that lying was not wrong under all circumstances, but that it was occasionally allowable, like medicine, on account of inevitable necessity. English moralists have very commonly held a similar opinion, that a lie is only told when what is false is said to one who has a right to the truth. Some modern Catholic theologians have also adopted this opinion, which places the malice of lying in the denial of the truth to one who has a right to it. They do not, however, sufficiently explain the nature of that right, whether it is a strict right of justice, or a right in a vague sense demanded by the good of society, and so due out of legal justice, or charity, or piety, or obedience. Moreover, it is as difficult to determine when that right exists as it is to determine what is a lie according to the common opinion, and the door seems to be opened to promiscuous lying provided that no injury be done to our neighbour. The only lie which the theory acknowledges seems to be the hurtful lie. Nor does it sufficiently answer the arguments on which the common opinion is based.

¹ C. Super eo, De usuris.

² Eph. iv 25.

If it is never lawful to tell a lie, if the lie of necessity cannot be allowed, what means have we of safeguarding a secret ?

Catholic theologians answer this question by propounding their doctrine of mental reservation. Mental reservations are either strictly or widely so called. The former is the restriction of one’s meaning in making an assertion to the proposition as modified by some addition made to it within the mind of the speaker. As if on being asked “ Are you going to town ?” one were to answer “ Yes,” meaning “‘ in imagination.” In wide mental reservations the words used are capable of being understood in different senses, either because they are ambiguous in themselves, or because they have a special sense derived from the circumstances of time, place, or person in which they are spoken. Thus, when a servant says that her master is not in, the words may mean either that he is absent, or that he does not wish to see the visitor. The servant’s real meaning is restricted to one of these senses. In the same way a defendant on his trial in an English court .of justice pleads not guilty—i.e., until the charge be proved. A lawyer or a doctor questioned about professional secrets replies, “ I don’t know ”—i.e., I have no knowledge which I can communicate.

Although strict mental reservations are lies, and therefore sinful, yet wide mental reservations are in common use; they are necessary, and they are not lies. They are necessary because justice and charity require that secrets should be kept, and frequently there is no other way of keeping them. They are not lies because, as we saw above, words take their meaning not only from their grammatical signification, but from the circumstances in which they are used. When a priest is asked about a sin which a penitent has confessed to him, and he answers, ‘‘I never heard of it,” he speaks as a man, not as a confessor who holds the place of God in the tribunal of Penance. All are aware that he is a priest, and to all his words mean, “‘ I never heard of it outside of the confessional.” He never speaks of what he has heard inside the confessional, and nothing can, or should, be gathered about what he has heard there from the words which he uses. Although these wide mental reservations are not lies, yet they must not be employed without just cause, for the good of society requires that we should speak our mind with frankness and sincerity in the sense in which we are understood by our hearers, unless there be a good reason for permitting their self-deception when they take our words in a sense that we do not mean.

Truth requires not only that we should say nothing that we know to be false, but also that we should weigh our statements and not make rash and unconsidered assertions. There are some people whose talk runs babbling along like a stream in a fresh, and with as little meaning. A man with a love for truth will be more sparing of his words, and will weigh them before giving them currency.

A SECRET is some hidden matter concerning another which cannot be made known without causing him injury or displeasure. Besides the secret of the seal of confession, which is treated of elsewhere, divines distinguish three kinds of secret: the natural secret, the promised secret, and the secret which is communicated under an express or implied contract of secrecy.

When we come to the knowledge of something concerning another which cannot be made known without causing him injury or displeasure we are under the obligation of a natural secret not to make it known. This obligation arises from charity and justice, inasmuch as these virtues forbid us to do anything to the hurt or annoyance of our neighbour.

If we come to know something concerning our neighbour and then give a promise not to reveal it to others, we are bound by a promised secret. If the matter was of its nature secret, there would be the obligation of a natural secret independently of the promise. When the promise is given, a special obligation arising therefrom binds the party to secrecy. In case the matter was not of itself secret, the only obligation would be that arising from the promise. It depends to some extent on the intention of the promisor as to.what obligation he takes upon himself by his promise. He may intend to bind himself to keep his word by the virtue of fidelity, because it is the duty of an honest man to keep his promise. In this case, as fidelity only binds under pain of venial sin, there will only be this obligation to observe the promised secret. However, if the other party to whom secrecy was promised would suffer serious loss from the violation of the secret, or if the parties were bound by mutual promises, then justice would require the secret to be kept, and the violation of the obligation would of itself be gravely sinful. Apart even from these circumstances, the promisor may intend to give the other a right to secrecy in justice, and then he will be bound to observe it under pain of mortal sin, A secret which is confided to another under the condition that secrecy is to be observed constitutes the matter of an onerous contract and binds more strictly than either a natural or a promised secret. Such are secrets of office which officials of all sorts become aware of in the execution of the duties entrusted to them; professional secrets of doctors, lawyers, priests, and others, who are consulted as experts by people in doubt or difficulty; as well as all others which are entrusted to any person under the express or implied condition of secrecy.

The obligation to observe a natural secret will cease after the secret has become public property. The party whose secret it is may sometimes be reasonably presumed not to be unwilling that the matter should be communicated to another, as, for example, to somebody who can and who will be of assistance to him. If the public good requires that the secret should be made known in order to prevent public wrong, the obligation of secrecy will cease, for the public welfare is of greater importance than that of an individual. If serious harm threatens one’s self or some other innocent person, or the party whose secret is in question, and the harm can only be averted by making known the secret, this will be allowed in the case of natural or promised secrets. The right of defence from impending evil prevails over that of natural and promised secrets.

Even the obligation of the third class of secrets will cease when they cannot be observed without serious harm to the public weal. The natural law, however, which requires that people should be able to consult others in their difficulties in all security, demands that this class of secret should be observed in the case when even serious harm threatens some innocent person, unless he whose secret is in question is the cause of the impending evil. Thus, if I know as a professional secret who is the real culprit in the case of a crime wrongly imputed to an innocent person, I may disclose the real culprit if by some special means he caused the false accusation of the innocent person, otherwise I must keep the secret. ‘It is a disputed point among theologians whether I am bound to observe a secret at the peril of my life when it was entrusted to me under that express condition, some maintaining that no one can pledge his life in that way, others more probably holding the contrary. ’Whether or not I am bound at my own serious loss to keep a secret entrusted to me under the condition of secrecy depends to some extent on circumstances, Sometimes I cannot be supposed under the circumstances to have bound myself by so strict an obligation; but as a rule professional secrets will continue to be binding even when the observance of them entails serious loss.

We are bound to make known natural and promised secrets at the command of lawful superiors. The obligation of obedience to lawful authority prevails over that of secrecy due to individuals in those cases. And so a witness in a court of justice when lawfully questioned about what he knows under the obligation of natural or promised secrecy must give the evidence required. Similarly, secret impediments to marriage must be declared according to the precept contained in the proclamation of banns. Professional secrets, however, and, in general, secrets which belong to the third class, are privileged, and must not be declared, unless they have ceased to be binding for some such reason as those mentioned above. Secrecy in this case is demanded by the natural law, which gives the fullest possible security to those who consult others in their difficulties, and even the precept of one’s superior cannot avail against the natural law, as St Thomas teaches.¹

English law acknowledges the privilege of state secrets and of the professional secrets of lawyers, but in the case of doctors and clergymen it does not as yet go the full length of the doctrine laid down above.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 70, a. I, ad 2.

The doctrine with regard to secrets is applicable to the opening and reading of letters, unless it is known that they contain no secrets and the writer is not aggrieved. It is, however, a general rule of Religious Orders that letters written by and to religious may be opened by the superior, except such as contain matters of conscience, and communications between higher superiors and their subjects.

The eighth precept declares: "You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor";¹ it therefore prohibits a lie by which the neighbor's reputation is injured. It is extended by some to every injury which is inflicted on the neighbor by words or by equivalent signs. Whatever the case may be, at least because of the connection of the matter, we shall speak: 1° of the injury of truth, or of lying; 2° of the injury of reputation, or of detraction; 3° of the injury of honor, or of insult; 4° of the injury of secrecy.

¹ Exod. XX, 16.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 60, a. 3; qq. 72-73; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 962-1003; Homo Apostolicus, tract 11, nn. 1-2 and 7-22.)

Reputation, from speaking, is the common opinion or estimation of many concerning the morals of another. It is called good or bad according as morally good or morally bad things are adjudged to someone. Speech pertains to the perfection of reputation. Reputation is injured externally through detraction, internally through rash judgments. Each must be discussed.

“44. Why should it not be only venial to overthrow, by a false accusation, the great authority of a detractor when it is harmful to oneself? — 45. It is probable that one does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend one’s own justice and honor. And if this is not probable, scarcely any opinion in theology will be probable.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“5. One who reviles someone praises God by the very sin of reviling; and the more he reviles and the more gravely he sins, the more he praises God.” Proposition of Eckhart condemned by John XXII.

Cf. no. 554.

437. • This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits, 1. chiefly and primarily, lest false testimony be said both in judgment and outside judgment; 2. indirectly and secondarily, lest the reputation and honor of the neighbor be injured.

But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that, every simulation and fallacy being removed, simple and naked truth be said ¹.

¹ Thus the Roman Catechism (De VIII Praec., n. 2): "In this precept... two laws are to be noted, one prohibiting lest false testimony be said; the other commanding that, simulations and fallacies being removed, our words and deeds be measured by simple truth." But this part is drawn over to the affirmative precept so that that may be suggested which is common to all affirmative precepts, namely that they bind always, but not for always, since on the contrary it is often necessary to hide the truth.

Hence it prohibits, 1. perjury against the neighbor; 2. lying; 3. detraction; 4. contumely; 5. rash judgment and injurious suspicion. We must speak about each, except perjury, concerning which enough was said in the second precept.

1103. 1. There are prohibited: (a) false testimony against any man whatever, even for favoring him, not only in judgment, but also outside judgment; (b) detraction through calumny and backbiting; (c) the stirring up of discords; (d) flattery; (e) lying; (f) simulation; (g) contumely; (h) rash judgment.

2. But there is commanded: (a) that judges exercise forensic judgments justly and according to the laws; (b) that the accused and the guilty confess the truth when they are legitimately interrogated; (c) that witnesses bring true and certain testimony when they are questioned by a judge according to the norm of law; (d) that advocates defend just causes justly and measure their fee according to right and equity by their work; (e) that accusers and petitioners exactly observe truth and justice toward all, even adversaries.

Concerning these things the treatment was given in the Treatise on Justice: (a) concerning rash judgment, n. 365-373; (b) concerning detraction, or defamation, through evil-speaking and calumny, 374-395; (c) concerning contumely, or injury to honor, 397-400; (d) concerning false testimony and lying, 401-417; and in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, where the duties of judges, accused persons, witnesses, advocates, etc., are treated, n. 992-1020.

S. Th. II-II, q. 122; I-II, q. 100, a. 3-7.

896. All the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice. - The precepts of the decalogue are the first determined principles of law, to which natural reason at once assents with slight consideration, as to most manifest principles. But the account of debt, which is required for a precept, appears most manifestly in justice, which is toward another: for "in those things which are toward oneself, at first sight it seems that man is master of himself, and that it is licit for him to do anything whatever; but in those things which are toward another, it manifestly appears that man is obligated to another to render him what he owes." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue must pertain to justice (a. 1).

Hence the first three precepts are concerning acts of religion, which is the chief potential part of justice; the fourth is concerning acts of piety, which is second among these; the other six are concerning acts of justice commonly and strictly so called, which is among equals.

897. The ten precepts of the decalogue are fittingly ordered. - This, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, Billuart proves nearly thus, de virt. iust. adn., diss. 3, a. 11:

The precepts of the decalogue were established for forming man to virtue: for it pertains to law to make men good and virtuous; therefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be ordered according to the order of generation, by which, namely, man becomes good and virtuous. Moreover, in the order of generation two things must be considered:

A. First, that the first part be constituted, as in the generation of man the heart, in a house the foundation: thus in the moral good or goodness of the soul there is goodness of the will, from which someone uses well any other goodness; but the goodness of the will is considered according to its object, which is the end. And therefore in him who was to be instructed to virtue by law, first there had to be made, as it were, a certain foundation of religion, by which man is duly ordered unto God, who is the last end of the human will. I am the Lord thy God (Ex. XX, 2). But because in the order of generation, before the first part is constituted, contraries and impediments must be removed - for the farmer first cleanses the field before he scatters the seed - therefore before all things man had to be instructed in religion in such a way that he would exclude the impediments of true religion. Now then:

I. The chief impediment of true religion is that man adhere to a false god or worship the true God unduly, which constitutes superstition. And for excluding this the first precept is set down: Thou shalt not have strange gods; thou shalt not make for thyself a graven thing, etc.

II. After the first impediment has been excluded, which is opposed to true religion by excess and pertains to superstition, which prevents the true God from being received for worship, another is fittingly removed, which is opposed to religion by defect, and is irreligiosity, which prevents God, after He has been received, from being honored: for it is prior to receive God for worship than to honor Him once received. Therefore, after the precept by which superstition is prohibited has been set down, the second is fittingly set down, by which perjury, or every inordinate and irreverent assumption of the divine name, is prohibited: Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.

III. The impediments of true religion having been removed through the first and second precepts, it followed that the third precept be set down, by which men would be founded in true religion. But to religion it pertains to exhibit the worship of God; hence the third precept is fittingly set down concerning the sanctification of the Sabbath: Remember that thou sanctify the Sabbath day (that is, of religious rest).

B. But the precepts of the decalogue are ordered not only to love of God but also to love of neighbor, as to an end; but among neighbors we are most obliged to parents, therefore:

IV. Immediately after the precepts ordering us to God, there is set down the fourth precept of piety, ordering us to parents, who are the particular principle of our being, as God is the universal principle: Honor thy father and thy mother; by the name of father and mother understanding also any superiors whatever.

C. Finally, just as by the aforesaid potential parts of justice, namely, religion and piety, a debt is rendered to certain determinate persons, to whom man is obligated from some special account, so by justice itself properly so called someone renders a debt indiscriminately to all. And therefore after the first three precepts pertaining to religion, and after the fourth, which is of piety, by which a special debt is rendered to parents, it was necessary that there be set down consequently some precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which renders a debt indifferently to all. And for this the last six precepts are set down, by which we are prohibited from inflicting harm upon the neighbor, namely:

V. In his person, which the fifth precept prohibits: Thou shalt not kill, where under homicide, as under the more principal thing, all personal harms are understood.

VI. In the person most conjoined to him through lust, which the sixth precept forbids: Thou shalt not commit adultery.

VII. In exterior bodily things, which the seventh precept prohibits: Thou shalt not steal.

VIII. In external incorporeal things, namely, reputation and honor, which the eighth precept prohibits: Thou shalt not speak false testimony against thy neighbor.

IX. In the very will of committing adultery, which the ninth precept prohibits: Thou shalt not desire thy neighbor's wife.

X. Finally, in the will of stealing, which the tenth forbids: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, etc.

Indeed by the sixth and seventh precepts, by which adultery and theft are prohibited, without doubt their will is also implicitly prohibited, just as by the fifth and eighth the will of homicide and false testimony is prohibited. Nevertheless, lest someone think that by these precepts only the external works of adultery and theft are prohibited, and not their will, as many among the carnal Jews were, and even now are among rude Christians, God willed to prohibit both of these concupiscences by special and distinct precepts. But He especially prohibited the concupiscence of adultery and theft rather than of homicide and false testimony because adultery has the account of a pleasurable good, theft the account of a useful good, and therefore they more strongly and more frequently allure the soul; but homicide according to itself, as also false testimony, are rather horrible than desirable: for the life of man, as also truth, is naturally loved.

898. Remarks. - 1. The ten precepts of the law have not been distinguished by all in the same manner or order; but this has no bearing on doctrine. We have followed the division which has now become common in the Catholic Church.

2. To the precepts of the decalogue in the Old Law there were added many ceremonial determinations of divine worship, insofar as they are ordered to God, and determinations of justice to be observed among men, insofar as they are ordered to the neighbor. But in the New Law they are abolished; and, certain broad ceremonial precepts having been given concerning sacrifice and the sacraments, the rest which regard religion and divine worship are left to be determined by ecclesiastical law, and those things which regard the manner of preserving justice are rather left to civil law.

3. Many establish a special treatise on the precepts of the decalogue, and not a few divide moral theology according to the precepts. But following the truly scientific method of St. Thomas, who divides moral science according to the virtues, and thus sets it forth altogether completely, it is now useless to treat specially of the precepts, since those things which pertain to them have already been set forth in the present treatise on Justice, or are also going to receive the supplement of exposition from the treatise on Temperance.

You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. Exod. xx, 16. - You shall not say false testimony. Matth. xix, 18

This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits chiefly and primarily that false testimony be said, both in judgment and outside judgment; indirectly and secondarily, that the reputation and honor of one's neighbor be injured. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands, according to the Roman Catechism on the 8th precept, n. 2, "that, simulation and deceits having been removed, we measure our words and deeds by simple truth." Wherefore by this precept there is prohibited: 1st. perjury against one's neighbor; 2nd. lying; 3rd. detraction; 4th. contumely; 5th. rash judgment and injurious suspicion. Of each, except perjury, concerning which enough was said in the second precept, one must speak.

Titius, a religious, is not rarely occupied in preaching the word of God and in giving missions to the people. Having returned to the monastery, he is accustomed to relate to the brethren marvelous things concerning what was seen and heard by him while he was outside the monastery. Almost all of them, however, are entirely fictitious, devised and uttered by Titius in order to increase the esteem of himself among the brethren and to delight them. Without scruple he also invents excusing causes in order that he may remain longer outside the monastery, and with them appeases the superior. He strongly maintains that he does not lie in acting thus, since he harms no one and the essence of a lie consists in the violation of another’s right to the truth. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a lie, and how many kinds are there?

2. In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a lie, and how many sorts of lies are there?

A lie is a speech against one’s mind. Lies are divided into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 464.

2. In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

Some would put the malice of lying in the denial to others of that to which they have a right. Others would say that it lies in the deceit practised on others. The common Catholic teaching follows St. Thomas in putting it in the disorder which is intrinsically in saying that which is known to be false. We have from nature the power of communicating our thoughts to our fellow men, and this power is necessary for a social being like man. Those thoughts which are to be communicated to others should be communicated truthfully, and there is a perversion of right order, if this is not done; the virtue of veracity is violated. As lying is intrinsically inordinate and wrong, it is never allowed to tell a lie.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 465.

3. The case. Titius, a Religious, frequently goes out of the monastery to preach. On his return he has wonderful things to tell the brethren, but for the most part, they are pure fabrications, invented to amuse his brethren and to add to his own reputation. He says he does nobody any harm by these tales, and that therefore he does not lie. Titius is wrong. Hurtful lies are not the only species; there are also jocose and officious lies, and Titius is guilty of jocose and officious lying. He says what he knows to be false, and he says it with the intention of deceiving others, or else there would be no prospect of his lies adding to his reputation. Much more is this the case when he invents reasons to be laid before the superior in order to excuse himself for making a longer stay than necessary out of the monastery. In this he is guilty of officious lying. He is also imperceptibly lessening his own estimation of the virtue of truth, and accustoming himself to trifle with it.

Titius, a Catholic advocate, asked a confessor in the sacred tribunal whether he was bound to reveal an occult impediment to marriage in these circumstances. The banns were recently proclaimed concerning the marriage soon to be entered into between Julius and Julia. Titius, however, had recently been consulted by Julius concerning the sum of money to be assigned for the support of his offspring begotten from secret fornication with the sister of Julia. Hence the confessor asks:

1. What is a secret, and how many kinds are there?

2. Is it lawful to reveal secrets, and for what cause?

3. What kind of obligation does the proclamation of banns introduce?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a secret, and how many sorts of secrets are there?

A secret is some hidden matter concerning another, which can not be made known without causing him injury or displeasure. Besides the secret of the seal of confession, which is treated of elsewhere, divines distinguish three kinds of secret: the natural secret, the promised secret, and the secret which is communicated under an express or implied contract of secrecy.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 470.

2. May secrets be revealed sometimes, and for what cause?

Natural and promised secrets may be revealed when the public good requires it, or when an innocent person can not otherwise be defended. Even professional secrets may be revealed when the public weal would otherwise suffer seriously, and when he whose secret is in question abuses the privilege of secrecy to do harm to an innocent person.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 471 and following.

3. What sort of obligation is imposed by the proclamation of banns?

A grave obligation is imposed of disclosing to the priest any known impediment of the marriage. Even if the impediment be known under natural or promised secrecy, the obligation to disclose it will arise. It will not arise usually if the secret be of the third and stricter kind.²

2 The same work, p. 265.

4. The case. Titius, a Catholic lawyer, wishes to know whether he is bound to make known to the parish priest the diriment impediment of affinity in the first degree in the collateral line which in his professional capacity he has learned exists between Julius and Julia, who are going to be married. No; he should not tell the parish priest, as the matter is a professional secret, but he should take an opportunity to warn Julius about the impediment, if Julius does not know of it, so that a dispensation may be applied for in time before the marriage.

Some years ago “Whole-time medical officer of health” wrote to the British Medical Journal, asking what he was to do in the following case: “A medical practitioner has consulted me under the following circumstances: He is attending a railway signalman for asthma. The attacks come on suddenly and are so severe that the patient falls on the floor, struggling for breath, and is totally incapacitated for an hour or longer. He has not yet had an attack in his signal-box, where he is on duty alone, sometimes for many hours at a time. The man declines to inform the railway company of his illness, thinking it would result in his discharge, or at least reduction of wages. The doctor is afraid that if he reports the case to the railway company who are not his employers, and therefore not entitled to a report from him, he will have to stand an action for damages brought against him by the patient. On the other hand, he fears that unless he breaks the seal of professional secrecy, there will probably be a railway accident, possibly on a large scale, as many London and other expresses traverse the line.”

We must take the facts of the case as stated. The signalman's complaint might at any time make him incapable of attending to his duties, and in the doctor's opinion there would probably be a big accident. The signalman had no right to continue at his post to the public danger; under the circumstances he was unfit to hold the post, as he could not, with reasonable certainty, guarantee that he would be able to fulfil its duties. His refusal to tell his employers threatened injury to them and to the public. In such a case the obligation to preserve even professional secrets ceases, and charity obliges anyone who is acquainted with the facts to make them known in the proper quarter. The doctor should therefore inform the company that the man is unfit to be left alone at his post. The rights of the public must be safeguarded, even at the expense of the individual.

Titius had entered into an engagement with Caia; when Julius, the physician of both families and a most intimate friend of the father of Caia, heard this, he was tormented by doubts of conscience. For under the secrecy of consultation he knew that Titius suffered from a syphilitic disease which would most certainly infect his future wife; hence he was uncertain whether he could or ought to disclose the condition of Titius to the father of Caia or not. Therefore, being a good Catholic, he approached a confessor to seek counsel. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and under what obligation is it to be concealed?

2. Is it lawful to reveal a secret, and when is it lawful or even obligatory?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This first question is answered on p. 337.

2. This question is answered on p. 338.

3. The case. While Titius is suffering from his disease, he can indeed marry, but he should not use marriage rights until he is cured, or at least without the consent of his wife after telling her about his state. In these circumstances Julius has no right to tell Caia's father about the disease from which Titius is suffering. As he is the family doctor he may and should tell Titius either to defer marriage, or at least not to use his marital rights, for a time until he is cured.

Julius, a boy being educated in a certain college, one day approached Caius, a master, and asked that he might consult him under secrecy. When Caius consented, Julius indicated another, very wicked boy in the college who was corrupting the others by teaching them a certain most grave sin and crime. Caius answered that Julius was bound to denounce that boy to the superiors; the latter, however, denied that he would do that or anything else that would bring the boy into danger. When Caius made no progress with Julius, he began to think about his own obligations in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and what is its obligation?

2. Is it lawful to reveal a secret, and is it sometimes obligatory?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered on p. 337.

2. This question is answered on p. 338.

3. The case. The only way of preventing very serious harm being done in the future among the boys of the college is to denounce the bad boy to the authorities. Julius is bound to do this in the first place, but he refuses to do his duty. Under these circumstances the public good requires that Caius should undertake the task. The obligation even of a strict secret ceases in such circumstances. Caius should therefore inform the authorities about what he has heard from Julius.

Caia, a Catholic, often reproaches Caius, her Protestant husband, concerning his excessive familiarity with Bertha, who instructs their children in the first elements (governess). At length, after some time, by her just complaints Caia brings it about that Bertha is dismissed from the house and employment. A little afterward Caia observes a letter written in Bertha’s hand brought to Caius in the morning with others. She secretly takes it, opens and reads it, and throws it into the fire. Afterward, however, in order to quiet her conscience, she asks a confessor whether she sinned or not by acting thus. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and how is it divided?

2. Is it lawful to open and read the letters of another?