The Impediments of the Conjugal Act

The impediments of the conjugal act are of two kinds: some arise from marriage itself, others from the married persons.

97. On the part of marriage there arises an impediment of the conjugal act: a. if the marriage is certainly invalid; b. if the marriage is doubtful.

1. If the marriage is certainly null and both spouses know the nullity, they must abstain from the conjugal act until a dispensation is obtained. If only one knows the nullity, he is bound to admonish the other party about this matter; but if he cannot do this, certainly he must abstain from intercourse under some pretext (e.g. that intercourse is harmful to him, intolerable), until a dispensation has been obtained: for intercourse, as being fornication, would be evil in itself.

a. It can happen in a twofold way that a spouse who certainly knows the nullity of the marriage cannot instruct the other party about it. Namely, a. it can happen that his proof is rejected by the ecclesiastical judge as insufficient, and therefore the spouse is compelled, even under penalty of excommunication, to cohabit with the putative spouse and render the debt to her; b. it can happen that he cannot reveal the impediment without danger to life or reputation.

b. I said above that the spouse knowing the impediment must abstain from intercourse. Nevertheless, if the case should ever occur, the confessor could permit intercourse where the impediment which induces nullity is of ecclesiastical law and a dispensation cannot be obtained at once. For the opinion is probable that in this case of most grave inconvenience the impediment ceases for the same reason as, in a perplexed case, according to the probable opinion of many, the impediment ceases. Meanwhile, however, for caution a dispensation is to be sought.¹

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri VI, n. 532 f. Lehmkuhl II, n. 826.

98. 2. If the marriage is doubtful, whether the doubt already exists before marriage, or whether it supervenes only after the marriage has been contracted:

a. If the doubt is light, it is to be disregarded; if the doubt is grave, the truth is to be investigated.

b. During the investigation, if both spouses doubt, they must abstain from intercourse to avoid danger of fornication; if only one party doubts, this party cannot ask, lest he expose himself to danger of fornication, but he can and must render if the other has not lost the right of asking, lest he expose himself to danger of injuring justice.

c. If, after investigation has been made, the doubt persists, the marriage must be considered as valid both in the external forum and in the internal forum, because in doubt one must stand for the value of the act.

99. On the part of the spouses an impediment of the conjugal act can arise from a threefold head: a. from incest; b. from adultery; c. from a vow of chastity.

Concerning the case of supervening impotence, see n. 66.

From incest. a. One who has committed incest inducing supervening affinity, as a penalty imposed by the Church, loses the right of asking,¹ but he can and must render the debt to the innocent party, even before a dispensation is obtained.

b. In order that an incestuous person incur this penalty, there is required: a. knowledge of the imposed penalty, because extraordinary penalties are not incurred by those who are ignorant; b. immunity from force and fear,² because force excuses from transgression of any law, and grave fear from transgression of ecclesiastical law and therefore also from incurring the penalty. Since these conditions are rarely had in spouses, they scarcely ever incur this penalty unless they have been warned about it.

c. If in the meantime the incestuous person is placed in great danger of incontinence, he can ask the debt, because ecclesiastical law does not oblige with so great an inconvenience.³

But the innocent other party, who notices the danger of sinning in the spouse, is bound neither to ask the debt nor to comply with one asking: for charity, from which of itself one is bound to remove a spouse from danger of sinning, does not oblige with grave inconvenience; but this is a grave inconvenience for the innocent other party. For since incest contains adultery, the innocent party has from it the right of demanding separation; but by asking or by rendering the debt this right is lost, which can be a grave inconvenience for the innocent party.

d. The innocent spouse is not indeed bound to comply with the incestuous other party asking the debt; nevertheless he can render the debt to her, even if he has knowledge of the incest of the other party and of the penalty laid upon the incestuous: for since only the asking, not intercourse itself, is illicit, the spouse does not cooperate with an evil thing.

For practice these things must be noted:

a. If a married person accuses himself of incest, first he must be asked in what degree he committed the incest: for affinity from illicit intercourse, just as it does not annul marriage, so neither does it take away the use of marriage beyond the second degree.

b. Then he must be asked whether he knew the ecclesiastical penalty, and if, as mostly happens, he was ignorant of this penalty, he must be warned about incurring it through a new incest.

c. Finally it must be investigated whether perhaps he consented to incest from grave fear: for the opinion of those whom St. Alphonsus also follows (n. 1071) is probable, namely that grave fear excuses, not indeed from grave sin, but from incurring the ecclesiastical penalty.

d. Incest always involves adultery; but the penalty of incest is one thing, that of adultery another. The injured party can condone the penalty contracted because of adultery, but cannot condone the penalty contracted because of incest: for the former has been enacted in favor of the innocent party, but the latter solely for punishing incest; therefore its removal must be sought from the Church itself.

e. Imperfect acts are not prohibited by this ecclesiastical law: for a penal law prohibiting intercourse, since it is of strict interpretation, is not to be extended to touches and other imperfect acts.

e. From this impediment, to dispense, or to restore the lost right of asking, not only bishops, who can also delegate this faculty to others,⁴ but even regular confessors can do this, and indeed outside confession.⁵

a. For granting the dispensation validly a cause is indeed required; nevertheless it is scarcely not always present, namely danger of incontinence.

b. Authors dispute whether regular confessors need the permission of a superior for granting this dispensation. The opinion which denies the necessity of permission seems safe, because the faculty has been conceded by the supreme pontiff without this condition; in practice, however, one must stand by the statute or custom of individual orders.

¹ C. Si quis 1. De eo, qui cognovit (IV. 13).

² C. Discretionem 6. De eo, qui cognovit (IV. 13).

³ St. Alphonsus n. 930.

⁴ Formula for petitioning from the bishop the faculty of restoring the right of asking the debt: "Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Lord. Caius, a married man, has had carnal intercourse with his wife's blood-relative in the first (or second) degree, and has thereby lost the right of asking the debt. But since he cannot preserve chastity with his spouse and the incest is occult, I most humbly beg that the faculty be granted to me of restoring to him, by dispensing, the lost right."

⁵ St. Alphonsus l. 6, n. 1076.

100. From adultery. a. One who has committed adultery can ask the debt, because he has lost not the right of asking, but the right of exacting the debt; nevertheless he probably does not lose this right before the innocent party has known the crime.

Whether an adulterous spouse loses the right of exacting the debt by the adultery itself, or only by the quasi-sentence of the innocent party, namely when the latter has known the crime and has not condoned it, but has determined to deprive the guilty party of the right, is disputed. Nevertheless the opinion which holds that the adulterer retains even the right of exacting the debt as long as the innocent party is ignorant of the crime is probable, because this privation of right has the character of a quasi-penalty, which the guilty person is not bound to impose upon himself. Wherefore the adulterer can not only ask the debt, but also exact it, until the innocent party, after the crime has been known, deprives him of this right by denying the debt.¹

b. By condonation the lost right is acquired again; furthermore adultery can also be tacitly condoned by rendering the debt.

Some suspicion or probability concerning adultery committed by the other party is not sufficient; rather, such indications are required as generate moral certitude, so that the innocent party may be able to deny the use of marriage to the other guilty party.

¹ Cf. Sanchez l. 1, disp. 68, n. 2 ff. Lehmkuhl II, n. 846.

101. From a vow of chastity. a. If one of the spouses is bound by a vow of chastity, he indeed cannot ask, because by vowing he has promised abstinence from every venereal act, which promise indeed he must fulfill as far as he can; but he can fulfill it by not asking. Nevertheless he can and must render, because an emitted vow cannot deprive the other of his right.

a. The vow of chastity which a spouse emits without the knowledge of the other spouse can be twofold: either of not using marriage and therefore not rendering the debt even if it is asked, or a vow of not asking. The first, once the marriage has already been consummated, is invalid, as being about an illicit thing; the other indeed is valid, but can be indirectly annulled by the other spouse. According to others, however, this vow is valid only in the wife, but not in the husband: for in the husband it would be about an illicit thing, because it would be grave for the wife if she herself were always compelled to ask the debt.¹

b. If a spouse bound by a vow of chastity notices that the other is most gravely tempted and is placed in danger of pollution, he licitly asks the debt in order to free the other from the danger of sin, because in this case he must be said not so much to ask as to render to one asking interpretatively; but he can licitly render.

b. If both spouses by common consent have vowed to abstain from the work of marriage for a certain time, neither can ask or render. But if one asks contrary to his vow, the other is bound to render, because the former has not renounced the right of asking by the vow. Nevertheless, from the precept of charity the other is bound to admonish the one asking, where he can do so without grave inconvenience, that he desist from the illicit asking.²

If because of the emitted vow they are placed in grave danger of incontinence, recourse to dispensation is to be advised; but probably even the husband can indirectly annul the vow of the wife, and the wife the vow of the husband: for by the fact that they vowed by mutual consent, they do not seem to have renounced the right of annulling the vow of the other party.

c. Regular confessors can dispense with married persons who, either before or after the marriage has been entered, have emitted a vow of perpetual chastity, to this extent, that they can licitly ask the debt (even outside confession).

a. That they can dispense in a vow emitted before marriage is established from the privileges conceded by the supreme pontiffs to mendicants;³ that they can do the same in a vow emitted after marriage is established from the known canon, that regulars can dispense in all vows in which bishops dispense by ordinary law.

b. But they cannot dispense if both spouses by common consent have emitted the vow, or if only one has done so, but with the consent of the other, who by this very fact yields his right. The dispensation in this case remains reserved.

c. Since spouses have been dispensed only for the use of marriage, they sin against the vow if outside the use of marriage they sin against chastity; moreover after the death of the other party they cannot enter a new marriage without dispensation.

¹ Cf. De praeceptis n. 232.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 944.

³ Cf. St. Alphonsus l. 6, n. 1128.

244. - 1. By the mutual handing over which is contained in marriage, "the woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. And similarly, the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman ¹." The tenets of Kant ², according to which, in marriage, one person is said to be acquired by the other partly as a thing, are entirely congruent also with these sayings of the Apostle.

¹ 1 Corinthians 7:4.

² Rechtslehre, book 1, chapter 2, section 3, § 25.

Wherefore, out of justice, one must comply with the express or even tacit request of the other by rendering the conjugal act. This obligation is grave in kind.

And you will observe that the express request of the wife is easily impeded by modesty.

2. But the obligation of requesting is only one of charity and piety. It arises when this is necessary to avert the imminent danger of incontinence of the other spouse, or to strengthen peace and mutual friendship; when the fatherland demands an heir to the kingdom, or the peace and tranquility of the family demand a son who may succeed the parents.

N.B. Because charity is owed to every neighbor, but piety to a spouse, the fatherland, and the family, the debt is jointly urged under each title. Often, however, because the respect of charity is accustomed more formally to govern relations between spouses, but that of piety relations toward the fatherland and family, what is demanded for the good of the spouse is said to be exacted by charity, but what is demanded for the common good of the fatherland or family by piety.

245. - 1. It is also the right of each spouse to obtain from the other party that intercourse which affords the hope of offspring that the circumstances of the person can of themselves afford. Wherefore, against the will of the other party, a wife who, without another and proportionate cause but for obtaining sterility, procures for herself the excision of an ovary or interruption of the oviduct violates not only the fifth and sixth precept as regards herself, but is also most gravely or gravely injurious to the other spouse.

In the same manner, a wife violates the right of her spouse if she places a pessary at the opening of the uterus, or, after intercourse, against the will of her husband, endeavors to expel the semen.

You will therefore rightly observe that no danger of a future fatal childbirth, but only a present disease (infection) or necessity, furnishes a just cause for removing an ovary; and that physicians who, when some occasion is given, remove the ovaries of a wife who has labored excessively in childbirth so that she may thereafter be able to exercise the conjugal work with impunity are guilty of grave sin.

2. In a not dissimilar manner, a man will sin or be unjust if, against the will of his wife, he admits vasectomy for the purpose that he be unable to generate, or so weakens his body that he renders himself almost unequal to the conjugal act, or practices neo-Malthusian arts.

246. - With the circumstances prudently weighed, it will be a light sin to deny the debt to one requesting if, with the frequency of use considered, the matter appears slight, or the other is not gravely unwilling: for example, if he is led by entreaties to change his intention, provided that the proximate danger of incontinence or of another grave inconvenience is truly absent.

But it happens that, because of a psychological state and neuropathy, one spouse is invaded by a fear of, for example, childbirth or offspring that can scarcely be overcome, and therefore abhors the conjugal act. Cf. no. 243. This person is to be exhorted and turned away from this fear by an efficacious argument, rather than that you cast scruples upon him with modest hope of success and not without disturbance of soul. For the healthy spouse, although the matter is unwelcome to him, is nevertheless easily judged to remit enough of his right for the other to be excused from grave sin. For by urging his right, he exposes himself and his own to a graver evil than the inconvenience of abstinence. Here, therefore, there is place for prudence and discretion.

247. - The use of marriage is commanded by no positive law. Wherefore, by mutual consent, spouses can exercise the conjugal act either not at all or only on those days on which there is less hope of offspring ³. This is lawful for them, with attention to the object of the counsel or resolution, and also with attention to the end, if it is reasonable. Theologians acknowledge that the intention of not further increasing offspring already sufficiently numerous can be such an end.

³ Cf. no. 10.

Although this rationale seems today scarcely to be mentioned by a priest.

248. - The debt ought to be rendered neither to an insane person, outside lucid intervals, nor to a drunken person, since their request is not a human act. Yet it can be rendered, unless the danger of killing a fetus already conceived seems to stand in the way.

249. - The debt can be denied to the party who has committed adultery (by adulterous, sodomitical, or bestial intercourse): for faith is broken with impunity toward one who breaks faith. Except if the other also sinned similarly, or was an accomplice in the sin, or knowingly and willingly forgave the sin.

This received doctrine of theologians is also confirmed by canon 1129 of the Code.

Modern doctors are not accustomed to explain further that compensation by which the right lost by the sinning party is restored through the sin of the other party. But theologians of the former age strictly urged this compensation, even if the offenses were equal neither in number nor in weight, as if one committed adultery voluntarily and spontaneously, but the other because he had been unjustly abandoned by the spouse; or if one committed adultery only once, but the other several times. Thus Sanchez, alleging others ⁴. We confess that the opinion of those who required for this compensation offenses equal in quantity and quality is more approved by us, as more consonant with equity ⁵. Yet we concede that a lesser injury is inflicted upon marriage through acts against nature than through perfect adultery, so that an adulterer cannot per se deny compensation to one who has sinned by sodomy ⁶.

⁴ De matrimonio, book 10, disputation 6, nos. 4-8.

⁵ Ibid., no. 4.

⁶ Cf. Sanchez, op. cit., book 10, disputation 6, no. 5.

But adultery committed by the innocent party after separation does not now compensate for adulteries previously committed. Wherefore, "the innocent spouse is never held by any obligation to admit the adulterous spouse again to the consortium of life ⁷."

⁷ Canon 1130. Cf. Sanchez, book 10, disputation 9, no. 30, who adduces this rationale: that the adulterer, through the sentence of separation, was deprived of a right over the body of the other, so that the subsequent adultery of the innocent party is no longer injurious to him. But the Code says the same where separation has been made by private authority.

250. - Grave harm or danger to life or health, either one's own or that of the offspring, excuses from rendering the debt. Suppose danger of contagion, a sufficiently notable illness of one's own, or extraordinary pains of childbirth.

251. - Another just cause also excuses from rendering the debt. Many, to whom we assent, though others deny it, judge that a great danger of bringing forth a dead fetus is a just cause. And the same must be said concerning monstrous or wretched offspring. For then the primary end of nature is not obtained in that manner which is useful for the common good; and it is very harsh to the wife that she must bear all the inconveniences of pregnancy with the danger of some infamy or dishonor.

But offspring multiplied too greatly to be suitably reared does not seem capable of furnishing a just cause for denying the debt. At most, the matter can be arranged in such a way that the use of marriage takes place only on those days on which fertilization is less probable. Cf. what was said in no. 10.

If that means of arranging the matter is omitted, the intended end could not be obtained without a prolonged denial of the debt, joined with the danger of excessive incontinence, which the other spouse, who wishes to exercise his right according to the primary end of marriage, is not bound to admit. Cf. Laymann, De matrimonio, chapter 1, no. 16; Palmieri, Opus theologicum, ed. 3, vol. 6, treatise 10, no. 401.

252. - Intercourse requested in an unnatural manner, which is nevertheless substantially honorable, is not owed in justice. The rationale of charity can counsel or even command that it be conceded, lest a graver evil arise.

253. - Intercourse, as is evident, is not owed to one who has fallen from his right of requesting. And the renunciation of a right is not repugnant of itself. Cf. what was said in nos. 232, 233.

254. - By the former law, neither spouse was obliged to render the debt for two months, since the law conceded that time for deliberating about entrance into religion ⁸. Some thought that this time had its beginning from the day appointed by the ecclesiastical judge. And they conceded to the bishop the faculty of extending the time. Once the marriage had been consummated, the faculty of deliberating was removed. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus, etc., vol. 6, treatise 10, nos. 482 ff.

⁸ Chapter Ex publico, 7, De conversione coniugatorum (III, 32).

This option was deservedly suppressed by the new Code. Wherefore, let canon 1111 sound: "Each spouse has, from the very beginning of the marriage, an equal right and duty with regard to the acts proper to conjugal life."

If some special rationale, from the manner in which the marriage was celebrated or from the unhappy beginnings of common life, seemed to give a just cause for an exception, this remedy is at hand: that by authority of the Ordinary, or even by his own authority if the cause is established and there is danger in delay ⁹, a spouse separate himself from the other and petition the Holy See for a dispensation from a ratified and nonconsummated marriage.

⁹ Cf. canon 1131, § 1.

255. - The debt, as we have seen, can per se be rendered to one unlawfully requesting an act which is nevertheless lawful of itself and to the other party (as if one alone bound by a vow requests, or one to whom intercourse is excessively harmful).

But whether it is owed is disputed. Palmieri ¹⁰, following many, affirms.

¹⁰ Opus theologicum, vol. 6, treatise 10, no. 404.

Since it is a question of a person so closely joined that solicitude concerning the spiritual or physical good of the other cannot reasonably seem importunate, we think that the obligation is rather to be denied. The other is not reasonably unwilling. The words of St. Thomas are consonant, at least when it is a question of physical detriment: "When the thing to be restored appears to be gravely harmful to him to whom restitution is to be made, or to another, it ought not then to be restored to him, because restitution is ordered to the utility of him to whom it is restored ¹¹."

¹¹ II-II, q. 62, art. 5, ad 1.

S. Th., Suppl., q. 64; q. 59, a. 6; q. 62.

959. Defect in the use of matrimony is not had if either spouse, with the consent of the other party, or both, by mutual consent, do not wish to use their right to the acts of conjugal life, but when, while the other party is urging his right and justly demanding the conjugal debt, the other denies it without a just reason. For since the use of matrimony must be regulated by the moral virtue of chastity, which is in the mean of reason, in it, just as there can be excess, so also there can be defect. Concerning this the following principles hold.

960. Principle I. The conjugal act, of itself, must obligatorily be rendered to the other party who has a right to it and justly demands it. - For copula can be demanded from justice by either spouse, because each has power over the body of the other party, and indeed from a bilateral onerous contract, so that of itself and generally the other party is bound to render it; for which reason it is commonly called the conjugal debt. Hence spouses in this matter are equal in right (can. 1111), and between them there is justice strictly so called and commutative. Hence the Apostle, I Cor. VII, 3-4: Let the husband render the debt to the wife; and likewise also the wife to the husband. The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. Likewise also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman.

A. Of asking there is no obligation of itself, because no one is bound to use his own right; by accident an obligation from charity and piety can exist, for example if the spouse judges that the other party, being in danger of incontinence, does not dare through shame to ask, or if the use of matrimony appears necessary for fostering love or averting dissensions.

B. Of rendering there exists an obligation grave of itself from justice, whenever one party reasonably, seriously, and legitimately asks, whether expressly or tacitly, because they have mutually handed over their bodies for conjugal use in the matrimonial contract; but to deny this of itself brings grave annoyance to the other. By accident, however, it will be light, as if the debt is rarely denied, for example once in a month to one asking more frequently; if it is deferred for a short time, for example from day to night, from night to morning; if the other asks remissly, not insistently, and easily acquiesces in the refusal; provided that in these circumstances there is absent danger of incontinence or of another grave inconvenience.

961. Principle II. The obligation of rendering the conjugal debt ceases in one, when the right of asking ceases in the other. - This can happen for many reasons:

a) If the spouse asking has admitted formal, certain, consummated adultery (sodomy properly so called, bestiality): for faith is broken with one who breaks faith. Except if the other has sinned similarly, or has been an accomplice in the sin, or, knowing and willing it, has condoned the sin (can. 1129).

b) If the one asking altogether lacks the use of reason or is in a state of complete drunkenness, as long as the state lasts: for one who lacks the use of reason does not ask in a reasonable and human manner.¹

¹ There can also be danger for offspring to be conceived from copula undertaken after much intoxicating drinking, namely lest it be born foolish, or deaf-mute, or liable to drunkenness.

c) If copula is the cause of grave danger or extrinsic inconvenience, either for the one rendering, or for the one asking, or for the offspring already conceived;² nevertheless, with a sufficient reason being present (for example, dissensions to be avoided, or one's own incontinence or that of the other party), one could, from charity, render to the other party and expose oneself to one's own danger, unless, however, death would threaten from the copula.3

² Specifically, there is a grave inconvenience of denying:

a) if the wife suffers from incipient cancer of the uterus, so that after coitus she is subjected to abundant emission of blood;

b) if she undergoes coitus with very acute pain which is repeated in each copula;

c) if she herself is gravely ill or if the other party suffers from a contagious disease, such as leprosy, venereal disease, which either brings danger of quick infection or excites an insuperable horror;

d) if either party suffers from an organic defect of the heart: for then coitus not only gravely harms, but can even produce sudden death;

e) if the wife knows by experience or by the judgment of a physician that in childbirth she undergoes grave danger of death.

Hence P. Vermeersch says, o. c., n. 225: "If a physician declares that a new conception will certainly be fatal for the wife, the wife must decline copula. But if death is not so imminent, the wife can put herself into danger for a grave cause. For since the conception itself is doubtful, the danger seems neither to have arisen nor to be proximate. But on these matters one must approach a physician at once skilled and God-fearing. For there are not lacking those who, because of slight indications, inconsiderately prohibit persons not very continent from the honorable use of matrimony. Wherefore Genicot judges that such danger from a future childbirth is very rarely certain, such that there would be a grave obligation of abstaining from matrimony."

3. That this is according to the mind of St. Thomas is clear from his response to the fourth objection, a. 1, q. 64.

d) If the other party asks immoderately, for example several times (three or four times) in the same night.1

e) If he asks in a manner illicit not only on the part of the agent but on the part of the act itself, for example that it be done onanistically, sodomitically, with scandal of others, etc.

But a graver harm is required for denying the debt absolutely than for deferring or restricting its rendering. Thus the weakness of the wife or great weariness, which does not suffice for absolutely denying copula, can be a reason for delaying the rendering or for denying it when it is as frequent as is sought by the husband. Hence:

1° Wives sin gravely who, in rendering the debt, show themselves difficult and slow, with danger of incontinence or adultery in the husband, or with the intention of deterring him from asking; likewise if they do not concede the debt except under compulsion, if they harshly and contumeliously reproach the husband for his requests, indeed if they obstinately deny it, even for one time, while he asks seriously and insistently.

2° Husbands also sin gravely who, whether from avarice in order to avoid offspring, or from ill-will, rarely know their wives.

3° Spouses are bound to the common bed (can. 1128) because of the obligation of rendering; therefore of itself it is illicit for one, without the consent of the other or with danger of incontinence, to be absent for a longer time; for this is equivalent to a denial of the debt; by accident it is licit because of grave causes, for example a notable good of the republic or of the family.

4° Hence he is unjust who illicitly separates himself or seeks civil divorce.

5° It is illicit for spouses to render themselves unable for copula or generation by excessive labors, vigils, austerities, or a fortiori by pollutions, adulteries, or other illicit acts. Hence husbands are guilty of grave and special injustice who, against the will of the wife, have admitted vasectomy for this reason, or castration, so that they cannot generate, or so emaciate the body that they render themselves almost unequal to the conjugal act, or practice neo-Malthusian arts; likewise on the other hand wives who, without the knowledge of the husband or against his will, not from the necessity of a present infection, but in order to obtain sterility or to avoid a future pregnancy, even a dangerous one, procure for themselves the excision of the ovaries or the interruption of the oviduct, or apply an occlusive pessary to the opening of the uterus, or use other neo-Malthusian means; likewise physicians who by their art perform the aforesaid excisions or operations or cooperate with them in any way.

6° Spouses are not excused from the obligation of rendering because of inconveniences inherent in matrimony, for example more numerous offspring, the inconveniences of gestation, ordinary difficulties of childbirth, grave and unusual but brief pains, light pains although long-lasting, etc., because these burdens are annexed to matrimony and they undertook them in entering matrimony.

7° Nevertheless the wife seems to be excused from rendering the debt if the husband by his own fault leaves the wife in extreme poverty, or does not wish to feed the offspring, or has no care of the family.

1. Men are not accustomed, much less women, to exceed the measure in asking the debt except in the first months after the marriage has been contracted, at which time also the moral difficulty will be slight, either because the husband more rarely intends to urge his strict right, or because he will willingly yield to the wife modestly begging off (Genicot, Th. M., II, n. 554).

962. Observations. - 1. Ordinarily the confessor is not bound, nor is it fitting for him, to question wives, except in the more modest manner he can, whether they have rendered the debt, for example whether they obey the husband in matters which pertain to matrimony, or whether anything troubles the conscience concerning matrimony; concerning the rest let him be silent unless he has been questioned. For the most part wives little fearing God are to be questioned in this matter, especially when they confess that they have been angry with their husbands. But this questioning ordinarily is to be omitted with wives of a God-fearing conscience.

2. When questioned, the confessor can propose to married persons who are pressed by anxiety concerning the baser things which they do between themselves the threefold rule indicated above, n. 948; - from further questions concerning the nature of the fact he should generally abstain; - besides, each should be taught: a) the husband, that he should not ask the debt at those times in which copula can be gravely harmful to the wife, for example at the time of purgation or of grave sickness; b) the wife, that she is bound under grave sin to obey the husband in rendering the debt, unless she is excused by a just cause, for example by infirmity.

3. A girl who asks what is licit or prescribed for her in matrimony soon to be contracted, the confessor should bid to ask her mother or another female relative whom she can trust; but if she has no woman of this kind at hand, he should teach her briefly and in a more honorable manner. Simply to send her back to the husband, so that she should conform herself to all his desires, already today does not seem expedient, since so many men now seek means against nature; - unless in a case in which the honesty of the husband is beyond every exception. Sometimes provisionally he will be able to say: that the husband is to be obeyed, unless sin is clearly certain; but if there is doubt, this is afterwards to be explained to the confessor.

4. Let the confessor beware lest he make untimely or excessive questions to spouses about various modes of coming together, since these not only are useless, but can also beget scandal. Wherefore if the penitent gives rise to a prudent suspicion, it will be enough for the confessor to inquire whether there was anything against nature or voluntary pollution; concerning the rest let him not speak unless questioned.

5. In matrimony, that matters may proceed in a happier manner, spouses should attend so that in the use of matrimony they consult the satisfaction of the other rather than their own; specifically:

a) that the husband: 1. begin to approach the wife not in a harsh but in a gentle manner; 2. use his right discreetly, and thus 3. foster and increase the affection of love in the wife;

b) similarly the wife should provide to the husband: 1. facility, by which she is ready, in rendering the debt, to please the husband; likewise 2. cleanliness; and 3. the order and neatness of the house.

6. A twofold danger occurs to matrimonial chastity from a twofold vicious inclination: namely to adultery and to onanism.

A. For impeding the first, occasions must be avoided: therefore let the husband not be so imprudent as to foster frequent society of the wife or friendship with other men; likewise the wife: a) should not introduce to the husband or keep at home another younger woman, for example a sister or a beautiful maidservant; b) should not permit the husband separate attendance at theaters or worldly gatherings; c) should not herself have a separate bed.

B. To avoid onanism it is necessary to restrain the imagination together with egoism. Specifically spouses:

a) in true humility, content with their modest condition, should not be tormented by desire for a higher one,

b) should prefer labor for feeding numerous children to heaping up riches or to leisure,

c) in the spirit of Christian abnegation, should be willing to be deprived of various delights for the good instruction of offspring.

I presuppose that the use of marriage for the sake of offspring is lawful. Likewise, to avoid the danger of incontinence, as D. Bonaventure teaches in 4 d. 31, art. 2. The reason for the first is that this is the first end of the institution of marriage. The institution, moreover, is from God, as is said in Genesis 1 and 8, Matthew 19, John 2.

The other, however, is conceded in 1 Cor. 7: Again return together into the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence. So teach Rebello, 2 part. de oblig. iust. lib. 3 de imped. matrim. quaest. 19; Cajetan, sum. verb. usus matrimonii; Soto, 4 d. 32, art. 4; Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 115, with others; or at most it is venial, as D. Bonaventure asserts, quaest. 2, with others cited by Sanchez, Tom. 3 de matrim. lib. 9, d. 11. One may also licitly use marriage for health's sake. So Rebello, sect. 1; Cajetan, tom. 1, opusc. tract. 12, quaest. 3; Henriquez, lib. 11 de matrim. cap. 17, num. 7; and others cited in Diana, resol. 218.

I presuppose also that the union of spouses from mere delight is venial. So D. Bonaventure, quaest. 3, from D. Augustine, lib. 1 de nupt. cap. 15, and de bono coniug. cap. 6 and 7; Rebello, loc. cit.; Fagundez, num. 5; Cajetan, verb. usus matrimonii; and this the Saintly Doctor calls a disordination with respect to the final cause. The reason is that marriage makes honorable the union, yet it still retains some disordination. Many, however, with Diana, p. 2, Tract. 4, resol. 116, excuse it even from venial sin.

The Saintly Doctor adds there, and in the Speculum animae, cap. 3, whom others follow: if from such concupiscence one is carried toward the spouse with a meretricious affection, so that he would wish, even if she were not his wife, or in the act should imagine another, it is mortal, and he is held to declare the condition of her whom he imagines, whether she is sacred, or married, or betrothed, or a virgin. But of these we must treat in the Tractate on Marriage.

The Saintly Doctor adds in the Speculum animae that a disordination of manner, of time, etc. may accompany the conjugal act.

With respect to manner, it is certain that it is a most grave sin if one defiles one's wife Sodomitically, as D. Bonaventure notes.

D. Bonaventure here; D. Thomas, quaest. 154, art. 11; either between the thighs, or in any other way by spilling the seed outside the natural vessel, as D. Bonaventure says and as is commonly held, with Sanchez, lib. 9 de debito coniugali, d. 17. The reason is that it is opposed not only to the general but to the special order of nature, as the Saintly Doctor argues in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21, and with him Fagundez, lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 17. Understand, however, that this is so if it is done advertently, as Fagundez notes, num. 20.

They ask, however, whether a man who begins the conjugal act Sodomitically with his wife, in order to complete it in the proper vessel, sins mortally.

The first opinion is that it is not mortal, provided the danger of pollution is absent. So Navarrus, lib. 5 consil. tit. de paen. et remiss. num. 7; Ovando, 4 d. 31, quaest. unic.; Angelus, V. debitum 25; Zerola, in praxi paen. cap. 12, quaest. 25; Graffius, tom. 1, lib. 5 de adulterio, conf. 3; Gambacurta, de casibus reser. casu 2; Zancharda, in direct. part. 1, Tract. de matrimonio, cap. 4, § 10.

But that it is not lawful teaches Bonacina, de matrimonio, quaest. 4, punct. 11, num. 12; Sanchez, lib. 9, d. 17; Rodriguez, sum. tom. 3, cap. 88; Basil Pontius, de matrimonio, lib. 10, cap. 11 — whom Diana reports, p. p. Tract. 17, resol. 37. I add Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3, num. 18, who calls it an absurdity to concede this. And I subscribe: for that act is not ordered by nature to that vessel, but is initiatory of an execrable abomination, and is accordingly reduced to it. If, however, he inserts his fingers into the woman's vessel, or his member into her mouth, they deny that it is a mortal sin — Sanchez, de matrim. tom. 3, lib. 9, d. 17, num. 5; Diana, loc. cit.; but Fagundez, loc. cit. num. 19, says it is mortal, as also to rub the member about the unnatural vessel. Diana, part. 3, Tract. 4, resol. 204, condemns this with Pontius, and deservedly, for they can have no order, but are brutish.

They ask further: when the man is sowing and withdrawing his member, may the wife, gravely aroused, excite herself with touches.

They say it is lawful: Sanchez, num. 12; Fagundez, num. 21; and very many others cited in Diana, p. p. tract. 17, resol. 38 — who nevertheless, with Rodriguez, summ. part. 3, cap. 88, condemns such an act.

To me the prior opinion seems more probable. The reason is that it is the consummation of the conjugal union, ordered to generation. For the seed of the woman, though not necessary, nevertheless according to many contributes greatly to generation, as Sanchez proves, num. 8.

As for variation of position — for instance, if the woman is on top — it is more probably not deadly; for the womb of the woman has a power of attracting and retaining the man's seed, as the stomach has for food. So Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrim. d. 16; Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 42; Rodriguez, tom. 1, sum. cap. 143; Fagundez, in 6 praec. lib. 6, cap. 3; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others cited by these. The same they say if the union is had unnaturally, or sitting, or from the side — provided, however, there is no danger of spilling seed outside the proper vessel.

But if in an extraordinary manner of union he emits some quantity of seed outside the vessel, and, weary of children, at the end of the act pours out all the seed outside the vessel.

It is answered that the effusion of all the seed outside is deadly, nor can the wife, knowing this, render the debt — whatever Basil Pontius may say, de matrim. lib. 19, cap. 11, as reported by Diana, p. p. Tract. 15, resol. 54.

Thus as often as the husband wishes to exercise the act mortally, the wife is not bound, nor can she render it, as Sanchez notes, lib. 9, d. 16, num. 8; but when it is venial, it is probable that she is bound to render it. So Sanchez, loc. cit.; Peter Soto, de matrim. lect. 16; Cajetan, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 1; Fagundez, num. 27; Henriquez, lib. 11, cap. 16, num. 6, in gloss. litt. O; Diana, p. p. Tract. de circumstantia aggravante, resol. 35; and others with D. Bonaventure, in 4, d. 32, dub. 4.

But whether to approach a menstruating woman is deadly.

The first opinion is that it is mortal, and of old it was punished by the penalty of death, Leviticus 18, as S. Bonaventure notes, loc. cit., where he observes that the penalty enjoined was upon the husband asking, or even upon the wife, if she herself be the one asking; yet he must render to the one asking, if he cannot otherwise, because he is bound to render his due to his husband.

He concludes, however, from what has been said, art. 3, quaest. 1, that if the time of the menses is, according to nature, customarily once a month, he ought not to ask, because he has a time to attend to generation, so that offspring may be born without danger of monstrosity or of elephantiasis, as D. Jerome admonishes, cited by the Saintly Doctor.

But if he violently renders, the wife is excused; if, however, he knowingly asks, and renders willingly, he sins; for at that time the man has no power over the body of the woman. But if it is a continuous disease, all concede with the Saintly Doctor that it is lawful to ask; otherwise they would be compelled to be long without their right, nor would a monstrous offspring then be born; even if there were danger of this, it would be better that she be, than not to be. So Navarrus, man. cap. 16, num. 32, and others cited by Fagundez, num. 18.

Some, however, say that to ask during the ordinary time of the menses is only venial. Fagundez says this is the common opinion, num. 29. But these things I shall defer to the Tractate on Marriage. So it is said likewise of the sin of one who approaches a pregnant woman, with danger of abortion.

There remains to be considered whether, on account of sacred time, unions are illicit.

First, when the most holy Eucharist is to be received: it is commonly asserted to be venial, as in Sanchez, lib. 9 de matrimonio, d. 13; Fagundez, cap. 4, num. 51, with D. Bonaventure, in speculo animae, cap. 5.

But others say it is not even venial; Fagundez reports them, loc. cit.

On the more solemn principal feasts, the Saintly Doctor judges it venial, loc. cit.; but in compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3, cap. 21 he teaches that it is a sin if it is done from a mere impulse of lust.

In the Confessional, cap. 2, particula 14, he reports the words of Alexander of Hales, who says that the conjugal act is deadly in five ways from mere impetuousness. The first is the cause of satisfying lust through meretricious blandishments; the second, when it is done against the natural use; the third, when it is at a prohibited time; the fourth, in a prohibited place; the fifth, when one approaches a menstruating woman. But in the other passages adduced, and there also before these words, he understands these circumstances of place and time to be mortal if the impulse of lust is grave, preferring delight to God.

For the rest, he judges it not mortal, as I have reported; and it is the common opinion with respect to time; with respect to place, however, I have said enough when the sacrilege was treated.

There are also certain preliminaries to the act. And indeed they ask: whether spouses sin mortally by touching one another and kissing the privy parts for the sake of mere pleasure.

Many assert so. So Paludanus, 4 d. 31, quaest. 3, art. 2; Sylvester, V. debit. coniug. quaest. 7; Rodriguez, tom. 1, cap. 129. But I shall say with Diana, 3 part. tract. 4, resol. 125: woe, woe to the married, if this opinion were true. Therefore he upholds the contrary opinion with Zancharda, de Sacram. matrimonio, cap. 41; Sylvius, 2. 2, quaest. 154, art. 4, concl. 61; Filliucius, tomo 2, tract. 30, cap. 10, num. 195. Diana adds that these men are to be gravely rebuked. Fagundez subscribes, in 6 praec. lib. VI, cap. 3, num. 37, who says they are venial — yet with this condition, that there be no danger of pollution; for then those acts would be deadly.