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The Necessity of Charity of God

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Works

Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

Vol. II, Part First. On the Precept…, Book Third. On the Precept…, Question First. On Charity…, Article Second. On the Necessity of Charity of God

n. 58.

58. On the necessity itself of charity. Habitual charity, which is inseparably joined with sanctifying grace, is necessary for all, both adults and infants, by necessity of means unto salvation: for no one can come to God without sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. But here the question concerns the necessity of eliciting an act of charity.

  1. Actual charity in the New Testament is not necessary by necessity of means unto justification and salvation except in defect of a sacrament: for if an adult first acquires justification through the sacrament of baptism or penance, the act of charity is not equally necessary as the act of faith and hope, since the disposition through attrition suffices for obtaining justification through the sacrament.

Yet an explicit or implicit act of charity in contrition, which in the Old Testament was absolutely necessary for justification and salvation, in the New Testament is hypothetically necessary by necessity of means, namely for those who cannot receive the sacraments of baptism or penance: for outside the sacrament, except in the case of martyrdom, there is no other means of arriving at justification.

  1. Actual charity is necessary by necessity of divine precept: for there exists a special precept of charity by which we are bound to love God above all things with appreciatively highest charity, but not necessarily also with intensively highest charity.

a. Christ the Lord enjoins upon us the great commandment of charity in these words: You shall love the Lord your God from your whole heart, and in your whole soul, and in your whole mind. This is the greatest and first commandment.1 And indeed, since God is the ultimate end of all things, supremely lovable for His own sake, the order of things requires that God be loved by a creature capable of love for His own sake and above all things; therefore He could not fail to command this act of charity. Besides this, the very nature of man is of such perfection that it cannot be quieted and fully beatified except in charity of God, the highest good, whence the well-known words of St. Augustine: Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee.2

b. The precept of charity is a special precept distinct from the others; therefore it is not satisfied by the mere observation of other precepts, but must be fulfilled by the act itself of charity. Certainly there exist three propositions condemned by Innocent XI, from which we especially gather this: that there exists a special precept, distinct from the others, of eliciting an act of love of God above all things.3

Nor let it be said that from Sacred Scripture effective charity suffices and affective charity is not required, since it says: He who keeps His word, in this man the charity of God is perfected.4 For since this testimony cannot conflict with the other words of Sacred Scripture which prescribe affective charity, it must be explained thus: he who keeps the commandments has perfect charity, internal and external, because observation of the commandments is the effect and sign of internal charity. Besides, he who does not elicit an act of charity does not keep His, God's, word, because he neglects the first and greatest commandment, which concerns affective charity of God.

c. To fulfill the precept of charity there is required perfect charity, which is love of benevolence: for the charity by which we ought to love God is an act of love from the whole heart, from the whole mind, from the whole soul, from all the powers; therefore it is love of the most perfect species. But charity by which we love God for His own sake is more perfect than charity by which we love God on account of goods coming to us from Him.

d. Above all things: If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother ... and besides this even his own soul, he cannot be My disciple.5 And indeed we ought to love God in that manner which corresponds to the divine goodness on account of which we love God; but this infinitely surpasses all other things.

e. Appreciatively highest, because the infinite goodness of God demands that we prefer God to all created goods. Not intensively, because the intensity of love corresponds not so much to the dignity of the object as to the vividness of apprehension and the natural disposition of the subject. Yet it is especially fitting that love of God even intensively be greater than love of a creature.

Therefore he does not sin who loves a son, friend, or bride more intensely and more sensibly than God, provided he is prepared in soul rather to lose all things than God and His friendship, because intensively highest love is not required. But he would sin who were so disposed in soul that he would not love God if there were no hope of reward or if hell were not to be feared, because he would constitute not God, but himself or his own beatitude, as the ultimate end.

1 Matt. 22:37-38. Cf. Mark 12:30; Deut. 6:5.

2 Confessions, bk. 1, c. 1.

3 We do not dare to condemn as sinning mortally him who would elicit the act of love of God only once in life (5). It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not rigorously oblige of itself even in single five-year periods (6). It obliges only then when we are bound to be justified and do not have another way by which we can be justified (7). Cf. also proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII (n. 45).

4 1 John 2:5.

5 Luke 14:26. Cf. Matt. 10:37.

n. 59.

59. When the precept of charity obliges. The precept of loving God is affirmative and negative; insofar as it is negative, it prohibits hatred of God and love of creatures appreciatively greater than love of God; insofar as it is affirmative, it prescribes an act of love of God. Since affirmative precepts oblige at certain times, it is now asked how often and when an act of love of God must be elicited. Further, sometimes it must be elicited per se, or by reason of charity itself, sometimes accidentally, or by reason of another precept to be fulfilled.

The precept of loving God obliges per se: a. After man has attained the use of reason, that is, when man, sufficiently instructed concerning God and His goodness, apprehends the obligation of loving God above all things; yet this is to be taken not mathematically concerning a determinate time or day, but morally, that is, in such a way that after the use of reason has been acquired the act of charity cannot be deferred for a long time without sin.

b. Several times in life. From proposition 6 condemned by Innocent XI, it is certain that the precept of loving God obliges at least within five years; but whether it urges more often and how often cannot be determined.

Authors establish diverse things concerning this matter: for some say that an act of charity must be elicited on each Sunday and feast day; others with St. Alphonsus, bk. 2, n. 8, once a month; others once a year; others finally every three years; but nothing certain can be established. Therefore the faithful are to be earnestly exhorted and admonished to elicit acts of the theological virtues frequently, but it must not be said that they are obliged to this either each week, or each month, or each year, because this obligation is not determinately established.

c. In a temptation of sinning against charity by hatred of God, which can happen in adversities: for if an act of charity is the only means without which the temptation cannot be overcome, it must be elicited from the precept of charity; but it will rarely happen that an act of charity is the only means by which the temptation is repelled.

For the rest, since satisfaction can be made to the precept of charity, as also to the precept of faith and hope, by a virtual act of charity, it is not necessary that penitents be asked whether they have fulfilled the precept of charity of God. For those who live as Christians frequently elicit acts of charity, even if they do not advert that they elicit them, for example while they keep the precepts and avoid sins lest they displease God; while they desire that all may worship God; while they pray that His name be hallowed, His kingdom come, His will be done, etc. But those who live impiously do not advert to the obligation itself, and therefore they sin only materially.

Note. There are some who add that an act of charity must be elicited:

a. In the article of death. St. Alphonsus calls this obligation most probable, because then "the safest way must be chosen"; but this obligation exists only for those who are in mortal sin and cannot receive the sacrament. For the rest, it is not necessary that the safest way be chosen, but it suffices that one simply secure and safe be chosen.

b. When man through mortal sin has lost the habit of charity. Yet the obligation by which the sinner, who has been justified through attrition in the sacrament of penance, would be bound immediately or soon after he has obtained justification to elicit an act of charity, cannot be demonstrated by any probable argument. Indeed, those who urge this obligation too much seem to affirm, against the Council of Trent,1 that attrition with the sacrament does not suffice for true justification, or without sufficient motive they establish a special precept of referring all our actions to God from the motive of charity.2

1 Sess. 14, c. 4.

2 Cf. On Principles, n. 85.

n. 60.

60. Accidentally the obligation of eliciting an act of charity urges: a. When someone needs the state of grace and cannot receive the sacrament, as when one existing in mortal sin must administer a sacrament or receive a sacrament of the living, or when someone is placed in danger of death and there is no supply of a confessor: for he cannot arrive at the state of grace unless he elicits an act of charity or of perfect contrition, in which an act of charity is contained.

b. When someone is found in a grave temptation against another virtue, and this temptation cannot be removed unless an act of charity has been elicited, as if someone must either deny faith or undergo death.

Note. 1. Parish priests, teachers, and parents ought to take care that children and the unformed are aptly instructed in eliciting the theological virtues. Wherefore not only are revealed truths to be explained, but at the same time it must be added that those truths have been revealed by God and that we ought to believe God revealing. In a like manner they ought to be instructed concerning the end for which they have been created by God, and that they may be more easily stirred up to love of God, God must be proposed to them under that respect under which He provokes more efficaciously to love (n. 55).

  1. Nevertheless Lugo judges that even those faithful to whom it is only said that the Son of God was incarnate, that Christ died for us, without its being added that God revealed these things, "regularly elicit acts of divine faith," because they conceive this doctrine confusedly as something superhuman and divine.1

1 Cf. Lugo, De virtute fidei divinae, disp. 1, n. 126.

n. 61.

61. Moral value of the theological virtues. 1. The theological virtues, as acts, are of the highest dignity and excellence; for since their immediate object is God Himself, man through the theological virtues is intimately joined by intellect and will with God and His perfections.

  1. If they are compared with one another by reason of origin, the first is faith: for unless knowledge of the highest good precedes, neither desire nor love of it is possible; the second, ordinarily, is hope: for he who knows that the highest goods in heaven have been proposed to him tends trustingly toward them, that he may be beatified from them; the third is charity, which embraces God with love of benevolence on account of His highest lovableness. By reason of dignity the first is charity: a. by its nature it is an intimate and most pure union with the highest good; b. it immediately disposes for receiving sanctifying grace and accompanies it by an inseparable bond; c. when charity is lost, faith and hope are unformed virtues, which must be informed by habitual charity that they may make man simply good and his virtues meritorious; besides this, it perfects faith and hope, because it confers singular dignity and splendor upon virtues which are done from charity; d. faith and hope are virtues of the state of the way; charity is the virtue of the fatherland; therefore in the state of the term faith passes into vision, hope into possession, and charity alone remains.1

  2. If they are considered in themselves. Faith is the full service of intellect and will exhibited to God revealing: for the will, reverently obeying the Creator commanding faith, determines the intellect to embracing the truth, which in itself is indeed obscure, yet elevates man above that which can be known by natural light.2 Hope, insofar as it is desire, tears man away from earthly pleasures and directs him to the spiritual beatitude of the other life; insofar as it is trust, man through it rests, fully trusting in the goodness of God and His grace. Charity embraces the highest good in the most perfect way and intimately joins man with God; it constitutes Christian perfection, and since charity cannot be sluggish and idle, it moves and stirs man to exercising virtues diligently; but the fullness of the law is love.3

1 1 Cor. 13:8.

2 Cf. Vatican Council, constitution De fide, c. 3.

3 Rom. 13:10.

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905)

Bucceroni, Moral Enchiridion (4th ed., 1905), On the Theological Virtues

n. 378.

The Precept of Charity

Cf. n. 353.

n. 381.

Whether We Are Bound Always to Act from Charity

“53. Charity alone makes [actions Christian] in a Christian manner through relation to God and Jesus Christ. — 54. Charity alone is that which speaks to God; it alone God hears. — 55. God crowns nothing except charity; he who runs from another impulse and another motive runs in vain. — 56. God rewards nothing except charity, since charity alone honors God. — 57. Everything is lacking to the sinner when hope is lacking to him; and there is no hope in God where there is no love of God. — 58. Neither God nor religion is present where charity is not present.” Propositions of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Vol. I, Treatise On Virtues, Ch. III, Article I. On the Love of God

n. ¶1.

1º A special precept of loving God above all things is given, both by internal affection through true love of the heart, and also by an external work. - This is clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 22.37: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment.

n. ¶2.

2º This precept, as affirmative, obliges to loving God above all things appreciatively, as is plain from the natural law, but not necessarily intensively, because the essence of Charity does not consist in degrees 1. - Thus commonly.

1 Namely, the degree of intensity, or of fervor in loving, does not fall under the precept of charity; for it suffices that God in reality be preferred to all goods, as the common opinion of the Doctors holds. Nor should what some old authors seem to hold otherwise move anyone and drive him aside; for under the name of greater intensity, or more fervent love, or greater extension, Scotus, for example, and St. Thomas, in reality understand appreciation (see Koninck, De Virtut. Theol. disp. 25. n. 2.).

And indeed by this common doctrine is exploded both the opinion of those who were requiring a supremely intense act of love (who indeed fall into absurdity, because no act can be thought so intense that a more intense one could not be elicited with the help of God), and that of those who contend that God must be loved with a more intense affection than anything else; whence it would follow that the affection which yesterday sufficed for fulfilling the precept today no longer suffices, if perchance I am affected by a more intense zeal for some other thing, even an honorable one; and likewise that contrition which today suffices for the remission of sins tomorrow will not be sufficient, if perchance I grieve more intensely over the worst thing, for example, the death of a brother (compare Koninck l. c. n. 4. 5., and Suarez, de Charit. Disp. 6. Sect. 2. n. 2-5.).

n. 218.
  1. Questions. - Q. 1º Are we bound always to act from the motive of Charity?
n. 218.

Resp. Neg., according to the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 31. Since even the acts of other virtues are good and meritorious 2. This is also clear from the 8th proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

2 They are meritorious for him who is in the state of grace; otherwise they will be either salutary, if they are placed from grace, or at least naturally honorable.

n. 218.

Q. 2º When does the precept of Charity bind?

n. 218.

Resp. It obliges both per se and per accidens, just as the precept of Faith. Recall the things said above concerning the precept of Faith, n. 188. This is also clear from propositions 5 and 6 condemned by Innocent XI, of which the prior lies thus: Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn. But the latter: It is probable that not even in each five-year period, rigorously speaking, does the precept of Charity toward God bind per se. The opinion of those who require an act of Charity once a month pleases St. Liguori. - Hom. apost. n. 12. But this opinion has no solid foundation 3.

3 For this opinion Cardenas and Croix alone are alleged (see St. Alph. Lib. 2. n. 8.). But Croix (Lib. 2. n. 141.) merely has these things: Since in so great a variety of opinions we do not know when and how often God must be loved, let us seize the safer things. These certainly cannot be so understood, as if Croix, from a defect of reasons for asserting any obligation, should most absurdly and contrary to first principles infer the necessity of imposing stricter obligations without any reason.

But Cardenas (Cris. 2. Disp. 6. n. 18.) discourses thus: It is very hidden and uncertain to determine the time in which this precept presses; for we only say that the precept is violated when the love of God is deferred for a long time, in the judgment of a prudent man; and an entire month seems to me a long time on account of the supreme dignity of this precept. These things plainly have no strength. For I omit that no one before fixed this term: but the reason, as is plain, which he seeks from the supreme excellence of the precept, is wholly feeble. Assuredly, if the more excellent a precept is, the greater should be the frequency of the prescribed acts, since the precept of receiving the Eucharist is more excellent than that of abstaining from meats, it would have to be concluded that we are bound to receive the Eucharist more than twice each week!

** Against this brief note, VV. (Pag. 145-149.) heap up many things through ten columns. But to what end? Namely, that they may prove that he sins mortally who omits an act of charity for a month. But has it really escaped the memory of the Most Illustrious Men that St. Alphonsus reports (Lib. 5. n. 52.) from St. Antoninus, that one must not define concerning mortal sin unless there is express authority of Sacred Scripture, or of a Canon, or of a determination of the Church, or an evident reason? And that which the same St. Alph. (Lib. 1. n. 89. al. 73.) teaches, both with Gerson: Doctors of theology ought not to be easy in asserting that some sins are mortal, where they are not most certain about the matter; and with St. Raymond: Do not be prone to judge mortal sins, where it is not clear to you through certain Scripture; and with Gabriel Biel: Nothing ought to be condemned as mortal sin concerning which there is not evident reason, or manifest authority of Scripture? Where, moreover, do we have evident reasons here, or so great a strength of authority?

1º Suarez, say VV., and Reginald prove from the dignity of so great a precept that an act of charity must be elicited more often.

Resp. Suarez (De Charit. disp. 5. Sect. 3. n. 1.) from this only deduces that it is repugnant to the dignity of so great a precept to cast back the obligation (only) to that time (of death), and (ibid. n. 4.) that he sins against this precept who for many years does not exercise this love. - But Reginald (Tr. 17. n. 98.) says that no one is obligated to an act of love, except when the exercise of it is necessary for defending the honor of God, ... or for retaining divine friendship. Where, then, is the obligation pressing in each month?

2º VV. urge that certain old authors taught that this precept obliges on each feast day; and Amort also acceded to them, asserting this obligation at least under light obligation.

Resp. Does not St. Alphonsus, with the most common body of Theologians, reject this opinion?

3º VV. note that St. Alphonsus brought forward the argument, that otherwise someone will be able with difficulty to observe the divine law (Hom. Ap. n. 12.).

Resp. When it is the only means of avoiding some grave sin, C., as Reginald also taught above. Otherwise, N. For St. Alphonsus's opinion means nothing else.

Moreover, the matter has itself thus, that Cardenas and Croix alone hold that opinion, and they confirm it by no other reasons except those alleged. Whether either that authority or those reasons suffice for asserting a grave sin of omission is to be defined from the rules of the Doctors brought forward above by St. Alphonsus: for it ought deservedly to seem grave to detain the discerning reader longer with these things.

n. 218.

Q. 3º Is the precept of Charity satisfied through attrition in the reception of the sacrament of Penance?

n. 218.

Resp. Neg., because attrition does not occur principally from love of God, but of oneself, and therefore in it the principal motive of Charity is lacking.

n. 219.
  1. Resolves. - 1º The faithful who live piously easily satisfy the precept of Charity, because they more often elicit acts of Charity rejoicing over the divine perfections, wishing that no one offend God, that all love and worship him, and observe his commandments, praying devoutly that his name be sanctified, that his will be done, avoiding sin because it displeases him, etc.
n. 219.

2º Therefore the faithful ought not to be anxious about this obligation, if they apply themselves to the Christian life and retain the will of avoiding grave sins. Nevertheless they are to be persuaded that they often elicit explicit acts of Charity in life, for a greater union with God, and so that the soul may be readier to elicit similar acts easily at death 4.

4 The dying are most opportunely stirred up to eliciting and repeating acts of charity; indeed there are not lacking those who think that a grave obligation of eliciting this act then presses. But it seems one must distinguish. For if the discussion is about those for whom no other means of justification is at hand, this is most truly affirmed; but otherwise, if necessity of this kind is absent; for no solid reason appears, either intrinsic or extrinsic, why some have called the opinion concerning this obligation common or most probable (see St. Alph. Lib. 2. n. 23.).

** Here also VV. (Pag. 149-151.) contend that neither an extrinsic nor an intrinsic reason for this obligation is lacking. But it was necessary to remember what VV. often seem to forget, that probabilities do not suffice for asserting an obligation.

Therefore, as regards the extrinsic reason, first of all the Authors were not to be neglected, and indeed most grave ones, who deny this obligation either expressly or equivalently, while, in recounting either the time of the obligation or the opinions concerning it, they pass over the time of death. Of this sort are Lugo, Navarrus (the citations, which are easily found, are omitted for the sake of brevity), Sanchez, Azor, Escobar, Croix, Becanus, Fagundez, Tamburini, and with these Potestas and Voit. - Among those denying this obligation are also to be numbered those who admit it then only when charity or perfect contrition is the only present means of justification. Thus Laymann, Toletus, Henriquez, Candidus, Lessius, Turrianus, Gordonus, Fabri, Ferraris, and Elbel. - To these must be added those who say that the affirmative opinion is probable or even seems to them more probable. The reason is that he who calls an obligation probable equivalently denies that it can be imposed. But to the three Authors whom VV. report can be joined Palaus, Gobat, Catalani, Mazzotta.

Next let us inspect the foundations of that obligation. 1º Suarez, and with him Koninck, Widgant, Cardenas, and Catalani, require charity on account of doubt about the value of the Sacrament with attrition alone, or about attrition itself, whether it has been duly elicited. - Resp. This reason proves too much. For if any such doubt had force, on account of it no less would the danger of frustrating the Sacraments by sacrilegious injury have to be guarded against. Therefore an obligation of charity or of perfect contrition would have to be enjoined under grave sin upon one approaching Confession, of premising an act; a doctrine which no one will easily admit. Moreover, since you can doubt equally, indeed more, about the certainty of contrition or charity than about certain attrition, because the former is judged more difficult, you would have to repeat it not once only, but again and again, and yet the doubt and at the same time the obligation of repeating would not cease. Finally, you would be bound to contrition not from the precept of charity, but from the precept of penance.

2º Others, for example, Bonacina, Valentia, Reginald, Giribaldi, etc., require an act of charity by which a man may fortify himself against temptations. - Resp. The same thing can be said about the use of holy water, about the sign of the Cross, about the invocation of the Blessed Virgin, and about any other means suitable for this. Do we therefore bind under grave obligation to employ all these things? This alone, therefore, can be laid down: an act of charity, and any other means, must be employed under grave obligation when it is the only means of avoiding grave fault. But then the omission does not violate the precept of charity, but brings in one and the same guilt as the sin into which someone falls on account of that omission.

3º Others, such as Cardenas, Holzmann, Reuter, Babenstuber, Antoine (whom Charmes and Collet transcribe), Viva, etc., argue thence, that since a man is then in such a state that he ought to be joined to his ultimate end, then especially it is fitting, suitable, useful, more convenient, more opportune that he dispose himself to this by the exercise of the principal virtues and of charity. And to this certain authors with Marchant and Sporer refer that saying of the Gospel: Let your loins be girt, and burning lamps in your hands. - Resp. Many other things are fitting, suitable, convenient, useful, opportune; but not the reason of fittingness, nor of convenience, nor of utility, nor of opportunity, but the reason of necessity from which one cannot withdraw himself, can induce a grave obligation. But whoever, adorned with sanctifying grace, is a friend of God, indeed also a son, has his loins sufficiently girt and bears a lamp lit.

4º Finally some with Cardenas argue thus: the doctrine that it suffices to have elicited an act of charity once in life has been condemned: therefore it must be elicited at death. - Resp. Both that sophism and the preceding weakest arguments are those on account of which Sanchez wrote concerning this opinion of obligation (Dec. Lib. 2. C. 35. n. 9.): Azor rejects this by the best right. And Tamburini (Dec. Lib. 2. C. 3. n. 4.): To posit this obligation, which certainly does not rest on a solid foundation, is nothing else than to inject scruples. And concerning the same matter Lugo says (de Poenit. Disp. 7. n. 276.): Therefore the Confessor ought not to cast snares upon the penitent in an uncertain matter.

n. 219.

3º He satisfies the precept of Charity who, stained with grave sin and destitute of the supply of a Confessor, elicits an act of perfect contrition, even if this act would be necessary for another reason, for example, for celebrating Mass. The reason is that the precept of Charity can well be fulfilled at the same time with another precept, and in circumstances of this kind there has place what we said above, that the precept of Charity sometimes obliges per accidens. - Elbel, etc.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Vol. I, Pt. I, Tract IX. On theological c…, Ch. I, Article II. On the necessity of charity

n. 560.

560. Proposition 1. Habitual charity (or the virtue of charity) is necessary for salvation for all, infants as well as adults, and always has been necessary by necessity of means.

This is Catholic doctrine;61 hence St. John says simply: "God is charity; and he who remains in charity remains in God, and God in him."62 But he who does not have "the wedding garment,"63 i.e. charity, will be cast into the exterior darkness. The reason is: a) because no one is saved unless he is God's friend. But through charity alone is true friendship constituted between God and man, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore no one is saved without charity. b) because no one is saved without sanctifying grace. But charity is indissolubly joined with sanctifying grace.

61 Conc. Trid. sess. 6, cap. 7.

62 1 Jo. 3, 16.

63 Matth. 21, 13.

n. 561.

561. Proposition 2. Actual charity (or an act of charity) is necessary by necessity of means for all adults capable of the use of reason, a) if, existing in the state of mortal sin, they cannot receive a sacrament of the dead (baptism or penance); b) after habitual charity has been obtained, at some times in life.

The reason for the first part is that for receiving the sacraments of the dead, baptism and penance, and, through them as mediating, for receiving justification, attrition suffices, which is not an act of perfect charity.64 But when the sinner cannot receive these sacraments, then contrition is required and suffices for obtaining justification, and contrition includes true charity.65 Nor, however, is it required that this act of charity be perfect in every part, but the Angelic Doctor rightly says: "However small the sorrow may be, provided it reaches the character of contrition, it deletes every fault."66 - The reason for the second part is that no adult will come to the vision of God unless he tends to union with God; and this indeed is done through actual charity. Hence St. John says concerning fraternal charity: "He who does not love remains in death."67 The same holds a fortiori concerning divine charity.

64 Cf. Conc. Trid. sess. 14, c. 4 de sacr. poenit. (Denz. n. 897 sq.). This opinion is now certain, whatever may be said about the nature of that attrition. Cf. below III, 342 sqq. in the treatise on penance.

65 Cf. Prop. 71 condemned by Baius (Denz. n. 1071).

66 Suppl. q. 5, a. 3.

67 1 Jo. 3, 14.

n. 562.

562. Proposition 3. Actual charity (or an act of charity) is necessary also by necessity of a special divine precept for all adults enjoying the use of reason.

The existence of this divine precept is manifestly drawn from the words of Christ: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, and in thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind."68 - But that this precept is special and distinct from the other commandments, and is something other than the observance of the other commandments (which some of the older authors falsely taught69), is clear: a) From the immediately following words of Christ: "This is the greatest and the first commandment." For if it is the greatest and first commandment, it is not the complex of all the commandments. b) From the proposition condemned by Alexander VII: "A man is never, at any time of his life, bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity by force of the divine precepts pertaining to these virtues." The following condemned propositions also pertain here: "We do not dare to condemn as sinning mortally one who would elicit an act of dilection of God only once in life." "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not of itself oblige rigorously even in each five-year period." "It obliges only when we are bound to be justified and do not have another way by which we can be justified." These three propositions were condemned by Innocent XI in the year 1679. "A man is not bound to love either at the beginning or in the course of his moral life." Alexander VIII condemned this proposition in the year 1690.70 - c) From the authority of St. Thomas, who says: "Nevertheless the act of dilection falls under special precepts."71

68 Matth. 22, 37 sq.

69 E.g. Joan. Sanches (Select. disp. 1, n. 2), Maldonatus (Comm. in Matth. 22, 38).

70 These condemned propositions are found in Denz. n. 1101, 1155-1157, 1289.

71 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1.

n. 563.

563. Extension of this precept. The precept of charity, insofar as it is negative, prohibits sins against this virtue, about which discussion will return below; but insofar as it is affirmative, it obliges that sometimes a due act of charity be elicited by us. But we must: a) love God from the whole heart, from the whole mind, from the whole soul, from all the powers. The Holy Fathers explain these terms in diverse ways. But St. Thomas72 gives this declaration: "It is commanded us that our whole intention be borne toward God, which is from the whole heart; and that our intellect be subjected to God, which is from the whole mind; and that our appetite be regulated according to God, which is from the whole soul; and that our exterior act obey God, which is to love God from the whole strength, or virtue, or powers." - b) love God with charity appretiatively supreme, as was already explained above, n. 557.

Since the affirmative precept of charity does not oblige always and for always, it is now asked:

How often and when an act of charity is to be elicited. To this question it is answered that this precept of charity obliges either per se or per accidens.

Per se there is an obligation of eliciting an act of charity:

  1. At the beginning of the moral life, i.e. when man, having already obtained sufficient use of reason, knows sufficiently clearly that God is lovable and to be loved above all things.73 For then man is bound to elicit an act of charity, because otherwise he makes little of God and consequently sins gravely. But this beginning of the moral life is not to be taken mathematically but morally, because perfect use of reason is not acquired all at once, but is usually acquired successively.74 Good Catholics, even if they do not remember having fulfilled this precept, ought not be anxious, because they have already satisfied this obligation by any service freely rendered to God.

  2. At the article of death. Thus the by far more probable opinion.75 For a man about to depart from this world at once is bound to desire union with God, which cannot be done without an act of charity.

  3. More often in life. Thus it is established from the condemned propositions recounted above. But if it is now asked how often in life a man is bound per se to elicit an act of charity, theologians do not agree, nor can anything else certain be said except that an act of charity must be elicited more often than every five years. Thus from the condemned proposition cited above. St. Alphonsus76 thinks that man is bound under grave sin to elicit an act of charity every month; others will that this obligation exists on every Sunday and feast day.77 - Besides, the faithful of fearful conscience ought not be anxious about transgression of this precept, because they sufficiently elicit an act of charity as often as from the intention of honoring God they perform some pious work, as often as they pour forth pious prayers, etc. For even in the mere recitation of the Lord's Prayer three acts of charity are contained; namely, the threefold desire that the name of God be sanctified, that the will of God be done in heaven and on earth, that the kingdom of God come.

Per accidens the obligation of eliciting an act of charity urges:

  1. As often as someone is engaged in a danger of sinning which cannot be removed without an act of charity. This case can easily occur if someone suffers grave temptations of hatred against neighbor, which cannot be conquered without a strong act of charity toward God, since He prohibits every hatred against neighbor, since neighbor is the image of God.

  2. As often as someone, existing in the state of mortal sin and lacking a confessor, is bound to recover the state of sanctifying grace; e.g. someone is bound to receive some sacrament of the living, or someone is bound solemnly to administer some sacrament while he himself is in the state of mortal sin and lacks access to a confessor. For then an act of perfect contrition must be elicited, which is necessarily joined with an act of charity. - Some theologians have asserted that after mortal sin has been committed a man is bound immediately to elicit an act of contrition and charity; this opinion today has been abandoned by all, as less conformable to the decrees of the Council of Trent.78 Certainly it is best and very much to be advised to rise as quickly as possible from the state of mortal sin, but nowhere does there exist a grave precept of effecting this resurrection immediately.79

Note. It is very salutary that we elicit acts of charity most frequently; and therefore Benedict XIV80 exhorts bishops that in any parish church they have the acts of faith, hope, and charity read aloud to the people on all Sundays and feast days.

72 Ib. a. 5.

73 Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 89, a. 6.

74 Cf. Billuart, De pecc. diss. 8, a. 7.

75 St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. II, 23) calls this opinion most probable.

76 Homo apost. tr. 4, n. 14.

77 Billuart, De gratia diss. 4, a. 7, §2.

78 Sess. 14, c. 4 de sacr. poenit. (Denz. n. 897 sq.).

79 Cf. St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 437.

80 Const. Etsi minime, d. 7 Febr. 1742.

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. I, Tr. III, Ch. I, Article II: On the Necessity of Charity Toward God

n. ¶469.
  1. Things to be noted beforehand. It is certain 1. that the habit of charity is necessary for all, both adults and little children, by necessity of means. It is certain 2. that in the New Testament the act of charity is not necessary by necessity of means, except hypothetically, when justification and salvation are not obtained by means of a sacrament or martyrdom. Yet for all adults there is given a negative precept of charity, by which we are prohibited: a) from ever having hatred for God; b) from postponing him to any creature, by doing something which dissolves our friendship with him, namely by sinning mortally.

As regards the affirmative precept of charity, behold what must be established.

n. ¶470.
  1. PRINCIPLES. I. There is given a special precept, or one distinct from others, by which we are commanded to love God. It is established 1. from the words of Christ (Matt. 22:37): Thou shalt love the Lord thy God from thy whole heart, etc. This is the greatest and first commandment; 2. from various condemned propositions, notably from the 1st condemned by Alexander VII: "Man, at no time whatsoever of his life, is bound to elicit an act of faith, hope, and charity, by force of the divine precepts pertaining to those virtues"; 3. from reason: because the other virtues do not attain the ultimate end except through charity (Billuart, de Carit., Diss. 4, a. 7, § 1).

It is said: special precept, and therefore not only effectively, namely by the observation of other commandments, but truly also affectively, that is, by an internal act of the will, ought we to elicit an act of charity; otherwise it would not be a special precept.

n. ¶471.
  1. II. For fulfilling the precept of charity, it is required and suffices that we love God appreciatively above all things. Thus St. Thomas (2.2, q. 27, a. 3). For charity appreciatively supreme, even in a remiss grade, is true and perfect charity (II, 22; VI, 442). Cf. the things said at n. 467.

Hence: 1. It is not a sin if someone loves a creature with a more intense love than God, provided that, by an act of the will, he loves God appreciatively above all things.

  1. These three grades pertain to the greater perfection of charity: a) that from love of God we are prepared to avoid everything which offends him even lightly; b) that we avoid those things which are less pleasing and acceptable to him, but seek above all those things which please him more; c) that we pursue him with a more intense and tender love than any creature whatsoever. See St. Francis de Sales, Theotim., P. II, l. 4, c. 4 and 5.
n. ¶472.
  1. Questions. QUAER. 1. When does the AFFIRMATIVE precept of charity toward God oblige?

Resp. 1. It obliges PER SE: a) At the beginning of the use of reason and of spiritual life, namely when divine Goodness, lovable above all things for its own sake, has been sufficiently proposed to someone, as they commonly teach with St. Thomas. For then man ought to deliberate concerning attaining the ultimate end, and to direct himself and his acts to it: which cannot be done without an act of charity (Salmant., tr. 21, c. 6, n. 7). b) Most probably, in the article of death, because then the safest way must be chosen, and because no one is absolutely certain that he is in the state of grace.1 c) More often in life; as is established from the 5th and 6th propositions condemned by Innocent XI, of which the former is this: "Whether he sins mortally who elicits an act of love of God only once in life, I do not dare to condemn"; and the latter: "It is probable that the precept of charity toward God does not per se oblige even rigorously in each five-year period."

  1. It obliges PER ACCIDENS: a) When someone is bound to be contrite, for example one about to die or about to celebrate, if namely a confessor is lacking to him; the reason is that contrition includes an act of charity. b) When there is danger of falling into hatred of God, or into another grave sin, unless an act of charity is elicited; for he who is bound to the end is bound to the necessary means (II, 23; Inst. cat., P. I, c. 1, n. 26).

QUAER. 2. How often, in life, is an act of charity to be elicited?

Resp. One must distinguish the obligation of eliciting an act of charity insofar as it is an excellent virtue, and insofar as it is a MEANS TO THE END, that is, to the observance of the precepts. There is not one opinion of all: some say that it must be elicited under grave obligation once a year; others once a week, or on any feast. But St. Alphonsus speaks thus (H. Ap., IV, 13; Conf. dir., IV, 6): "Concerning the act of charity, the opinion of those who require it once a month is more pleasing to me, since he who does not frequently exercise his love toward God by positive acts will with difficulty be able to observe the divine law." Cf. Vind. Alph., P. II, q. 3; Lehmkuhl, I, 451; Perrone, de Virt. theol., P. 3, c. 5, n. 253.

n. ¶473.
  1. From these things you will resolve: 1. There is no obligation of always acting from the motive of charity; for the precept of charity, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges only at stated times. Recall the things said at n. 307.
  1. A special obligation lies upon those to whom the care of children or of the dying has been entrusted, that they suggest to these and those, at due time, acts of charity (St. Alph., de Assist. morib., § 3). Yet, as regards the dying, exhortation rather than strict admonition is to be used.

  2. Those who remain in the state of mortal sin for months do not of themselves satisfy the precept of charity. Nor do they satisfy it if with attrition alone they receive the sacrament of penance; because attrition does not attain to the notion of true charity (cf. n. 1675).

  3. Those who live Christianly easily satisfy this obligation. "For there is no need that these acts be made reflexively and explicitly, with the intention of satisfying the precept; but it is enough if they are made in an exercised way, although from another end, namely for casting away temptation, for eliciting contrition, if someone wishes to confess. Thus also acts of charity are all acts of uniformity with the divine will and all virtues exercised for the complacency of God" (H. Ap., IV, 3). Likewise, satisfaction can be made through prayer, notably through the Lord's prayer, when it is said from the heart: Hallowed be etc...., thy kingdom come etc...., thy will be done etc.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Vol. I, TREATISE ON VIRTUES, Ch. III, ARTICLE I: ON LOVE OF GOD

n. ¶276.
    • 1° There is a special precept of loving God above all things both by internal affection, through true love of the heart, and also by external work. - This is established from the words of Christ:2 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart ... this is the greatest and first commandment.

2° This precept, insofar as it is affirmative, obliges to loving God above all things appreciatively, that is, in such a way that in reality He is preferred to all goods, as is clear from the natural law; but not necessarily intensively, that is, by a more intense sensitive affection than anything else, because the essence of charity does not consist in degrees.

n. ¶277.
  1. Questions. - Quaer. 1° When does the precept of charity urge?

Resp. 1° Of itself: a) at the beginning of the use of reason, or when man has obtained sufficient knowledge of the infinitely good God; b) most probably in the article of death, because then not merely the safe way, that is, attrition with the Sacrament of Penance, but the safest way also is to be chosen; c) several times in life. But how often in life, there is not one opinion of all. The opinion of Cardenas is more pleasing to St. Alphonsus,3 who teaches that he can with difficulty be excused from mortal sin who defers an act of charity beyond a month; this opinion he thinks must altogether be persuaded as very salutary, since in reality a man can with difficulty live long in a Christian manner, by observing the divine commandments, unless he frequently cherishes and nourishes love toward God; but he will not be able to nourish and cherish it except through acts of charity. Yet Croix notes that all meritorious works exercised from the intention of pleasing God are true acts of love, as almsgiving is. Likewise it suffices if such acts are elicited for fulfilling other precepts, as for confessing; since the precept is fulfilled in exercise, although there is no advertence to it.1 Indeed as often as those words are uttered from the heart in the Lord's Prayer: hallowed be Thy name; Thy will be done, acts of perfect charity are sufficiently elicited. Therefore timorous faithful ought in no way to be anxious as to the fulfillment of this precept.2

Resp. 2° By accident: a) if there is danger of falling into mortal sin unless an act of charity is elicited, or grave temptation cannot otherwise be overcome; for he who is held to the end is also obliged to the necessary means; - b) when the precept of contrition urges, as if it is necessary for a priest to celebrate when he does not have a supply of a confessor and is conscious to himself of grave sin; for charity is included in the act of perfect contrition.

Quaer. 2° Is the precept of charity satisfied through attrition in the reception of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Negatively, because attrition does not occur principally from love of God, but of oneself, and therefore in it the principal motive of charity is lacking.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Vol. I, Special Moral Theology, Treatise: On Divine Charity, Second Part: On the Object…, Question Two: On the Mater…, Article II: On Loving God

n. ¶1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4; q. 25, a. 1; q. 27, aa. 2, 5, 6; q. 28, a. 1; q. 44, aa. 4, 5, 6.

n. 884.

884. How charity is to be exercised toward God. - Charity or divine friendship is an efficacious love of benevolence, whence it embraces both complacency concerning divine goods, - and desire or benevolence properly so called, that is, the will of increasing divine goods, - and zeal for promoting the glory of God.

n. 884.
  1. Complacency is concerning the goods which God possesses: for when we truly love someone, we hold his goods as ours, and therefore we are complacent in his goods, as if they were ours; which Christ indicated in these words: "If you loved me, you would indeed rejoice, because I go to the Father" Jn. XIV, 28. Hence:
n. 884.

a) The just rejoice concerning the infinite perfections of God considered in himself, such as wisdom, power, benignity, beauty, etc.; indeed they are more complacent in the perfection and glory of God than concerning their own beatitude. Thus Augustine is reported to have said: "Lord God, I love you thus, that if I were God and you Augustine, I would wish to be Augustine, so that you might be God." And St. Francis de Sales, who reports this, himself prayed: "O most beloved of my heart, I do not indeed desire that I could wish any good to your majesty, but with my whole heart I am complacent in that supreme grade of goodness which you have, to which neither by desire nor even by thought can anything be added; but if such a desire were possible, O infinite Deity and divine Infinity, my soul would wish to be this very desire and nothing else."1

1 Traite de l'Amour de Dieu, l. V, ch. 6.

n. 884.

b) They rejoice likewise concerning the external manifestation of the attributes of God, concerning divine providence, concerning the extension of the kingdom of God, concerning the external glory which he receives from the Angels, the elect in heaven, and the just on earth.

n. 884.

c) This complacency spontaneously bursts forth into praise of God (which is an act of religion), by which they congratulate him concerning all things which pertain to his perfection and glory: "Glory to God in the highest... We praise you, we bless you, we glorify you... We praise you, O God; we confess you, O Lord."

n. 884.
  1. Desire is concerning divine goods to be increased insofar as this is possible; which is benevolence strictly so called, by which we will and wish good to God: for when we truly love someone, we wish good to him as to ourselves.
n. 884.

a) That desire is not absolute as regards perfections intrinsic to God, the increase of which we do not wish, since no good can accrue to the Infinite; nevertheless we can in some way wish them under a condition. For St. Thomas says (III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4): "If it were possible that from our works something would accrue to him, one having charity would do many more things for preserving beatitude to him than for obtaining it for himself." Whence St. Francis de Sales (l. c.): "I said to the Lord: You are my God, filled with immense goodness, who need neither my goods nor anyone else's; nevertheless, if it were possible for you to need some good, I would never cease to wish it for you, and, to procure it for you, I would freely spend my life and all things dearest to me."

n. 884.

b) But the desire is absolute as regards the extrinsic glory of God, which by love we are led to procure, both in ourselves insofar as we are prepared to do and suffer all things for progressing in divine love, and in others insofar as we sincerely desire that sinners and unbelievers be enlightened and know, love, and glorify God, or also that the just glorify him more: "Let the peoples confess you, O God; let all the peoples confess you... Praise the Lord from the heavens... praise the Lord from the earth... praise him, all nations... Bless the Lord, all works of the Lord... Hallowed be your name, your kingdom come."

n. 884.

c) From this desire arises sadness concerning sins and offenses committed against God, the highest Good, and filial fear lest by offending God we be separated from him loved above all things.

n. 884.
  1. Zeal for promoting the glory of God arises when love does not rest in affection alone, but also works exteriorly. For affection is not sufficient, but charity must be effective: "Let us not love in word nor with the tongue, but in deed and truth" (I Jn. III, 18; cf. Mt. XXV, 41 sq.). "He who has the commandments and keeps them, he is the one who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21). Whence St. Gregory: "The proof of dilection is the exhibition of work" (hom. in Ev., l. 8, hom. 30).
n. 884.

This happens in two ways: a) by vehemently repelling, as far as possible, those things which are against the honor and will of God, and b) by positively carrying out those things which procure the honor of God: in oneself by perfectly observing the commandments, indeed also the counsels, and by effecting all works for pleasing God in such a way that he truly reigns over us; in others by promoting the exercise of religion and of the virtues.

n. 885.

885. Suitable means for progressing in the love of God are to be employed. It is necessary:

n. 885.
  1. To diminish the obstacle and gradually eradicate disordered love of self, which is directly contrary to divine love and is the cause of every sin (I-II, q. 77, a. 4). Whence Christ (Mt. XVI, 24): "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself." Therefore the nourishment of charity is the diminution of cupidity, and we progress in charity so much as we depress love of ourselves.
n. 885.
  1. To consider the reasons for loving God, namely, a) God is the lover of us, who first loved us and from eternity freely chose us for existence and for innumerable natural and supernatural benefits, not for his advantage or happiness, but for our good.
n. 885.

b) God wills and ardently desires to be loved by us, as is clear from the precept which he imposed upon us as the first and greatest of the whole law (Mt. XXII, 37-38), - from the promises, threats, benefits, and punishments by which he allures us to love of himself, and is shown as most lavish benefactor, best father, most loving spouse, urgently demanding to be loved, - especially from the fact that he sent the Son who came to communicate the divine life to us, to send the fire of divine love so that it might be kindled, and to promise the Holy Spirit and God dwelling in us.

n. 885.

c) God in himself is infinitely lovable, as is clear from the fact that all perfections, goodnesses, and beauties of all creatures and all supernatural benefits he contains in himself eminently and infinitely; whence he is worthy of all love, and if love ought to be proportioned to the dignity of the object, the supreme and infinite goodness will have to be loved without measure.

n. 885.
  1. To employ means by which charity may be frequently exercised and increased, whether:
n. 885.

a) directly, by eliciting an act of love toward God, an illustrious benefactor lovable in himself, complacency in the divine attributes worthy of all praise, benevolence by which we wish that the name of God be sanctified, that his kingdom come, and that his will be done as in heaven and on earth, zeal by which with all our powers we promote the glory of God, perfect contrition by which we detest sins because they offend God infinitely good; - or:

n. 885.

b) indirectly, by eliciting acts of the moral virtues which are informed by charity, especially observance of the commandments, which is a sign of dilection (Jn. XIV, 15, 21; I Jn. II, 4; V, 3), perfect submission to the will of God, especially in fulfilling the duties of one's state; indeed by any action of piety, work, mortification, etc., performed from the love of God (I Cor. X, 31). And thus even more difficult works become easy, for, as Augustine says, nothing is difficult to those who love.