Article I. On the Love of God

1º A special precept of loving God above all things is given, both by internal affection through true love of the heart, and also by an external work. - This is clear from the words of Christ, Matt. 22.37: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart... this is the greatest and first commandment.

2º This precept, as affirmative, obliges to loving God above all things appreciatively, as is plain from the natural law, but not necessarily intensively, because the essence of Charity does not consist in degrees ¹. - Thus commonly.

¹ Namely, the degree of intensity, or of fervor in loving, does not fall under the precept of charity; for it suffices that God in reality be preferred to all goods, as the common opinion of the Doctors holds. Nor should what some old authors seem to hold otherwise move anyone and drive him aside; for under the name of greater intensity, or more fervent love, or greater extension, Scotus, for example, and St. Thomas, in reality understand appreciation (see Koninck, De Virtut. Theol. disp. 25. n. 2.).

And indeed by this common doctrine is exploded both the opinion of those who were requiring a supremely intense act of love (who indeed fall into absurdity, because no act can be thought so intense that a more intense one could not be elicited with the help of God), and that of those who contend that God must be loved with a more intense affection than anything else; whence it would follow that the affection which yesterday sufficed for fulfilling the precept today no longer suffices, if perchance I am affected by a more intense zeal for some other thing, even an honorable one; and likewise that contrition which today suffices for the remission of sins tomorrow will not be sufficient, if perchance I grieve more intensely over the worst thing, for example, the death of a brother (compare Koninck l. c. n. 4. 5., and Suarez, de Charit. Disp. 6. Sect. 2. n. 2-5.).

218. Questions. - Q. 1º Are we bound always to act from the motive of Charity?

Resp. Neg., according to the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 31. Since even the acts of other virtues are good and meritorious ². This is also clear from the 8th proposition condemned by Alexander VIII.

² They are meritorious for him who is in the state of grace; otherwise they will be either salutary, if they are placed from grace, or at least naturally honorable.

Q. 2º When does the precept of Charity bind?

Resp. It obliges both per se and per accidens, just as the precept of Faith. Recall the things said above concerning the precept of Faith, n. 188. This is also clear from propositions 5 and 6 condemned by Innocent XI, of which the prior lies thus: Whether he sins mortally who would elicit an act of love of God only once in life, we do not dare to condemn. But the latter: It is probable that not even in each five-year period, rigorously speaking, does the precept of Charity toward God bind per se. The opinion of those who require an act of Charity once a month pleases St. Liguori. - Hom. apost. n. 12. But this opinion has no solid foundation ³.

³ For this opinion Cardenas and Croix alone are alleged (see St. Alph. Lib. 2. n. 8.). But Croix (Lib. 2. n. 141.) merely has these things: Since in so great a variety of opinions we do not know when and how often God must be loved, let us seize the safer things. These certainly cannot be so understood, as if Croix, from a defect of reasons for asserting any obligation, should most absurdly and contrary to first principles infer the necessity of imposing stricter obligations without any reason.

But Cardenas (Cris. 2. Disp. 6. n. 18.) discourses thus: It is very hidden and uncertain to determine the time in which this precept presses; for we only say that the precept is violated when the love of God is deferred for a long time, in the judgment of a prudent man; and an entire month seems to me a long time on account of the supreme dignity of this precept. These things plainly have no strength. For I omit that no one before fixed this term: but the reason, as is plain, which he seeks from the supreme excellence of the precept, is wholly feeble. Assuredly, if the more excellent a precept is, the greater should be the frequency of the prescribed acts, since the precept of receiving the Eucharist is more excellent than that of abstaining from meats, it would have to be concluded that we are bound to receive the Eucharist more than twice each week!

** Against this brief note, VV. (Pag. 145-149.) heap up many things through ten columns. But to what end? Namely, that they may prove that he sins mortally who omits an act of charity for a month. But has it really escaped the memory of the Most Illustrious Men that St. Alphonsus reports (Lib. 5. n. 52.) from St. Antoninus, that one must not define concerning mortal sin unless there is express authority of Sacred Scripture, or of a Canon, or of a determination of the Church, or an evident reason? And that which the same St. Alph. (Lib. 1. n. 89. al. 73.) teaches, both with Gerson: Doctors of theology ought not to be easy in asserting that some sins are mortal, where they are not most certain about the matter; and with St. Raymond: Do not be prone to judge mortal sins, where it is not clear to you through certain Scripture; and with Gabriel Biel: Nothing ought to be condemned as mortal sin concerning which there is not evident reason, or manifest authority of Scripture? Where, moreover, do we have evident reasons here, or so great a strength of authority?

1º Suarez, say VV., and Reginald prove from the dignity of so great a precept that an act of charity must be elicited more often.

Resp. Suarez (De Charit. disp. 5. Sect. 3. n. 1.) from this only deduces that it is repugnant to the dignity of so great a precept to cast back the obligation (only) to that time (of death), and (ibid. n. 4.) that he sins against this precept who for many years does not exercise this love. - But Reginald (Tr. 17. n. 98.) says that no one is obligated to an act of love, except when the exercise of it is necessary for defending the honor of God, ... or for retaining divine friendship. Where, then, is the obligation pressing in each month?

2º VV. urge that certain old authors taught that this precept obliges on each feast day; and Amort also acceded to them, asserting this obligation at least under light obligation.

Resp. Does not St. Alphonsus, with the most common body of Theologians, reject this opinion?

3º VV. note that St. Alphonsus brought forward the argument, that otherwise someone will be able with difficulty to observe the divine law (Hom. Ap. n. 12.).

Resp. When it is the only means of avoiding some grave sin, C., as Reginald also taught above. Otherwise, N. For St. Alphonsus's opinion means nothing else.

Moreover, the matter has itself thus, that Cardenas and Croix alone hold that opinion, and they confirm it by no other reasons except those alleged. Whether either that authority or those reasons suffice for asserting a grave sin of omission is to be defined from the rules of the Doctors brought forward above by St. Alphonsus: for it ought deservedly to seem grave to detain the discerning reader longer with these things.

Q. 3º Is the precept of Charity satisfied through attrition in the reception of the sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Neg., because attrition does not occur principally from love of God, but of oneself, and therefore in it the principal motive of Charity is lacking.

219. Resolves. - 1º The faithful who live piously easily satisfy the precept of Charity, because they more often elicit acts of Charity rejoicing over the divine perfections, wishing that no one offend God, that all love and worship him, and observe his commandments, praying devoutly that his name be sanctified, that his will be done, avoiding sin because it displeases him, etc.

2º Therefore the faithful ought not to be anxious about this obligation, if they apply themselves to the Christian life and retain the will of avoiding grave sins. Nevertheless they are to be persuaded that they often elicit explicit acts of Charity in life, for a greater union with God, and so that the soul may be readier to elicit similar acts easily at death ⁴.

⁴ The dying are most opportunely stirred up to eliciting and repeating acts of charity; indeed there are not lacking those who think that a grave obligation of eliciting this act then presses. But it seems one must distinguish. For if the discussion is about those for whom no other means of justification is at hand, this is most truly affirmed; but otherwise, if necessity of this kind is absent; for no solid reason appears, either intrinsic or extrinsic, why some have called the opinion concerning this obligation common or most probable (see St. Alph. Lib. 2. n. 23.).

** Here also VV. (Pag. 149-151.) contend that neither an extrinsic nor an intrinsic reason for this obligation is lacking. But it was necessary to remember what VV. often seem to forget, that probabilities do not suffice for asserting an obligation.

Therefore, as regards the extrinsic reason, first of all the Authors were not to be neglected, and indeed most grave ones, who deny this obligation either expressly or equivalently, while, in recounting either the time of the obligation or the opinions concerning it, they pass over the time of death. Of this sort are Lugo, Navarrus (the citations, which are easily found, are omitted for the sake of brevity), Sanchez, Azor, Escobar, Croix, Becanus, Fagundez, Tamburini, and with these Potestas and Voit. - Among those denying this obligation are also to be numbered those who admit it then only when charity or perfect contrition is the only present means of justification. Thus Laymann, Toletus, Henriquez, Candidus, Lessius, Turrianus, Gordonus, Fabri, Ferraris, and Elbel. - To these must be added those who say that the affirmative opinion is probable or even seems to them more probable. The reason is that he who calls an obligation probable equivalently denies that it can be imposed. But to the three Authors whom VV. report can be joined Palaus, Gobat, Catalani, Mazzotta.

Next let us inspect the foundations of that obligation. 1º Suarez, and with him Koninck, Widgant, Cardenas, and Catalani, require charity on account of doubt about the value of the Sacrament with attrition alone, or about attrition itself, whether it has been duly elicited. - Resp. This reason proves too much. For if any such doubt had force, on account of it no less would the danger of frustrating the Sacraments by sacrilegious injury have to be guarded against. Therefore an obligation of charity or of perfect contrition would have to be enjoined under grave sin upon one approaching Confession, of premising an act; a doctrine which no one will easily admit. Moreover, since you can doubt equally, indeed more, about the certainty of contrition or charity than about certain attrition, because the former is judged more difficult, you would have to repeat it not once only, but again and again, and yet the doubt and at the same time the obligation of repeating would not cease. Finally, you would be bound to contrition not from the precept of charity, but from the precept of penance.

2º Others, for example, Bonacina, Valentia, Reginald, Giribaldi, etc., require an act of charity by which a man may fortify himself against temptations. - Resp. The same thing can be said about the use of holy water, about the sign of the Cross, about the invocation of the Blessed Virgin, and about any other means suitable for this. Do we therefore bind under grave obligation to employ all these things? This alone, therefore, can be laid down: an act of charity, and any other means, must be employed under grave obligation when it is the only means of avoiding grave fault. But then the omission does not violate the precept of charity, but brings in one and the same guilt as the sin into which someone falls on account of that omission.

3º Others, such as Cardenas, Holzmann, Reuter, Babenstuber, Antoine (whom Charmes and Collet transcribe), Viva, etc., argue thence, that since a man is then in such a state that he ought to be joined to his ultimate end, then especially it is fitting, suitable, useful, more convenient, more opportune that he dispose himself to this by the exercise of the principal virtues and of charity. And to this certain authors with Marchant and Sporer refer that saying of the Gospel: Let your loins be girt, and burning lamps in your hands. - Resp. Many other things are fitting, suitable, convenient, useful, opportune; but not the reason of fittingness, nor of convenience, nor of utility, nor of opportunity, but the reason of necessity from which one cannot withdraw himself, can induce a grave obligation. But whoever, adorned with sanctifying grace, is a friend of God, indeed also a son, has his loins sufficiently girt and bears a lamp lit.

4º Finally some with Cardenas argue thus: the doctrine that it suffices to have elicited an act of charity once in life has been condemned: therefore it must be elicited at death. - Resp. Both that sophism and the preceding weakest arguments are those on account of which Sanchez wrote concerning this opinion of obligation (Dec. Lib. 2. C. 35. n. 9.): Azor rejects this by the best right. And Tamburini (Dec. Lib. 2. C. 3. n. 4.): To posit this obligation, which certainly does not rest on a solid foundation, is nothing else than to inject scruples. And concerning the same matter Lugo says (de Poenit. Disp. 7. n. 276.): Therefore the Confessor ought not to cast snares upon the penitent in an uncertain matter.

3º He satisfies the precept of Charity who, stained with grave sin and destitute of the supply of a Confessor, elicits an act of perfect contrition, even if this act would be necessary for another reason, for example, for celebrating Mass. The reason is that the precept of Charity can well be fulfilled at the same time with another precept, and in circumstances of this kind there has place what we said above, that the precept of Charity sometimes obliges per accidens. - Elbel, etc.