The Origin of Virtues

There is one origin for natural virtues and another for supernatural virtues; therefore each must be discussed separately.

I. Origin of Natural Virtues. Natural virtues are generated from the repetition of acts, whence they are also called acquired. For upon powers which by their nature are not determined to one mode of acting, through individual acts, at least acts proportionally equal or superior in intensity, there is impressed a certain inclination toward this mode of acting. This inclination, by repetition of acts, as experience establishes, passes into a stable disposition or habit; and the more intensely these acts are placed, the more quickly stability of inclination arises from them.

From this origin of natural virtues it becomes clear of itself that dispositions which are often born with a man, and which render him inclinable to this or that act, for example, of mercy, by no means deserve the name of virtues. For virtue is a stable disposition arisen from the repetition of honorable acts, or acts which have been placed according to the norm of right reason; but those dispositions are not subject to reason. They can, however, be called virtues inchoatively, insofar as the soul is thus more disposed to acquire similar virtues for itself.

II. Origin of Supernatural Virtues. 1. Supernatural virtues are generated by infusion from God; whence they are also called infused. Now:

a) With regard to the theological virtues, this doctrine according to some must be held as of faith; according to others, it is so certain that the contrary must be held erroneous. It is proved: 1. from the Council of Trent, which teaches thus: "In this justification, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these gifts infused at the same time through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity."¹ Now it is clear from the context that the Council intends not acts of faith, hope, and charity, but habits, since it speaks in the same way of these as of sanctifying grace. It is proved: 2. from the Catechism of Trent, which, speaking of grace infused in Baptism, adds: "To this is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."² 3. It is confirmed by reason. For all supernatural gifts wholly exceed the natural faculties of man; hence they can be bestowed on us by God alone (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 3; De virtutibus in communi, a. 10).

b) As regards moral virtues, that they too have their origin only from divine infusion is taught by the more common and more probable opinion, against Scotus and the Scotists. This opinion is founded on the mind of the Church. For the Council of Vienne,³ choosing as the more probable the opinion teaching that even in little children grace and virtues are infused in Baptism as to habit, openly supposes this opinion. For that by those virtues are understood not only theological virtues but also moral virtues is clear from the fact that the Council chooses that opinion which in those times theologians admitted with St. Thomas against the Scotists, namely, that moral virtues also are infused, and which Innocent III had mentioned in his own time but had left undecided. Now Innocent says that this opinion maintains that "faith and charity and the other virtues" are infused into little children. There is added the authority of the Catechism of Trent, which teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace] is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."⁴ It then calls them "an abundance of virtues," and again "so great an abundance of virtues." But these things cannot rightly be said of the three theological virtues alone. Moreover Leo XIII, in the Letter to the Archbishop of Baltimore,⁵ openly distinguishes supernatural moral virtues from natural acquired virtues; once this is posited, they must be called infused and not acquired. The proposed opinion is confirmed by reason. For the order of grace is more perfect than the order of nature, and perfects it. Now in the order of nature man is perfected in operations concerning intermediate ends by natural moral virtues; therefore, a fortiori, in the order of grace by supernatural moral virtues.

2. Once the doctrine is supposed that all supernatural virtues take their origin in souls from infusion, it is further investigated at what time this infusion takes place. Now:

a) All agree that the virtue of charity is infused together with sanctifying grace.

b) With regard to supernatural moral virtues, theologians who teach that they arise in the soul by infusion also affirm that they are always infused together with sanctifying grace.

c) As regards the virtues of faith and hope, a distinction must be made between little children and adults. For little children all assign the infusion of sanctifying grace as the moment of infusion. For adults, different authors establish different moments of their infusion.

alpha) Some teach that the virtues of faith and hope are infused by God into the souls of adults as soon as they elicit, by the help of actual grace, acts of these virtues; therefore even before justification itself. On the one hand they say that these virtues can exist without sanctifying grace, as is clear; on the other hand the infusion of these virtues seems more fitting if the soul is sufficiently disposed by elicited acts of these virtues.

beta) Others teach that these virtues also are always infused at the moment of justification, with one case excepted, namely when the sacrament of Baptism is received validly but unformed; because the sacraments, they teach, produce their effect insofar as no obstacle is opposed to it. Now just as adherence to mortal sin is not an obstacle to the permanence of these virtues, so neither does it seem to be an obstacle to their infusion in valid but unformed Baptism.

gamma) Finally others, and indeed more probably, say that the infusion of these virtues takes place only together with sanctifying grace, as was said about the virtue of charity. This opinion is defended by St. Thomas (III, q. 69, a. 4), and is proved from the Council of Trent, which teaches that for adults, in order to obtain justice, a disposition is required which also contains faith;⁶ and nevertheless these adults receive the virtue of faith and hope in justification. This is also clear from the same Council, which declares: "Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at the same time through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity."⁷ Therefore God had not yet infused the enumerated virtues into these adults already believing before Baptism. This opinion is clear besides from the authority of Clement V in the Council of Vienne,⁸ and is supported by reason. For it seems improbable that the powers of the soul should be elevated earlier by a habitual supernatural quality than the very essence of the soul has been enriched with sanctifying grace, and this all the more since all supernatural virtues must more probably be said to result from sanctifying grace by a physical emanation (St. Thomas, III, q. 62, a. 2).

Note. Although in justification the sinner receives together with grace all infused virtues, nevertheless he does not at once lose acquired bad habits, as experience makes clear. The reason is that infused virtues do indeed complete the elective powers of acts, and thus bestow facility of acts per se and intrinsic facility, but not extrinsic facility, which is had from the removal of impediments and depraved dispositions. Only acquired virtue does that; yet not formally and reduplicatively as virtue, as if it were formally the removal of impediments and indispositions, but only concomitantly, because such virtue is generated by the repetition of acts, and thus by force of these acts depraved dispositions and those impediments are taken away. Moreover, infused virtues are not directly contrary to vices, since they are not of the same order, nor do they exist in the same subject taken formally.

¹ Session 6, chapter 7.

² Part II, chapter 2, q. 39.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

⁴ Part II, chapter 2, q. 39.

⁵ 22 January 1899.

⁶ Session 6, chapters 5 and 6.

⁷ Cited place, chapter 6.

⁸ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

579. Preliminary matters. (A) Virtue (from the word vir, man) first indeed designated a quality proper to a man, or fortitude,¹ but afterward any endowment,² especially that by force of which we operate according to the dictate of right reason. In this sense it is usually defined as a habit disposing man's powers to operating rightly,³ or a good habit. Therefore it is a quality added to the faculties, helping them toward acting according to right reason.

¹ Thus Cicero, Tuscul., l. II, 18: "For virtue was named from man: but what is most proper to a man is fortitude, whose two greatest offices are contempt of death and of pain." Cf. Breal and Bailly, Dict. etymol., p. 441.

² Apud Cicero, Brut., 17: "In Cato's orations all oratorical virtues will be found."

³ According to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 55, a. 4, virtue is a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. - These last words can be predicated of infused virtues alone; but the former also regard acquired virtues.

580. (B) Therefore virtues properly reside not in the essence of the soul, but in its powers: for these are immediately ordered to act.⁴ Now the faculties in which virtues properly so called inhere are rational powers, namely intellect and will, but especially the will.⁵ For virtues properly so called rightly order our acts in the moral order; now the only truly moral act is that which proceeds from the will with previous knowledge of the intellect (above, n. 66); and therefore virtues properly inhere in those faculties which elicit moral acts, chiefly in the will. Nevertheless other faculties participate in the nature of virtue insofar as they are subject to the command of the will (above, n. 73-75): for under this respect they are made capable of morality, and therefore secondarily can be the subject of virtue: thus the virtue of temperance in some way inheres in the sensible appetite for moderating sensual passions.⁶

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56, a. 1.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3 and 6.

⁶ Ibid., a. 4; cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 74, a. 4.

581. (C) Since there is a twofold order, natural and supernatural, virtues are of a twofold kind, namely natural, or acquired, and supernatural, or divinely infused. Here we treat only of the former.

Acquired virtues can be found even in pagans or heretics, since these are capable of good works and consequently of habits, from the things said in the Treatise on Grace, n. 34. - But the faithful, who enjoy the gift of true faith and sanctifying grace, ought to cultivate with all their powers these virtues, which of themselves are natural, and indeed in a more perfect manner than unbelievers, so that by examples they may manifestly show that grace does not destroy, but on the contrary perfects whatever good is in human nature.¹ But, that they may be truly Christian, they ought to cultivate these virtues in a supernatural manner, that is, on account of a supernatural end, and under the influence of actual grace: for thus they will pursue not only an honorable end, but the supernatural end to which in fact they are ordered, and will acquire supernatural merits.

¹ Concerning certain natural virtues Cardinal Gibbons excellently discusses, The Ambassador of Christ, Baltimore, 1896, ch. 8-10; translated into French by Andre: L'Ambassadeur du Christ, Paris, Lethielleux; cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introd., 3rd Part, ch. 36; Ribet, Honnete avant tout.

Virtues of this kind are of two species: intellectual and moral: the former perfect the intellect with regard to the knowledge of truth; the latter perfect the will with regard to the pursuit of good: concerning both we must speak separately.

594. Besides acquired virtues, in the soul of the just there are supernatural habits divinely infused, by which it is directed toward choosing meritorious acts and attaining the supernatural end. For, by a certain analogy with natural life, three things are required for supernatural life: (a) a vital principle, which is nothing other than habitual grace, perfecting and elevating the substance of our soul, so that it can be the remote principle of supernatural actions; (b) operative faculties, or infused virtues, by which the powers naturally implanted in us are so elevated that they can be the proximate principle of supernatural acts; (c) the supernatural concurrence of God, namely actual grace, by force of which our faculties, strengthened by infused virtues, are excited and helped toward eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 62-63; Suarez, De Passionibus et habitibus, diss. III; John of St. Thomas, op. cit., disp. XVI; Lequeux, op. cit., p. 40-49 and passim; Muller, § 114-119; Pesch, Praelect. dogmaticae, t. VIII, n. 19-96; Billot, op. cit., th. 1-5.

597. Thesis: It is certain that the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused in justification itself, and commonly the same is held concerning the moral virtues, especially the cardinal ones.

(A) Scripture rather clearly intimates this with regard to charity, and more obscurely with regard to the others: "The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us";¹ for there charity (of God toward us, and therefore our charity toward God, since charity is mutual) is said to be infused by the Spirit at the very instant in which he is given to us, that is, in which we are justified. The other virtues likewise are exhibited as a gift of God: "For God has not given us a spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of sobriety."² - The Fathers, although they do not expressly uphold our thesis, not rarely assert that Christian virtues are the gift of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, given through grace. Thus, among others, Augustine: "Grace will come after the Law; it is itself the blessing. And what has this grace and blessing furnished to us?" He answers that through grace many virtues are given, which he enumerates, and, after describing the four cardinal virtues, adds: "These virtues now in the valley of weeping are given to us by the grace of God."³

¹ Rom. 5:5.

² 2 Tim. 1:7.

³ St. Augustine, in Ps. 73, n. 11, P. L., XXXVII, 1065-1066.

598. (B) At the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was supposed as certain that virtues are infused with habitual grace in adults, but it was doubted whether the same must be said of little ones, and some said that by the virtue of baptism guilt indeed is remitted to little ones, but grace is not conferred, nor virtues.⁴ The matter was afterward brought to the Council of Vienne (A.D. 1311), and there it was declared:⁵ "But we, attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have thought that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism upon little ones as upon adults, as more probable and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the saints and modern doctors of theology, should be chosen, with the sacred council approving."

⁴ Decretal. Gregor., l. III, tit. 42, c. 3.

⁵ Denzing., n. 411.

The Council of Trent declared the same as certain with regard to the theological virtues:¹ "In justification itself, with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused together through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The Catechism of the Council of Trent holds that the same must be said concerning the other virtues; for, after describing sanctifying grace, it says: "But to this is added the most noble company of all virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul with grace."²

¹ Trent, sess. VI, cap. 7, apud Denzing., n. 682.

² Catech. Trent., De sacram. baptismi, n. 42. The Catechism certainly does not possess the authority of the Council itself, but hands down the commonly accepted doctrine.

599. (C) Reason counsels this. In the natural order, God furnishes to man not only nature as the remote principle of acting, but also faculties by which he is immediately disposed to act. Now there is a certain analogy between natural life and supernatural life; and therefore it is deservedly inferred that God infuses into man not only habitual grace, which is the remote principle of acting supernaturally, but also proximate principles, or virtues. For although supernatural acts can be elicited through merely actual helps, it seems more consonant with divine wisdom that supernatural habits be infused, by whose aid these acts may be regularly produced.

456. 1. Acquired and infused virtues. Acquired virtues are called those which man obtains for himself by his own acts. Indeed, there have been implanted in man certain principles as if naturally inborn, both of things knowable and of things to be done. Thus in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good, and in the intellect there are certain practical truths so obvious and so clear that anyone imbibes them as it were with his mother's milk. Hence certain virtues are inchoatively from rational nature.¹¹² Add that certain men from their natural constitution, commonly called their "temperament," are inclined to certain virtues, for example to fortitude, to meekness, etc. But no perfect virtue belongs to man by nature; it must be acquired either by exercise of acts or by supernatural infusion.¹¹³ - Infused virtues are those which, in a supernatural manner, are mercifully infused into man by God together with sanctifying grace, for example faith, hope, charity. - As long as charity, which is the form of all virtues (cf. below, 559), exists in man, his virtues are called formed; but once charity has been lost, the other virtues, and notably faith and hope, are called unformed.

2. Intellectual, moral, theological virtues.

¹¹² Cf. St. Chrysostom, Hom. 13 de statuis.

¹¹³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 1, and below n. 473.

We divide this chapter into two articles: 1. on the existence and essence of acquired virtues; 2. on their properties.

Concerning intellectual virtues, as not so properly pertaining to Moral Theology, enough now seems to have been said; it remains that we discuss moral virtues somewhat more broadly, and first indeed those insofar as they are acquired by our acts, or acquired virtues.

460. The existence of acquired virtues in man is certain, so that it does not seem safe in faith if someone were to assert that man cannot acquire virtues by his natural acts. For it is certain that man can elicit good acts by his own powers.¹ Moreover, from repeated good acts arise good habits or virtues. Hence the proposition 25 of Baius was proscribed: "All works of unbelievers are sins and the virtues of philosophers are vices,"² and St. Thomas teaches:³ "Although without grace man cannot avoid mortal sin so that he never sins mortally, nevertheless he is not hindered from being able to acquire a habit of virtue, through which he abstains from evil works for the most part."⁴ Hence the doctrine of Baius and Quesnel and of the Synod of Pistoia, who teach that fallen man without the help of grace is unequal to acquiring any virtue for himself, is just as false as the opinion of several philosophers affirming that virtues are innate.⁵

¹ Cf. ib. q. 109, a. 2.

² Denz. n. 1025.

³ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 1 ad 2.

⁴ Cf. also ib. q. 65, a. 2.

⁵ Thus Schopenhauer writes: "Virtues and vices are inborn. Man does not change" (Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik I, 53).

461. The essence of these virtues is not explained in the same way by all. Several Holy Fathers and Doctors, such as St. Jerome,⁶ St. Augustine,⁷ St. Gregory the Great,⁸ St. Bernard,⁹ indeed also St. Thomas,¹⁰ teach that acquired virtues without charity and grace are not virtues simply, but only in a certain respect. But Benedict XIV¹¹ and, after him, Ernest Muller¹² and Tanquerey¹³ assert that acquired virtues without charity and grace are true and perfect virtues in their genus. Here are the words of Benedict XIV:¹⁴ "For if unbelievers can do honorable works and frequently exercise themselves in them, they can also acquire and obtain for themselves habits of such works, and thus consequently have true and perfect moral virtues in their own genus."

It must indeed be conceded that true moral virtues can exist even without charity, for they have whatever pertains to the essence of moral virtue; for they can be very firm habits inducing to good acts and rendering man morally good, at least in some sense. Besides, this doctrine follows from the now certain opinion that a sinful man, or even an unbelieving man, can perform morally good works. Moreover, if someone can perform good works, and that repeatedly, gradually there arises a good habit; and this habit can truly and properly be named virtue. Nevertheless it does not seem that one should concede that these virtues without charity are perfect virtues. For a) perfect virtue is that which makes a man good simply. But a man existing in the state of mortal sin, although he exercises any good works whatsoever, cannot be called good simply, but on the contrary is always worthy of divine hatred. Besides, b) there is no perfect virtue without perfect prudence, since prudence is the charioteer of all the virtues. But if someone knowingly exists in mortal sin or in unbelief, he can in no way be called truly prudent, since he esteems his happiness and his ultimate end lightly. But the Holy Fathers and St. Thomas, who seem to deny true moral virtues without charity, must be understood of perfect virtues and especially of virtues meriting eternal life, as St. Augustine himself¹⁵ not obscurely insinuates when speaking of virtue "which serves for liberating and beatifying men."¹⁶ Hence in reality there does not seem to be disagreement among the diverse Doctors except in the mode of speaking.

⁶ Comm. in ep. ad Gal. c. 5.

⁷ De civ. Dei l. 5, c. 19 and in other places.

⁸ Moral. l. 20, c. 7, n. 17.

⁹ In Cant. Cant. sermo 22, n. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 183, 883): "What have you to do with virtues, you who are ignorant of Christ, the virtue of God? Where, I ask, is true prudence, except in the doctrine of Christ? Whence true justice, except from the mercy of Christ? Where true temperance, except in the life of Christ? Where true fortitude, except in the passion of Christ? Therefore only those who are imbued with his doctrine are to be called prudent; only those just who have obtained pardon of sins from his mercy; only those temperate who strive to imitate his life; only those strong who hold fast in adversities the documents of his patience. Therefore someone labors in vain in the acquisition of virtues if he thinks they are to be hoped for from anywhere other than from the Lord of virtues."

¹⁰ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 2.

¹¹ De serv. Dei beatif. l. 3, c. 21, n. 6.

¹² Theol. mor. I, § 107.

¹³ Synopsis Theol. mor. II, De virtut. mor. n. 586.

¹⁴ De serv. Dei beatif. l. 3, c. 21, n. 6.

¹⁵ Contra Iulian. l. 4, c. 3.

¹⁶ Cf. Billuart, De pass. et virtut. diss. 2, a. 4, § 3.

We divide this chapter into two articles: 1. on the existence and essence of the infused virtues; 2. on their properties.

472. Thesis. It is proximate to faith that, together with sanctifying grace, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are infused; but the most common opinion of theologians holds that, in addition, all the moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are infused.

1. The existence of the theological virtues is clearly intimated in Sacred Scripture, e.g.: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us";⁵⁰ "For God has not given us the spirit of fear, but of power and of love and of sobriety."⁵¹ - Moreover, the Council of Trent⁵² declared: "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity," and defined: "If anyone says that men are justified either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or by the sole remission of sins, excluding grace and charity, which is poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit and inheres in them ... let him be anathema."⁵³ Since these words, "poured forth," "inheres," so clearly express that faith, hope, and charity are given not through a transitory act, but through a permanent habit, several theologians, e.g. Vega,⁵⁴ Suarez,⁵⁵ Ripalda,⁵⁶ Benedict XIV,⁵⁷ judge that the existence of the infused theological virtues is of faith. Yet because the Council does not expressly speak of virtues or permanent habits, it is therefore better said that this is only proximate to faith. For the rest, all theologians, old and more recent, unanimously teach that infused theological virtues exist. Only Peter Lombard, the Master of the Sentences, wishes charity not to be a virtue, but the Holy Spirit himself, who directly and without a mediating habit moves us to acts of charity.⁵⁸

472. 2. The existence of the infused moral virtues was not absolutely denied except by a few older authors, e.g. Scotus,⁵⁹ Durandus, Biel, Ockham, etc. But in the thirteenth century several doubted whether not only in the justification of an adult man, but also in the baptism of infants, virtues were infused together with grace.⁶⁰ The reason for doubting was that those virtues then seem to be altogether superfluous, since infants are incapable of the use of them. Nevertheless the Council of Vienne (1311) declared: "But we, considering the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all the baptized, have thought that the second opinion, which says that informing grace and the virtues are conferred in baptism on little ones as well as on adults, as more probable and more consonant and accordant with the sayings of the saints and of modern doctors of theology, with the sacred Council approving, should be chosen."⁶¹ - There is added the authority, certainly great, of the Roman Catechism,⁶² which teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace], however, is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."

Finally a reason of fittingness can be added. The greatest analogy exists between the natural order and the supernatural order; for grace does not corrupt nature, but elevates it. Moreover, in the natural order man needs diverse habits and moral virtues in order to act well, promptly, and delightfully. Therefore, by parity, the same must be said in the supernatural order, to which man is elevated through sanctifying grace, which as it were deifies the soul. Therefore, besides sanctifying grace, supernatural habits are required, and indeed first habits which dispose the soul well concerning the ultimate end itself, i.e. the theological virtues. Then supernatural habits disposing man concerning suitable means for obtaining the ultimate end are required; these supernatural habits are the infused moral virtues.⁶³

Today the existence of infused moral virtues is denied by no theologian. There are as many infused moral virtues as there are acquired moral virtues. Thus teaches the truer and more common opinion.⁶⁴

The intellectual virtues, since they are not necessary for leading a moral and supernatural life, are not infused together with sanctifying grace; nevertheless sometimes they are conferred as graces gratis given, e.g. the grace of tongues. - Concerning the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are infused together with grace, it has already been said above, n. 445.

⁵⁰ Rom. 5, 5.

⁵¹ 2 Tim. 1, 7.

⁵² Sess. 6, c. 7 de iustif. (Denz. n. 800).

⁵³ Sess. 6, can. 11 de iustif. (Denz. n. 821).

⁵⁴ In Trid. l. 7, c. 24.

⁵⁵ De gratia l. 6, c. 8, n. 14.

⁵⁶ De ente supern. disp. 120, n. 18 sqq.

⁵⁷ De serv. Dei beatif. l. 3, c. 21, n. 13.

⁵⁸ See the refutation of this error in S. theol. 2, 2, q. 23, a. 2.

⁵⁹ In 3, dist. 36, q. 1, n. 28, § "Licet de istis."

⁶⁰ Cf. S. theol. 3, q. 69, a. 6.

⁶¹ Denz. n. 483.

⁶² Pars 2 de sacr. bapt. c. 2, q. 39.

⁶³ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 3, and the Commentaries of Cajetan and Sylvius on this article.

⁶⁴ Salmant., Curs. S. theol. de virtut. disp. 3, dub. 1, n. 18.

473. 3. The essence of infused virtues. The Augustinian definition given above explains the essence of the infused virtues. For infused virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, and which God works in us without us. Hence infused virtue is caused in us by a divine act, namely by the infusion of sanctifying grace, without man in any way being able by his own natural acts to merit this infusion. For just as man cannot merit sanctifying grace, so also he cannot merit infused virtues.

a) Infused virtues are consequents of sanctifying grace. This indeed is certain for infused moral virtues and for charity, but concerning the infused virtue of faith and hope several theologians, such as Cajetan and Bannez,⁶⁵ Medina,⁶⁶ Suarez,⁶⁷ Schilling⁶⁸ and others, teach that the habit of faith and hope is sometimes infused before the habit of charity, and therefore before sanctifying grace; for these authors think that a heretic or catechumen can be sufficiently disposed for the habit of faith and hope before he is disposed for charity. For just as faith and hope (unformed) are conserved without sanctifying grace in a Catholic sinner, so they can be produced without sanctifying grace in a catechumen. But this opinion is deservedly rejected with St. Thomas,⁶⁹ who asserts that the habits of all the virtues are infused together. For the Council of Trent teaches:⁷⁰ "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things at once infused through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity." The same is clear from the Roman Catechism, which calls the virtues the company of grace and teaches that they are infused together with grace.⁷¹ But nothing prevents man without sanctifying grace, even before baptism, from eliciting acts of faith with the help of actual grace; and in this sense the Holy Fathers and St. Thomas are to be understood when speaking of him "who receives faith from God without charity."⁷²

b) Infused virtues really differ from sanctifying grace. Theologians dispute whether infused virtues are really distinct from sanctifying grace, or rather are sanctifying grace itself insofar as it is ordered to acts. St. Thomas,⁷³ all Thomists, such as Cajetan, Medina, Soto, and very many others, e.g. Valentia, Suarez, Kleutgen, Scheeben, Gopfert, and others, affirm the real distinction. But Alexander of Hales, Durandus, Scotus, Vega, Lessius, Bellarmine, and others deny the difference at least between charity and grace (although they concede that grace differs from the other virtues). The Thomistic opinion is not only by far the more common, but also the truer. For the Council of Trent, the Council of Vienne, and the Roman Catechism speak of grace and charity as of distinct things.⁷⁴ Moreover, just as our soul is distinguished from its powers, so sanctifying grace, which is received in the essence of the soul, must be distinguished from the infused virtues, which are subjected in the powers of the soul.⁷⁵

⁶⁵ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 6, a. 2.

⁶⁶ Comm. in 1, 2, q. 62, a. 4.

⁶⁷ 3, t. 3, disp. 28, sect. 3.

⁶⁸ Moraltheologie I, § 40.

⁶⁹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 62, a. 4; 3, q. 85, a. 6.

⁷⁰ Sess. 6, c. 7 de iustif. (Denz. n. 800).

⁷¹ Cf. above n. 472.

⁷² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 6, a. 2 ad 3.

⁷³ Ib. q. 110, a. 3 and 4, and in other places.

⁷⁴ Cf. the places cited above.

⁷⁵ Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 110, a. 4 ad 1.

474. c) Infused virtues are specifically distinguished from their respective acquired virtues. For although the material object, e.g. of the virtue of acquired temperance and of infused temperance, is one and the same, namely the moderate use of food, nevertheless the rule moderating that object is one thing in acquired temperance and another in infused temperance. For the rule of acquired temperance is right reason, commanding moderation in food and drink, not only lest health be ruined, but also that the whole concupiscible appetite may be well ordered; but the rule of infused temperance is the divine law, which commands that man chastise his body and bring it into servitude, in order more securely to attain heavenly beatitude. Speaking generally, infused virtues direct all things to a supernatural end; but acquired virtues directly intend a natural good. The Angelic Doctor says fittingly: "And in this way also the infused moral virtues differ in species, through which men are well disposed in order to this, that they may be citizens of the saints and members of the household of God; and the other acquired virtues, according to which man is well disposed toward human affairs."⁷⁶

d) Infused virtues cause the power, but not the (extrinsic) facility, of performing supernatural acts. Just as sanctifying grace residing in the essence of the soul elevates it to a higher nature, so infused virtues elevate the powers of the soul for placing supernatural acts. Since acquired virtues procure facility in acting, infused virtues cause the very power of acting supernaturally in the present condition of things. E.g. without the virtue of temperance a man could, although with difficulty, perform acts of sobriety; but without the virtue of faith a man would be unequal to eliciting acts of true faith. But since infused virtues give the power indeed, yet not the (extrinsic) facility⁷⁷ of eliciting virtuous acts, therefore even the justified man having these virtues not rarely suffers great labors in the exercise of them, especially if before he was given over to vices. Therefore it is necessary that infused virtues be assisted by acquired virtues, not indeed intrinsically, because the natural habit of acquired virtues cannot intrinsically perfect the supernatural habit of infused virtues, but extrinsically, insofar as they remove obstacles, namely perverse inclinations and disordered concupiscence. With obstacles of this kind removed, infused virtues begin also to act easily and promptly and to produce excellent meritorious works.

⁷⁶ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 63, a. 4.

⁷⁷ A twofold facility of acting is distinguished, namely intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic consists in the proneness which belongs to the faculty itself toward its proper act. Extrinsic facility arises from the removal of external obstacles which impede the act. Infused virtues indeed confer intrinsic facility of acting, because they elevate and strengthen the natural force of the power; but not extrinsic facility, because external obstacles remain, e.g. inveterate contrary habits (cf. St. Thomas, De virtut. in com. a. 10 ad 14).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, 52, 53; q. 63, a. 1 and 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 8 and 9.

566. Principle I. One operative habit of the soul inheres in man from nature, not indeed totally (for then it would be innate), but partially and according to an inchoation, namely, the habit of first principles, insofar as, once the terms have been known through intelligible species (which do not inhere in us by nature), there immediately flows forth the facility of seeing that the terms agree with one another or do not.

567. Principle II. Other habits are caused in the soul from human acts proper to the agent, namely, from acts of the moving power in the moved power of the same agent;¹ thus, for example, the act of the appetitive power proceeds from apprehension representing the object, the intellective power as reasoning has as an active principle a proposition known through itself, and the possible intellect is moved by the agent intellect. For an agent in which there is at once the active and passive principle of its act, insofar as it is active can cause a habit, and insofar as it is passive can receive that habit and be perfected by it.

¹ Also the same power can be moving and moved under a diverse respect.

They are acquired habits.²

² Cf. I-II, q. 51, a. 3, and De Virt., q. 1, a. 9, ad 10 and 11.

Sometimes a habit is caused by one act, when the acting power by one act totally overcomes the passive power, as happens in the habit of science, because one act suffices for conviction;³ - ordinarily, however, it is caused from repeated acts of the same species, as happens in an opinative habit, in habits of the internal senses, and especially in moral virtues and vices, because reason by one act cannot bring it about that the appetite be good or bad ordinarily, generally, and in all circumstances, as is nevertheless required for virtue or vice.

³ Thus as to the intellect, for "as to the lower apprehensive powers, it is necessary that the same acts be reiterated several times, so that something be firmly impressed on the memory." q. 51, a. 3.

568. Principle III. Other habits are caused by God, namely, supernatural habits by which we are disposed to the supernatural end exceeding the faculty of human nature; likewise God can also cause habits which we can acquire by our acts, just as He gave to some knowledge of the Scriptures or of languages.

They are habits infused per se, or per accidens.

569. Principle IV. No habit is innate. - Supernatural habits in no way inhere in us from nature; - nor are acquired habits from nature according to essence, perfection, and consummation, but only according to a certain aptitude and inchoation, and indeed in two ways.

a) On the part of the soul, not according to the inchoation of the habit itself, but only according to aptitude or as to its principles, insofar as the intellect and will naturally state an order and inclination to knowledge of the true and love of the good, and thus the habit of first principles in the intellect and the natural inclination of the will to the good are principles or seeds from which intellectual and moral virtues are generated.⁴ But "because the inclination to proper objects, which seems to be an inchoation of habit, does not pertain to habit but rather to the very account of the powers" (q. 51, a. 1), therefore it is not an inchoation of the habit itself according to itself, but only according to its principles or according to its aptitude in its causes.

⁴ Cf. q. 51, a. 1 and q. 63, a. 1.

b) On the part of the body and of the internal senses, also according to the inchoation of the habit itself, insofar as on account of their disposition man is helped or impeded toward good, and thus is disposed better or less well to certain habits: thus from the disposition of the organs and the complexion of the body, one man is more disposed to understanding than another, or has a propensity to certain virtues (chastity, fortitude, meekness) or vices (anger, lust). Thus he has a greater aptitude for receiving such and such a habit and acquires it more easily.⁵

⁵ Nevertheless they are not virtues or vices: for the soul can be unharmed, although the body is so disposed from natural complexion.

Moreover habits of the body can be caused by one act, if the producing cause was of great power, as health from one strong medicine, organic deformation from one passion, for example, from immense terror.

570. Principle V. Habits are increased, but not by the addition of a new grade: for addition supposes two or more things which are added, whence there would be several habits and thus several accidents of the same species in the same subject, which is repugnant (for example, two charities, two temperances, two arts); nor would the prior habit truly become greater and be increased, but rather it would be multiplied. But they are increased:

1. according to themselves: extensively, insofar as the same habit in number extends itself to new objects to which it was not previously ordered; as theological science is extended by the study of a new treatise;

2. on the part of the subject: intensively, insofar as the same habit is received more and inheres more firmly in the subject, and reduces it more into act; and consequently the power in which the habit resides participates more in the account of the habit, whence it tends to act more expeditiously and promptly; as the knowledge of the same treatise becomes clearer. And indeed:

a) Habits are increased intensively by the same cause by which they are produced: for similar acts cause habits similar not only in species but also in grade and intensity; whence an act more intense than, or equally intense as, the habit increases it or at least disposes it to increase; but when the will does not use the habit totally and produces a less intense act, that act disposes rather to diminution of the habit and does not increase it.

b) Habits are increased extensively through acts concerning another part of the object: one who already has knowledge of all the treatises of theology, except one, increases the habit by the study of that part.

571. Principle VI. Habits are corrupted per se or per accidens: per accidens, when the subject in which they inhere is corrupted; per se, that is, through their contrary. It should be noted that every habit which is acquired by one act is corrupted by one act; but that which is acquired by several acts is not corrupted except by several, though it is diminished by only one.

Habits which do not have a contrary, such as the habit of principles, are not corrupted per se. But those which have a contrary can be corrupted per se, as science and opinion through an opposite principle or through a sophistical deduction; and acquired moral virtue through contrary judgments of practical reason from ignorance, passion, or malice; likewise habits of the body.

Habits of the intellect and will are not corrupted per accidens, because these faculties are incorruptible; but habits of the sensitive powers and of the body are corrupted, as temperance before the resurrection.

572. Principle VII. Habits are diminished intensively and extensively from the same cause by which they are corrupted per se, that is, through a contrary, because diminution is the way to corruption.

Moreover, certain habits are also diminished and corrupted by cessation from act alone, not indeed directly per se, but indirectly per accidens, namely, through the removal of that which prevents, insofar as this cessation takes away the acts which would impede things contrary to the habit from corrupting or diminishing it per se.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 51, a. 3 and 4; q. 110, a. 2; q. 62, a. 1 and 2; q. 63, a. 2, 3, 4; De Virt., q. 1, a. 9 and 10; q. 5, a. 4.

618. Thesis. Supernatural operative habits are infused into us by God.

It is proved:

1. No one tends and operates perfectly to an end except through a permanent principle of operation, by which he is intrinsically inclined to that operation; whence God not only moves natural things to their acts, but has given to them permanent principles of operating to their end,¹ by which their motions become connatural and easy. Therefore also to our supernatural end (for which God certainly provides no less) He gave us supernatural habitual and permanent principles, so that we might operate and tend perfectly to it;² otherwise we would be moved not connaturally but as if violently.

¹ Remote: form; and proximate: powers.

² He gave the remote principle: habitual grace; and proximate principles: habits and virtues. - The argument is especially valid when the sweet Providence which we know from revelation is considered.

"It is not fitting that God provide less for those whom He loves for having supernatural good than for creatures which He loves for having natural good. But He provides for natural creatures in such a way that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows on them certain forms and powers, which are principles of acts, so that according to themselves they may be inclined to a motion of this kind; and thus the motions by which they are moved by God become connatural and easy to creatures. Much more, therefore, into those whom He moves toward obtaining eternal supernatural good, does He infuse certain forms, or supernatural qualities, according to which they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly toward obtaining eternal good" (q. 110, a. 2).

2. This is certain, because it is clearly deduced and is the obvious sense of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, although it is not expressly defined: for it says that grace and charity inhere in us (can. 11), and that man is justified through the reception of grace and gifts (c. 7), and receives infused faith, hope, and charity (c. 7); all of which indicate habitual principles, especially because it attributes the same justification to infants (sess. 5, can. 4; sess. 6, c. 2), who are not capable of acts and of motion to act.

3. Whence the Scriptures say that the seed of divine life remains in us (I John III, 9), and describe justification as regeneration; these indicate the concession of a permanent principle.

619. What the essence of infused habits is. - Supernatural beings are not properly in the categories of natural beings, in the same way as God Himself, of whom they are a participation; nevertheless they are reduced to the categories according to a certain analogy, more or less, and thus sanctifying grace, since it is a spiritual and permanent accident, is reduced to quality, as an entitative habit. Similarly supernatural operative principles are reduced to quality, and indeed as operative habits, although they do not have all things in common with them. For they are neither pure habits nor pure powers, but have something of power and something of habit. For:

1. In something they fall short of the account of habit, because they do not give facility for operating in every way: they indeed confer an intrinsic inclination, aptitude, and promptitude toward the good, indeed a greater one than acquired habits, but not an extrinsic one, because they do not remove from us all obstacles to good, as is clear from a converted sinner, who does not experience a facility toward good much greater than before; whence they are not habits properly so called.³

³ "Facility of operating the works of virtues can be from two things, namely, from preceding custom, and infused virtue does not bestow this facility in its beginning; and again from strong inherence in the object of virtue, and this is found in infused virtue immediately in its beginning." St. Thomas, in IV Sent. d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5. Cf. q. 65, a. 3, ad 2 and De Virt., a. 10, ad 15.

2. But they make man able to operate supernaturally, which habit does not do, and in this therefore they do not agree with habit but rather with operative power.

3. But in all other respects they agree with habits, for a) just like habits, they reside in natural operative powers, which they elevate and with which they operate: for they do not give simply the power to act, but the power to act better and supernaturally; b) man, if they are active, uses them when he wills and in what grade he wills, intensely or remissly, and he can use them only for good; c) they can be increased and corrupted. All these things do not belong to power properly so called. Therefore they have more of the account of habit than of the account of power, and therefore they are customarily called supernatural habits.

620. Supernatural habits and virtues differ from natural ones in many ways:

a) On the part of essence: natural virtues are habits properly so called, whence they do not give power but facility of acting; supernatural virtues give the power of acting supernaturally, but not such facility in every way.

b) On the part of the efficient cause: natural virtues are acquired from the principles of nature and from our acts; supernatural virtues must be infused by God (q. 51, a. 4; q. 63, a. 1).

c) On the part of the nature and end to which they are ordered: by natural virtues man has himself well in order to human things and to natural acts suitable to human nature; by supernatural virtues man has himself well in order to this, that he be an adoptive son of God, destined to eternal life, and in order to this, that he exercise supernatural acts suitable to the divine nature (q. 54, a. 3; q. 63, a. 4).

d) On the part of the formal object: in natural virtues there is good according to the rule and light of human reason, or conformity to the natural end; in supernatural virtues there is good according to the supernatural rule and light of the law divinely revealed (which exceeds human reason), or conformity to the supernatural end. Therefore they are nobler than acquired virtues (q. 63, a. 4).

621. Observation. - By exercising supernatural virtues man will conquer and remove obstacles extrinsic to the habit, and thus will acquire facility in every way and perfect facility toward the good. For acts produced from a supernatural habit can be considered in two ways:

1. as supernatural, or as tending toward something precisely as supernatural, exceeding human nature, and thus they cannot produce habits of the same species, or supernatural habits, which are infused by God alone (n. 639); but

2. supernatural acts, while they tend to the supernatural end or good and object, at the same time tend under some respect to the natural end and to the natural good suitable to reason, both because natural faculties are exercised at the same time, and because supernatural act and good eminently contain and include natural act and natural goodness. But in this way they can produce natural habits of the same species as that object as it is natural and conformable to reason, and by this conquer and remove obstacles opposed to this act and object, in the same way as was said concerning acquired virtue (n. 567). And thus facility in every way is acquired, which nevertheless is not supernatural virtue, as not proportioned to the supernatural end, but is a natural habit: for example, while someone believes God, exercises chastity or justice with a view to eternal life, he also does something conformable to reason. Cf. De Verit. q. 10, a. 10, ad 1; Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2.

Virtue, generally, is a habit of acting according to right order. Virtues are distinguished in many ways; for they are 1st. natural or supernatural, according as they are acquired and increased by natural powers, or by the aid of supernatural grace; 2nd. infused or acquired, according as they are infused by God himself, or are acquired by repeated acts of the agent; 3rd. theological or moral, according as they have for their formal object either God immediately, or the honesty of the action.

There are four cardinal moral virtues to which the others are reduced, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But since discourse concerning the moral virtues is made here and there throughout this whole Compendium of Moral Theology, here we shall treat specifically of the theological virtues, namely of faith, hope, and charity.

[I suppose 1° that there are in us from nature certain seeds of virtues, both moral and intellectual ¹. For there are in human nature certain common principles naturally congenital, both of things knowable and of things to be done; as in reason certain natural principles of right and honest, in will natural inclination toward good of reason. So likewise in individuals there are certain dispositions toward virtues, as some are readier for sciences, others for fortitude, others for temperance; whence it is said, Job, XXXI, 18 : « From my infancy mercy grew up with me. » But these seeds are not essentially complete and consummated virtues; because what is from nature to man is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin; for even in demons the naturals remain, as St. Dionysius says, c. 4 de Div. nomin. But virtue is present not in all men, and is taken away by sin, at least frequent sin ². Therefore.] ¹ Here q. 63, a. 1, c. ² Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

I suppose 2° that certain virtues are acquired by our repeated acts ¹, according to the common axiom : « From repeated acts habit is made. » The reason is because, although agents which have in themselves only the active principle of their operation acquire no habit by acting — as heating confers on fire no habit of heating — nevertheless those agents which have in themselves at once both the active principle and the passive principle of their act, insofar as the principle immediately elicitive of act elicits it only as moved by another superior principle existing in the same agent, through repeated acts acquire habit, inasmuch as from the superior moving principle there is derived into the elicitive principle of act a certain impression habitually remaining and expedient for doing those things which it does from the motion of the superior : which fixed impression is called habit; and if it be toward true or honest good, it is called virtue. As therefore from the fact that agent intellect moves passive intellect by imprinting upon it species and notions, intellectual virtue is acquired, v. g., science; so from the fact that intellect moves will, and will the sensitive appetite, virtue is acquired through repeated acts, both in will and in sensitive appetite, that is, a permanent and firm inclination toward honest good. ¹ Ibid., c.

There remains therefore the question whether, besides the moral virtues acquired, there be others infused per se into us by God. Indeed that the theological virtues are infused per se into us by God is dogma of faith defined in the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, c. 7. Likewise that moral virtues acquirable by our acts can, God so dispensing, be infused per accidens into us admits no doubt, since in this there is no implication, and thus were they infused into Christ and the first parent. But the difficulty is, whether there be moral virtues of supernatural order, not acquirable by our acts, infused per se into us by God. For the resolution of which,

I say : Besides the moral virtues acquired, there are others infused per se into us by God ². It is common with the Angelic against Scotus, whose opinion some theologians note with censure after the definition of the Council of Vienne, concerning which below. ² Here q. 63, a. 3, c.

It is proved 1° from Holy Scripture ¹. God, according to Holy Scripture, teaches men the four cardinal virtues. For it is said, Sap., VIII, 7, of eternal Wisdom : « She teacheth sobriety, that is temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude [virtue], than which nothing is more useful in life to men. » But to teach and to infuse something is the same thing in God; for God teaches not as men do, merely proposing objects, but by infusing light. Whence I Joann., II, 27 : « You have no need that any man teach you; but as his unction teacheth you of all things. » ¹ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

It is proved 2° by the authority of the Church. Clement V in the Council of Vienne, resolving the question which Innocent III, answering to the archbishop of Arles, cap. Majores, de baptismo, Decretal. lib. III, tit. 42, c. 3, had left undecided, namely : whether faith, charity, and other virtues be infused into infants in baptism? defines thus : « We attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all baptized, judged the opinion which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism alike upon infants and adults to be the more probable, and more consonant and accordant with the sayings of the saints and doctors of modern theology, with the approval of the sacred council we deemed it to be chosen. » By the virtues moreover, in this definition, are understood not only the theological, but also the moral ones; since concerning these also the question posed under Innocent III proceeded, as is plain from what was said. Therefore.

It is confirmed from the Roman Catechism, part II, c. 2, § 51, where it is said : « To this is added the noblest company of all the virtues, which are divinely poured forth into the soul together with grace. »

It is proved 3° by reason. 1º Man through the theological virtues infused is disposed, elevated, and rectified concerning the ultimate supernatural end ¹. Therefore it is connatural and necessary that he be elevated and rectified equally, through the moral virtues infused, concerning the means attaining this supernatural end. — The consequence is plain, because elevation and rectification through the theological virtues is not only in order to the supernatural end considered in itself, but as attainable through means. But the supernatural end is attainable only through supernatural means. ¹ Ibid., c.

2° As virtues are distinguished, so also are they multiplied according to formal objects. But one thing is the object and formal motive of acquired virtue, another of infused ². Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The object and formal motive of acquired virtue is natural, that of infused, supernatural. Thus, v. g., although acquired and infused temperance agree in matter — for both are concerned with the delights of touch — they agree not in object and formal motive. Indeed both seek the mean; but infused temperance seeks the mean on another account than acquired temperance : this latter seeks the mean according to the rule of human reason in order to good of nature, health of body, and free use of natural reason; but the infused seeks the mean according to the rule of faith and the reasons of divine law in order to the supernatural end, wherefore it often prescribes stricter abstinence than the natural rule. Similarly of the other virtues. Therefore.] ² Ibid., a. 4, c.