On the cause of the virtues

[I suppose 1° that there are in us from nature certain seeds of virtues, both moral and intellectual ¹. For there are in human nature certain common principles naturally congenital, both of things knowable and of things to be done; as in reason certain natural principles of right and honest, in will natural inclination toward good of reason. So likewise in individuals there are certain dispositions toward virtues, as some are readier for sciences, others for fortitude, others for temperance; whence it is said, Job, XXXI, 18 : « From my infancy mercy grew up with me. » But these seeds are not essentially complete and consummated virtues; because what is from nature to man is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin; for even in demons the naturals remain, as St. Dionysius says, c. 4 de Div. nomin. But virtue is present not in all men, and is taken away by sin, at least frequent sin ². Therefore.] ¹ Here q. 63, a. 1, c. ² Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

I suppose 2° that certain virtues are acquired by our repeated acts ¹, according to the common axiom : « From repeated acts habit is made. » The reason is because, although agents which have in themselves only the active principle of their operation acquire no habit by acting — as heating confers on fire no habit of heating — nevertheless those agents which have in themselves at once both the active principle and the passive principle of their act, insofar as the principle immediately elicitive of act elicits it only as moved by another superior principle existing in the same agent, through repeated acts acquire habit, inasmuch as from the superior moving principle there is derived into the elicitive principle of act a certain impression habitually remaining and expedient for doing those things which it does from the motion of the superior : which fixed impression is called habit; and if it be toward true or honest good, it is called virtue. As therefore from the fact that agent intellect moves passive intellect by imprinting upon it species and notions, intellectual virtue is acquired, v. g., science; so from the fact that intellect moves will, and will the sensitive appetite, virtue is acquired through repeated acts, both in will and in sensitive appetite, that is, a permanent and firm inclination toward honest good. ¹ Ibid., c.

There remains therefore the question whether, besides the moral virtues acquired, there be others infused per se into us by God. Indeed that the theological virtues are infused per se into us by God is dogma of faith defined in the Council of Trent, Sess. VI, c. 7. Likewise that moral virtues acquirable by our acts can, God so dispensing, be infused per accidens into us admits no doubt, since in this there is no implication, and thus were they infused into Christ and the first parent. But the difficulty is, whether there be moral virtues of supernatural order, not acquirable by our acts, infused per se into us by God. For the resolution of which,

I say : Besides the moral virtues acquired, there are others infused per se into us by God ². It is common with the Angelic against Scotus, whose opinion some theologians note with censure after the definition of the Council of Vienne, concerning which below. ² Here q. 63, a. 3, c.

It is proved 1° from Holy Scripture ¹. God, according to Holy Scripture, teaches men the four cardinal virtues. For it is said, Sap., VIII, 7, of eternal Wisdom : « She teacheth sobriety, that is temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude [virtue], than which nothing is more useful in life to men. » But to teach and to infuse something is the same thing in God; for God teaches not as men do, merely proposing objects, but by infusing light. Whence I Joann., II, 27 : « You have no need that any man teach you; but as his unction teacheth you of all things. » ¹ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

It is proved 2° by the authority of the Church. Clement V in the Council of Vienne, resolving the question which Innocent III, answering to the archbishop of Arles, cap. Majores, de baptismo, Decretal. lib. III, tit. 42, c. 3, had left undecided, namely : whether faith, charity, and other virtues be infused into infants in baptism? defines thus : « We attending to the general efficacy of the death of Christ, which through baptism is applied equally to all baptized, judged the opinion which says that informing grace and virtues are conferred in baptism alike upon infants and adults to be the more probable, and more consonant and accordant with the sayings of the saints and doctors of modern theology, with the approval of the sacred council we deemed it to be chosen. » By the virtues moreover, in this definition, are understood not only the theological, but also the moral ones; since concerning these also the question posed under Innocent III proceeded, as is plain from what was said. Therefore.

It is confirmed from the Roman Catechism, part II, c. 2, § 51, where it is said : « To this is added the noblest company of all the virtues, which are divinely poured forth into the soul together with grace. »

It is proved 3° by reason. 1º Man through the theological virtues infused is disposed, elevated, and rectified concerning the ultimate supernatural end ¹. Therefore it is connatural and necessary that he be elevated and rectified equally, through the moral virtues infused, concerning the means attaining this supernatural end. — The consequence is plain, because elevation and rectification through the theological virtues is not only in order to the supernatural end considered in itself, but as attainable through means. But the supernatural end is attainable only through supernatural means. ¹ Ibid., c.

2° As virtues are distinguished, so also are they multiplied according to formal objects. But one thing is the object and formal motive of acquired virtue, another of infused ². Therefore. — Proof of the minor. The object and formal motive of acquired virtue is natural, that of infused, supernatural. Thus, v. g., although acquired and infused temperance agree in matter — for both are concerned with the delights of touch — they agree not in object and formal motive. Indeed both seek the mean; but infused temperance seeks the mean on another account than acquired temperance : this latter seeks the mean according to the rule of human reason in order to good of nature, health of body, and free use of natural reason; but the infused seeks the mean according to the rule of faith and the reasons of divine law in order to the supernatural end, wherefore it often prescribes stricter abstinence than the natural rule. Similarly of the other virtues. Therefore.] ² Ibid., a. 4, c.