Section III. On the Origin of Virtues

There is one origin for natural virtues and another for supernatural virtues; therefore each must be discussed separately.

I. Origin of Natural Virtues. Natural virtues are generated from the repetition of acts, whence they are also called acquired. For upon powers which by their nature are not determined to one mode of acting, through individual acts, at least acts proportionally equal or superior in intensity, there is impressed a certain inclination toward this mode of acting. This inclination, by repetition of acts, as experience establishes, passes into a stable disposition or habit; and the more intensely these acts are placed, the more quickly stability of inclination arises from them.

From this origin of natural virtues it becomes clear of itself that dispositions which are often born with a man, and which render him inclinable to this or that act, for example, of mercy, by no means deserve the name of virtues. For virtue is a stable disposition arisen from the repetition of honorable acts, or acts which have been placed according to the norm of right reason; but those dispositions are not subject to reason. They can, however, be called virtues inchoatively, insofar as the soul is thus more disposed to acquire similar virtues for itself.

II. Origin of Supernatural Virtues. 1. Supernatural virtues are generated by infusion from God; whence they are also called infused. Now:

a) With regard to the theological virtues, this doctrine according to some must be held as of faith; according to others, it is so certain that the contrary must be held erroneous. It is proved: 1. from the Council of Trent, which teaches thus: "In this justification, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these gifts infused at the same time through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity."¹ Now it is clear from the context that the Council intends not acts of faith, hope, and charity, but habits, since it speaks in the same way of these as of sanctifying grace. It is proved: 2. from the Catechism of Trent, which, speaking of grace infused in Baptism, adds: "To this is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."² 3. It is confirmed by reason. For all supernatural gifts wholly exceed the natural faculties of man; hence they can be bestowed on us by God alone (cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 3; De virtutibus in communi, a. 10).

b) As regards moral virtues, that they too have their origin only from divine infusion is taught by the more common and more probable opinion, against Scotus and the Scotists. This opinion is founded on the mind of the Church. For the Council of Vienne,³ choosing as the more probable the opinion teaching that even in little children grace and virtues are infused in Baptism as to habit, openly supposes this opinion. For that by those virtues are understood not only theological virtues but also moral virtues is clear from the fact that the Council chooses that opinion which in those times theologians admitted with St. Thomas against the Scotists, namely, that moral virtues also are infused, and which Innocent III had mentioned in his own time but had left undecided. Now Innocent says that this opinion maintains that "faith and charity and the other virtues" are infused into little children. There is added the authority of the Catechism of Trent, which teaches: "To this [sanctifying grace] is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused into the soul together with grace."⁴ It then calls them "an abundance of virtues," and again "so great an abundance of virtues." But these things cannot rightly be said of the three theological virtues alone. Moreover Leo XIII, in the Letter to the Archbishop of Baltimore,⁵ openly distinguishes supernatural moral virtues from natural acquired virtues; once this is posited, they must be called infused and not acquired. The proposed opinion is confirmed by reason. For the order of grace is more perfect than the order of nature, and perfects it. Now in the order of nature man is perfected in operations concerning intermediate ends by natural moral virtues; therefore, a fortiori, in the order of grace by supernatural moral virtues.

2. Once the doctrine is supposed that all supernatural virtues take their origin in souls from infusion, it is further investigated at what time this infusion takes place. Now:

a) All agree that the virtue of charity is infused together with sanctifying grace.

b) With regard to supernatural moral virtues, theologians who teach that they arise in the soul by infusion also affirm that they are always infused together with sanctifying grace.

c) As regards the virtues of faith and hope, a distinction must be made between little children and adults. For little children all assign the infusion of sanctifying grace as the moment of infusion. For adults, different authors establish different moments of their infusion.

alpha) Some teach that the virtues of faith and hope are infused by God into the souls of adults as soon as they elicit, by the help of actual grace, acts of these virtues; therefore even before justification itself. On the one hand they say that these virtues can exist without sanctifying grace, as is clear; on the other hand the infusion of these virtues seems more fitting if the soul is sufficiently disposed by elicited acts of these virtues.

beta) Others teach that these virtues also are always infused at the moment of justification, with one case excepted, namely when the sacrament of Baptism is received validly but unformed; because the sacraments, they teach, produce their effect insofar as no obstacle is opposed to it. Now just as adherence to mortal sin is not an obstacle to the permanence of these virtues, so neither does it seem to be an obstacle to their infusion in valid but unformed Baptism.

gamma) Finally others, and indeed more probably, say that the infusion of these virtues takes place only together with sanctifying grace, as was said about the virtue of charity. This opinion is defended by St. Thomas (III, q. 69, a. 4), and is proved from the Council of Trent, which teaches that for adults, in order to obtain justice, a disposition is required which also contains faith;⁶ and nevertheless these adults receive the virtue of faith and hope in justification. This is also clear from the same Council, which declares: "Whence in justification itself, together with the remission of sins, man receives all these things infused at the same time through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted: faith, hope, and charity."⁷ Therefore God had not yet infused the enumerated virtues into these adults already believing before Baptism. This opinion is clear besides from the authority of Clement V in the Council of Vienne,⁸ and is supported by reason. For it seems improbable that the powers of the soul should be elevated earlier by a habitual supernatural quality than the very essence of the soul has been enriched with sanctifying grace, and this all the more since all supernatural virtues must more probably be said to result from sanctifying grace by a physical emanation (St. Thomas, III, q. 62, a. 2).

Note. Although in justification the sinner receives together with grace all infused virtues, nevertheless he does not at once lose acquired bad habits, as experience makes clear. The reason is that infused virtues do indeed complete the elective powers of acts, and thus bestow facility of acts per se and intrinsic facility, but not extrinsic facility, which is had from the removal of impediments and depraved dispositions. Only acquired virtue does that; yet not formally and reduplicatively as virtue, as if it were formally the removal of impediments and indispositions, but only concomitantly, because such virtue is generated by the repetition of acts, and thus by force of these acts depraved dispositions and those impediments are taken away. Moreover, infused virtues are not directly contrary to vices, since they are not of the same order, nor do they exist in the same subject taken formally.

¹ Session 6, chapter 7.

² Part II, chapter 2, q. 39.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.

⁴ Part II, chapter 2, q. 39.

⁵ 22 January 1899.

⁶ Session 6, chapters 5 and 6.

⁷ Cited place, chapter 6.

⁸ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 483.