The Potential Parts of Prudence

V. Parts of Prudence. 1. Subjective parts. It belongs to prudence, as we noted above, to direct man in individual acts to the due end; but man can be considered as an individual person or as a person of a society. In either consideration, a special mediate end has been set before him, which must also be attained by special acts. Hence there is also a twofold subjective part of prudence: one is personal prudence, which is also called private, monastic, or solitary; the other is governing prudence, which is often called polyarchic or social.

a) Personal prudence is that by which someone rules himself in conformity with the supernatural end, in order to a private good.

b) Governing prudence is that by which someone rules, in conformity with the supernatural end, both a multitude and himself in order to a multitude. This differs according as multitudes differ. Hence it is distinguished as domestic, political, and military.

Domestic prudence is said to be that "which is ordered to the common good of a house or family" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11; cf. II-II, q. 48, single article, and q. 50, a. 8).

Political prudence is that which is ordered to the common good of the city (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 47, a. 11; cf. II-II, q. 48, single article), and in authority it is called regal, while in subjects it is simply called political (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 50, a. 1, corpus and ad 2; a. 2; q. 48, single article).

Military prudence is that which is ordered "to resisting those who attack and corrupt from without" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 50, a. 4) the common good of the city (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 48, single article).

Take care, however, lest from what has been said you conclude that every just person, because he has the supernatural virtue of prudence, is also fitted for governing, and that the holier person is by that very fact more fitted for this office. For for the office of superior there is required not only the virtue of prudence, whose act is to render acts of ruling conformed to the ultimate end, but also an art which is occupied around external governance. Hence the holier person is quite often less fit for the office of superior, because he lacks this art of ruling.

2. Potential parts of prudence are eubulia, synesis, and gnome.

a) Eubulia is the habit of consulting well. By this virtue man is directed to considering rightly the various means conducing to the end and the various ways in which the end can be attained. Hence it imports a certain inquiry of reason concerning things to be done (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 1).

b) Synesis is the habit of judging rightly concerning those things which must be done according to common rules. Therefore this virtue brings it about that man rightly judges which, among the various means found by eubulia, with the circumstances considered, is here and now better, more useful, and more fitting according to common rules (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 3; I-II, q. 57, a. 6).

c) Gnome is the habit of judging rightly, but concerning those things which must be done according to rules that are not common but higher, contrary indeed to the tenor of the law, but not contrary to the mind of the legislator. Therefore this virtue brings it about that in circumstances in which common rules cannot rightly be applied, we judge that means to be chosen which, with these circumstances considered, is here and now better, more useful, and more fitting according to higher rules (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 51, a. 4).

3. Integral parts of prudence are:

a) Memory, which is recollection of past things; experience of these greatly conduces to forming a prudent judgment about present or future things.

b) Understanding, which consists in full knowledge both of the action to be placed and of the principles of morality.

c) Docility, which is a disposition of soul toward learning from others, "and especially from elders, who have attained sound understanding concerning the ends of things to be done" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 3).

d) Shrewdness, which is a certain sagacity of mind for finding a suitable means, especially in sudden matters.

e) Reasoning, which brings it about that the agent "can well apply universal principles to particulars, which are various and uncertain" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 4).

f) Foresight, which foresees future contingents, whether good or evil, which are to follow from the action.

g) Circumspection, by which man "compares that which is ordered to an end also with the things which surround it" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 49, a. 7).

h) Caution is that by which evils are avoided which can vitiate the work of virtue.

Divisions.—According to the difference of the person who confers the reward, there are two kinds of merit: (a) human merit, or the claim which a person has to a reward from his neighbor, or from society, for the benefits he has conferred upon his neighbor or society; (b) divine merit, or the right a person has to receive a reward from God for the fidelity wherewith he has exercised stewardship over his acts, of which God is the Last End, or wherewith he has served society, of which God is the Supreme Ruler. Only divine merit is here considered.

The Greatness of Legal Equity.—(a) It is a distinct virtue, since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the lawgiver’s intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver’s words.

(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in Articles 5 and 6.

(c) It pertains to the species, not of particular, but of general or legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, per se its obligation is grave (see 1721).

(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two parts—good judgment (synesis), which settles ordinary cases of morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment (gnome), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary run—so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles (viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city, the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity would command one to transgress it.

(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.

What is prudence, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? R. To the first. It is a certain special virtue of the practical intellect, by which in any business occurring we know what is honorable, what shameful. And thus prudence is the right reason of things to be done, or the virtue rightly ordering those things which are toward the end of the whole of life. But every virtue is in the mean; the mean is to do those things which virtue commands, when one ought, where one ought, as one ought; and accordingly the office of prudence is to find a mean of this sort, which is one thing as a mean of reason, another as a mean of the thing. - The acts of prudence are: 1. To take counsel, namely by inquiring what means and what circumstances are necessary, so that the work may be done honorably. 2. To judge concerning the things found, i.e., after diligent consideration, to conclude what is to be done, in what way, in what place and time, and with what other circumstances. 3. To command, namely by prescribing what and when it is to be done, by applying to operation those things which have been counseled and judged. 4. To operate solicitously the things commanded. For solicitude is that moderated speed by which, by the cleverness and vigilance of the soul, that which has been consulted and defined is quickly committed to execution.

Hence a precept of prudence is not given by reason of itself, but only by reason of another thing, namely of a virtue to be exercised and a sin to be avoided. Therefore as all precepts pertain to prudence, because it is directive of all virtuous acts, so universal Moral Theology pertains to prudence, and especially the treatise on Conscience; since the whole of Moral Theology and the aforesaid treatise in particular hand down rules so that we may act prudently and rightly. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 64; 2. 2. q. 47; q. 56.

R. To the second. The integral parts of prudence, which concur toward its perfect act, are: 1. Memory, which is knowledge of past things. For since experience is required for prudent persons, and experience is from many memories, the memory of many things is required for prudence. 2. Understanding or intelligence, not as it is a certain power, but as it is a certain right estimation of some ultimate principle. For every deduction of reason is from some principle, and prudence is the right reason of things to be done. 3. Docility, by which someone is prompt and easy in receiving instruction from others and acquiring knowledge from them. For prudence consists about particular things to be done, which someone cannot always know all by himself alone. 4. Shrewdness, which is an easy and prompt conjecturing, by which, when something occurs unexpectedly, someone quickly by himself finds what is fitting. 5. Reason. For it belongs to a prudent man to be good at taking counsel; but counsel is a certain inquiry proceeding from certain things to others, which is the work of reason. 6. Foresight, which imports a respect of something distant, or future, to which those things which occur in the present are to be ordered. Therefore foresight is the right ordering of suitable means to the end, and accordingly includes rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. 7. Circumspection, by which that which is ordered to the end is compared with the things which surround it, and therefore is an accurate consideration of all circumstances. For something is good in itself and fitting to the end, which nevertheless, from certain concurrent things, is rendered either evil or not opportune to the end. 8. Caution, which is consideration of evils and extrinsic impediments, through which it happens that they are avoided, lest good be impeded by evil, lest evil be mixed with good. Of these eight parts, the first five pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive; but the three later according as it is preceptive, applying knowledge to work. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 49.

The subjective parts of prudence are: 1. Prudence simply so called, which is ordered to one's own good. 2. Royal prudence, which is the prudence of the king himself, which rules a city or kingdom. For it belongs to prudence to rule and fittingly to command. And therefore to the king, to whom it pertains to rule a city or kingdom, a more special prudence belongs. For a rule is so much the more perfect, the more universal it is, extending itself to more things and reaching a further end beyond itself. 3. Political prudence, and this is that by which men rule themselves in obeying Princes in order to the common good of the city or kingdom. 4. Economic prudence, by which men direct themselves toward living well according to domestic intercourse, for the common good of the house or family. 5. Military prudence, by which harms from enemies are repelled. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 47, aa. 10, 11, 12; q. 48, 50.

The potential parts of prudence are: 1. Eubulia, or the virtue of taking counsel well, whose office is to suggest good counsel. 2. Synesis, which is the virtue of judging well concerning particular things to be done, according to common rules. 3. Gnome, which is the virtue of judging about things to be done beyond common principles; and consequently it imports a certain perspicacity of judgment. These parts are potential parts of prudence, because the principal act of prudence is to command execution, to which taking counsel well and judging well are directed. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 57, aa. 4-6; 2. 2. q. 48; q. 51.

R. To the third. Imprudence is opposed to prudence. It is either such privatively, or contrarily. "But negatively it is not properly so called, namely so that it properly imports only the lack of prudence, which can be without sin. Privatively, indeed, imprudence is so called insofar as someone lacks prudence which he is naturally apt and ought to have; and according to this, imprudence is a sin by reason of negligence, by which someone does not apply effort to having prudence. But contrarily imprudence is taken according as reason is moved or acts in a contrary mode to prudence; for instance, if the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent person spurns counsel; and so concerning the other things which must be considered in the act of prudence. And in this way imprudence is sin according to the proper account of prudence. For this cannot happen, that man acts against prudence, except by turning aside from the rules by which the reason of prudence is rectified. Hence, if this happens by aversion from divine rules, it is a mortal sin; for instance when someone, as if contemning and repudiating divine documents, acts precipitately. But if he acts beside them without contempt and without detriment of those things which are of the necessity of salvation, it is a venial sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 53, a. 1.

Generally speaking, every sin is against prudence, as follows from the very nature of prudence and imprudence. But specifically one sins against prudence by excess and by defect. By defect: by precipitation, inconsideration, inconstancy, negligence. By excess, or rather by a certain species of prudence: by prudence of the flesh, cunning, deceit, fraud, solicitude about temporal things, solicitude about future things.

Precipitation is that which, some end having been proposed, immediately undertakes the work, or at least judges concerning the means and mode of executing it, deliberation being omitted, against the office of prudence to take counsel. It is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconsideration is that which judges while diligent inspection of things from which right judgment proceeds has been omitted, against the office of prudence to judge well. Likewise it is not grave except by reason of the danger of grave sin. - Inconstancy is that by which, without just cause, one's opinion is changed, and one contemns commanding those things which according to right reason had previously been judged and proposed, against firmness of judgment. It is not grave unless from some extrinsic circumstance, e.g., of scandal, precept, vow, someone is bound to persist in the opinion. - Negligence is that which imports defect of due solicitude, and omits to commit to execution at the opportune time a thing deliberated and judged, against the vigilance of reason in executing. It is not grave except in a grave matter.

Prudence of the flesh is that which thinks out suitable means for accomplishing the works of the flesh, so that one may follow the instinct and motions of corrupted flesh. The sin is grave or light by reason of the depraved affection, grave or light, which underlies it. Under prudence of the flesh is comprehended the prudence of the age and of the world, because we also desire the exterior things of the world on account of the flesh. - Cunning generally is the manner of doing something in a hidden mode. But here it is taken specifically for knowledge of depraved means suitable for deceiving, joined with an affection of executing them. It has place in those things which regard the neighbor. For no one hides something from himself. Therefore cunning is a sin by which someone uses not true ways, but false and simulated ways, for obtaining some end, whether good or evil. It is a grave or light sin according to the account of the affection which underlies it, and the harm which follows for the neighbor. - Deceit is the execution of cunning, whether by words or deeds; for it is a general name. Therefore deceit is the assumption of ways that are not true, but simulated and apparent ways, according to the execution of the work. It differs from cunning because cunning is the assumption of ways of this sort, not in execution, but only in the thinking out of them. Fraud is the execution of cunning through deeds, as when someone spends adulterated coin, and is something more restricted than deceit. Deceit and fraud are used especially in contracts, and they are a grave or light sin according to grave or light harm of neighbor. Concerning fraud and deceit the Rules of Law are: "Fraud and deceit ought to patronize no one," C. Ex tenore 16, de Rescr.; "Fraud is not done to him who knows and consents," L. Nemo de Reg. Iur.

Solicitude about temporal things is excessive occupation of mind, proceeding from inordinate love of having, or fear of losing. For solicitude imports a certain effort applied to obtaining something. - Solicitude about future things is excessive occupation of soul concerning future things, especially so that the necessities of life may be had, joined with anxiety and little confidence in Providence. Each solicitude is a grave or light sin, according as by it someone is prepared to violate a precept in a grave or light matter. S. Th. 2. 2. qq. 53-55; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Prud.

633. c) Potential parts of prudence are called the joined virtues which are ordered to some secondary acts or secondary matters, and are three, namely eubulia, synesis, gnome.

1. Eubulia is the habit of taking counsel rightly.³¹ As was said above, to take counsel well or to deliberate well is an act of prudence, but this must be understood in such a way that prudence exercises this act not immediately through itself, but by means of the virtue of eubulia; or in other words: "it pertains to prudence to take counsel well imperatively, but to eubulia elicitively."³²

2. Synesis is a virtue judging well concerning operable things according to common rules, i.e. according to natural and positive law.³³

3. Gnome³⁴ is a judging virtue according to higher principles in those things in which sometimes one must recede from the common law, but not from the mind of the legislator. Therefore gnome produces the act of epikeia in the observance of law.

³¹ Capacity for considering well and taking counsel.

³² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 51, a. 2 ad 1.

³³ Capacity for judging rightly, according to the law, concerning actions to be performed; the faculty of judging well according to the law.

³⁴ Capacity, in extraordinary occurrences, to judge rightly not according to the wording but according to the sense of the law; the faculty of judging well against the letter of the law in an extraordinary case.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 57, a. 6; II-II, q. 48 and 51.

29. Potential parts are annexed virtues which are ordered to certain secondary, preparatory, and easier acts, and do not have the whole power of prudence, but fall short of it in something. The principal virtue uses them in the manner by which the soul uses its powers (q. 51, a. 2, ad 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 1): for just as in the individual powers of the soul the force and condition of the soul shines forth, although not fully, so in these faculties and their functions the nature and condition of prudence shines forth, although not adequately. There are three:

1. Eubulia (eu-boule, good counsel; goede raad, welberadenheid), which is concerned with counsel: namely, it is the habit of counseling well or of finding means suitable to the end. Moreover, "for counseling well there is required not only the discovery or devising of those things which are opportune for the end, but also other circumstances, namely the congruous time, so that one be neither too slow nor too swift in counsels, and the manner of counseling, namely so that one be firm in his counsel, and other due circumstances of this sort" (q. 51, a. 1, ad 3).

2. Synesis (synesis, composition of two = judgment: bon sens; gezond oordeel; eusynetoi = persons well-sensed), concerning judgment of those things which are done according to law: it is the habit of judging well concerning things to be done according to common rules, namely laws and their particular ends.

3. Gnome (gnome = reason, judgment: sens de l'exception; gematigd, milddadig, getemperd oordeel), concerning judgment of those things in which one must depart from the law and judge from a higher principle of reason: for there are unusual cases which the law does not know, or in which it does not oblige because of special circumstances, for the determination of which a special perspicacity is required. Whence it is the habit of judging well according to higher principles concerning things to be done beyond the common law. Hence gnome directs epikeia (équité; rechtmatigheid, billijkheid), that is, equity in the application and observance of laws according to the equitable and the good (cf. treatise on Laws, I, n. 296).

1. The reason why one virtue suffices for counsel, while two are required for judgment, St. Thomas hands down in I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 3: "Judgment concerning each thing is made through its proper principles. But inquiry is not yet through proper principles (but through common ones), because once these were had there would be no need of inquiry, but the thing would already have been found. And therefore one virtue alone is ordered to counseling well, but two virtues to judging well; because distinction is not in common principles but in proper ones. Whence also in speculative matters dialectic, which inquires concerning all things, is one; but the demonstrative sciences, which are judgmental, are diverse concerning diverse things. But synesis and gnome are distinguished according to the diverse rules by which judgment is made. For synesis is judgmental concerning things to be done according to common law; but gnome according to natural reason itself in those things in which common law fails." Cf. II-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 2.

30. Potential parts are true virtues, but annexed. - They are virtues, because they render perfect an act proper to man, namely to counsel or judge.

They are virtues distinct from prudence, because they are concerned with acts which are distinguished from the act of prudence according to a diverse notion of goodness, indeed are even separated from it; for he who counsels well does not always judge well, and he who judges well does not always command well, but sometimes delays or acts negligently or inordinately. But if they were not distinct from prudence, prudence would not be a cardinal virtue, because it would not be the foundation of others.

They are annexed virtues, because their acts, to counsel well and to judge, are ordered to commanding well as to a more principal and more difficult act, whence the whole power of the virtue of prudence does not inhere in them. "And just as to counsel (or to judge) is ordered to commanding as to the more principal thing, so also eubulia (likewise the others) is ordered to prudence as to the more principal virtue, without which it would not even be a virtue," just as neither would the moral virtues be virtues without prudence (q. 51, a. 2). And thus prudence is the cardinal virtue in which the others are founded, which it commands, which it uses, and through the mediation of which it acts (ibid. ad 1; I-II, q. 57, a. 6, ad 1).

1. If prudence did not command good counsel, man would not always counsel well.

2. Therefore the annexed virtues are commanded by prudence, which acts mediately through them. According to Lessius they are commanded by love of the end(!), and are not really distinguished from prudence. Thus prudence would not be a cardinal virtue.

31. Observation. - Inquiry and counsel pertain to reason, which compares the means with the end and among themselves, and discourses through individual, many, and diverse things. Judgment properly pertains to the intellect, which sees and considers that which is to be done: "for consideration imports an act of the intellect beholding the truth of the thing." Command looks to reason because it orders the means to the end; but to order belongs to reason. Cf. q. 53, a. 4; q. 51, a. 3.

76. II. Prudence perfects the intellect, directing it to discern on all occasions what is best suited for the attainment of our last end. Thus defined, prudence is a general virtue, which includes: (a) Clear-sightedness, or a quick, accurate perception of the true value of means to an end; (b) Caution, which bids us take time to notice difficulties and to provide against them; (c) Self-distrust which disposes us to examine matters with care, and to accept the advice of others, especially if our own case is in question.