Chapter — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Chapter III. On the Parts of Prudence
631. The parts of prudence, not otherwise than of any other cardinal virtue, are of three kinds, namely a) integral, b) subjective, c) potential.
a) Integral parts are so called, not because from them as from parts the habit is composed, as, e.g., a house is composed from walls; for virtues are one habit and not something composed from several parts. But they are called integral parts because virtues cannot exercise acts in every respect perfect without those parts. Therefore integral parts are certain prerequisites for the perfect act of virtue. For prudence such prerequisites are enumerated by St. Thomas18 as eight, namely memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, and caution; the five former of these pertain to prudence according as it is cognitive, but the three remaining according as it is preceptive by applying knowledge to work.
Memory19 (which here is not taken for the memorative power, but for the very recollection of past things) is very necessary for the perfect act of prudence, because it was deservedly said by the ancients: "Nothing new under the sun"; or, that which happened in past times in similar adjuncts of things will happen also now, if the circumstances are the same or similar. Hence from past experience we can with sufficient probability judge concerning present acts to be done, and for this reason it is certain that a good and vivid memory of past events is the best assistance of prudence. Hence also it is clear that those who have many experiences are generally more prudent than those who have not had such long experience. - Oblivion is opposed to memory. But since oblivion regards knowledge alone, while prudence consists not in knowledge alone but also in right appetite, oblivion can indeed impede prudence in some way, but not totally take it away.20
Understanding or intelligence likewise is not taken here for the intellective power, but both for knowledge of present things and for right estimation of some end, or of a particular moral principle.21 That understanding accepted in this sense greatly concurs toward the act of prudence is self-evident; for, that someone may prudently dispose his actions, it is required that he have the present state of the matter well viewed, that he rightly know that moral principle which must be applied to the practical conclusion here and now.
Docility is an affection and promptitude for learning. That docility is necessary for perfect prudence is clear from this, that prudence is concerned with particular operable things, in which there are almost infinite diversities, which cannot be known and considered by one man. Hence man needs to be instructed by others. But contempt for hearing others, living or deceased, is a cause of imprudence. This will and promptitude for learning is docility.
Shrewdness or sagacity (eustochia) is a prompt conjecture concerning means congruent for obtaining some intended end, or shrewdness is a certain perspicacity of swiftly apprehending the means, which happens from natural aptitude and also from exercise.22 That this shrewdness helps very greatly for exercising prudence is self-evident. Shrewdness is indeed often a natural gift and not granted to all in the same degree; nevertheless it can also be acquired in some way by diligent exercise.
Reason, i.e. promptitude for reasoning or for collecting one thing from another, likewise is necessary for prudence, since often there is need of long reasoning before one arrives at a prudent practical judgment.
Foresight is taken here in a twofold sense, namely either for the ordering of means to an end,23 or for the consideration of future events which can follow from a work.24 Concerning foresight St. Thomas says: "For it is the principal part of prudence, to which the other two parts are ordered; namely memory of past things and understanding of present things, according as from past things remembered and present things understood we conjecture concerning future things to be provided for."25
Circumspection26 is attentive consideration of circumstances; for it happens that something considered according to itself is good and suitable to the end; nevertheless from some circumstances it is rendered evil and unsuitable for attaining the end. Hence it is clear that circumspection is necessary for prudence.
Caution27 is the care of avoiding all evils and impediments by which from without the work of virtue could be vitiated or impeded, e.g. lest damage be incurred, lest neighbor be offended.28
18 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 48, a. unic.
19 Erinnerung, souvenir.
20 S. theol. l. c. q. 47, a. 16.
21 A clear survey of the state of the matter and sound moral judgment. S. theol. l. c. q. 49, a. 2 ad 1, and a. 5 ad 3.
22 Resourcefulness, swift insight into the causes of an appearance, presence of mind; presence d'esprit, sagacity. Cf. S. theol. l. c. q. 49, a. 4.
23 Plan of execution.
24 Foreseeing the consequences of an act; prevoyance.
25 S. theol. 1, q. 22, a. 1.
26 Circumspection.
27 Caution; precaution.
28 Concerning the accurate difference between foresight, circumspection, and caution, see Cajetan in 2, 2, q. 49, a. 8.
632. b) Subjective parts of some cardinal virtue are the species into which it is divided. Besides natural and supernatural prudence, concerning which there was speech above n. 626, prudence is divided into personal prudence, by which someone governs himself, and governing or regnative prudence, through which someone governs a multitude.
Governing prudence29 was divided by the ancients into various species, according to the different species of multitude. Now there is a certain multitude united for some special business, as an army is gathered together for fighting. - Ruling prudence over an army is called military prudence. Prudence by which a family is governed is called economic prudence. Prudence by which some kingdom is governed is called regnative or legislative prudence. In subjects there corresponds to the governing prudence of the superior political prudence, through which they direct themselves in obeying rulers for the common good.30 - Personal prudence is a species really distinct from political and governing prudence, because it has a different end, namely personal rectitude, while governing and political prudence besides this intends and directly procures the rectitude of the community. Certainly there are many holy men who, although perfect in every virtue, nevertheless do not have governing prudence so perfectly. Hence St. Celestine abdicated the Supreme Pontificate, because he felt himself unequal to directing the Church in those most difficult times. Nevertheless he who has great sanctity can deservedly be called very prudent, because he directs all his acts in a perfect manner to the true end and to true beatitude. Therefore the Blessed Virgin, who was most holy, is called the most prudent virgin.
29 Talent for governing.
30 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 50, a. 2.
633. c) Potential parts of prudence are called the joined virtues which are ordered to some secondary acts or secondary matters, and are three, namely eubulia, synesis, gnome.
Eubulia is the habit of taking counsel rightly.31 As was said above, to take counsel well or to deliberate well is an act of prudence, but this must be understood in such a way that prudence exercises this act not immediately through itself, but by means of the virtue of eubulia; or in other words: "it pertains to prudence to take counsel well imperatively, but to eubulia elicitively."32
Synesis is a virtue judging well concerning operable things according to common rules, i.e. according to natural and positive law.33
Gnome34 is a judging virtue according to higher principles in those things in which sometimes one must recede from the common law, but not from the mind of the legislator. Therefore gnome produces the act of epikeia in the observance of law.
31 Capacity for considering well and taking counsel.
32 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 51, a. 2 ad 1.
33 Capacity for judging rightly, according to the law, concerning actions to be performed; the faculty of judging well according to the law.
34 Capacity, in extraordinary occurrences, to judge rightly not according to the wording but according to the sense of the law; the faculty of judging well against the letter of the law in an extraordinary case.