The Potential Parts of Temperance

The Potential Parts of Temperance.—The appetites of pleasure are the most difficult to restrain, and there is need of a perfect virtue like temperance to rule over them and keep them within the bounds of reason. The analogous or potential virtues of temperance are that one which is able to check, though it does not tame, the animal appetites (continency), and those that preside and rule over the less violent appetites for vengeance, exercise of authority, superior excellence, knowledge, amusement and display (meekness, etc.). See above, 2465 c.

646. In temperance there are integral, subjective, and potential parts.

1. The integral parts of temperance are two, namely, shamefacedness and honorableness; for the complete office of temperance consists in two things: in flight from turpitude, toward which shamefacedness assists, and in love of comeliness, toward which honorableness assists. The following things are to be noted briefly concerning these integral parts.

a) Shamefacedness¹¹⁸⁸ is fear of disgrace. It is not a virtue properly so called, but a laudable passion, which therefore is sometimes called a virtue in the broad sense. For shamefacedness is a certain imperfection consisting in fear of reproach on account of those things which are held as base by men. Thus many are ashamed of poverty and of bodily defects; this shamefacedness is a sign of a weak mind. Others are ashamed of honorable acts themselves because they are mocked for them by the impious; this shamefacedness is evil. But if a man is moved to shamefacedness according to right reason, namely, because he has committed something base or because he fears lest something base occur, this shamefacedness is good and disposes toward virtue, because it instills horror of turpitude. Since sins against temperance are very base, as they render man like the brute animals, shamefacedness, which withdraws one from these base things, can rightly be called an integral part of temperance. Therefore St. Thomas¹¹⁸⁹ says: "Shamefacedness is not a part of temperance as though entering into its essence, but as disposing one toward it; whence Ambrose says that shamefacedness lays the first foundations of temperance, insofar, namely, as it instills horror of turpitude." Since the virtue of temperance, and especially of chastity, is most necessary for virgins, the Creator therefore implanted great shamefacedness in them so that they might better preserve virginity.

b) Just as shamefacedness is flight from turpitude, so honorableness¹¹⁹⁰ is the love and pursuit of comeliness. Honorableness accepted in this sense is likewise an integral part of temperance. Whence St. Thomas¹¹⁹¹ teaches: "Honorableness is a certain spiritual beauty. But the base is opposed to the beautiful. Opposites chiefly manifest one another. And therefore honorableness seems to pertain especially to temperance, which repels that which is most base for man, namely, brutal pleasures. Whence even in the very name of temperance there is understood chiefly the good of reason, whose office it is to moderate and temper depraved desires. Thus, therefore, honorableness, insofar as it is attributed to temperance by a certain special reason, is posited as its integral part, not indeed as a subjective part or as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part of it, as a certain condition of it."

Note. These two virtues of shamefacedness and honorableness must be cultivated as much as possible in the education of boys and girls; for they are, as it were, guardians of chastity and temperance. But if these guardians are dead, man is accustomed to rush headlong into every filthiness of lust and intemperance.

¹¹⁸⁸ Scham, Scheu, pudeur, honte [shame, reserve, shamefacedness].

¹¹⁸⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 144, a. 4 ad 4.

¹¹⁹⁰ Anstandsgefühl [sense of propriety].

¹¹⁹¹ L.c., q. 145, a. 4.

647. 2. Four subjective parts of temperance are enumerated by St. Thomas, namely, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and pudicity.

"The subjective parts of a virtue are called its species; but the species of virtues must be diversified according to the diversity of matter or object. Now temperance concerns the pleasures of touch, which are divided into two genera. For some are ordered to nourishment; and among these, as regards food there is abstinence, and as regards drink properly there is sobriety. Others, however, are ordered to the generative power; and among these, as regards the principal pleasure of coitus itself there is chastity; but as regards the surrounding pleasures, such as those which are in kisses, touches, and embraces, pudicity is considered."¹¹⁹² The individual parts will be treated more fully in the following chapter.

¹¹⁹² S. theol. 2, 2, q. 143, a. un.

648. 3. The potential parts of temperance are five, namely, continence, humility, meekness, modesty, and moderation.

As is clear from what was said above, the potential parts of a principal virtue are called those secondary virtues which have the same formal object quo as the principal virtue, but nevertheless concern less principal and less difficult matters. It pertains to temperance to moderate the pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate; whence any virtue which imports a certain moderation in some less difficult matter and restrains the appetite tending inordinately toward something pleasurable can be posited as a potential part of temperance or a virtue annexed to it. An inordinate appetite is found in three objects, namely: 1. in interior movements of the soul; 2. in exterior movements and acts of the body; 3. in exterior things. As regards the first, besides the movement of the concupiscence of touch, which temperance moderates and restrains, three movements tending toward something are found in the soul. The first is the movement of the will stirred by the impetus of passion; and continence¹¹⁹³ restrains this movement, from which it results that, although the lower part of man suffers immoderate movements of concupiscence, the will is not conquered. The second interior movement is the movement of hope tending inordinately toward one's own excellence; and humility moderates or restrains this movement. The third interior movement is the movement of anger tending toward vengeance; and meekness or clemency moderates or restrains this movement. Modesty introduces due moderation into exterior bodily movements. Finally, as regards exterior things, moderation is posited, which rejects both superfluous things and does not require things that are excessively exquisite. Modesty and moderation are again subdivided by certain authors.¹¹⁹⁴

¹¹⁹³ Selbstbeherrschung, maîtrise de soi-même [self-mastery].

¹¹⁹⁴ Cf. S. theol., l.c.

708. The following potential parts of temperance are fittingly enumerated: continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty. Under modesty, however, several other virtues are contained, and especially humility. Each is to be treated briefly.

S. Th. II-II, q. 143, 144, 145, 160.

944. The integral parts of temperance, or the dispositions or conditions without which the act of temperance is not perfect, are two:

1. Shamefacedness (pudeur; schaamte), which is a certain laudable passion of fear by which someone flees the turpitude contrary to temperance, which consists in this, that someone seeks pleasure in those things which are lowest in man and agree with him according to bestial nature, where there is nothing of the light of reason.

2. Special honesty (eerbaarheid), by which someone loves the beauty or decorum of temperance, which it has from this, that reason restrains the bestial concupiscences, which are most base, and reduces them to due proportion.

For the whole office of temperance consists in two things: in flight from turpitude and in love of decorum.

Hence it is especially fitting that they be cultivated, especially in the education of children: for they are the guardians of sobriety and chastity.¹

¹ Shamefacedness is fear of reproach. It is an imperfection consisting in fear of blame on account of those things which are held by men as base, for example, concerning poverty, defect of hair, etc.: thus it is not a virtue. But if it is according to reason, because someone has committed a base thing or because he fears lest something truly base happen to him, then it is truly good and a disposition to virtue, because it casts horror of turpitude into one; yet it is not a virtue, because one who is perfect does not apprehend what is base as possible for himself or as though difficult to avoid. Hence, according to St. Thomas, it is not a part entering the essence of virtue, but disposing itself toward it: it lays the foundations of temperance. - But honesty is a condition of temperance.

945. The subjective parts or species of temperance are three. - For temperance is concerned with pleasures of touch, of which some are ordained to nourishment, and in these, with respect to food and common drink, there is abstinence, and with respect to intoxicating drink there is sobriety; some are ordained to the generative power, and concerning these there is chastity, which is also concerned with the pleasure of the act of generation itself, to which pudicity is reduced, which properly concerns certain surrounding pleasures.

To these three vices of intemperance are opposed: gluttony - drunkenness - lust, to which is reduced immodesty, which is imperfect lust.

946. The potential parts of temperance are annexed habits which are concerned with a less principal or secondary matter, namely, pleasures less difficult to moderate. By a general name they are called modesty.

Modesty is named from mode or moderation; therefore it is a virtue moderative of those things which have a middling difficulty. For where there is a special virtue concerning something greatest, there must be virtues concerning those things which hold themselves moderately, because human life ought to be regulated by virtue as to all things. Temperance applies moderation concerning the more difficult pleasures of touch; therefore there must be a virtue which applies moderation in other things which are not so difficult to moderate, especially concerning smallest things, such as gestures, garments, movements of the body, and exterior things. Therefore in a general way "it is a virtue by which someone contains himself within the mode and limits of his state, character, and fortune, as to internal movements, external gestures, and every apparatus of his things"; or, a moderation by which someone, content with his own measure, restrains his internal and external movements and every apparatus of his things within the measure congruent to him.

There are several modesties, of which the principal ones have obtained a special name. For according to right reason there can be tempered:

1. pleasures in the internal movements of the soul:

a) the movement of the will stirred by the impulse of passion, concerning pleasures of touch, and this continence moderates, from which it comes about that although man suffers immoderate concupiscences, nevertheless the will is not conquered;

b) or the movement of anger tending both toward vengeance, which meekness moderates, and toward external punishment, concerning which clemency is exercised;

c) or the movement of hope (and daring) tending toward a certain excellence, and this humility moderates;

d) or the movement of desire tending toward knowledge, and this studiousness moderates;

2. pleasures in exterior movements, which modesty of exterior movements moderates, so that they may be done decently and honestly:

a) either in those things which are done seriously, to which eutaxia pertains, which includes decency through fittingness to the agent according to himself, and good ordering through fittingness toward others;

b) or in those things which are done in play, to which eutrapelia belongs, or according to others austerity;

3. pleasures in exterior things, concerning which there is modesty of external equipment or apparatus, to which are reduced thrift or self-sufficiency, and moderation and simplicity.

THREEFOLD are the parts of Temperance, as of the other Cardinal virtues. Some are integral; some subjective; some potential.

THE quasi-integral parts are two, namely Shamefacedness, by which one shuns the baseness contrary to temperance: and Honesty, by which the beauty of Temperance is loved.

SHAMEFACEDNESS is described by St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 42: Shamefacedness is to preserve honesty in gesture and word. And opusc. declarat. terminorum Theol.: Shamefacedness is the observance of honesty in gesture and word. He describes it from the Fathers in S. Ductor lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 14.

HONESTY is described by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. 12 Centiloquii: It is neither to seek daintier foods, nor to give pains in outward show. He means to say that it is that affection toward honesty, or toward the works of temperance worthy of honor. But the works of temperance are called honest, or worthy of honor, because they are opposed to the disgraceful and infamous sins of intemperance.

THE subjective parts of the Virtue of Temperance, which are diverse by object, are four. For the delectations of touch, in curbing which Temperance is engaged, are divided into two kinds: some are ordered to nourishment, and in these, as regards food, there is Abstinence; as regards drink, Sobriety. Some indeed are ordered to the generative power, and in these, as regards the principal delectation of coition itself, there is Chastity; as regards the delectations surrounding it, such as looks, kisses, touches, it is called Pudicity. Yet it is the same as chastity; and it is called Pudicity inasmuch as shame is wont to be present about the use, as St. Augustine says 14. de Civit. cap. 17. and 18, and Aristotle 2. Rhet. cap. 6. Whence St. Thomas says that Pudicity is chastity as affected by shame even about the signs themselves. So Valentia disp. 9. quaest. 1. puncto 2, Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 3. dub. 6.

IN Chastity the principal place is held by Virginity, which keeps itself untouched from every venereal act, as St. Ambrose says lib. de Virginibus: Virginal chastity is an integrity devoid of contagion. By integrity of the body, however, I understand that which has been violated by no voluntary obscenity, as St. Augustine admonishes lib. 1. de Civitate Dei, cap. 18. and 25; but once corrupted it cannot be restored, as St. Jerome has it epist. 22. cap. 2, and St. Thomas quaest. 152. art. 1.

INFERIOR indeed is abstinence from illicit coition; which is twofold: conjugal; and widowed. See all this in St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 42, and the other places to be cited quaest. 9. and 10.

THE potential parts of Temperance are certain virtues which are engaged in moderating delectable things; yet they fall short of the perfection of Temperance, because they labor not about things so difficult, such as the delectable things of touch; and these are eight, namely Continence, Mildness, Clemency, Modesty, Humility, Studiosity, Eutrapelia, Parsimony, or simplicity, or moderation.

CONTINENCE is the virtue restraining the exorbitant motions of the will, which usually arise from the impulse of the passions of the sensitive appetite, moving the will toward things contrary to right reason. On this St. Thomas quaest. 155, and Aristotle, 7. Ethic.

MILDNESS is the virtue establishing moderation in the appetite for vengeance. So St. Thomas quaest. 157.

CLEMENCY is the virtue applying a measure convenient to right reason in external punishment, and thus it belongs to superiors toward subjects, as St. Thomas teaches loco citato.

MODESTY is the virtue placing moderation in the external actions of the body.

HUMILITY is the virtue curbing by fear the motions of daring and of hope, so that one should not wish anything beyond one's merit attributed to oneself.

STUDIOSITY is the virtue prescribing a measure to the appetite in the desire of knowing.

EUTRAPELIA is the virtue placing a measure in honest recreations and jests.

PARSIMONY is the virtue that makes use in moderation of external things pertaining to the body, such as ornament, clothing, etc. See this in St. Bonaventure sermone 5. Hexaëmer., and the other places alleged. It is also had in 3. part. Centil. sect. 43.

AMONG these vices curiosity first presents itself, which can be taken broadly or strictly; taken broadly it stands for an immoderate eagerness for trying novelties in any way whatever; thus the Holy Doctor takes it in his exposition on the Psalter, Psalm 13, where he sets out four things by which a Christian man is most corrupted; and he puts Curiosity first among them, saying: there are four things that corrupt, Curiosity, loquacity, cruelty, and pleasure.

And since the experience of novelties is perceived chiefly by sight, therefore the Holy Doctor in the place cited ascribes Curiosity to the eyes; for these, while the mind within is distracted through negligence, run about and wander abroad among various objects; whence a multitude of thoughts, creeping into the mind in a throng, empties piety, and by degrees drives the soul on to graver sins.

The Holy Doctor also elegantly sets forth another, more physical reason, in the place cited above: why the eyes are seduced by curiosity more than the other senses? For since the four elements flourish especially in four parts of man, fire shines forth most of all in the eyes, and therefore by nature, being remote from the center, it strives to burst forth in every direction and to course about, and scarcely allows the visual rays to be fixed long on one object; hence the young are more curious than the old, since in the latter that fire lies almost extinct and languishes, while in the former, being more lively, it distracts: The other parts, in which the remaining elements flourish, are the hands, in which, because of the predominance of earth, there is touch; the tongue, in which the air forms the voice; and the genitals, in which the watery humor serves generation: And these parts (the Holy Doctor subjoins) the aforesaid four vices, like a fourfold pestilence, destroy — the eyes namely curiosity, the tongue loquacity, the hands cruelty, and the genitals pleasure. I relate this because those vices oppose that temperance in a special manner, of which more fully elsewhere.

STRICTLY speaking, however, curiosity taken thus is opposed to studiousness by excess, and consists in the desire and immoderate eagerness to know and to be wise, not unto sobriety, but to satisfy the lust of the mind.

Hence this curiosity is very well defined by the Holy Doctor in his exposition on Ecclesiastes on the words I saw all things that are done. It is the lustful prostitution of the human understanding, embracing any truth whatsoever everywhere and committing adultery with it: The reason for this definition is given in the same place by the Seraphic Doctor, because the first Truth is the bride, whose faith the human understanding in a certain way breaks, while it curiously explores other truths and places its satiety, or happiness, in them; And since curiosity advances thus far, it is without doubt deadly, when it turns the soul wholly away from the first Truth.

That this immoderate desire of knowing can occur in four ways is taught by St. Thomas, q. 167, and St. Bonaventure in the mirror of the soul, chap. 1.

FIRST on the part of the end, if he ordains knowledge to an evil end, or does not refer it to God as he ought, as St. Augustine says book on true religion, chap. 29, and book on the morals of the Church, chap. 21, in Valencia's collection.

SECOND on the part of the learner, if by means of it he is hindered from satisfying his duty. On this ground St. Jerome in the epistle to Damasus, on the prodigal son, rebukes Priests, who, setting aside the Gospels and the Prophets, read comedies and love poems, and sing the words of bucolic verses.

THIRD on the part of the one from whom knowledge is sought, as if it be sought from a demon, as I said concerning Superstition and Adjuration, Treatise on Religion.

FOURTH on the part of the thing whose knowledge is sought, if it be above nature. Therefore Ecclesiasticus 3: Seek not the things that are too high for thee.

THE EXCESS of games is opposed to Eutrapelia, as I said when treating of Games and Jests. See St. Thomas question 178, article 3.

And indeed it will be mortal, if the manner of playing is disgraceful and obscene, or pernicious to one's neighbor through mingled frauds: Or if anyone so gives himself to play that he neglects the commandments of God or of the Church, and indeed places in it his ultimate end, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the mirror of the soul, chap. 2, §. The fifth fruit of rapine is the game of dice. Hence some say of this that it is a mortal sin, because it is against Canonical and Civil law. And what is gained from play is possessed by no good title, nor can it be retained, but ought to be distributed to the poor. For since he who gains in play gains unjustly, and he who loses loses justly, therefore he who gains is not bound to restore to him from whom he gains, unless perhaps he led him into playing. And since play seems to have sufficiently from its root the character of mortal sin, because it seems to proceed from avarice, and because many sins are communicated in play — namely fraud, lying, perjury, blasphemy, scandal, loss of time, and anger — therefore this seems to be the reason for the prohibition of play. When one plays for the sake of recreation, the sins said above being excluded, it does not seem to have the character of mortal sin. Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

And chap. 3, §. On dishonesty in gesture, he strikes the same note.

From these gather, first, that the game of dice is not forbidden by the natural law. So Molina Volume 2, on Justice, question 510. Stephanus Costa, Treatise on Play, article 4, number 5. Diana part one, treatise 15, resolution 65, against Scacchius treatise on commerce, §. 1, question 1, number 104.

GATHER, second, that the civil and canonical laws prohibiting these games do not of themselves bind under mortal sin, as the Holy Doctor says, but only by reason of the sins that follow; and that the civil laws have been abrogated by custom, as taught by Homobonus on the examination of churches, part 2, treatise 9, chap. 24, question 25. Regius in the resolution of cases, case 23. Salas treatise on play, disputation 3. Lessius book 2, chap. 26, doubt 1. Filliucius volume 2, treatise 38, chap. 4, number 58. Diana in the place cited, who with others infer that, by force of the said laws, other circumstances set aside, there is not even sin.

THERE is, moreover, the question whether the keepers of houses for these games sin gravely.

THE NEGATIVE opinion is upheld by Vincentius Iustinianus, a Dominican, cited by Lopez, to be quoted below; for by the authority of St. Thomas 1. 2. question 169, article 2, ad 4, and by the examples adduced after Sanchez by Bonacina, Treatise on laws, disputation 2, question 4, point 2, it is lawful to minister and sell indifferent things, even with knowledge of their wicked abuse: And such are these games.

THAT it is nevertheless unlawful St. Bonaventure teaches in the place cited of the mirror, chap. 2, for there those grave sins are perpetrated which the Holy Doctor enumerates, as tearful experience teaches.

He has been followed by Suarez, treatise on Charity, disputation 10, section 4. Sanchez, Volume 1, book 1, chap. 7, number 39. Sylvester, under the word Ludus, question 15. Navarrus, Manual, chap. 19. Comitolus, book 3, question 7. Zanardus, in the Directory, part 2, precept 3, chap. 28. John de la Cruz, in the Directory, part 1, precept 7, article 5, doubt 13. Valencia, volume 2, disputation 5, question 6, point 5, §. 2. Molina, Volume 2, on Justice, disputation 516, and many others among these, with whom Diana subscribes above, referring to others.

It is proved by the argument of St. Bonaventure: Those things from which grave sins follow are gravely forbidden: such are these gatherings of houses, or conventicles: Therefore. The minor is proved from St. Bernard sermon 33, where he enumerates twelve sins. What is Barattry but a betting-house, in which by blasphemies the limbs are cut down of him who redeemed us with his own blood, and of his sweetest Mother, and of all the Saints, as Bellochius says in practice, part 2, question 4, from number 492 to 504, who says it is the seed-bed of all vices, of which St. Antoninus enumerates twenty-one part 2, title 1, chap. 23, §. 6. Wherefore he beseeches Princes, in the bowels of Christ, to root out this most foul pestilence.

Bellochus number 466 infers, and Diana in the place cited and others, that the patrons of these conventicles, should the principal players default, step in and are bound in restitution.

Diana infers, second, that Princes cannot grant a license for exposing a house for play.

From what has been said the adverse argument is answered: it is not lawful to minister things to wicked uses when the wicked use is exercised in the very exhibition itself; and thus dice, dice-games, and candles are exercised while men are actually blaspheming, as Diana notes with Lorca 2. 2, question 10, article 9. Nor does Diana rightly concede in his first answer that these things are indifferent, since on the very fact they are wicked and morally ordered to this.

THE DEFECT opposed to Eutrapelia at the other extreme remains, and is called Rusticity, as Aristotle teaches Nicomachean Ethics 2, chap. 7, and book 4, chap. 8, and St. Thomas question 168, article 4, and St. Bonaventure in the places adduced, and it occurs when a man is so boorish as to make himself burdensome to all, hindering honest recreations, either by not cooperating in them or by biting, carping, and embittering them out of a certain unurbanity which I call Saturnine, which very many hunt after, especially spiritual Cydonians, and by which they vex others.