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The Remission of Punishment

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Works

Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology

Vol. III, Book Fifth. On Penance., Chapter First. On Penance …, Question Fourth. On the re…, Article Third. On the remi…, Section 2. On Remission as to Punishment.

n. 246.

246. Remission and its modes. 1. While guilt has not yet been remitted, punishment cannot be remitted: for guilt is the cause on account of which a man is worthy of punishment; but, while the cause has not yet been removed, the effect cannot be taken away.

  1. When mortal guilt has been remitted, by that very fact eternal punishment is remitted; but when venial guilt has been remitted, by that very fact temporal punishment is not remitted.

The reason for the first: mortal sin is remitted by the infusion of sanctifying grace, by which a right to eternal life is conferred; but in the same man there cannot at once be a right to eternal life and the necessity of undergoing eternal punishment; therefore, when guilt is remitted, eternal punishment is necessarily remitted, or rather eternal punishment is changed into temporal punishment.

By the disposition of the divine will, eternal punishment in this sacrament is not wholly blotted out as in baptism, but is changed into temporal punishment, a thing which will be explained below.

The reason for the second: from the nature of the thing nothing prevents punishment from remaining to be paid after venial guilt has been remitted; but from faith we know that God has so established it, that when mortal guilt is remitted there remains temporal punishment to be paid; from this, moreover, we conclude that when venial guilt is remitted not even all temporal punishment is remitted.1

The temporal punishment owed for remitted mortal sin is remitted together with the guilt itself, either wholly or in some greater or lesser part, according to the perfection of the disposition existing in the penitent. Likewise the punishment owed for remitted venial sins is blotted out together with the liability of guilt either wholly or in part according to the penitent's disposition.

  1. Temporal punishment can be compensated or paid in three ways:

a. By voluntary satisfaction in this life, whether it is sacramental or extra-sacramental, through works of the virtues, among which the offering and hearing of the holy sacrifice is eminent.

b. By satispassion in purgatory in the other life.

c. By indulgences, by which God accepts the payment made by the Church from the satisfactions of Christ and the saints.

1 Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 30.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Vol. II, Bk. III, Tr. V, Diss. I, Pt. III, Section IV. On the Remission of Punishment

n. 285.

I. By sinning, man contracts: 1. the guilt of fault, by which he is formally constituted a sinner; 2. the guilt of punishment, by which, because of the guilt of fault, he becomes liable to punishments to be undergone. Moreover, while the fault remains, the punishment which follows the fault cannot be taken away. But when the fault has been removed, the guilt of eternal punishment is necessarily taken away, but not the guilt of temporal punishment. For the former cannot consist with the friendship of God and a right to eternal beatitude; but the latter must be spoken of otherwise. Indeed:

II. In fact, the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted with the fault. This is of faith from the Council of Trent.1 It is also clear from Sacred Scripture.2

III. The punishment remaining after the remission of fault is remitted, or at least diminished, by:

  1. Ex opere operato: the sacraments, the sacrifice, indulgences, and sacramental satisfaction, each of which applies the satisfaction of Christ.

  2. Ex opere operantis: satispassion and satisfaction. Satispassion consists in this, that someone suffers the punishments which God of himself has appointed for sin. Satisfaction is situated in this, that someone performs a penal work or works which God accepts in compensation for the punishment appointed of itself. Satisfaction, however, can be offered through all good works, because all are penal to some extent. Besides this, one just person can satisfy for another just person,3 as is deduced: 1. from the fact that we can satisfy for the souls in purgatory; 2. from the communion of Saints, by which it comes about that the members of the Church can aid one another. Nevertheless, it is not altogether certain that God always accepts satisfaction of this kind for others.

  3. It is disputed whether the remission of temporal punishment can also be obtained by impetration. It seems that it must be answered affirmatively, because the Church herself in the office of the dead asks God that through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary and of the other Saints he free the souls from purgatory; but it is clear that the works of those Saints are not penal.

Corollary. Sins are remitted through penance in such a way that they do not return in any way on account of a subsequent sin, neither as regards the guilt of fault nor as regards the guilt of punishment. The guilt of fault does not return; this is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture;4 2. from the fact that through justification sin is truly remitted and destroyed; but what has truly been destroyed cannot be imputed again. Nor does the guilt of punishment return; for this cannot return unless the guilt of fault returns.

1 Session 14, on Penance, canon 12.

2 Numbers 12:14 sq.; 20:1 sq.; 27:12 sq.; Deuteronomy 34:1 sq.; 2 Samuel 12:13 sq.

3 It is required that each be in the state of grace: the one satisfying, so that his work may be satisfactory; the one for whom satisfaction is made, so that the punishment can be remitted.

4 Isaiah 1:18; Ezekiel 33:12, 16; Micah 7:19.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Vol. II, Treatise On the Sacrament …, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § III. On the Efficacy of Contrition

n. 456.
  1. QUESTION 2. Does contrition remit not only guilt, but also the punishment due to guilt?
n. 456.

Reply 1. It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain liable to eternal damnation.

n. 456.

Reply 2. According to its greater or lesser intensity, it also remits a part of the temporal punishment due to mortal or venial sins which have been blotted out. Hence very intense perfect contrition can abolish even every punishment; but by its nature it does not necessarily have this efficacy. This is gathered from Trent, sess. 6, ch. 14 and canon 30. - Likewise from sess. 14, De Poenitentia, ch. 8 and canon 12.

Tanquerey

Vol. I, Matrimony, and Holy Orders, On Penance (Volume I), Dogmatic Part — Chapter III: On the Sacrament of Penance Itself

n. 189.

§ II. On the Remission of the Punishment Due to Sin

  1. (A) The sacrament of penance always remits eternal punishment together with the fault. It is certain; (a) for Trent teaches1 that a penitent, after receiving absolution, is bound to satisfy through fastings, alms, and prayers, "not indeed for eternal punishment, which is remitted either by the sacrament or by the intention of the sacrament together with the fault; but for temporal punishment, which, as the sacred letters teach, is not always wholly dismissed for them, as happens in Baptism"... (b) The reason is clear from the things said; for the remission of mortal sin occurs through the infusion of habitual grace; but habitual grace makes us sharers in the divine nature, friends of God, and His adoptive children with a right to eternal beatitude, as we demonstrated in the Treatise on Grace (n. 139 sq.); therefore it remits eternal punishment.

1 Trent, sess. VI, ch. 14.

n. 190.
  1. (B) The Sacrament of Penance also diminishes the temporal punishment due to sin, and indeed in a twofold way:

(a) By reason of absolution; for, as Lugo says,2 since it is certainly for God, when He commutes eternal punishment into temporal punishment, to be able to change it into a graver and more lasting temporal punishment. Therefore we ought to give thanks to God, both because He has remitted eternal punishment, and because He has not commuted it into some other greater temporal punishment, as He most justly could; and in this sense eternal punishment is never remitted without some temporal punishment being remitted at the same time, into which it could have been commuted.

2 Lugo, disp. VIII, n. 64.

(b) By reason of satisfaction, or of the penance imposed by the Priest; for, according to Trent (ch. 3), satisfaction is one of the three parts which pertain to the integrity of the sacrament and concur toward the full and perfect remission of sins; but satisfaction does not directly concur toward the remission of fault, since this is remitted before satisfaction is completed; therefore it concurs toward the remission of punishment. This indeed it accomplishes ex opere operato, according to the common opinion, which holds that the three acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament.

(C) The Sacrament of Penance does not always take away the whole temporal punishment, as we have already proved, but sometimes it does accomplish this, namely if contrition is most intense. For since temporal punishment of this kind is finite, contrition can be so intense that it remits it adequately and totally.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Vol. III, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On Penance, Second Part: On the Effect…, Question Three: On the Remission of Punishments

n. 461.

461. Thesis I. Penance, through perfect contrition alone, or through imperfect contrition in the sacrament, together with guilt remits the eternal punishment due to mortal sin on the part of aversion. - It is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14 and can. 30.

n. 461.

It is proved: Penance does not remit mortal sin except through the infusion of habitual grace making one pleasing. But habitual grace renders us participants of the divine nature, friends of God and His adoptive sons, and by right heirs of life and eternal beatitude. Therefore penance, together with the guilt of mortal sin, remits eternal punishment.

n. 462.

462. Thesis II. Penance together with mortal or venial guilt remits, at least partially, the temporal punishment due to sin on account of inordinate conversion to the creature and the honor thereby withdrawn from God.

n. 462.

This it does in two ways: a) by contrition and confession, which, on account of shame, already include a certain reparation of the divine honor wounded by sin;

n. 462.

b) by satisfaction, especially that which is imposed by the priest, and, as Trent says, sess. 14, c. 3, concurs toward the full and perfect remission of sins.

n. 462.

These things can do this ex opere operantis when they are done in the very justification or in the state of grace; but by the power of absolution they become a title and cause of the remission of punishment ex opere operato.

n. 463.

463. Thesis III. Penance, even in the sacrament, together with guilt even merely venial, does not always remit all punishment, but ordinarily there remains temporal punishment to be undergone, in order that the honor withdrawn from God be fully restored. - It is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30, and sess. 14, c. 8, can. 12.

n. 463.

Thus also a man to whom damage has been inflicted by an enemy remits the fault to the offender when he, seeking reconciliation, asks pardon, but nevertheless demands reparation of the damage inflicted.

n. 463.

It is proved: 1° From the Scriptures, namely, both from the examples of those who, after remission of sin was obtained, nevertheless had to undergo punishment (Adam, Moses and Aaron, David), and from the words which by exhorting counsel, indeed command, penitential satisfaction (Joel II, 12; Dan. IV, 24; Luke III, 8).

n. 463.

Nor does it help to say with Luther that these punishments are ordered only to amendment; for from the context it is plain that they are also inflicted for chastisement.

n. 463.

2° From perpetual tradition, namely, not only a) from the ancient and constant practice of the Church, authentically confirmed by the definition of the Council of Trent (sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30; sess. 14, c. 3 and 8, can. 4, 12, 13, 15), - but also b) by explicit testimonies, for example, Tertullian, On Penance 9; Cyprian, On the Lapsed; Origen, hom. 3 on Judges 2; hom. 9 on Leviticus; Ambrose, on Luke VII, 156; On Penance II, 6; Basil, hom. Attende, 4; Jerome, on Joel I, 13; Augustine, Against Faustus XXII, 67; on Ps. L, 11; Gregory, Moralia IX, 34; - moreover c) from the connection with the dogma of Purgatory.

n. 463.

3° By reason it cannot be strictly proved, since God could remit punishment and guilt at the same time; nevertheless it can be shown that this is done reasonably:

n. 463.

A. From the nature of sin and of its remission. In the remission of sin eternal punishment is not changed into temporal punishment, as Scotus and Suarez said, for the remission of eternal punishment naturally follows the remission of guilt or aversion from God: for through grace the friendship of God and the right to eternal life are restored, whence man cannot be eternally separated from God and merit the eternal punishment of loss, and consequently this punishment is totally taken away. Besides, as Cajetan notes, the words of absolution absolve, they do not change. - But it must be said with St. Thomas (q. 86, a. 4, and in IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2) that satisfaction is required, because ordinarily the undue conversion to the creature is not sufficiently repaired.

n. 463.

For in sin there is a twofold inequality, namely, one opposed to friendship and one to justice; namely, the equality of friendship is wounded in affection, the equality of justice in effect or in things. But each wound must be repaired. For a) divine friendship is violated by aversion from God, which merits eternal punishment, and is recompensed by contrition, which is the recompense of violated friendship and restores the equality of friendship (as far as is possible for man); b) also the honor due to God is withdrawn from Him by undue conversion to the creature, by which the law is violated, and one is impeded from giving God the honor due to Him in all acts; which merits temporal punishment (I, n. 524). Now ordinarily this is not totally recompensed by one act of contrition, by which the whole honor which was taken away is not always rendered; whence temporal punishment remains for restoring the equality of justice.

n. 463.

At least ordinarily: for exceptionally it can happen that all punishment is taken away, if contrition is extraordinary and very great, either on the part of charity or on the part of sensible sorrow.

n. 463.

Therefore: What has been taken away by aversion from God cannot be totally rendered, and therefore God does not exact perfect recompense, but is content with imperfect recompense (n. 396); the honor taken away by conversion to the creature can be totally restored, and therefore can also be exacted by God.

n. 463.

B. From the difference between Baptism and Penance (a. 4, ad 3; Suppl., q. 18, a. 2). In Baptism man receives the power of the Passion of Christ totally, which of itself is sufficient for remitting every guilt and punishment: because namely, through water and the Holy Spirit, he is dead together with Christ to sin and in Him regenerated to new life, made a new man, in whom nothing of the old ought to remain (as to the soul); and therefore in Baptism no punishment remains for preceding sin. But in penance man is not changed into another life, because it is not regeneration but a certain healing to be obtained through one's own acts, by which he is repaired into the former life; and therefore he obtains the power of the Passion of Christ, not totally, but according to the mode and disposition of his own acts, which are the matter of the sacrament of Penance, as water is of Baptism: for in healing, the remains of sickness remain until perfect restoration. Whence not at once, through the first act of penance by which guilt is remitted, is the debt of punishment loosed, but when all the acts have been completed, among which there is also sufficient satisfaction to be offered.

n. 463.

And indeed Penance was instituted by way of judgment, to which it also belongs to punish crimes. Hence, says the Council of Trent, the reason of divine justice seems to demand that those who have sinned before Baptism through ignorance, or at least not with so much malice, be received with greater indulgence than those who, ungrateful for the grace of God which they have received, have grieved the Holy Spirit and knowingly violated the temple of God. Whence it is equitable that satisfaction be exacted from these (sess. 14, c. 8).

n. 464.

464. The Protestants object the Scriptures which affirm that God remits sins freely, so that He does not remember them, nor do they harm any more (Ezek. XVIII, 22; XXXIII, 11-12). - But God is said a) to remit sins freely, namely, their very guilt and eternal punishment, but not the annexed temporal punishment; - b) not to remember sins, because sins do not return, and God does not consider the converted sinner as an enemy, although He purges a friend by punishments; - c) the impiety of sinners not to harm, because penal works do not harm, and because the just man has that from which he may satisfy.

n. 465.

465. Observations. - 1. Penance remits temporal punishment not only ex opere operantis, because the man who is justified or is already just by repenting partially restores the honor taken away from God, but also ex opere operato, because by the power of the sacrament the act of our penance becomes a title and efficient cause of at least partial remission of the punishment due, and indeed a) so that it has greater value for expiating sin than if by his own judgment man did the same work, i.e., even if so done it would not suffice; b) indeed it also has value for a greater remission than the same penance would obtain from its own merit.

n. 465.
  1. If temporal punishment can remain because, when the effect on the part of aversion has been removed, a certain effect on the part of inordinate conversion to the creature can remain, a fortiori nothing prevents dispositions to sin and infirmity toward good, caused from preceding acts, from remaining after guilt has been remitted; these are called the remnants of sin; for removing these ordinarily one act is insufficient. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so that they do not dominate man, and this more by way of disposition than by way of habit, because they are retracted.
n. 465.
  1. Therefore, just as "God perfectly heals the whole man; but sometimes suddenly, as He at once restored Peter's mother-in-law to perfect health, so that rising up she ministered to them, as is read (Luke IV); sometimes, however, successively, as was said of the blind man enlightened (Mark VIII). And so also spiritually He sometimes converts the heart of man with so great a commotion that he at once perfectly obtains spiritual health, not only guilt having been remitted but all remnants of sin having been removed, as is clear of Magdalene (Luke VII). But sometimes He first remits guilt (through operating grace), and afterward (through cooperating grace) successively takes away the remnants of sin" and punishments (a. 5, ad 1).

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Vol. II, Tr. XV, Pt. II, Ch. I, Art. I, § III. On the Efficacy of Contrition

n. 736, Q. 2.

Question 2. Whether contrition remits not only the fault, but also the punishment due to fault? Resp. It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain guilty of eternal damnation. Besides, according to the greater or lesser intensity of the same contrition, it also remits part of the temporal punishment due to mortal or venial sins that have been destroyed. Consequently very intense perfect contrition can also abolish all punishment; but it does not necessarily have this efficacy from its nature. This is drawn from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 14; and sess. 14, on Penance, chap. 8 and can. 12.