Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Three: On the Remission of Punishments
S. Th. III, q. 86, a. 4 and 5; q. 87, a. 3, ad 3; Suppl., q. 18, a. 2.
It is proved: Penance does not remit mortal sin except through the infusion of habitual grace making one pleasing. But habitual grace renders us participants of the divine nature, friends of God and His adoptive sons, and by right heirs of life and eternal beatitude. Therefore penance, together with the guilt of mortal sin, remits eternal punishment.
462. Thesis II. Penance together with mortal or venial guilt remits, at least partially, the temporal punishment due to sin on account of inordinate conversion to the creature and the honor thereby withdrawn from God.
This it does in two ways: a) by contrition and confession, which, on account of shame, already include a certain reparation of the divine honor wounded by sin;
These things can do this ex opere operantis when they are done in the very justification or in the state of grace; but by the power of absolution they become a title and cause of the remission of punishment ex opere operato.
463. Thesis III. Penance, even in the sacrament, together with guilt even merely venial, does not always remit all punishment, but ordinarily there remains temporal punishment to be undergone, in order that the honor withdrawn from God be fully restored. - It is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30, and sess. 14, c. 8, can. 12.
Thus also a man to whom damage has been inflicted by an enemy remits the fault to the offender when he, seeking reconciliation, asks pardon, but nevertheless demands reparation of the damage inflicted.
It is proved: 1° From the Scriptures, namely, both from the examples of those who, after remission of sin was obtained, nevertheless had to undergo punishment (Adam, Moses and Aaron, David), and from the words which by exhorting counsel, indeed command, penitential satisfaction (Joel II, 12; Dan. IV, 24; Luke III, 8).
Nor does it help to say with Luther that these punishments are ordered only to amendment; for from the context it is plain that they are also inflicted for chastisement.
2° From perpetual tradition, namely, not only a) from the ancient and constant practice of the Church, authentically confirmed by the definition of the Council of Trent (sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30; sess. 14, c. 3 and 8, can. 4, 12, 13, 15), - but also b) by explicit testimonies, for example, Tertullian, On Penance 9; Cyprian, On the Lapsed; Origen, hom. 3 on Judges 2; hom. 9 on Leviticus; Ambrose, on Luke VII, 156; On Penance II, 6; Basil, hom. Attende, 4; Jerome, on Joel I, 13; Augustine, Against Faustus XXII, 67; on Ps. L, 11; Gregory, Moralia IX, 34; - moreover c) from the connection with the dogma of Purgatory.
3° By reason it cannot be strictly proved, since God could remit punishment and guilt at the same time; nevertheless it can be shown that this is done reasonably:
A. From the nature of sin and of its remission. In the remission of sin eternal punishment is not changed into temporal punishment, as Scotus and Suarez said, for the remission of eternal punishment naturally follows the remission of guilt or aversion from God: for through grace the friendship of God and the right to eternal life are restored, whence man cannot be eternally separated from God and merit the eternal punishment of loss, and consequently this punishment is totally taken away. Besides, as Cajetan notes, the words of absolution absolve, they do not change. - But it must be said with St. Thomas (q. 86, a. 4, and in IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2) that satisfaction is required, because ordinarily the undue conversion to the creature is not sufficiently repaired.
For in sin there is a twofold inequality, namely, one opposed to friendship and one to justice; namely, the equality of friendship is wounded in affection, the equality of justice in effect or in things. But each wound must be repaired. For a) divine friendship is violated by aversion from God, which merits eternal punishment, and is recompensed by contrition, which is the recompense of violated friendship and restores the equality of friendship (as far as is possible for man); b) also the honor due to God is withdrawn from Him by undue conversion to the creature, by which the law is violated, and one is impeded from giving God the honor due to Him in all acts; which merits temporal punishment (I, n. 524). Now ordinarily this is not totally recompensed by one act of contrition, by which the whole honor which was taken away is not always rendered; whence temporal punishment remains for restoring the equality of justice.
At least ordinarily: for exceptionally it can happen that all punishment is taken away, if contrition is extraordinary and very great, either on the part of charity or on the part of sensible sorrow.
Therefore: What has been taken away by aversion from God cannot be totally rendered, and therefore God does not exact perfect recompense, but is content with imperfect recompense (n. 396); the honor taken away by conversion to the creature can be totally restored, and therefore can also be exacted by God.
B. From the difference between Baptism and Penance (a. 4, ad 3; Suppl., q. 18, a. 2). In Baptism man receives the power of the Passion of Christ totally, which of itself is sufficient for remitting every guilt and punishment: because namely, through water and the Holy Spirit, he is dead together with Christ to sin and in Him regenerated to new life, made a new man, in whom nothing of the old ought to remain (as to the soul); and therefore in Baptism no punishment remains for preceding sin. But in penance man is not changed into another life, because it is not regeneration but a certain healing to be obtained through one's own acts, by which he is repaired into the former life; and therefore he obtains the power of the Passion of Christ, not totally, but according to the mode and disposition of his own acts, which are the matter of the sacrament of Penance, as water is of Baptism: for in healing, the remains of sickness remain until perfect restoration. Whence not at once, through the first act of penance by which guilt is remitted, is the debt of punishment loosed, but when all the acts have been completed, among which there is also sufficient satisfaction to be offered.
And indeed Penance was instituted by way of judgment, to which it also belongs to punish crimes. Hence, says the Council of Trent, the reason of divine justice seems to demand that those who have sinned before Baptism through ignorance, or at least not with so much malice, be received with greater indulgence than those who, ungrateful for the grace of God which they have received, have grieved the Holy Spirit and knowingly violated the temple of God. Whence it is equitable that satisfaction be exacted from these (sess. 14, c. 8).
464. The Protestants object the Scriptures which affirm that God remits sins freely, so that He does not remember them, nor do they harm any more (Ezek. XVIII, 22; XXXIII, 11-12). - But God is said a) to remit sins freely, namely, their very guilt and eternal punishment, but not the annexed temporal punishment; - b) not to remember sins, because sins do not return, and God does not consider the converted sinner as an enemy, although He purges a friend by punishments; - c) the impiety of sinners not to harm, because penal works do not harm, and because the just man has that from which he may satisfy.
465. Observations. - 1. Penance remits temporal punishment not only ex opere operantis, because the man who is justified or is already just by repenting partially restores the honor taken away from God, but also ex opere operato, because by the power of the sacrament the act of our penance becomes a title and efficient cause of at least partial remission of the punishment due, and indeed a) so that it has greater value for expiating sin than if by his own judgment man did the same work, i.e., even if so done it would not suffice; b) indeed it also has value for a greater remission than the same penance would obtain from its own merit.
- If temporal punishment can remain because, when the effect on the part of aversion has been removed, a certain effect on the part of inordinate conversion to the creature can remain, a fortiori nothing prevents dispositions to sin and infirmity toward good, caused from preceding acts, from remaining after guilt has been remitted; these are called the remnants of sin; for removing these ordinarily one act is insufficient. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so that they do not dominate man, and this more by way of disposition than by way of habit, because they are retracted.
- Therefore, just as "God perfectly heals the whole man; but sometimes suddenly, as He at once restored Peter's mother-in-law to perfect health, so that rising up she ministered to them, as is read (Luke IV); sometimes, however, successively, as was said of the blind man enlightened (Mark VIII). And so also spiritually He sometimes converts the heart of man with so great a commotion that he at once perfectly obtains spiritual health, not only guilt having been remitted but all remnants of sin having been removed, as is clear of Magdalene (Luke VII). But sometimes He first remits guilt (through operating grace), and afterward (through cooperating grace) successively takes away the remnants of sin" and punishments (a. 5, ad 1).