The Reviviscence of Merits

I. Works are distinguished into living, death-bearing, dead, and mortified. Living works are those which are done in the state of grace, and therefore proceed from a living principle, and merit eternal life. Those are called death-bearing which deprive man of the life of grace and of the right to eternal life, or, in other words, mortal sins; likewise - others add - venial sins, since they lead to mortal sins. Dead works are called good works which are done in the state of sin, and therefore do not proceed from a living principle, nor merit eternal life. Mortified works are those which were done in the state of grace, and therefore proceeded from a living principle and merited eternal life, but because of a supervening sin have been deprived of vital force, or of value for eternal life. Moreover:

II. Mortified works, once sin has been remitted through penance, revive, or recover the value for eternal life which they had lost. This is deduced: 1. from Sacred Scripture;¹ 2. from the Council of Trent;² and it is affirmed by St. Thomas (3, question 89, article 5), who teaches that mortified merits remain so far as they are in themselves, and in fact do not efficaciously lead to eternal life because of the impediment of supervening sin; but this impediment is supposed to be set aside through penance.

III. As regards the mode or degree of reviviscence, it must be said that the justified person immediately receives a right to all grace previously possessed and to the total essential reward. It is disputed, however, whether the grace previously possessed is immediately infused into the soul - and indeed either all of it, or, as others wish, according to the measure of the present disposition - or only in the first instant after death. Moreover, the preferred opinion is that which teaches that all the grace possessed is immediately infused. For this alone sufficiently preserves the reviviscence of merits such as seems to be deduced from the arguments, and this alone agrees with the proper notion of reviviscence, according to which penance seems to have itself toward reviviscence as removing what prohibits, not by way of disposition.

¹ Ezekiel 33:12.

² Session 6, on Justification, canon 32.

³ Other opinions seem less probable.

191. State of the question. When someone is justified by the sacrament of Penance, he receives, together with habitual grace, the infused virtues which he had lost through sin: for since virtues of this kind flow from grace, as properties from essence, when grace is restored, the virtues are likewise restored, and indeed with an intensity proportioned to the perfection of the subject's disposition. But besides this, the question is whether merits mortified by sin revive.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 89; Suarez, Opusc. V, De meritis mortificatis; Salmantic., de Merito, disp. V; Billuart, diss. III, a. 5; Palmieri, th. 19; de Augustinis, p. I, art. 10; Billot, p. 94-108.

For the understanding of this, a few things must be noted beforehand concerning various works in relation to merit. (a) Living works are called those which are done in the state of grace, with actual grace stirring and assisting, both because they are from a spiritually living principle, and because they merit eternal life. (b) Dead works are those which, although good and supernatural, are done in the state of sin, and consequently are not meritorious of eternal life. (c) Death-bearing works are those which deprive a man of the life of grace, such as mortal sins. (d) Mortified works are called those works which, done in the state of grace, are hindered from their effect by subsequent mortal sin, insofar as they are no longer able to lead a man to eternal life. Now the question is whether merits thus mortified can revive. Theologians commonly answer affirmatively, but there is controversy concerning the mode and degree in which they revive.

192. Thesis: When sin has been remitted through penance, works previously done in charity and mortified by subsequent sin revive. Thus commonly.

(a) The matter cannot be proved by Scripture alone; but the Fathers use two texts to propose their doctrine concerning reviviscence. First they allege these words of the epistle to the Hebrews: "For God is not unjust, that He should forget your work and the love which you have shown in His name, you who have ministered to the saints and do minister";¹ but, as the Fathers and theologians argue, here there is question of works done in grace and mortified; for the Apostle addresses the Hebrews, some of whom had fallen into sin; therefore God does not forget the good works of those who do penance, but remunerates them. To the point St. Epiphanius says:² "In this you see how he pronounced that that second restoration could by no means be made, and yet he did not exclude from salvation those who repented of their sin; but he also said that they were near to salvation, and that God is rightly the receiver of the things done by those who take up absolute penance for their offenses." The Fathers deduce the same from another place:³ "So great things have you suffered without cause, if nevertheless without cause"; for Jerome says on this place:⁴ "Whoever has labored on account of faith in Christ and afterward has fallen into sin, just as he is said to have suffered the former things without cause while he sins, so again he does not lose them, if he returns to his former faith."

¹ Heb. 6:10.

² St. Epiphanius, Haeres., 59, n. 2; P. L., XLI, 1019.

³ Gal. 3:4.

⁴ Comment. on Gal., l. I, ch. 3; P. L., t. XXVI, p. 350.

(b) From Trent also the thesis can be gathered: for it declares that the good works of the just "truly merit an increase of grace and the attainment of eternal life, provided, however, that he has departed in grace";⁵ but there it is not required that someone persevere without interruption from first justification until death, but only that he depart in grace; therefore, if someone has sinned mortally and afterward repents, his merits revive.

⁵ Trent, sess. VI, can. 32.

(c) It is recommended by reason. Works done in charity, if they are considered according to themselves, always remain in divine acceptance, and therefore they are said to be mortified only because through sin they are hindered from their effect, insofar as one sinning mortally is unworthy of eternal life; but such an impediment is taken away through penance; therefore works previously mortified, through penance, recover the force of leading to eternal life the one who performed them.¹ Moreover God does not will to punish a remitted sin with any eternal punishment; but if merits previously acquired were not restored, once the fault has been remitted, sin would be punished with an eternal punishment; for the privation of glory corresponding to those merits would be a true punishment, and indeed an eternal one; therefore.

¹ St. Thomas, 3, q. 89, a. 5.

193. But concerning the mode and degree in which merits revive, there is dispute among theologians, and nothing certain can be defined:

(a) The first opinion holds, with Banez (2. 2. q. 24, a. 6), that mortified works revive only in this sense, that glory will be given to a just man rising again from sin by a twofold title, namely both on account of the preceding merits and on account of the new ones acquired from the last justification, yet not a greater glory than is due to these latter merits; nevertheless there will be some accidental reward for the preceding works, insofar as the elect will rejoice concerning their reviviscence. Yet this opinion is deservedly rejected, since it seems to deny the reviviscence itself: for what does it profit to receive the same quantity of glory by a twofold title?

(b) The second opinion teaches that all mortified works are indeed restored immediately after penance, with respect to the merit of eternal life, but not with respect to the quantity of habitual grace previously had; namely the habitual grace itself previously lost will not be restored except at the instant of death, or after death, at the first instant of glorification. The reason is that grace in justification is not given except according to each one's disposition and cooperation;² but not according to merits previously acquired. Thus Scotus and the Salmanticenses.

² This principle St. Thomas explains thus, q. 89, a. 2: "Forms which can receive more and less are intensified and remitted according to the diverse disposition of the subject... And from this it is that according as the motion of free will in penance is more intense or more remiss, according to this the penitent obtains greater or lesser grace."

(c) According to the third opinion, which Dominic Soto and Ledesma defend, merits so revive according to the degree of the present disposition, that if someone elicits an act of contrition as five, he receives ten degrees of grace, five by reason of preceding merits, and five by reason of the actual disposition.

(d) But Suarez (op. cit., disput. II), with many moderns, holds that all merits acquired before are immediately restored to the penitent sinner, both with respect to the right to glory and with respect to grace. For merits of this kind, from the things said, always remain in the acceptance of God, and are hindered from their effect only by mortal sin; therefore, when sin has been remitted, the impediment is immediately removed, and nothing prevents past merits from immediately obtaining their whole effect. We freely embrace this opinion as the more benign, but at the same time we confess that the solution of this question depends on the will of God alone, which is not sufficiently known to us from Scripture and Tradition.

337. 3. Through penance the reviviscence of merits is obtained.

Theologians customarily distinguish four kinds of works: some are living works, namely, those which proceed from grace, the principle of spiritual life; others are dead works, which, although objectively good, were nevertheless performed by a man existing in the state of mortal sin, for example, an alms given by a sinner; others are death-dealing works, that is, mortal sins, which bring spiritual death upon the soul; finally, others are mortified works, which are good works performed in the state of grace but which, through the subsequent state of sin, have lost all merit. Through penance mortified works revive. Living works do not need reviviscence, as is evident. Death-dealing works, or mortal sins, do not revive through penance but are thoroughly destroyed. Nor do dead works revive, since they never had life. That mortified works, or merits which through subsequent sin have been deprived of efficacy, revive through penance is certain and admitted by all theologians; nevertheless, it is not properly of faith.

Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. "The wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him, in whatsoever day he shall turn."⁹³ But wickedness would hurt very greatly if through it all prior merits were irrevocably lost.

Proof 2. From the Council of Trent,⁹⁴ which requires three conditions for human works to be meritorious and to obtain eternal life, namely: a) that they be works of a justified man; b) that they be done in God, or by the grace of God; c) that the one acting depart in the state of grace. But mortified merits have the first two conditions, while they recover the third through the virtue of penance. Arguments drawn from the authority of the Holy Fathers may be seen in Billuart.⁹⁵

Proof 3. From theological reason this reviviscence of merits is commended. It is very consonant with divine mercy that those works which were once good, meritorious, and accepted by God in order to eternal life should always remain so unless a grave obstacle occurs. Such an obstacle indeed is mortal sin, but it is removed through penance. Therefore merits acquired before the state of sin are recovered if the sin is removed.⁹⁶

The manner and degree of this reviviscence. Although all theologians agree concerning the fact itself of reviviscence, nevertheless they depart into many diverse opinions when they discuss the degree and quantity of reviviscence.

The first opinion holds that all merits acquired before sin, after penance has been performed, are immediately restored to the justified man both as to grace and as to the right to glory. Thus Suarez in his opusculum on the reviviscence of merits, and several others, especially modern authors.

The second opinion holds that all merits do not always revive, but according to the quantity of present penance and charity. Thus several Thomists, for example, Dominic Soto, Ledesma, and Gonet.

The third opinion teaches that merits revive only as to the right to accidental glory, which is increased from the reviviscence, but that essential glory is not indeed increased, yet is granted under a twofold title, namely, because of grace newly acquired and merits possessed before sin. Thus Bañez, Sylvius, and Contenson.

The fourth opinion asserts that all merits indeed rise again as to the right to glory, but not as to the quantity of habitual grace previously possessed, since this is given according to the actual disposition of the penitent. But at the moment of death a justified man elicits an act of charity so perfect that he acquires anew all the grace previously possessed. Thus the Salamancans.

Billuart⁹⁷ rightly says that among so many opinions scarcely anything certain can be established. The first opinion is more benign, more consonant with divine mercy, and suffers no more difficulties than the others. He who desires more concerning this controversy should consult Billuart,⁹⁸ who defends yet another opinion.

⁹³ Ezek. 33:12.

⁹⁴ Session 6, can. 32, On Justification (Denz., n. 842).

⁹⁵ De poenit., diss. 3, a. 5.

⁹⁶ St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 89, a. 5.

⁹⁷ Loc. cit.

⁹⁸ Loc. cit.

S. Th. III, q. 89.

466. Thesis I. Penance together with habitual grace restores all infused virtues.

It is proved: Penance does not remit mortal sin except by means of the infusion of habitual grace making one pleasing (n. 454). But from habitual grace flow all infused virtues, as powers from the soul. Therefore through penance, together with habitual grace, all virtues are restored.

467. Thesis II. Penance restores the merits of good works; whence living good works of virtue, done in the state of grace and charity, and mortified through sin, revive through penance. - It is certain.

The thesis treats of living works, which, done in charity and grace, from an inhering supernatural principle have in themselves supernatural and meritorious value; but of works mortified, which through a subsequent mortal sin that takes away grace are impeded from their effect, which is to lead to eternal life, insofar as they are no longer able to lead to an increase of grace and eternal life: these merits are restored. But it does not treat of dead works, or honest works done in the state of sin, because these from the beginning are without supernatural value and merit, and therefore can never in the future acquire a value which they do not have: they did not live and therefore cannot live again; - nor a fortiori of deadly works, or evil works which deprive man of grace and are mortal sins: these are destroyed through penance and do not revive (n. 456, 1).

It is proved: 1° From the sources of revelation, namely, from the words of Scripture interpreted by tradition. From Scripture alone the matter cannot be demonstrated peremptorily, because the words to be adduced can strictly be understood otherwise; but since the Fathers use them to set forth the doctrine of reviviscence, an argument is had from tradition. Thus the words directed to sinners, Gal. III, 4: So great things have you suffered in vain, if yet in vain, are understood thus: if you have been converted, those sufferings will not be in vain, but will again have value, as Jerome explains on this place, Ambrose, book 1 on Luke, Chrysostom, hom. 10 on Genesis. - Similarly Heb. VI, 10: For God is not unjust, that He should forget your work and the love which you have shown in His name, you who have ministered to the saints and do minister, seems to indicate that God will not forget the good works of charity of those who after sin do penance, but will remunerate them. And thus interpret Epiphanius, haer. LIX, 2; Chrysostom, hom. 10 on Genesis; Athanasius, or. on blasphemy against the Holy Spirit; Augustine, On Faith and Works, 14.

2° From the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, which posits only three conditions for merit: 1) that the works be done in God, namely, under the influence of divine grace, 2) that they be of a just man, 3) who dies in grace; and it does not add a fourth: that they were not mortified. Whence it says, can. 32: if nevertheless he shall have departed in grace, but not: if he shall always have remained in grace.

3° By reason: A cause remaining, but lacking its effect because of an impediment, produces the effect when the impediment has been removed. But works done in charity, or proceeding from the intrinsic inhering principle of supernatural life, if considered according to themselves, lose nothing through mortal sin of those things which pertain to their life, and therefore always remain in divine acceptance, insofar as of themselves they are worthy of eternal life; although per accidens they are inefficacious for leading to eternal life because of the impediment of sin, and are impeded from their effect insofar as the sinner is unworthy of eternal life. Therefore, the impediment of sin having been removed, they produce their effect. But this impediment is taken away through penance. Therefore through penance mortified works recover their effect, or the efficacy of truly leading him who performed them into eternal life; which is to revive.

468. Concerning the mode or grade in which virtues are restored and merits revive, there is dispute among theologians. - All indeed admit both that merits revive totally as they were before and unto the whole reward to which of themselves they had value; whence there is no difference on the part of reviviscence itself, but the whole difference proceeds from this, that they conceive differently the very merit of eternal life and the increase of grace.

A. Many more recent authors, after the Nominalists, such as Vasquez, Suarez, Lugo and others, especially from the Society of Jesus, hold our acts as only moral and meritorious causes of grace and glory, and say that all acts merit a determinate grade of grace and glory, and therefore that virtues and merits are always restored in the same grade of grace in which they existed before sin. Whence they also say (which seems incredible) that the sinner always rises again in grace greater than that which he had, because he recovers a determinate grade of grace for all preceding works and, besides, a new grade for the present disposition.

Their chief foundation is a) that the merit and reviviscence of good works cannot be understood unless to each work there is given a special reward, i.e., a special grade of grace and glory; otherwise we would not merit more by many works than by one; - b) nor would the works of the sinner revive totally; - and c) remitted sins would be punished with eternal punishment, namely by the privation of the corresponding determinate grade of grace and glory.

B. On the contrary, the older authors: St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus and the Thomists: Cajetan, St. Antoninus, Bannez, Sylvius, Contenson, to whom more recently Billot has acceded, hold that our acts are not only moral and meritorious causes, but also dispositive causes, and say that all good works merit grace and glory, but not in a determinate grade, except under the condition that there be present a disposition proportioned to that grade (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7). Whence, says St. Thomas, "according as the motion of free will in penance is more intense or more remiss, according to this the penitent obtains greater or lesser grace. But it happens that the intensity of the motion of the penitent is sometimes proportioned to greater grace than was that from which he had fallen through sin; sometimes equal, sometimes indeed lesser. And therefore the penitent sometimes rises again in greater grace than he previously had, sometimes in equal, sometimes also in lesser, and the same reason applies to the virtues which follow upon grace" (a. 2).

The general reason is the philosophical principle that qualities which admit more and less exist in a greater or lesser grade according to the diverse disposition of the subject. Whence good works will not obtain an increase of grace except at the moment at which there will be present a disposition proportioned to it. - The special reason is that works revive as they were before, namely, so that they merit an increase of grace under the condition that a disposition suitable for this be present. This is absent, but not because of the preceding sin, but because of actual indisposition. Therefore the works revive unto the whole reward to which, as far as is of themselves and by reason of themselves, they extended.

They respond to the arguments of the prior opinion:

To the first. Works are meritorious even if they do not obtain a special reward, because the same reward can be given under many titles: it is a great moral perfection to have heavenly glory not only under the gratuitous title of inheritance, but also as the crown of works, and the perfection is greater insofar as it is obtained under the title of many works. Thus Christ, who had a right to the glory of the body, merited the same right by His works, and not only by one but by all.

To the second. They revive totally as they are according to themselves, because, as was said, after sin as before they merit a determinate grade of grace provided the required condition is present, namely, our suitable and proportioned disposition (a. 2, ad 2).

To the third. Eternal punishment does not remain, because punishment is that which is meritoriously from sin. Mortal sin merits the privation of grace as such, but not privation in a determinate grade, as is clear from the fact that from a most grave sin there can follow the loss of minimal grace and from a minimal sin even the loss of maximal grace; whence grace having been restored in whatever grade, by that very fact every privative punishment is taken away.

C. After the controversy certain more recent Thomists chose an intermediate opinion, saying that not all grace is restored if the disposition is not present, yet some greater grade is rendered on account of preceding merits, for example, if someone has a disposition for grade 5, he will recover grace in grade 10: thus Soto, Nugno, Alvarez, Ledesma, Gonet, Billuart. But this is not according to the principles of St. Thomas concerning proportioned conformity to dispositions, nor is it according to the principles of the prior opinion according to which works revive totally. Whence it seems to be left aside as illogical; and besides it is founded on nothing.

469. Corollary. - There is a difference between sins and good works. Sins according to themselves are radically destroyed and abolished by God through penance done under grace: not in such a way that acts of sins did not precede, but that they do not have the power of impeding grace; - meritorious works, since they belong to grace, cannot according to themselves be destroyed and abolished by man, and therefore are impeded from their effect only per accidens, because mortal sin renders man incapable of reward (a. 5, ad 1). "The remission of sins," says St. Thomas, in IV, d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6, "is principally the work of God, but the mortification of preceding merits is the work of man. But man by his action cannot simply empty out the work of God, although he can impede it from profiting himself; and therefore man through following sin cannot annul the remission of preceding sins. But by his action he can empty out what has been done by himself, and therefore the penitent can annul the mortification of preceding merits through subsequent merits, especially aided by grace."

470. Observations. - From the general doctrine on the sacraments it is gathered:

1° That the grace of sacraments received before the fall is restored, when the sinner converts himself through penance, provided that the sacramental title for receiving grace remains in him. Thus the grace of Baptism, Confirmation, and Order revives during the whole of life, because the indelible character always remains; the grace of Extreme Unction and Matrimony during the same sickness and the same union (n. 58).

2° That the sacrament of Penance grants greater grace ex opere operato than the act alone of the virtue of Penance ex opere operantis. Between our dispositions and grace granted ex opere operantis arithmetical equality is required, but between dispositions and the grace of the sacrament ex opere operato only equality of proportionality.

3° That the sacrament of Penance, unlike the virtue, also gives special sacramental grace, which is healing of sins subjected to the keys, and therefore confers special help for not relapsing into these same sins.