Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article V. On the Effects of the Sacrament of Penance
Preliminary note. Since in the present order of things no true virtue of penance can exist without the sacrament of penance received at least in voto, the effects of the virtue and of the sacrament of penance in fact almost coincide, although the manner of producing them is diverse. The effects of penance are customarily called by dogmatic theologians the justification of the impious. Let the following things be stated briefly concerning it. All the effects of penance can be reduced to three, namely: 1. the remission of all sins; 2. the infusion of grace; 3. the reviviscence of merits.
335. 1. Through penance all sins, whether mortal or venial, can be remitted.
"If the wicked man do penance, ... I will not remember all his iniquities which he hath wrought."85 "If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow."86 Hence the Lord also said to the Apostles: "Whatsoever you shall loose," making no limitation. For the remission of mortal sin the sacrament of penance received at least in voto is altogether required. But the venial sin of a man who exists in the state of sanctifying grace can be remitted even ex opere operantis without the sacrament of penance. For the Council of Trent87 teaches that "venial sins can be expiated by many other remedies." But no sin, even venial, is remitted without some penance at least virtual,88 which consists in the detestation of sin. For it is impossible that God remit fault to that man who does not will to abandon sin. Virtual penance can be exercised in many ways, for example, if someone asks pardon of sins from God, if someone exercises the virtue contrary to the sins committed, or if someone exercises even other virtues with the intention of obtaining pardon of sins.89
85 Ezek. 18:21 f.
86 Isa. 1:18.
87 Session 14, c. 5, On Penance (Denz., n. 899).
88 S. theol. 3, q. 87, a. 2 ad 2.
89 S. theol. 3, q. 87, a. 3.
336. 2. Through penance sanctifying grace is infused.
For it is of faith that in justification sins are not only covered or no longer imputed, as the Protestants maintain, but on the contrary man is made pleasing to God. Now no one can be pleasing to God without sanctifying grace. Therefore sins are remitted through the infusion of sanctifying grace. But because sanctifying grace and sin cannot exist at the same time in the same man, for they are incompatible like water and fire, when one mortal sin is remitted, all are remitted; and when one is not remitted, none is remitted. From these things it follows that the penitent must elicit contrition for absolutely all mortal sins committed. It is otherwise with venial sins; for mortal sin can be remitted without venial sin, and likewise one venial sin without another, but a venial sin cannot be remitted unless the mortal sin is also remitted, since he who wishes to remain an enemy of God is unworthy of pardon. For the remission of venial sin some influx of sanctifying grace is always required.90
From the infusion of sanctifying grace the following effects are produced:
a) When the fault is remitted, the eternal punishment, that is, of Gehenna, is also remitted, but not always the whole temporal punishment. That eternal punishment is always remitted follows manifestly from the nature of sanctifying grace, since it renders a man pleasing to God and an heir of eternal glory. Therefore it is impossible that the same man should still be worthy of eternal punishment to be discharged in Gehenna. The Council of Trent, however, defined that through penance the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted. For it admonishes penitents after absolution has been received to make satisfaction through fasts, alms, and prayers, "not indeed for the eternal punishment, which is remitted together with the fault either by the sacrament or by the desire for the sacrament, but for the temporal punishment, which, as Sacred Scripture teaches, is not always wholly remitted to them, as is done in baptism."91 That when mortal sin is remitted God does not always forgive the whole temporal punishment is clear from several examples of Sacred Scripture, for example, from the sin of David, which indeed was remitted, but the adulterine son had to die; Moses was forbidden to enter the promised land because of a sin of distrust, remitted indeed as to fault but not as to the whole punishment. The most manifest example, however, is original sin itself, which indeed is remitted as to fault, but whose penalties remain.
b) With grace all the virtues, both theological and moral, are infused,92 and sacramental grace is granted, that is, a right to those helps by which the penitent man thoroughly wipes away past stains and guards against future ones.
90 Ibid., a. 4.
91 Session 6, c. 14, On Justification (Denz., n. 807).
92 Cf. above, in the treatise on the virtues, I, n. 472.
337. 3. Through penance the reviviscence of merits is obtained.
Theologians customarily distinguish four kinds of works: some are living works, namely, those which proceed from grace, the principle of spiritual life; others are dead works, which, although objectively good, were nevertheless performed by a man existing in the state of mortal sin, for example, an alms given by a sinner; others are death-dealing works, that is, mortal sins, which bring spiritual death upon the soul; finally, others are mortified works, which are good works performed in the state of grace but which, through the subsequent state of sin, have lost all merit. Through penance mortified works revive. Living works do not need reviviscence, as is evident. Death-dealing works, or mortal sins, do not revive through penance but are thoroughly destroyed. Nor do dead works revive, since they never had life. That mortified works, or merits which through subsequent sin have been deprived of efficacy, revive through penance is certain and admitted by all theologians; nevertheless, it is not properly of faith.
Proof 1. From Sacred Scripture. "The wickedness of the wicked shall not hurt him, in whatsoever day he shall turn."93 But wickedness would hurt very greatly if through it all prior merits were irrevocably lost.
Proof 2. From the Council of Trent,94 which requires three conditions for human works to be meritorious and to obtain eternal life, namely: a) that they be works of a justified man; b) that they be done in God, or by the grace of God; c) that the one acting depart in the state of grace. But mortified merits have the first two conditions, while they recover the third through the virtue of penance. Arguments drawn from the authority of the Holy Fathers may be seen in Billuart.95
Proof 3. From theological reason this reviviscence of merits is commended. It is very consonant with divine mercy that those works which were once good, meritorious, and accepted by God in order to eternal life should always remain so unless a grave obstacle occurs. Such an obstacle indeed is mortal sin, but it is removed through penance. Therefore merits acquired before the state of sin are recovered if the sin is removed.96
The manner and degree of this reviviscence. Although all theologians agree concerning the fact itself of reviviscence, nevertheless they depart into many diverse opinions when they discuss the degree and quantity of reviviscence.
The first opinion holds that all merits acquired before sin, after penance has been performed, are immediately restored to the justified man both as to grace and as to the right to glory. Thus Suarez in his opusculum on the reviviscence of merits, and several others, especially modern authors.
The second opinion holds that all merits do not always revive, but according to the quantity of present penance and charity. Thus several Thomists, for example, Dominic Soto, Ledesma, and Gonet.
The third opinion teaches that merits revive only as to the right to accidental glory, which is increased from the reviviscence, but that essential glory is not indeed increased, yet is granted under a twofold title, namely, because of grace newly acquired and merits possessed before sin. Thus Bañez, Sylvius, and Contenson.
The fourth opinion asserts that all merits indeed rise again as to the right to glory, but not as to the quantity of habitual grace previously possessed, since this is given according to the actual disposition of the penitent. But at the moment of death a justified man elicits an act of charity so perfect that he acquires anew all the grace previously possessed. Thus the Salamancans.
Billuart97 rightly says that among so many opinions scarcely anything certain can be established. The first opinion is more benign, more consonant with divine mercy, and suffers no more difficulties than the others. He who desires more concerning this controversy should consult Billuart,98 who defends yet another opinion.
93 Ezek. 33:12.
94 Session 6, can. 32, On Justification (Denz., n. 842).
95 De poenit., diss. 3, a. 5.
96 St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 89, a. 5.
97 Loc. cit.
98 Loc. cit.
338. Scholion. On the mutual relation between the virtue and the sacrament of penance. It is useful here, the essence of penance having been explained, to set forth under one view wherein the sacrament and the virtue of penance agree and wherein they differ.
They agree in effect, namely, in the destruction of sin. Indeed, in the present order of things neither the sacrament without the virtue nor the virtue without the sacrament received at least in voto can destroy mortal sin. Therefore the virtue and the sacrament of penance are intimately connected, but nevertheless differ in many things, namely:
They differ a) as to nature. The virtue of penance is a habit whose acts are principally internal. But the sacrament of penance, as a sensible sign, contains proximate matter externally manifested, namely, the three acts of the penitent externally produced: contrition, confession made to a priest, and satisfaction. The absolution of the priest, likewise externally manifested, must be added as the form.
b) As to the manner of operating. The virtue of penance produces the effect of justification ex opere operantis, but the sacrament ex opere operato; wherefore attrition or imperfect contrition suffices in the latter, but the virtue of penance cannot justify except by means of perfect contrition.
c) As to necessity. For a man burdened with grave sin, the virtue of penance in re, and not only in voto, is necessary by a necessity of means; but the sacrament of penance actually received is necessary only by a necessity of precept; wherefore in necessity the desire for this sacrament suffices.