Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Four: On the Restitution of Virtues and the Reviviscence of Merits
S. Th. III, q. 89.
466. Thesis I. Penance together with habitual grace restores all infused virtues.
It is proved: Penance does not remit mortal sin except by means of the infusion of habitual grace making one pleasing (n. 454). But from habitual grace flow all infused virtues, as powers from the soul. Therefore through penance, together with habitual grace, all virtues are restored.
467. Thesis II. Penance restores the merits of good works; whence living good works of virtue, done in the state of grace and charity, and mortified through sin, revive through penance. - It is certain.
The thesis treats of living works, which, done in charity and grace, from an inhering supernatural principle have in themselves supernatural and meritorious value; but of works mortified, which through a subsequent mortal sin that takes away grace are impeded from their effect, which is to lead to eternal life, insofar as they are no longer able to lead to an increase of grace and eternal life: these merits are restored. But it does not treat of dead works, or honest works done in the state of sin, because these from the beginning are without supernatural value and merit, and therefore can never in the future acquire a value which they do not have: they did not live and therefore cannot live again; - nor a fortiori of deadly works, or evil works which deprive man of grace and are mortal sins: these are destroyed through penance and do not revive (n. 456, 1).
It is proved: 1° From the sources of revelation, namely, from the words of Scripture interpreted by tradition. From Scripture alone the matter cannot be demonstrated peremptorily, because the words to be adduced can strictly be understood otherwise; but since the Fathers use them to set forth the doctrine of reviviscence, an argument is had from tradition. Thus the words directed to sinners, Gal. III, 4: So great things have you suffered in vain, if yet in vain, are understood thus: if you have been converted, those sufferings will not be in vain, but will again have value, as Jerome explains on this place, Ambrose, book 1 on Luke, Chrysostom, hom. 10 on Genesis. - Similarly Heb. VI, 10: For God is not unjust, that He should forget your work and the love which you have shown in His name, you who have ministered to the saints and do minister, seems to indicate that God will not forget the good works of charity of those who after sin do penance, but will remunerate them. And thus interpret Epiphanius, haer. LIX, 2; Chrysostom, hom. 10 on Genesis; Athanasius, or. on blasphemy against the Holy Spirit; Augustine, On Faith and Works, 14.
2° From the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, which posits only three conditions for merit: 1) that the works be done in God, namely, under the influence of divine grace, 2) that they be of a just man, 3) who dies in grace; and it does not add a fourth: that they were not mortified. Whence it says, can. 32: if nevertheless he shall have departed in grace, but not: if he shall always have remained in grace.
3° By reason: A cause remaining, but lacking its effect because of an impediment, produces the effect when the impediment has been removed. But works done in charity, or proceeding from the intrinsic inhering principle of supernatural life, if considered according to themselves, lose nothing through mortal sin of those things which pertain to their life, and therefore always remain in divine acceptance, insofar as of themselves they are worthy of eternal life; although per accidens they are inefficacious for leading to eternal life because of the impediment of sin, and are impeded from their effect insofar as the sinner is unworthy of eternal life. Therefore, the impediment of sin having been removed, they produce their effect. But this impediment is taken away through penance. Therefore through penance mortified works recover their effect, or the efficacy of truly leading him who performed them into eternal life; which is to revive.
468. Concerning the mode or grade in which virtues are restored and merits revive, there is dispute among theologians. - All indeed admit both that merits revive totally as they were before and unto the whole reward to which of themselves they had value; whence there is no difference on the part of reviviscence itself, but the whole difference proceeds from this, that they conceive differently the very merit of eternal life and the increase of grace.
A. Many more recent authors, after the Nominalists, such as Vasquez, Suarez, Lugo and others, especially from the Society of Jesus, hold our acts as only moral and meritorious causes of grace and glory, and say that all acts merit a determinate grade of grace and glory, and therefore that virtues and merits are always restored in the same grade of grace in which they existed before sin. Whence they also say (which seems incredible) that the sinner always rises again in grace greater than that which he had, because he recovers a determinate grade of grace for all preceding works and, besides, a new grade for the present disposition.
Their chief foundation is a) that the merit and reviviscence of good works cannot be understood unless to each work there is given a special reward, i.e., a special grade of grace and glory; otherwise we would not merit more by many works than by one; - b) nor would the works of the sinner revive totally; - and c) remitted sins would be punished with eternal punishment, namely by the privation of the corresponding determinate grade of grace and glory.
B. On the contrary, the older authors: St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus and the Thomists: Cajetan, St. Antoninus, Bannez, Sylvius, Contenson, to whom more recently Billot has acceded, hold that our acts are not only moral and meritorious causes, but also dispositive causes, and say that all good works merit grace and glory, but not in a determinate grade, except under the condition that there be present a disposition proportioned to that grade (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7). Whence, says St. Thomas, "according as the motion of free will in penance is more intense or more remiss, according to this the penitent obtains greater or lesser grace. But it happens that the intensity of the motion of the penitent is sometimes proportioned to greater grace than was that from which he had fallen through sin; sometimes equal, sometimes indeed lesser. And therefore the penitent sometimes rises again in greater grace than he previously had, sometimes in equal, sometimes also in lesser, and the same reason applies to the virtues which follow upon grace" (a. 2).
The general reason is the philosophical principle that qualities which admit more and less exist in a greater or lesser grade according to the diverse disposition of the subject. Whence good works will not obtain an increase of grace except at the moment at which there will be present a disposition proportioned to it. - The special reason is that works revive as they were before, namely, so that they merit an increase of grace under the condition that a disposition suitable for this be present. This is absent, but not because of the preceding sin, but because of actual indisposition. Therefore the works revive unto the whole reward to which, as far as is of themselves and by reason of themselves, they extended.
They respond to the arguments of the prior opinion:
To the first. Works are meritorious even if they do not obtain a special reward, because the same reward can be given under many titles: it is a great moral perfection to have heavenly glory not only under the gratuitous title of inheritance, but also as the crown of works, and the perfection is greater insofar as it is obtained under the title of many works. Thus Christ, who had a right to the glory of the body, merited the same right by His works, and not only by one but by all.
To the second. They revive totally as they are according to themselves, because, as was said, after sin as before they merit a determinate grade of grace provided the required condition is present, namely, our suitable and proportioned disposition (a. 2, ad 2).
To the third. Eternal punishment does not remain, because punishment is that which is meritoriously from sin. Mortal sin merits the privation of grace as such, but not privation in a determinate grade, as is clear from the fact that from a most grave sin there can follow the loss of minimal grace and from a minimal sin even the loss of maximal grace; whence grace having been restored in whatever grade, by that very fact every privative punishment is taken away.
C. After the controversy certain more recent Thomists chose an intermediate opinion, saying that not all grace is restored if the disposition is not present, yet some greater grade is rendered on account of preceding merits, for example, if someone has a disposition for grade 5, he will recover grace in grade 10: thus Soto, Nugno, Alvarez, Ledesma, Gonet, Billuart. But this is not according to the principles of St. Thomas concerning proportioned conformity to dispositions, nor is it according to the principles of the prior opinion according to which works revive totally. Whence it seems to be left aside as illogical; and besides it is founded on nothing.
469. Corollary. - There is a difference between sins and good works. Sins according to themselves are radically destroyed and abolished by God through penance done under grace: not in such a way that acts of sins did not precede, but that they do not have the power of impeding grace; - meritorious works, since they belong to grace, cannot according to themselves be destroyed and abolished by man, and therefore are impeded from their effect only per accidens, because mortal sin renders man incapable of reward (a. 5, ad 1). "The remission of sins," says St. Thomas, in IV, d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6, "is principally the work of God, but the mortification of preceding merits is the work of man. But man by his action cannot simply empty out the work of God, although he can impede it from profiting himself; and therefore man through following sin cannot annul the remission of preceding sins. But by his action he can empty out what has been done by himself, and therefore the penitent can annul the mortification of preceding merits through subsequent merits, especially aided by grace."
470. Observations. - From the general doctrine on the sacraments it is gathered:
1° That the grace of sacraments received before the fall is restored, when the sinner converts himself through penance, provided that the sacramental title for receiving grace remains in him. Thus the grace of Baptism, Confirmation, and Order revives during the whole of life, because the indelible character always remains; the grace of Extreme Unction and Matrimony during the same sickness and the same union (n. 58).
2° That the sacrament of Penance grants greater grace ex opere operato than the act alone of the virtue of Penance ex opere operantis. Between our dispositions and grace granted ex opere operantis arithmetical equality is required, but between dispositions and the grace of the sacrament ex opere operato only equality of proportionality.
3° That the sacrament of Penance, unlike the virtue, also gives special sacramental grace, which is healing of sins subjected to the keys, and therefore confers special help for not relapsing into these same sins.