The Second Commandment

The Second Commandment of the Decalogue is, “‘ Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.”¹ It prohibits all irreverent use of the name of God, blasphemy, unlawful oaths, and violation of vows. Inasmuch as it is virtually positive, it commands us always to speak of God with reverence and respect,

¹ Exod. xx 7.

WE take God’s name in vain and break the Second Commandment when we use the word “ God” as an exclamation of wonder or impatience, or merely as an interjection in such phrases as “ good God,” ‘‘ my God,” “by God.” If these phrases are used at fitting times and with due reverence they are, of course, not sinful but meritorious; the sin consists in using them without due reverence, too frequently, and merely as expletives, for such an abuse of the holy name of God shows a want of reverence to him and is displeasing to him.

This irreverence, however, is not grave, and so the sin of taking God’s name in vain is of itself only venial; indeed, want of advertence will often prevent it from being even venially sinful. Still, care should be taken to correct any bad habit that may have been contracted in this matter.

What has been said of the name of God may be applied with due proportion to those of our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, and the saints.

BLASPHEMY is an imprecatory or a contumelious speech against God. Not only words, but actions also, which express contempt, insult, derision, or imprecation against God are blasphemies.

Blasphemy is direct when the dishonour of God is intended; if the dishonour of God is not intended in itself but it is foreseen that it will be the consequence of one’s word or actions, it is indirect.

Blasphemy which is against God in his own person is immediate; if it immediately affects some creature which has a special relation toward God it is mediate.

Blasphemy is a grave insult to almighty God, and is always a serious mortal sin if it is committed with full advertence and consent. To deny the existence of God, to complain against his Providence and assert that he is unjust, to deny the perpetual virginity of the Blessed Mother of God, are so many heretical blasphemies and grievous sins.

It is a disputed question among theologians whether blasphemy against the saints which is only mediately against God is of the same species of sin as blasphemy which is immediately against him. Many assert that the species is different inasmuch as the honour due to the saints is outraged as well as that which is due to God. Ordinarily, however, it is God who is chiefly dishonoured by insults offered to his saints, and so practically we may follow the opinion of other theologians and hold that there is no specific difference between the two sins.

To utter imprecations or to speak injuriously against creatures which have a special relation to God is blasphemy. Thus it is grievously sinful to call down maledictions on one’s fellow-men, wishing that they may perish eternally. Such acts are seriously against charity as well as religion. To utter imprecations against brute beasts or other creatures which have no special relation to almighty God is not blasphemy, and will not ordinarily exceed a venial sin. Profane words and vulgar expressions like “‘ damn,” “ bloody,” and so forth, are commonly used without definite meaning, and at most are venial sins, because they are unbecoming, shock others, or are manifestations of anger and impatience. It is sometimes said that blasphemy is most common where faith is strong, and this may be a reason why real blasphemy is not so common perhaps with us in ordinary conversation as with some nations.

AN oath is the calling on God to witness to the truth of what we say. This calling on God may be express or tacit; it is express when God is mentioned, as, ‘‘ I swear by God ”’; it is tacit when we swear by some creature which in a special way shows forth the Divinity or has some special relation to him, as, ‘‘ I swear by the Christian Faith,” “‘ by the Gospel,” “by Heaven.”

In an assertory oath we call God to witness to the truth of a present or past event; in a promissory oath we call him to witness to some future event.

A solemn oath is clothed with the ceremonies prescribed by law, such as holding up the right hand or kissing the Bible; a simple oath is devoid of such ceremonies.

An imprecation is sometimes added to an oath by such words as, ‘‘ so help me God ”’; in this case we have an imprecatory oath; otherwise it is an invocatory oath.

There cannot be an oath strictly so called unless there be the intention of swearing and a suitable form of words be used which express that intention. One who uses the colloquialism, “‘ I swear it is so,’ usually has no intention of taking an oath, nor do the words signify an intention of calling on God to witness to the truth of what is said. The same must be said of phrases like ‘‘ on my honour,” “ by my faith,” * God knows ”’; and a fortiori the mention of fabulous gods, as, “‘ by Jupiter,’ etc. However, if there be an intention to take an oath, this will be sufficient to make it binding in conscience whatever the form of words may be, so that perjury will be committed if what is asserted is not true. If the form of words is suitable for an oath, the intention to swear is presumed.

If the requisite conditions be fulfilled, oaths are lawful, and indeed they are an act of divine worship, for they are an acknowledgement of the omniscience and veracity of God, as well as a public profession of belief in him. This has been the constant teaching of the Church, teaching which has ample warrant in both the Old and New Testament, The prophet 1$7 Jeremias lays down the conditions which justify an oath, and many instances of oaths are found in the epistles of the Apostle of the Gentiles. The words of our Lord¹ do not prohibit the taking of oaths if the requisite conditions be present. They give expression to his desire that all Christians should be so truthful and sincere that it will not be necessary for them to use oaths to confirm the truth of what they assert. The conditions which make an oath lawful are given in the words of Jeremias:² ‘‘ And thou shalt swear, As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgement, and in justice.”

We swear in truth when we are morally certain that what we assert under oath is according to fact. We are not justified in asserting that to be true which we do not know to be true and we commit the grave sin of perjury if we swear to what we know to be false.

We swear with judgement when there is a just cause for invoking the testimony of God and it is done with proper consideration and reverence. A just cause will be any matter of some importance for the welfare of either soul or body, whether it be public or private. We are not, therefore, justified in swearing to every assertion which we believe to be true; there must be some special reason for employing the name and authority of God to confirm what we say. However, provided that the other conditions are not wanting, the defect of judgement in swearing will not be more than a venial sin, for it is no more than the idle use of the name of God.

It is an insult to God to invoke his testimony to a sinful act or in furtherance of what is sinful. If this is done, the oath is unlawful on account of the want of justice. Justice, then, in this connection requires that the assertion in an assertory oath should not be sinful, such as a sin of detraction or boasting about past sins. In a promissory oath, that which is promised must be honest and lawful.

There is some difficulty and dispute among theologians about the gravity of the sin which is committed when an oath wants justice. If in an assertory oath the testimony of God is unjustifiably invoked to promote a seriously sinful object, the want of justice in the oath will be gravely sinful. If, on the contrary, the testimony of God does not further the end in view, the want of justice will probably be only venially sinful, because the assertion is true, as is here presumed, and the irreverence committed against God by invoking his testimony even to a gravely sinful act does not seem to many to be more than a venial sin.

An oath, therefore, taken to confirm detraction in a grave matter is mortally sinful; an oath confirming a boast about grave sins committed in the past is probably only venial.

Somewhat similarly in a promissory oath, if the act promised be gravely sinful, the defect of justice makes the oath gravely sinful; for it is a great insult to God to use his testimony to further what is mortally sinful. If the act promised is only a venial sin, a probable opinion holds that the oath is only venially sinful, against a more probable contrary view.

¹ Matt. v 34.

² Jer. iv 2.

The effect of a promissory oath is to bind the person swearing to do what he promises by an additional obligation derived from the virtue of religion, which requires that out of reverence for God we should religiously perform what we promised under oath. If we fail to do this in a matter of moment, grave sin will be committed, as all acknowledge. Moreover, as is obvious, if when the oath is taken there is no intention of keeping it, a grave sin of perjury is committed, for perjury is never venial on account of triviality of matter. If, however, when the oath was taken there was a serious intention of keeping it, but afterwards there was a failure to do so in a matter of small moment, a probable opinion holds that such a want of fidelity in a small matter cannot be more than a venial sin.

The obligation imposed by a promissory oath is of strict interpretation, and follows the nature of the act or contract to which it is annexed, so that it is dependent on all the conditions and limitations with which law, or custom, or the circumstances invest the act or contract. For a promissory oath is accessory and follows the nature of the principal act to which it is annexed. And so an oath to observe the rules or statutes of a corporation is understood to refer only to those that are in force.¹

¹ Can. 1318, 1321.

An oath should conduce to the service and honour of God; it cannot be a bond of iniquity; and so an oath to do what is wrong is sinful and of no effect. Similarly, an oath to do what is useless, or which hinders greater good, is null and void. In case, however, another party has acquired rights under an oath, justice requires that this should be kept, and so the mission oath, by which a sworn promise is given to serve a particular church or mission, binds a missionary priest even though he is persuaded that he has a vocation to the religious state.

In accordance with rules of canon law, an oath extorted by violence or grave fear is valid, but it can be dispensed by an ecclesiastical superior. Moreover, an oath taken without violence or fraud by which one renounces a private advantage or favour granted him by law must be kept as long as it can be kept without sin (Can. 1317, sec. 2, 3).

An oath may cease to bind from intrinsic or from extrinsic causes. If circumstances produce a change in the matter of the oath so that it has become unlawful, or useless, or an obstacle to greater good, or if some condition is not fulfilled, the oath no longer binds. The same must be said when the motive of a promissory oath no longer exists, as if I swore to help a poor person with money who subsequently becomes rich (Can. 1319).

An oath may be annulled, dispensed, commuted, or relaxed, in much the same way as a vow, and it will be more convenient to treat of these extrinsic causes for being released from the obligation of an oath in the next chapter, where the doctrine is applicable to vows and oaths alike (Can. 1320).

A vow is a promise made to God about something which is good, possible, and better than its omission.

It is, then, a promise, a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of a new obligation which binds the conscience; and in this it differs from a mere purpose to do better, which imposes no new and special obligation. Such an act must be perfectly human, performed with full knowledge and with complete use of reason, so that a vow taken by a man who was half drunk, or who had not the full use of reason, would not be valid. A vow, however, does not require actual and explicit consent when the obligation is assumed; it will be sufficient if there is virtual and implicit consent. A person who receives the subdiaconate, to which he knows that the Church has annexed a solemn vow of chastity, takes the vow by the very fact of being ordained, though at the time he is not thinking of it.

A vow in the strict sense is an act of divine worship offered to God alone, and so we cannot take a vow to the Blessed Virgin Mary or to the saints.

The matter of a vow must, of course, be something which is lawful and good; it would be an insult to God to promise him to do something wrong. It must be something which is possible, both physically and morally, for there can be no obligation to do what is impossible. A vow, then, to avoid all sin, even the slightest, would be invalid, for without a special privilege of God it is impossible. The matter of a vow must not only be good, but better than its omission or its opposite. For what is promised to God in a special manner and under a fresh obligation must be something that will be pleasing to him, but a promise to do something which had better not be done cannot be pleasing to God, who desires our perfection.

A vow is absolute when it has no condition attached to it, otherwise it is conditional.

A personal vow makes a promise of some action to be performed; a real vow dedicates a thing to God.

Vows are perpetual if the obligation is undertaken for life; otherwise they are temporary.

A solemn vow is one which is invested by the Church with special force and stability, together with certain legal effects; others are simple. The vows taken by religious in regular orders specially approved by the Pope, and by those who receive sacred orders, are solemn.

Substantial mistake about the matter of a vow or about the circumstances which are regarded as entering into the substance of the matter invalidates a vow. For substantial mistake hinders consent of the will; consent was given to something which was not there, and so there was no contract. A vow, then, dedicating to God a chalice which is thought to be silver, while in reality it is gold, would be invalid, just as a sale of it would be under the same mistake. Merely accidental mistake about things of little moment which were not really the motive for taking a vow does not invalidate it. However, according to St Alphonsus,¹ it is a probable opinion that a mistake about something connected with a vow, which if it had been known before would have prevented its being taken, is sufficient to invalidate it. This doctrine may be applied to private vows, but it cannot be extended to the vows of religion, which place the religious in a permanent state of life. In order to invalidate these, mistake must be substantial. For just as the perpetuity of the state of marriage, the good of the parties concerned, and the public good, require that only substantial mistake should invalidate marriage, so for the same reasons only substantial mistake invalidates the vows of religion, by which the religious enters into mystical espousals with Christ.

Fear arising from natural causes, provided that it does not take away the use of reason, does not invalidate a vow. If, however, grave fear be unjustly caused with a view to compelling another to take a vow, the vow is null and void (Can. 1307). The same is probably true even if the fear be slight. For God cannot be supposed to accept a promise which has not been freely given, but on the contrary extorted by unjust violence,

¹ Theol. Mor., 3, n. 226.

A vow, as we have seen, imposes a special obligation on him who has taken it to perform what he has promised: “ If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him: but whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it.¹ If a special time was fixed for the fulfilment of the vow, with the intention that it should be fulfilled then, and at no other time, it must be fulfilled at the time appointed under pain of sin, and it no longer binds after the time has elapsed. If, on the contrary, it was intended that it should continue to bind even after the time fixed had elapsed, then the obligation still remains, The obligation should be fulfilled at the proper and reasonable time, and unreasonable delay will be sinful: ‘‘ When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it... . And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”² It is not clear, however, whether even notable delay in the execution of a vow is always mortally sinful. Notable delay without just cause would be a mortal sin if the obligation of the vow were grave, and if the delay endangered its execution altogether or made the matter of the vow notably less than was promised. On the other hand, if a rich man vowed to give a large sum of money to the poor, assigning no particular time for the execution of the vow, it is probable that he would not commit a grave sin, even if he deferred giving the money until his death, and then gave it by his will. For in these circumstances the matter of the vow is not seriously affected by the delay, which therefore cannot be a grave sin.

The measure of the obligation of a vow is the will of him who takes it, much in the same way as the obligation of a law depends on the will of the lawgiver. Ordinarily it will be presumed that in grave matter, such as the Church considers to be sufficient for a precept to bind under mortal sin, a vow also binds under pain of grave sin, for the intention of him who took the vow is presumed to accommodate itself to the matter. Nothing, however, prevents him from limiting the obligation of a vow even in grave matter, so that transgressions of it will be only venial sins, if he expressly intended it. This, however, must not be understood of the essential vows of religion, nor of the solemn vow of chastity annexed to sacred orders. These vows are regulated by the Church, and according to her intention they bind under pain of grave sin in grave matter. Another exception must be made to the general rule that the obligation of a vow depends on the will of him who takes it; for if the matter be light it cannot form the ground for a grave moral obligation, when this is imposed by a human will. As a contract binds only the parties who agree to it, so no one can be bound by a vow made by someone else. In former times it was not uncommon for parents to vow a child to religion. Such a vow put no obligation on the child, but the parents were bound by it to give the child the opportunity of entering religion if he desired to do so. There are also instances of communities who have jointly taken a vow to observe a certain day as a fast or a feast. Thus the Romans, in the year 1703, vowed to observe as a fast day the vigil of the feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary in thanksgiving for being preserved from an earthquake. The successors of those who took such a vow are bound to fulfil it, much in the same way as they are bound to pay interest on the National Debt. Their predecessors had the power to bind themselves and their successors, for the community remains the same moral entity.

We saw above that the matter of a vow must be something which is physically and morally possible. It may happen that he who took the vow may be able to fulfil it in part only and not wholly. He will be bound to do at least this when the matter is capable of being divided and is usually so treated, for the obligation of the vow then falls on the whole and on its several parts. Otherwise he will not be bound, nor will he be bound to do something which was a mere accessory of the substance of the vow, even if it be possible. And so one who should vow to fast for a week, if he found this impossible, would not be excused from fasting on the days that he could do so. But if he had vowed to build and decorate a church and afterwards found this to be impossible, he would not be bound to build a portion of it, nor to decorate some other church.

¹ Eccles. v 3.

² Deut. xxiii 21.

A vow may cease to bind for intrinsic or for extrinsic reasons. It will cease to bind intrinsically if the matter cease to be a better good or become impossible. Thus if a young man had vowed to enter religion, but his parents afterward became dependent on him so that he could not leave them without a violation of duty, his vow would cease to bind as long as the same conditions lasted. Or if a wealthy man vowed to spend a considerable sum of money in charities every year, if he became poor his vow would no longer bind him. And generally a vow, like any other promise, will cease to bind if circumstances supervene which at the outset would have prevented the vow from being taken. A vow ceases to bind extrinsically if it is annulled or dispensed or commuted. We will treat of these extrinsic causes of the cessation of a vow in the following paragraphs.

The annulment of a vow may be direct or indirect, By direct annulment the obligation of a vow is altogether removed by one who has authority over the will of the person who took the vow. For those who are placed in such a state of dependency on their superiors cannot undertake any absolute obligation; they can only bind themselves conditionally, supposing that their superior consents. If he does not consent, the obligation falls to the ground (Can. 1312).

By indirect annulment the obligation is suspended by one who has authority over the matter of the vow. For it is not just that an obligation should be undertaken which interferes with the rights of someone else. And so if a servant took a vow to hear Mass every morning, her mistress, whose rights are infringed thereby, might suspend the obligation of the vow as long as the servant remains with her, for no service is rendered to God by injuring a fellow-creature. When the term of service expired, the obligation of the vow would revive.

The annulment of a vow will be valid even when it is done without just cause and against the will of the subject, for even then a condition is wanting on which the validity of the vow depended. It will be lawful as well, if there be a reasonable cause, which need not necessarily be a very serious one.

All religious superiors can directly annul the vows taken by their subjects after their religious profession, and indirectly the vows taken by them previously, as far as they prejudice religious discipline or the rights of superiors. The vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience—the essential vows of religion by the taking of which a person becomes a religious—cannot be annulled; for it is only by them that religious superiors receive their authority over the wills of their subjects, and authority is powerless against its own source.

Parents can directly annul the vows of their children taken before the age of puberty, when children become independent of the authority of their parents in matters relating to the service of God. They can indirectly annul the vows of their adult children as long as they continue to live with them.

A husband can directly annul the vows of his wife taken after marriage, and indirectly those taken previously. A wife can annul the vows of her husband only indirectly, as far as they prejudice her rights.

A dispensation from a vow is a remission of the vow made in the name of God for a just cause by one who has spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum. The Church has always understood that the power to dispense vows is contained in the authority granted by our Lord to his Church.¹ She exercises this power in the name of God, not arbitrarily, but for just cause, which is required not merely for the lawfulness, but also for the validity of the act. As examples of a just and sufficient cause theologians give the following: the public good or the private spiritual advantage of him who is dispensed; unusual difficulty in the observance of the vow; the fact that the vow was taken without sufficient deliberation or in immature age.

The power of dispensing vows belongs to the public authority granted by God to the Church in order that she may rule and legislate for her people. It does not belong to the power of remitting sins which is exercised in the sacrament of Penance. All ecclesiastical prelates, then, who exercise jurisdiction in the external forum in their own name can dispense from vows, except in so far as their authority has been limited by a superior. Other ecclesiastics can only dispense from vows by delegated authority and according to its terms and conditions, (a) The Pope can for just cause dispense any of the faithful from any vow.

(b) For a good reason and provided that the dispensation does not injure the rights of others, local Ordinaries can dispense their subjects and also strangers from private vows which are not reserved to the Holy See. The only private vows which are now reserved to the Holy See are a vow of perfect and perpetual chastity and a vow of entering into a religion of solemn vows, if they were taken absolutely and after the completion of the eighteenth year of age (Can. 1309, 1313).

(c) Prelates of Religious Orders have quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over their own subjects, and as a general rule have the same power over these as a Bishop has over his subjects. Besides, they receive by their privileges ample delegated authority to dispense not only their own subjects, but seculars and lay people as well. The privileges granted to the respective Orders should be consulted concerning this special authority and the conditions of its exercise.

(d) Parish priests and confessors have no jurisdiction in the external forum, and can only dispense from vows by delegated authority. They should consult their faculties to know what powers they have received from their Bishop, When a vow has been made in favour of a third person and accepted by him, such a vow cannot lawfully be dispensed without his consent, otherwise justice would be violated. And so, although a Bishop has power to dispense members of diocesan congregations from the vows of religion, he cannot do this lawfully without the knowledge and consent of the superiors of the Order.² The religious vows of congregations which have in any way been approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Pope.

The vow of chastity imposes a serious and arduous obligation which should not be undertaken without mature deliberation and knowledge of one’s own strength. A confessor should be slow to approve of such a vow being taken, especially if it is to be perpetual. When there is just cause for a dispensation being granted, it is the practice of the Church to commute, rather than altogether to dispense, a perpetual vow of chastity. This practice, though not of obligation, should be adhered to by those who have authority to dispense from this vow. It may be commuted into the obligation of receiving the sacraments at least once a month, saying the rosary every day, or other works of piety.

¹ Matt. xvin 18.

² Constitution of Leo XIII, Conditae, December 8, 1900.

A vow is commuted when another good work to be performed under the same obligation is substituted for that which was promised.

All who can dispense from a vow can also commute it, for the less is contained in the greater. It is obvious, however, that it must not be done to the injury of a third person. person who is under vow may commute it into some The good work which is evidently better than what was promised, for, as the rule of canon law has it, he does not violate his promise who changes it into something better (Can. 1314). He may also commute his vow into something that is of equal merit; but to avoid the danger of self-deception, and because it is not easy to say when good works are of equal merit, it is better to have recourse to one’s confessor. Special authority is required to commute a vow into something which is less good, for such a commutation is a sort of dispensation from the vow. In order that commutation into something which is less good may be lawful, a just cause is required, though less than is required for dispensation; probably, however, if there be no just cause the commutation will be valid, but the obligation will remain of supplying the deficiency as in human transactions. No special cause is required for commuting a vow into something which is evidently better; greater readiness in fulfilling one’s obligation will be a sufficient cause for commuting a vow into something of equal merit.

One whose vow has been commuted is always at liberty to return if he pleases to the observance of his vow, for the commutation was made in his favour, and he may renounce it.

When a vow has been commuted by competent authority its obligation is extinguished or transferred to the new work, and it does not revive even if the performance of the substituted good work is found to be impossible. On the contrary, when the substitution has been made by private authority, in case the performance of the substituted work is impossible, the original obligation revives.

This precept regards the honor to be shown to God through words. But by words he is especially honored through praise, a vow, an oath, and adjuration. Hence we shall treat first of praise, then of the vow, then of the oath, and finally of adjuration.

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 91; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, lib. III, nn. 121-132; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, nn. 1-11.)

Praise is an honorable utterance of the excellence of God. But concerning praise, what we said about adoration holds, namely that in order for it to be a true act of religion, there must be joined to it an internal act by which we honor the excellence of God with mind and heart, and which is customarily called praise of the mind or praise of the heart.

We shall speak first, very briefly, about the usefulness and modes of praising, then about the sin chiefly opposed to it, that is, blasphemy.

"1. Whether it is lawful for the Bishops and Clergy to swear the Spanish civil Constitution of the year 1869 according to the formula prescribed by the Government? 2. Whether the Spanish Bishops and the other Ordinaries of places ought, through Pastoral letters, to teach the faithful people concerning the true sense of taking the oath? - As regards the first question, it is easily evident to anyone that the prescribed oath is illicit both for clerics and laymen, the formula of the same oath being considered, circumscribed by no limits. For it cannot be permitted to a Catholic man that he swear that he will observe those laws which are opposed both to divine and to ecclesiastical sanctions. Moreover, the Bishops of Spain do not fail to know, and Your Eminence knows well, that in that Constitution laws are contained by which Catholic unity is gravely wounded, the widest liberty of worships and doctrine is introduced and constituted, and other things opposed to divine and ecclesiastical right are established, which were reproved by the unanimous voice of the Bishops and by the wishes of almost all Spaniards. Hence it happened that there were not lacking those who, with a praiseworthy plan indeed, preferred to resign public offices rather than, with conscience resisting, bind themselves by an oath of this kind. Nevertheless, if the Government perseveres in what it has begun, which may God avert, and the Clergy is driven to issuing this oath, then, in order to avoid greater evils and only in the case of coercion, the Sacred Penitentiary judged that it can be tolerated that the taking of the oath be made according to the prescribed formula, provided that to the text of the formula itself the limitation be added: excepting those things which are opposed to the laws of God and of His Holy Catholic Church. - But as regards the second question, since from the taking of this kind of oath, especially when done by ecclesiastics, occasion of scandal would easily be provided because of the peculiar condition of the Spanish people, unless they are rightly taught about the aforesaid appended limitation, hence this Sacred Penitentiary judged it supremely expedient that Bishops and Ordinaries of places admonish and instruct the flock committed to them concerning the appended limitation by pastoral letters. Indeed, it would be desirable that these pastoral admonitions become known to the people before the mentioned oath is issued. But since similar questions have also been proposed by other sacred Prelates of Spain, I most readily persuade myself that Your Eminence will courteously and willingly deliver a copy of these letters to them, so that in so great a matter all may be able and willing to walk with equal step." Cf. Fr. Villada, Cas. Consc. his present. tempor. accommod., Part 1, De liberalismo, Brussels, 1884, p. 266 f.; Acta S. Sed. Vol. 2, p. 675.

"Whether the oath proposed by the intruding Government is lawful in these or similar words, in which unlimited obedience is contained: I swear fidelity and obedience to Victor Emmanuel, king of Italy, and to his successors. I swear that I will observe the Statute, and every other law of the state, as for the inseparable good both of the king and of the fatherland of Italy. Resp. The oath, as it is set forth, is not lawful; but the oath of merely passive obedience can be tolerated in all those things which are not opposed to Divine and Ecclesiastical Laws, according to the form approved by Pius VII of holy memory, and expressed in these words, namely: I promise and swear that I will never give assistance to conspiracy of any kind, whether assembly or sedition, against the actual Government; and likewise that I will be subject to and obey the same in all those things which are opposed neither to the laws of God nor of the Church." S. Poenit. 10 Dec. 1860. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 561.

"Can a Bishop, when asked, pronounce an oath, or at least what observance can he promise to the new order of things? - Resp. In the negative; both because it is prohibited by the Sacred Canons for Ecclesiastics to issue an oath before lay authorities, and because the oath as proposed is illicit, as is clear from the Response in the Letters of 10 Dec. 1860." S. Poenit. 14 Dec. 1866. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 2, p. 675.

"But it has been reported that in several regions of the Indies, Catholics have been accustomed, if the issuing of an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and exhibited by the Government; but from another side, it is by no means difficult to obtain from the civil Government itself that Catholics be granted the power of issuing the oath upon their own Bibles. Therefore all Apostolic Vicars in whose Missions a use of this kind has been accustomed to be employed should diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian Government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church.

But until they have obtained this from the civil authority, let them prudently be silent, if they see the faithful furnishing oaths upon Bibles of Heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath. Meanwhile let them teach the Sacred Congregation whether the Bibles of heretics, exhibited for the oath, are substantially corrupted, whether they are exhibited so as to be approved by Catholics, whether our Latin Vulgate is customarily excluded. Finally, by whom, and in what circumstances, and for what object, oaths of this kind are exacted." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 8 Dec. 1869.

The vow of Communities to celebrate certain Feasts of precept with vigil and procession, insofar as it is by the force of a vow, although confirmed by the Bishop, obliges no one except those making the vow. S. R. C., in the decrees apud Gardellini, nn. 1444, 1624, 1874, 1963, 2019, 4152.

“6. God is praised by blasphemy.” Proposition of Eckhart condemned by John XXII.

Title of the Cause. — “I, the undersigned, appointed by the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord N. N., Cardinal Ponent or Relator of the Cause, as a secret Theological Censor for the examination of the writings attributed to the aforesaid Servant of God, touching these Most Holy Gospels of God placed before me, swear and promise faithfully to fulfill the office committed to me and to disclose my judgment in writing according to the truth, in accordance with the form prescribed by Pope Benedict XIV of holy memory. I further swear and promise religiously to preserve secrecy, and not to disclose in any way to anyone my appointment or judgment, except only to the aforesaid Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord Cardinal, to the Most Reverend Father, Lord Promoter of the Faith, to his Subpromoter, to the Chancellor of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, and to his Substitute, under pain of perjury and excommunication latae sententiae, from which I cannot be absolved except by the Supreme Pontiff—even the Major Penitentiary being excluded—apart from danger of death. Thus I promise and swear; so may God help me and these His Holy Gospels. — Rome, on this day ____.”

— Signature.

“Since in certain missions the following question has arisen concerning the interpretation and force of the Bulls Ex quo and Omnium sollicitudinum, which Benedict XIV issued concerning the oath to be made by Missionaries to the Chinese and Indian peoples—namely, whether, besides European priests, native priests also are bound to take the said oath—the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, to which a doubt of this kind had been proposed, judged that the whole matter was to be referred to the Holy Office. Now, on Wednesday, the 29th day of last May, the aforesaid Congregation gave the following response concerning the doubt referred to it, which was thereafter confirmed by Our Most Holy Lord Pope Leo XIII, namely: According to information newly received, they are bound. While I communicate to Your Amplitude this decision, to which thereafter the individual priests of every mission, whether European or native, will have to adhere faithfully, I also make use of this occasion to signify to you that the oath concerning which there is question above, once it has been taken before any Prelate of a mission, will always thereafter remain in its force; so that it is not necessary for it to be renewed if the Missionary passes to another mission and becomes the subject of another Superior. He will nevertheless have to exhibit to that Superior testimony concerning the same oath having been taken.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 21 June 1895.

“We do not condemn an oath; indeed, we believe with a pure heart that it is lawful to swear with truth, judgment, and justice.” Profession of Faith of the Waldensians prescribed by Innocent III.

“The third error of these persons—the Fraticelli—agrees with the error of the Waldensians, since both these and those assert that an oath is to be taken in no event, dogmatizing that those whom it should happen to be bound by the religious obligation of an oath are polluted by the contagion of mortal sin and held liable to punishment.” Error condemned by John XXII in a Constitution issued in 1318.

“101. Nothing is more opposed to the spirit and doctrine of Jesus Christ than to make oaths common in the Church, because this is to multiply occasions of perjury, to spread snares for the weak and uneducated, and to bring it about that the name and truth of God sometimes serve the counsel of the impious.” Proposition of Paschasius Quesnel condemned by Clement XI.

“43. Oaths which are made to confirm human contracts and civil commerce are unlawful.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned at the Council of Constance.

“75. The doctrine which declares that, in the blessed times of the nascent Church, oaths seemed so foreign to the instructions of the divine Preceptor and to golden evangelical simplicity that even to swear without extreme and unavoidable necessity would have been regarded as an irreligious act, unworthy of a Christian man; which moreover maintains that a continuous series of the Fathers demonstrates that oaths were held to be forbidden according to the common understanding; and which proceeds therefrom to disapprove the oaths which the ecclesiastical court, following—as it says—the norm of feudal jurisprudence, adopted in investitures and in the sacred ordinations of Bishops themselves; and which establishes that a law is therefore to be implored from the secular power for abolishing oaths which are exacted even in ecclesiastical courts for undertaking functions and offices, and generally for every curial act: false, injurious to the Church, harmful to ecclesiastical law, subversive of the discipline introduced and approved by the canons.” Proposition of the Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI.

“1. Whether it is lawful for the Bishops and clergy to swear to the Spanish Civil Constitution of the year 1869 according to the formula prescribed by the Government. — 2. Whether the Spanish Bishops and the other local Ordinaries ought by pastoral letters to instruct the faithful people concerning the true sense of taking the oath.

“As regards the first question, it is readily evident to anyone that the prescribed oath is unlawful for clerics and laity alike, in view of the formula of the same oath, circumscribed by no limitations. For a Catholic man cannot be permitted to swear that he will observe those laws which are opposed both to divine and to ecclesiastical sanctions. Moreover, it is not hidden from the Bishops of Spain, and Your Eminence knows well, that in that Constitution are contained laws by which Catholic unity is gravely injured, a most extensive liberty of forms of worship and doctrine is introduced and established, and other things opposed to divine and ecclesiastical law are established, which were reproved by the united voice of the Bishops and by the votes of nearly all Spaniards. Hence it has happened that there have not been lacking those who, with a truly praiseworthy counsel, preferred to resign from public offices rather than bind themselves by an oath of this kind against conscience. Nevertheless, if the Government should persist in what it has begun—which may God avert—and the clergy should be compelled to make this oath, then, in order to avoid greater evils, and only in a case of coercion, the Sacred Penitentiary has judged that it can be tolerated that the taking of the oath be made according to the prescribed formula, provided that this limitation is added to the text of the formula: excepting those things which are opposed to the laws of God and of His holy Catholic Church.

“But as regards the second question, since from the taking of an oath of this kind, especially when made by ecclesiastics, an occasion of scandal would easily be furnished on account of the peculiar condition of the Spanish people unless they are rightly instructed concerning the aforesaid limitation appended to it, this Sacred Penitentiary has therefore judged it greatly expedient that the Bishops and local Ordinaries admonish and instruct the flock entrusted to them concerning the appended limitation by pastoral letters. Indeed, it would be desirable that these pastoral admonitions become known to the people before the aforementioned oath is made. But since other sacred Prelates of Spain have also proposed similar questions, I readily persuade myself that Your Eminence will courteously and willingly furnish them with a copy of these letters, so that in so great a matter all may be able and willing to proceed with equal step.” Cf. P. Villada, Cas. Consc. his praesent. tempor. accommod., part 1, On Liberalism, Brussels, 1884, p. 266 ff.; A. S. S., vol. 2, p. 675.

“Whether it is lawful to take the oath proposed by the intruding Government, in these or similar words, in which unlimited obedience is contained: I swear fidelity and obedience to Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, and to his successors. I swear that I will observe the Statute and every other law of the State for the inseparable good of the King and of the Italian fatherland. — Resp. The oath, as it is set forth, is not lawful; but an oath of merely passive obedience can be tolerated in all things which are not opposed to divine and ecclesiastical laws, according to the form approved by Pius VII of holy memory and expressed in these words, namely: I promise and swear that I will never give assistance to a conspiracy, assembly, or sedition of any kind against the present Government; and likewise that I will be subject and obedient to it in all those things which are opposed neither to the laws of God nor to those of the Church.” Sacred Penitentiary, 10 Dec. 1860; A. S. S., vol. 1, p. 561.

“Can a Bishop who is asked take an oath, or can he at least promise a certain observance toward the new order of affairs? — Resp. In the negative, both because ecclesiastics are prohibited by the Sacred Canons from taking an oath before lay authorities, and because the oath, as it is proposed, is unlawful, as is evident from the Response in the Letter of 10 Dec. 1860.” Sacred Penitentiary, 14 Dec. 1866; A. S. S., vol. 2, p. 675.

“Moreover, it has been reported that in many regions of the Indies Catholics are accustomed, when the making of an oath occurs, to swear upon Bibles corrupted by Protestants and presented by the Government; while, on the other hand, it is not difficult to obtain from the civil Government itself that Catholics be given the power of taking an oath upon their own Bibles. Therefore, let all Apostolic Vicars in whose missions a custom of this kind is usually employed diligently take care that the Anglo-Indian Government leave to the faithful the liberty of swearing upon Sacred Scripture received by the Catholic Church. But until they shall obtain this from the civil authority, let them prudently remain silent if they see the faithful taking oaths upon the Bibles of heretics, provided that there is question of a lawful oath. Meanwhile, let them inform the Sacred Congregation whether the Bibles of heretics presented for an oath are substantially corrupted; whether they are presented so that they may be approved by Catholics; whether our Latin Vulgate is customarily excluded; and finally, by whom, in what circumstances, and for what object oaths of this kind are exacted.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 8 Dec. 1869; C. 1664.

“Since Protestant officials preside over all tribunals, courts, customs houses, and public offices of the Government, both civil and military—in French, les bureaux—and the manner of swearing among them is by touching and kissing the Bibles, heretical Bibles are everywhere furnished to be touched and kissed, and it is conceded to the clergy alone that they swear by placing a hand upon the breast. These things being posited, it is asked whether the faithful are to be disturbed concerning the manner which has become prevalent of touching and kissing Bibles of this kind. — Resp. In the case and circumstances set forth, the response is to be in the negative; namely, they are not to be disturbed.” Holy Office, 23 Feb. 1820. — Cf. n. 367.

“14. Likewise, whether he believes that perjury knowingly committed for any cause or occasion whatsoever, for the preservation of the bodily life of oneself or another, even in favor of the faith, is a mortal sin.” Articles from the Bull Inter cunctas of Martin V concerning which those suspected of the errors of Wycliffe and Hus are to be questioned.

“24. To call God as witness to a slight lie is not such great irreverence that on account of it He should will or be able to condemn a man. — 25. With cause, it is lawful to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter is slight or grave. — 26. If anyone, whether alone or before others, whether questioned or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end whatsoever, should swear that he did not do something which he in fact did, understanding within himself some other thing which he did not do, or another manner different from that in which he did it, or anything else true added, he does not in reality lie, nor is he perjured. — 27. A just cause for using these equivocations exists whenever this is necessary or useful for preserving bodily health, honor, or family property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then considered expedient and deliberate. — 28. He who through recommendation or a gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able, with a mental reservation, to take the oath which by command of the King is customarily exacted from such persons, without regard to the intention of him exacting it, because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

“The faculty of dispensing from vows does not of itself include the faculty of dispensing from an oath.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 19 May 1845; C. 2087.

“3. Vows concerning the doing of something are impediments to perfection.” Proposition of Michael de Molinos condemned by Innocent XI.

A vow of communities to celebrate certain feasts of precept with a vigil and procession, insofar as it has force from the vow, although confirmed by the Bishop, obliges only those making the vow. Sacred Congregation of Rites, Decrees 834, 2113.

1097. Although, in the first precept of the divine law, this which follows in the second place is necessarily contained, nevertheless God, because of the greatness of the matter, willed to give separately this law concerning the honoring of His own divine and most holy name.

1. As affirmative, the second precept commands us to honor the name of God, and by it to swear holily.

But we are commanded to honor not the name itself taken literally, according to the vain superstition of certain Jews, but the omnipotent and eternal majesty of the one and triune Deity which the name of God signifies.

The name of God, thus understood, is honored: (a) by confession, by which we acknowledge God and His Christ to be our Lord and the author of our salvation; (b) by meditation on the word of God, by which His will is declared; (c) by praise, by which, following the example of David and Job, we celebrate the magnificent attributes and works of God, and give singular thanks to Him for all things, both prosperous and adverse; (d) by prayer, by which we confidently implore His help; (e) by vow, by which we irrevocably refer certain works to the worship of God; (f) we pursue the name of God with honor when, for the sake of making faith, we call God as witness, whatever the form and conception of words by which this is done; for both "God is my witness" and "By God" are the same. We can also swear by created things, as by the sacred Gospels of God, by the Cross, by the relics of the Saints, and other things of that kind, insofar as the splendor of the divine majesty shines forth in those things.

There are two kinds of swearing: one assertory, when we religiously affirm something concerning a present or past matter, as the Apostle does in the Epistle to the Galatians;⁹ the other promissory, to which also threats are referred, looking to future time, when we promise and confirm as certain that something will be so; of this kind is that oath of David directed to Bersabee.¹⁰

⁹ Gal. 1:20.

¹⁰ 3 Kings 1:29.

For a legitimate oath three things are required: (a) truth, insofar as what is asserted is itself true, and he who swears judges that it is so, or insofar as he who promises something is so disposed that, when the time comes, he will actually perform it; (b) judgment, by which the oath is employed not rashly and inconsiderately, but advisedly and thoughtfully; whence it has been established that an oath not be exacted from children before the fourteenth year;¹¹ (c) justice, which is especially required in promises; therefore if someone promises something unjust and dishonorable, he both sins by swearing, and by making promises heaps crime upon crime, as Herod¹² and the Jews did, who wickedly pledged that they would taste nothing until they had killed Paul.¹³

¹¹ Gratian, Decretum, p. II, C. 22, q. 5, c. 16.

¹² Mark 6:23.

¹³ Acts 23:12.

Under these conditions it is plainly lawful to swear, as is established by the authority of Scripture¹⁴ and by manifold reason.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ps. 18:8; Deut. 6:10, 13; Ps. 62:12; Apoc. 10:3.

¹⁵ Cf. Catech. Rom., here, 7.

2. As negative, the second precept forbids: (a) to swear without counsel, without truth, without justice, or with some contempt, as if someone were to swear that he would not obey the evangelical counsels, or were to swear by false gods; (b) to injure the word of God, either by bending Sacred Scripture from its right and genuine meaning to the dogmas and heresies of the impious, or by twisting it to scurrilous and fabulous things; (c) to blaspheme, which is a far more detestable crime.

Concerning this we have treated in the Treatise on the Virtue of Religion, explaining namely: (a) how there are prohibited: blasphemy, n. 919-924; the vain taking of the name of God, 961-963; rash oath and the violation of a legitimate oath, 947-957; and also violation of a vow, 984-989; - (b) how reverence for the name of God is prescribed, which is shown by frequent invocation and praise, n. 963; by the religious observance of an oath, 947-952; and by the faithful fulfillment of a vow, 979-989.

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. - Exod. xx, 7.

By this precept any irreverence toward God is prohibited, whether through vain usurpation of his most holy Name, or through blasphemy, or through an oath or vow either illicit or violated.

"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that shall take the name of the Lord his God in vain." — Exodus 20:7

The first commandment of the Decalogue has supplied us with an ample subject for disputation. The second, however, presents a subject for discussion not, indeed, so vast, but far more sorrowful on account of the depravity of Christians. For in the commentary on that commandment, which I undertake to treat with a fuller pen, lies that oath which has always been held in the highest veneration, and in great esteem, by all nations, however wild, barbarous, and uncultivated. But, O the times, O the customs! Although the Christian religion, above all others, professes the sanctity of the oath, and teaches that it is to be employed with reverence, only in the most extreme circumstances, its conditions observed, and with the greatest caution, on solemn occasions only — nonetheless the abuse is so great, that very many Christians have nothing more frequent in their mouths, in the midst of professing this sound doctrine and evangelical teaching, than oaths, whether in ratifying pacts and contracts, or in the buying and selling of goods, now in games and amusements, now, finally, in every familiar conversation. This frequency of swearing, moreover, introduces such a habit of perjury, that it exposes the law and profession of Jesus Christ to the contempt, mockery, and reproach, indeed nearly to the peril, of all the infidel nations. For pagans cannot bring themselves to believe that Christians worship and love the true God with faith, hope, and charity, when they hear them everywhere holding his most sacred name in contempt, and abusing it in almost every word.

But what demands a still more abundant fount of tears is the teaching of certain Casuists, who do not recall the laws themselves, and the rules to be observed in the use of oaths, back to a just and holy custom of swearing; but, on the contrary, accommodate the rules of oaths to the depraved morals of perjurers — which I would not have understood in the sense that any of them approve the horrendous crime of perjury; but rather that, deceived by a false and cruel benignity, not a few of them, when they hear the holy name of God usurped in almost every utterance, strive, with a merciful intention and in good faith, to persuade the multitude that this is not truly an oath according to the sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers, so as to withdraw very many from the danger of perjury — that swearing is not the formula of this or that particular nation, but a peculiar one. For the unbridled and unchecked license of many in employing the divine name without discrimination, judgment, and justice has given occasion to not a few submissive writers to write that men do not swear, although they affirm "By God" that what they utter is true — since either they have no intention of swearing, or this invocation "By God" is, among certain nations, reduced to a mere customary manner of speaking; or, by mental restrictions, the matter is withdrawn from the oath; or the oath is directed toward some other meaning than that which the one to whom it is sworn understands. Hence the frequency of Christians' swearing has driven not a few Casuists to coin lax opinions; and their opinions, in turn, more bold, have made Christians more reckless in the use of oaths; and finally, both on account of the laxity of the former's writing, and on account of the latter's vain usurpation of the divine name, the sacrilegious custom of perjury has struck such deep roots, and flourishes so obstinately and with such impunity everywhere, that it has already almost shed the enormity of its crime. Wherefore, before I proceed to untangling the difficulties of the oath, I will set before the eyes, according to custom, the errors of the heretics, and the propositions of certain Casuists, proscribed by the Church, and, partly, though not proscribed, nonetheless straying too far from evangelical honesty. To all these, however, I must first prefix what God really commands, and what he forbids, by this his second commandment. For very many things are contained in these words, "thou shalt take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," which, unless I expound beforehand, my discourse, being defined by no boundary, could not be consistent with itself everywhere, nor proceed by a straight path. I will, then, first disclose the various meanings of the words by which God expressed his second commandment; then I will proceed to handling the proposed subject.

I. St. Thomas explains the threefold sense in which the name of God can be used, in these words (II-II, q. 89, in the proem of that same question): "We must now treat of the taking of the divine name. Now the divine name is taken by man in three ways. In one way, by manner of oath, for the confirmation of one's own words; in another way, by manner of adjuration, to induce another; in a third way, by manner of invocation, to pray, or to praise. Of these three we too, following the Angelic Doctor's words, shall have our discourse." For the rest, St. Thomas explains more broadly the several modes by which the name of God can be used in vain. But because our discourse will also be of the various formulas of oaths, we make progress toward explaining these too.

II. Wherefore, since God forbids his name to be usurped in vain, he at the same time commands that this same holy name be honored by us, and that, through it, we swear justly, holily, and with the highest reverence. This precept of the Decalogue, then, contains two things. First, it forbids anyone to despise, pollute, or use the most sacred name of God vainly, or without necessity; and it forbids that anyone swear by it falsely, or rashly, or recklessly. Second, it commands us to praise, venerate, and honor that same holy name with the utmost obedience. This the Catechism of the Council of Trent, on the second commandment, teaches perspicuously (ch. 10): "What this commands, again, and what it forbids, are these: that the name of God is to be honored, and by it holily to be sworn — but that no one is to despise or use the divine name in vain, nor swear by it falsely, or rashly, or recklessly."

III. The divine name, to which we are commanded to show honor and worship, is not taken merely according to the syllables and letters, or the sound of the voice, but as to what the name itself signifies. Now the name to be sworn by, chiefly according to this, betrays the divine majesty and its infinite attributes... . Whatever name, then, expresses the immense majesty of God, we are bound to render honor to those names. For frequently, in the divine Scriptures, God is called Lord, Omnipotent, Most High, Highest, King of Kings, Just, Father of mercies, and by other names, under all of which he is to be honored by us. Wherefore the Catechism of Trent rightly reproves, in the place cited, the superstition of the Jews, in these words: "From this it is easily gathered how empty is the superstition of certain Jews, who dared not pronounce the name of God, as though they were writing it, as if there were some power in those four letters, and not in the divine reality itself."

IV. We praise and honor God, then, when we confess him in the sight of all; when we proclaim his goodness, justice, wisdom, and mercy; when we acknowledge him as the author and maker of all things; when we learn his law and commandments, and strive to carry them out. We honor the divine name when, whether in prosperous or adverse events, we render thanks to God... , as Micah says: "Blessed be the name of the Lord"; or, with David (Psalm 33): "I will bless the Lord at all times: his praise shall be always in my mouth." We further honor the divine name when we implore his aid, that he may free us from evil, preserve us from temptations, and render us strong and steadfast in bearing all calamities, and persevering in the way of virtue. Finally, we worship the name of God when we call God himself as witness, necessity requiring it, to confirm the truth to unbelievers, according to that saying (Deuteronomy 6): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve him only, and thou shalt swear by his name." If you wish more on this subject, consult Natalis Alexander (Bk. IV, ch. 4), where he explains more fully what the Catechism of Trent teaches, in the place cited, §3.

Lucia, an Anglican, makes the three perpetual vows of religion in a certain congregation of Anglican women called Saint Margaret’s. While she was faithfully observing her vows, by reading Catholic books she gradually became persuaded that the Catholic religion alone was true. Therefore she left the Anglican Church and the congregation without any permission of the superioress, and was received into the Catholic Church by Julius, a Catholic priest. She asked Julius whether and to what extent she was still bound by the vows made in the Anglican Church, and what she must do if she were bound; he answered that she was by no means bound by them, inasmuch as they had been made from error, and that even if she were bound, he dispensed her from them in such a way that she remained entirely free. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a vow, and to what extent is it invalid from ignorance or error?

2. What is the obligation of a vow, and how does it cease?

3. Who are able to dispense from vows?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a vow and how far is it rendered invalid by ignorance or mistake? A vow is a promise made to God concerning something which is possible and better than its opposite. Ignorance and mistake about the substance of the vow, or about some quality of it which is of great importance, makes the vow invalid; ignorance and mistake about accidental qualities of small moment do not invalidate the vow.

2. What is the obligation imposed by a vow and how does it cease?

A vow produces an obligation to perform what was promised to God. This obligation, like that of a law, depends partly on the matter of the vow, partly on the intention of him who takes the vow. If the matter is serious, the obligation will be grave, unless he who made the vow expressly limited the obligation, and willed it to be light. The obligation of a vow ceases intrinsically or extrinsically. It ceases intrinsically if the matter of it becomes impossible, useless, or immoral; if it undergo a change of importance; if the final cause of it cease to exist; and on the non-fulfilment of a condition if the vow was conditional. It ceases extrinsically if it is annulled, dispensed, or commuted by competent authority.

3. Who can dispense vows?

Those who have spiritual jurisdiction in the external forum can for good cause dispense from vows which are not reserved to a higher authority. The Pope, bishops, and Religious superiors can dispense by their ordinary authority; confessors and others who are capable of exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, by delegated authority.

4. The case. Lucy, an Anglican, took the perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, in an Anglican order of St. Margaret. From reading Catholic books she became convinced that the Catholic Church is the true Church of Christ, left her convent without leave of her superioress, and asked Julius, a Catholic priest, to receive her into the Church. She further asked Julius whether and how far she was bound by her vows, and he answered that she was not bound at all, because they were taken under mistake, but in any case he said that he would dispense her from them as far as was necessary, so that she might be free.

Julius was wrong in saying that the vows were invalid on account of mistake. Lucy was under mistake about the true Church, but not about her vows, as far as the case allows us to see. She was also in error about the Religious congregation to which she belonged, and if she only took her vows as a member of the order, and conditionally on her remaining in it, they would lapse on her leaving it. But as they were perpetual we must not presume such a condition; they were taken to God independently of the order in which she took them. She had promised God to observe during her life poverty, chastity, and obedience, and we must presume that she knew and intended what she promised. The Anglican Church, however, had no legitimate claim on her, nor had the Anglican sisterhood. Hence they will be private vows, not vows of religion in the strict sense. Julius, as confessor, would usually have faculties to dispense the vows of poverty and obedience; the perpetual vow of chastity is reserved to the Holy See, though special powers are often granted to bishops to dispense in it. If Lucy wants a dispensation from this vow, she may have recourse to the bishop either directly or through her confessor. The Sacred Penitentiary, Nov. 29, 1842, answered that the vows of a Protestant made orally and in writing before an Anglican minister are simple vows, and that the one vowing is bound to the observance of the vow if he had a true intention of vowing.¹

1 Collectanea S. C. de P. F., n. 959. 2d ed.

Titius and Bertha, Catholics, seriously gave mutual promises of entering into marriage in the future without committing them to writing, which they thought useless since Titius had confirmed them by oath. But, such is the instability of the human heart, through the familiarity permitted to him as Bertha’s betrothed, Titius gradually conceived a more ardent love for Catharine, Bertha’s sister. At length, after some time, his disposition was so changed that he could not endure Bertha, because he regarded her as an obstacle to union with Catharine. The parish priest, consulted by Titius about his freedom, answered that the promises in the case indeed had no canonical effects, but nevertheless produced a natural obligation which bound in conscience, especially since they had been confirmed by oath. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the effect of an invalidating law with respect to an act valid by natural law?

2. What is an oath, and what kind of obligation does it introduce?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the effect of a voiding law on an act which is valid by the law of nature?

The effect of a voiding or annulling law on an act which otherwise would be valid depends very much on the intention of the legislator. Sometimes the legislator merely.

intends to deny the right of bringing an action in court to enforce a claim; sometimes the claim is made voidable, not void; sometimes it is made void. What the effect is of any particular voiding law will therefore largely be a question of interpretation. :

2. What is an oath, and what sort of obligation does it impose?

An oath is the calling of God to witness to the truth of what we say. It imposes a special obligation out of reverence for God, the God of truth, to tell the truth, or, in a promissory oath, to be faithful to the promise given. A promissory oath is accessory to the promise which it confirms, and must be interpreted according to the nature of that promise. If for any reason the promise was null and void from the beginning, or if it becomes so, the oath, as being accessory, will also cease to bind.

3. The case. Titius and Bertha enter into a verbal engagement to marry, and Titius confirms his promise with an oath. Afterward he falls in love with Catharine, Bertha's sister, and wants to marry her. As now he can not endure Bertha, he asks his parish priest whether he may do as he desires, but he is told that though the verbal engagement with Bertha produced no canonical effects, yet it gave rise to a natural obligation by which he is bound to marry her, especially as the promise was confirmed by oath.

The parish priest was wrong in giving this answer. If that were the effect of the new law Ne temere, it would not attain the end intended by the lawgiver—“that the inconveniences might be met which arise from betrothals, that is, from mutual promises of future marriage entered into privately.” Just as clandestine marriage is null and void, so unwritten engagements are null and void by the new law. "Therefore

Titius’ engagement was null and did not produce any natural obligation, and the oath as being accessory was also void. This, if we look merely at the promise and the oath; for if Bertha will suffer any special damage on account of having relied on the promise and oath of Titius, he will be bound to abstain from damaging her, and if he does not do so, he will be bound in justice to compensate her as far as he can. In certain circumstances he might even be bound to marry her, if that were the only means of saving her from a cruel wrong, not precisely on account of his sworn promise, but because he has no right to deceive others in the reasonable expectations which they have formed from his course of conduct towards them.

Caius, a priest formerly a regular, approaches Julius, a confessor of the same Order, to whom he lays open the scruples and anxieties of his conscience. For he said that he was troubled about the manner in which he had obtained dismissal from the Order. For, on account of various difficulties which he experienced, he lost love of his vocation and urgently sought dismissal; at first, however, the superiors exhorted him to persevere, but after repeated petitions they finally granted him dismissal. For some time he applied himself to the duties of a secular priest, and then, when he thought himself not safe in conscience, he hastened to Julius, formerly his confrère. Hence it is asked:

1. What kind of obligation arises from perpetual vows of religion?

2. Who can dispense from religious vows, and is a cause required?

3. If a fictitious cause is alleged, is the dispensation valid?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What sort of obligation arises from the perpetual vows of religion?

By his vows a Religious binds himself to observe poverty, chastity, and obedience, and moreover to persevere to the end in the observances of religious life according to the rule of his order. These obligations are grave of their own nature, but sins against the vows may be venial from lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

2. Who can dispense in the vows of religion, and is a cause required for dispensation ?

The substantial vows of religion taken in an order approved by the Holy See are reserved to the Holy See, and can only be dispensed by the Pope or by his authority, and for grave and just cause. Such cause is the good of Church or State, or the notable good of the Religious himself.

3. If a fictitious cause is alleged for a dispensation, is this valid ?

No; the Pope acts in the name of God to whom the vows are made, and he can not dispense them unless for a sufficient cause. Hence if a false cause is assigned as a reason for dispensation, the dispensation is void.

4. The case. Caius, a regular and a priest, on account of the difficulties he met with in his order, asked for his dismissal. At first his superiors refused his request and urged him to persevere. At last, however, by repeatedly making his request he obtained his dismissal, but after some time he became so uneasy in conscience about the way he had obtained it, that he went to Julius, a confessor of the order which he had left, and consulted him on the matter. Julius will tell Caius that there may have been fault in the determined obstinacy with which he demanded his dismissal. But we must presume that Caius acted in good faith, and did not give fictitious reasons for obtaining his dismissal. On that hypothesis he should be sorry for any fault there may have been on his part, but there is no reason why he should be uneasy about the validity of his dispensation. The difficulties which he experienced, the dissatisfaction which he felt in his state of life, and his great desire to change it, were sufficient reasons to justify his superiors in granting the dispensation, though perhaps Caius should not have asked for it.

Caius, born in Belgium, entered a religious order of solemn vows in the English province with the intention of devoting himself to the foreign missions. When his studies were completed, he made solemn profession, and after a year received news of his father’s death in Belgium and of the legitimate portion of his father’s goods falling to him according to Belgian laws. But since regulars in Belgium, notwithstanding even a solemn vow of poverty, remain capable of ownership by a pontifical dispensation, Caius doubted whether he himself could enter upon the inheritance or not. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a vow?

2. What are the effects of the vow of poverty, and which of these are from the nature of the vow and which from ecclesiastical law?

3. How is the solemnity of the vow of poverty compatible with the capacity to have ownership?