The Subject, Cause, Increase, and Loss of Charity

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, aa. 1, 2, 3, 4; I-II, q. 112, a. 4; De Virt., q. 2, aa. 10 and 11.

863. Charity is in the will. - Since charity has as its object not a sensible good indeed, but the divine good, hence it is not in the sensitive appetite but resides in the will.

864. Thesis. Charity is a virtue infused in itself: for it is not in us naturally, nor is it caused from our acts; therefore it is from divine infusion alone. - It is proved:

Charity exceeds the faculty of our nature: for it is founded upon the communication of eternal beatitude and of grace, which are supernatural gifts exceeding nature. But that which exceeds the faculty of nature is not in us naturally; nor is it acquired through natural powers, because an effect cannot surpass the cause. Therefore charity cannot be had except through divine infusion. It is confirmed: charity

a) is a property consequent upon grace making one pleasing, therefore it is supernatural as that is;

b) is the principle of a salutary and supernatural act, therefore it too is supernatural;

c) has a supernatural material and formal object; therefore it must be supernatural so that it may be able to tend toward that object.

865. Corollary. - From this St. Thomas deduces that charity is not given to us according to natural capacity (or disposition), as if natural perfection or works done by the powers of nature had a disposition toward charity or toward a certain quantity (or grade) of charity; or as if God had decreed to give greater or lesser charity according as natural perfection is greater or lesser. But God gives charity in such proportion as he wills (Eph. IV, 7); nevertheless, when he infuses it, through grace he prepares the man (adult) and gives him the actual disposition by which he strives to receive it voluntarily and freely, and indeed he gives a disposition or striving proportioned to the quantity of charity which he wills to infuse; otherwise man would have the love of God without willing it, or more than he willed or strove for. In this sense the Council of Trent is to be understood, sess. 6, c. 7: "each one receives his own justice, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and cooperation." Cf. cc. 5 and 6 and can. 4.

866. Observation. - The supernatural act of charity proximately disposes toward grace and the habit of charity after the manner of a material cause, and therefore with the desire alone of the sacrament it justifies (cf. treatise on Justification and on Penance).

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, aa. 4-9; q. 184, a. 2; I-II, q. 114, a. 8; III, q. 89, aa. 2 and 5; Q. D. de Virt., q. 1, a. 11.

867. Charity in the way can be increased intensively. - Charity of the fatherland cannot be increased because it is at the term. - Charity of the way cannot be increased extensively, namely, by extending itself to new objects, because the least charity extends itself to all things which are to be loved from charity. But it can be increased intensively, insofar as it becomes more intense, stronger, and more prompt for acting.

This happens not indeed by addition of charity to charity, but only by this, that the same charity is received more and inheres more firmly, and man participates charity more, and is more reduced into act according to it, as was explained in the treatise on Virtue in general, n. 570.

It is proved: For he who is on the way can always approach the term more; but the term of the way is God; therefore on earth we can always approach God more. But through charity we tend and approach to God, to whom one does not approach by steps of the body but by affections of the mind by which we are united to him; therefore charity of the way can always be increased. Cf. Eph. IV, 15-16; Phil. I, 9; Prov. IV, 18; and the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 24 and 32, c. 10: "Moreover holy Church asks for this increase of justice when she prays: Give us an increase of faith, hope, and charity."

868. Charity can be increased without end, as was defined in the Council of Vienne, can. 1 against the Beguards. For no reason is present why its increase would be limited: 1. from its essence it is a participation of the infinite charity of God, which can always be participated more; 2. the infinite power of God, which is the cause of charity, can always produce greater charity; 3. man can always receive greater charity, for as charity grows, the aptitude for an increase of charity grows. Therefore from no side is there given a reason for limiting this increase. - Nevertheless, from divine preordination no one in fact will arrive at the charity of Christ or of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

869. God is the principal efficient cause of the increase of charity, as of its production; but charity is increased instrumentally through the sacraments, dispositively and meritoriously through good works. From the treatise on grace and on human acts we know that any act, whether of charity, or placed from the influence of charity, even the least, merits de condigno eternal life, and an increase of grace and charity. Hence Christ says, Mk. IX, 40: "For whoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name... shall not lose his reward." Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, cc. 10 and 16, can. 32.

870. When charity is increased. - Although every good act done from charity disposes toward an increase of charity, indeed merits it, nevertheless it seems that one must say with St. Thomas, not that every act of charity in fact increases it, but that this is done only through an intense act by which the agent strives as much as he can toward an increase of charity, namely, with all the powers of the charity which he has. For just as God does not infuse a determinate grade of charity except proportionately to the disposition and striving of the will, so he does not seem to increase it unless one strives toward this through an intense act. And then the increase is given not only on account of the last act but also on account of all the preceding acts. "The spiritual increase of charity is in some way similar to bodily increase; but bodily increase in animals and plants is not a continuous motion...; rather for some time nature operates disposing toward increase, and increasing nothing in act; and afterward it produces in effect that to which it had disposed, by increasing the animal itself, or the plant, in act. So also charity is not increased in act by every act of charity; but every act disposes toward an increase of charity, insofar as from one act of charity man is rendered more prompt for acting again according to charity, and with aptitude growing, man breaks forth into a more fervent act of dilection, by which he strives toward the progress of charity; and then charity is increased in act" (q. 24, a. 6). Cf. de Virt., n. 640.

871. In what sense charity can be perfect. - Charity:

1. On the part of the object, God lovable, cannot be perfect, because God can never be loved as much as he is lovable: thus therefore only that charity by which God loves himself is perfect.

2. On the part of the subject, the man loving, charity of the fatherland is perfect because it is in a connatural state (while here we are pilgrims from the Lord): a) for in it the conditions of friendship are verified perfectly: there is had eminent communication, highest union, perfect presence of the friend, conversation with him and possession of him; whence b) it is always actually borne toward God and indeed with its whole power; and therefore c) it is incapable of being lost. Therefore, although the habit of charity according to its essence is the same as in heaven, and can be equal in degree, indeed even greater in one wayfarer than in another blessed one, nevertheless according to the aforesaid conditions charity of the fatherland is always more perfect and more intense.

3. Charity of the way, although it cannot have the perfection of the fatherland by which the whole heart of man is actually borne always toward God - for it is impossible on account of the infirmity of human life always actually to think of God and to be moved by dilection toward him - nevertheless can be perfect insofar as it excludes all things which are repugnant to the motion of charity. And this in two ways:

a) so that habitually someone places his whole heart in God, so that he thinks or wills nothing which is contrary to divine dilection (or any mortal sin), and this perfection is essential to charity, which cannot exist without it, and common to all having charity, and of the necessity of salvation;

b) so that he studies to be free for God and divine things in such a way that he is also actually borne toward God insofar as the necessities of the present life allow this, and leaves other things except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires; and such perfection also is possible to some in the way, and is of counsel, and belongs only to the perfect.

Hence charity of the way on the part of man is in a threefold state:

for when someone has acquired charity, his principal care is that he avoid (mortal) sin and preserve charity, and then charity is called beginning (the purgative way);

then the principal care is toward progressing in good, and venial sins, especially deliberate ones, are to be avoided, and then charity is progressing (the illuminative way);

finally, third, the principal care is toward adhering to God, and those things are to be avoided which impede even more perfect union with God, and then charity is perfect (the unitive way), not as in heaven, but as it can be perfect on earth, namely, not so that it is actually borne always toward God, but so that man does this insofar as the necessity of the present life permits it.

The first is prescribed under mortal sin, the second under venial sin, the third is not of precept; nevertheless it would be a sin to contemn it, or to set the mind firmly against spiritual progress.

S. Th. II-II, q. 24, aa. 10, 11, 12; de Virt., q. 2, aa. 6, 11, 12, 13.

872. Charity cannot be diminished. - Charity is not diminished properly, directly, and in itself:

1. For this is not effected by the mere cessation from act (as with acquired virtues), because charity is not caused by our acts.

2. Nor by a sinful act:

a) it does not happen through mortal sin, because mortal sin takes charity away;

b) nor does venial sin effect a diminution of charity: for a habit is diminished through its contrary, but venial sin is not opposed to charity, because it is only a disorder concerning the means to the end, whereas charity is concerning the ultimate end itself.

3. Nor does God diminish charity in us, because he does not withdraw a good from us unless we merit it; but venial sin does not merit a diminution of charity: for when someone fails in a lesser thing, he does not merit suffering detriment in a greater thing, whence he who has himself inordinately concerning the means to the end does not merit suffering detriment in charity through which he is ordered to the ultimate end itself. Namely, God does not turn himself away from man more than man turns himself away from him.

Nevertheless the cooling of charity (Mt. XXIV, 12), which consists in the diminution or cessation of fervor, that is, of the frequency of acts or of the exercise of charity, disposes indirectly to its corruption; and venial sins also dispose directly to that cooling: this disposition to corruption can be called diminution indirectly and improperly so called.

873. Charity of the way on our part can be lost. - Charity according to itself cannot fail, neither 1. on the part of God moving, who through it can infallibly move to an act of charity (Rom. VIII, 38), nor 2. according to the proper nature and power of charity, which excludes every sin (I Jn. III, 9); but only 3. on the part of the subject, our will, which is mutable according to freedom of choice, and so can cast off charity.

Nevertheless charity of the fatherland cannot be lost because it is always borne actually toward God; but charity of the way can be lost because of the change of our will: for when charity is not actually borne toward God, something can occur through which it is lost, namely, a motive of sinning to which consent is given. Thus the Council of Vienne defines against the Beguards, and Trent against the Calvinists, sess. 6, cc. 12, 14, 15, can. 23 and 27 (cf. Ezech. XVIII, 26; XXXIII, 12-13; Rom. XI, 20-22; Gal. V, 4; I Cor. IX, 27; Apoc. II, 4, 5).

Charity is lost through any mortal sin whatever (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15). For:

1. "He who has my commandments and keeps them, he is the one who loves me" (Jn. XIV, 21); but he who sins mortally does not keep the commandments of God; therefore he does not love God.

2. Mortal sin renders one worthy of eternal death (Rom. VI, 23); but he who has charity is worthy of eternal life (Rom. VIII, 15-17 together with II Tim. I, 7 and IV, 8). But it is impossible that someone be worthy of eternal death and eternal life at the same time. Therefore mortal sin takes away charity.

(St. Thomas, q. 24.)

You will ask 1° what is the subject of charity.

I answer. that it is the will¹³¹, because the act of charity, which is love, is elicited from the will; but a virtue is in that power in which its act is. ¹³¹ Here q. 24, a. 1, o.

You will ask 2° what is the efficient cause of charity.

I answer. that the habit of charity is not acquired by our acts, but infused by God¹³², according to that, Rom., V, 5 : The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. The reason is, because charity is a certain friendship of man with God, which is founded in the communication of beatitude. But this communication is not according to natural goods, but according to gratuitous gifts. Therefore charity exceeds the faculty of nature. Add that its object is supernatural good, and that it is a property consequent upon the infusion of grace. ¹³² Ibid., a. 2, o.

If you say, that from acts of infused charity some habit of love is generated, as the Author teaches, q. 17 de Veritate, a. 1, ad 4,

I answer. that this habit is not the charity by which we are friends and adopted sons of God, but a habit of different species arising from the acts of this infused charity, and therefore acquired, yet not natural absolutely — namely in the sense that it be caused by nature — but in some way supernatural, namely arisen from supernatural acts. Whence, when St. Thomas, 1ae 2ae, q. 51, a. 4, ad 3, says that from acts no habit of an infused habit is produced, he understands a habit of the same species, as the argument required. So interprets Sylvius.

You will ask 3° whether charity can increase.

I answer. That the charity of the wayfarer can increase without limit¹³³ : so it was defined in the council of Vienne, Clementina Ad nostrum, against the Beghards and Beguines¹³⁴. Likewise in the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10 : «This increase of justice, he says, holy Church asks when she prays : «Give us, Lord, an increase of faith, hope and charity.»» ¹³³ Ibid., a. 4, c., and a. 7, o. ¹³⁴ Ibid., a. 4, o.

Proof. moreover 1° from Scripture. Ephes., IV, 15 : Doing truth in charity, let us grow in him through all things, who is the head Christ. Philip., I, 9 : I pray that your charity may abound more and more.

Proof. 2nd by reason. From this we are called wayfarers, that we tend toward a destined term, which is God. But it is of the notion of wayfarers that they can tend toward the term in such wise that they approach it more and more; otherwise the way of progress would cease. Ergo we can tend toward God in such wise that we approach him more and more. — I subsume. But it is charity that makes this approach; for we do not approach God with steps of the body, but with affections of mind whereby we are united to him. Ergo charity can always be increased in this life.

You will ask 4° how charity is increased.

I answer. 4°. Charity is not increased extensively, but intensively only¹³⁵ ; because even the least charity extends itself to all those things which are to be loved out of charity. For since it is efficacious love of the last end, namely God, it has in itself sufficient power for loving other things for God's sake. And if actually it is not extended to counsels and to goods of supererogation, this is not from defect of habitual charity itself, but of the will; because we use habits when we will. ¹³⁵ Ibid., a. 5, o.

I answer. 2°. Charity is not increased intensively by the addition of charity to charity¹³⁶ ; for this would be to multiply charity, not to increase it : but by deeper rooting in the subject, or by greater actualization of the subject, or by closer adherence to the subject; for to be an accident is to inhere. All these are one and the same thing, and St. Thomas uses now one, now another, while he treats of the intension of qualities. Likewise whether you call this greater a new degree or a new mode, it is all one for our purpose; for this question, about the intension of qualities, is philosophical, and therefore we remit it to the physicists. ¹³⁶ Ibid.

[You will ask 5° whether charity can be perfect in this life.

I answer.¹³⁷ If perfection of charity be taken on the part of the lovable, no creature's charity can be perfect. For God is infinitely lovable. But any created virtue is finite. Ergo no creature can love God infinitely. On the part indeed of the lover, charity is perfect when he loves as much as he can; which happens threefoldly : 1° When the whole heart of man is actually always borne toward God; and this is the perfection of the charity of the homeland, than which nothing is possible in this life, in which it is impossible, because of the weakness of human life, always actually to think of God and be moved by love of him. 2° When man devotes his study to occupying himself with God and divine things, others being set aside, except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires; and this perfection is possible in the wayfarer's state, yet it is not common to all having charity. 3° When habitually someone places his whole heart in God, so that he wills nothing that is contrary to divine love; and this perfection is necessary and common to all who have charity.] ¹³⁷ Ibid., a. 8, o.

You will ask 6° whether charity is increased by every act of charity, even remiss.

Before the answer, I suppose 1° that our acts do not efficiently and physically cause the increase of charity, because the reason of increase and of production of habit is the same; for increase is as it were the continued production of a thing. But our acts preceding charity, however elicited with supernatural help, do not efficiently produce charity, as we said above. Ergo.

I suppose 2° that our acts concur dispositively to the increase of charity, not only morally or meritoriously, but also physically; because, as I was already saying, the reason of increase and of production of habit is the same, and our acts are physical dispositions to the production of grace and charity. Both suppositions we proved in the tract. on Grace, dissert. VI, art. 3. See it.

I answer. Every act of charity, even remiss, whether elicited or imperate, merits de condigno the increase of charity¹³⁸. ¹³⁸ Ibid., a. 6, ad 1, and elsewhere.

Proof. 1° from the council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, where it defines thus : «If anyone shall say..., that the justified man does not truly merit by good works done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, an increase of grace... ; let him be anathema.» But the act of charity, even remiss, is a good work done by the just man through the grace of God and the merit of Christ. Ergo it merits the increase of grace, consequently of charity, which is a property consequent upon grace.

Proof. 2nd. An act of charity, even remiss, has all the conditions required for merit de condigno of an increase of charity. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. A remiss act of charity is supernatural, made by grateful and friendly man in homage of God, and ordained by God to reward, since he promises a reward even to the least acts, such as the giving of a cup of water in his name. These however are the conditions of merit de condigno, as we explained in the tract. on Grace, dissert. VI, art. 1. Ergo.

You will ask 7° when the increase of grace and charity due to remiss acts is conferred.

Before the answer, note that grace and charity are considered two ways : 1° in physical being, insofar as they are qualities; 2° in moral being, insofar as they give right to glory as reward.

If you say that right to glory is founded on grace and charity taken physically, answer that this is true of physical and intrinsic right to glory as inheritance, such as belongs to infants dying after baptism, but not of moral and extrinsic right to glory as reward; for this latter is founded on good works which God accepts unto glory as crown and reward. As if the son of a king, heir of a kingdom, had merited a crown by insignia and heroic deeds proposed by the father, he would have a twofold right to the kingdom : one physical and intrinsic, founded in birth, to the kingdom as inheritance; the other moral and extrinsic, founded in distinguished deeds, to the kingdom as crown and prize.

I answer. 1°. Grace and charity are increased morally straightway by remiss acts, or, which is the same, man by remiss acts of charity acquires new right to the increase of grace, charity and glory. It is evident from what was said above, where we proved that man by remiss acts merits de condigno an increase of grace, charity and glory. Merit moreover is right to reward.

I answer. 2°. Grace and charity are not straightway increased in physical being by remiss acts.

Proof. The increase of grace and charity is not conferred except according to the disposition of the subject. But remiss acts, say up to two in one having charity as six, are not sufficient dispositions for increasing charity physically beyond six, since they are disproportionate to such increase and less perfect than the habit itself. Ergo. — Proof of the major. 1° Grace and charity are not infused into adults except according to the dispositions of the subject, as we proved, On Grace, dissert. VI, art. 3. But the reason of increase and of first production is the same, as we already said, since increase is as it were the continued production of a thing. Ergo. 2° Of spiritual things, proportion observed, we must speak as of natural things, unless the contrary appear from revelation; for the sweet providence of God requires this, to dispose of supernatural things as of natural things known to us : otherwise it would be licit for anyone to feign anything whatever concerning supernatural things. But natural effects, whether in growth or in first production, are produced only according to the dispositions of the subject. Ergo.

I answer. 3°. When the just man breaks forth into a more fervent act, the increase of charity which he acquires corresponds to this single more fervent act alone, not to the prior remiss acts, so that there be not one reward conferred under a double title. This is against Bannes and Contenson.

Proof. 1°. Between merit de condigno and reward equality ought to be observed. But if the increase of grace and charity which responds to the more intense act were conferred under another title to the remiss acts, equality is not preserved; for those remiss acts are defrauded of their reward. As if one laboring through six days in the vineyard deserved twenty asses daily, and at the end of the week there were given to him only once twenty asses under several titles, he is defrauded of his hire, nor is equality preserved between merit and reward. Ergo.

Proof. 2nd from absurdities. From the opposite opinion it follows 1° that the just man who through many years should have elicited more than a thousand remiss acts, if he elicit not a more fervent act, and thus die, will perpetually lack the reward owed to his remiss acts. 2° It follows that one who during a long life should have elicited countless remiss acts, as eight, and dying elicit an intense act as ten, obtains no greater essential reward than the most flagitious man who at the end of life elicits an act of charity as ten.

I answer. 4°. The increase owed to remiss acts is not conferred in this life, but deferred until entry into glory, or until the first instant of glorification. So John of St. Thomas, Serra, de Marinis, Gonet, etc.

Proof of the first part. The just man is never sufficiently disposed in this life to the increase of grace and charity owed to remiss acts. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. When the just man elicits a more fervent act, he is disposed thereby to increase corresponding to this act, and at once merits it and receives it. But this increase adequately responds to the more fervent act and is given for it alone, as though no remiss act had preceded, as was proved. Ergo no disposition remains for the increase owed to the remiss acts.

Proof of the second part. The just man at entry into glory, or in the first instant of glorification from the clear vision of God, breaks forth into a most fervent act of such intensity as was the merit of the remiss acts : and since that act is not meritorious, because it is no longer the act of a wayfarer, but only a physical disposition, the whole increase proportioned to this disposition will correspond to the remiss acts alone elicited in the way. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Remiss acts by which man merited de condigno an increase of grace and charity cannot be defrauded of their reward. But they cannot receive it in this life, by lack of disposition, as was proved. Ergo they receive it in the homeland.

[You will ask 8° whether charity can be lost.

I answer. affirmatively, against Calvin, who, condemned by the council of Trent, had renewed the error of Jovinian and of the Beghards and Beguines already proscribed by the council of Vienne, Clement. Ad nostrum, On Heretics.

It is of faith, as is evident from the following definition of the council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 23 : «If anyone shall say that a man once justified cannot sin more, nor lose grace, and hence that he who falls and sins was never truly justified... ; let him be anathema.»

Proof. 1° from Sacred Scripture. Ezech., XVIII, 26 : When the just man shall turn himself away from his justice and shall commit iniquity, he shall die in them. Galat., V, 4 : You are made void of Christ, you who are justified in the law; you have fallen from grace. Rom., XI, 20 : Thou standest by faith : be not highminded, but fear. I Cor., IX, 27 : I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, while I preach to others, I myself become a castaway.

It is confirmed. Adam, David, St. Peter were just, and yet by sinning fell from justice and charity. Likewise all infants who are baptized receive grace and charity through baptism. Who would say that none of them ever falls from grace and charity by sinning?

IOVINIANUS established by this heresy that there is no augmentation of charity, but that all are equal in merits and all in reward; which error I refuted in prima parte, Tract. 1. disput. 11, and prima secunda, Tract. de Gratia, disput. 4. Thus also I expelled, as infected, the Sectarians.

OTHERS with St. Bonaventure said that Charity is increased by another diverse one succeeding, as days are said to grow, not by addition to the days, for instance of April, but by others of May succeeding.

Others said that charity is increased, but by a deeper rooting alone in the subject. Thus the Thomists with St. Thomas here, and Valencia quaest. 1. p. 3.

The TRUE opinion of the Theologians, however, is that charity is increased by the addition of degrees: to this Cajetan tries to reduce St. Thomas.

St. Bonaventure observes, however, in quaest. 5. that augmentation is a passion of quantity, which is twofold: one of bulk, the other of virtue, from St. Augustine libro de quantitate animae, cap. 3. In spiritual things, indeed, that is virtue which in bodily things is bulk. Increment is also given in qualities according to the intension of degrees, as in heat up to the eighth; and in this way the question is raised about the augmentation of charity: whether it is increased according to intension and virtue, which is truly a physical augmentation, by which other forms also grow. But a moral augmentation can also be given, by which the subject, growing morally in the order of merit, meritoriously causes such an augmentation; and in this sense St. Augustine spoke, epist. 106, apud D. Bonav.: Charity merits to be increased, that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected.

Secondly, the Saintly Doctor observes, in the following question, that some said charity is increased by the sole diminution of the contrary concupiscence: but he himself asserts outright that it is increased by the intension of itself; otherwise it could not have been increased either in the Angels or in innocent man.

I ASSERT first that Charity is intensified substantially and meritoriously.

It is PROVED first by St. Bonaventure with the argument of St. Augustine epist. 106, which the Council of Trent uses, sess. 6. de Iustificatione cap. 10. The increment of charity is made by merit in Charity itself, which the just man has on the way, and it is perfected in the fatherland: but this is the true physical Charity, poured forth in our hearts: therefore. This argument supposes first that we can merit the increment of charity, which is proved from 4. ad Ephes.: Let us grow in charity. Philip. 1: This I pray, that your charity may more and more abound; and first Thessal. 3: May the Lord multiply you, and make you abound in charity. Apoc. 1: He that is just, let him be justified still. Eccles. 18: Fear not to be justified even to death. Prima Cor. 9: He will increase the growths of the fruits of your justice. Whence St. Augustine above: Grace merits to be increased, that, when increased, it may merit to be perfected. And St. Gregory, homil. 15. in Evang.: Every virtue is increased, as it were, by certain degrees; and thus, by the increments of merits, it is led to the summit. Finally Iacob. 2: You see that a man is justified by works, and not by faith only.

Next, the argument supposes that the augmentation of the same charity is brought about, which the cited passages of Scripture prove; and therefore the Church prays: Grant us, O Lord, the increase of faith, hope, and Charity; and the philosophical reason is at hand, for intension is the addition of a new degree, or of virtue, to the same thing, as Aristotle teaches 1. de Gener. text. 31, and St. Bonaventure observes quaest. 2. fund. 2.

THIRDLY it supposes that the same charity is perfected in the fatherland,¹ which is asserted in prima Cor. 13: Charity never falleth away. And therefore the Apostle says, prima Corinth. 15, speaking of merit and reward, to which it corresponds: One is the brightness of the sun, another the brightness of the moon, another of the stars. For star differeth from star in brightness: so also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in ignominy, it shall rise in glory. ¹ Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'eandem chastatem perfici in patria'; 'chastatem' (chastity) contradicts the context, which is entirely about charity (1 Cor. 13 is quoted immediately after); rendered as 'charitatem' (charity).

The MINOR is of faith, proved in prima secunda, Tract. de Gratia, disp. 3. This argument is strengthened also by the other foundations of the Seraphic Doctor.

THE SECOND foundation, therefore, is: Every motion from lesser to greater, the thing remaining, is an augmentation: but Charity, remaining essentially the same that it is on the way, is increased in the fatherland: Therefore. The major is evident. The minor is proved from 1. Cor. 13: Charity never falleth away.

THE THIRD foundation. To the quantity of the charity of the way there corresponds the reward of glory and of the charity of the fatherland; but in the fatherland the rewards will be unequal, as I showed from prima Cor. 15. Therefore.

THE FOURTH. A being which is not the highest can be made better: Charity is not the highest good; otherwise it would be the same in each individual, and accordingly would have equal effects in all and each, which is false; for in one just man it works more and higher things than in another. Nor is it the highest, that it could be, since it is the perfection by which a man is formally constituted on the way toward the ultimate term of the fatherland. Whence the Saintly Doctor forms the argument thus, which St. Thomas also uses, art. 4. That perfection by which a man is formally constituted on the way toward a term can be increased; but Charity is that perfection by which a man is constituted on the way toward beatitude, which is the ultimate term: Therefore. The major is evident; for it belongs above all to a wayfarer that he be able to advance on the way. The minor is proved by St. Bonaventure quaest. 2. fundamento 3, because Charity is as it were a Light, growing from the dawn of grace to the most brilliant noon of glory. Therefore Proverb. 4: The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forward, and groweth even to the perfect day. Valencia uses the same reason disp. 3. quaest. 2. p. 3.

I ASSERT secondly that this augmentation is physically from God.

IT IS PROVED IT IS PROVED by St. Bonaventure, quaest. 2, fundamento 4, and his reply. A thing is increased by the same by which it is produced: but charity is infused by God: Therefore. The major is proved, because the same virtue is capable of acting upon the essence, and upon the degrees of the essence, and its accidents; the minor is proved from Romans 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. Second Timothy 1: God hath given us the spirit of love; first John 3: Behold what manner of charity God hath given us, that we should be called, and be, the sons of God; and cap. 4: Charity is of God. Cajetan uses this argument on art. 6 of St. Thomas, and Valencia, disput. 3, quaest. 2, p. 3, assert. 7, where he discusses: whether, at least by God's absolute power, man could be, at least instrumentally, the physical cause of the augmentation of charity: and indeed he himself asserts it, thinking that charity is not created. But this was exploded in p. 1, Tract. 3, disputation 1, where I showed that infused habits are created.

You will object first. Every form is unchangeable, consisting in something indivisible.

The Saintly Doctor answers that this is true as to universal essences, and even singular ones as to what is essential, but not by reason of the subject, against Scotus, 1. dist. 17, quaestione 4. The Saintly Doctor does not will that the form be changed essentially in subjects, but by a certain substantial perfection of the individual, as is clear in the rational soul; but he wills that it be varied accidentally by intensive degrees per se.

You will object secondly. Simplicity does not admit magnitude.

He answers that it does not admit magnitude of bulk; but of virtue.

You will object thirdly. Augmentation in bodily things is according to accident, from 5 Phys. t. 8.

The Saintly Doctor answers that quantity is accidental to the how-much; but the augmentation of quantity is substantial to it; for it is made from its own entity by degrees, which in moral virtue are essential.

He answers secondly that the term of augmentation in bodily things is a quantity perfect per se; but per accidens it is increased also by the addition of substance, unless it comes about by rarefaction or protension; for when quantity is increased, the subject also is increased, in which it may be, although the formal term of augmentation is the quantity itself; so therefore in spiritual things the quantity of virtue is increased in Charity, which is indeed an accident, but one consubstantial with that form; as the third degree of heat, and the following ones, according to which it is intensified.

You will object fourthly. If Charity is increased substantially, it is changed substantially; but Charity never falleth away, from prima Cor. 13. Therefore.

The answer is made that Charity remains with respect to its being of itself; yet it is simply increased by degrees.

You will object first, to prove that charity is increased by itself, because it is more powerful than fire; but fire by its own heat increases itself by combustion: Therefore.

The Saintly Doctor answers that Charity is not active as to creation.

You will object secondly, with St. Thomas, to prove that it is not increased by the addition of degrees, because it is simple.

The Saintly Doctor answers that Charity has degrees of perfection, and therefore can be increased; nor do degrees according to intension repugn to a quality, even if it be a simple quality, for thus also heat is intensified. In the same way the Saintly Doctor answers in 2. dist. 27. art. 2. quaest. 2. ad 1.

You will say: The point has a quantity of virtue, and yet cannot be increased.

The Saintly Doctor answers that this happens because the point is complete in an indivisible of its genus, whence nothing can be united to it so as to be increased, because it is essentially such.

NEXT he answers that the point is indivisible in the genus of quantity of bulk; but in the genus of quantity of virtue, no perfection is indivisible simply, except the Divine. Moreover, the point is an act, imperfect in the genus of quantity, which is not perfect in act; but only terminative with respect to lines; therefore it has not an infinite active power, but passive; whence it cannot produce lines, but terminate them; wherefore it is not compared to the Divine virtue, nor can it be augmented, as Charity can.

You will object secondly. Every addition implies composition, and this induces a diminution of virtue: Therefore, the greater the addition, the feebler charity becomes; and the feebler, the less.

The Saintly Doctor answers first that as much as is added of formal parts to anything, so much is added of act and virtue; otherwise a lesser fire would be more powerful than a greater; and a syrup composed of many things would be feebler than one of its ingredients. Therefore charity is increased according to the degrees of the form.

He answers secondly that increased Charity is not more composite, but more simple; for things stand in a contrary way in the quantity of bulk and in the quantity of virtue; for in the quantity of bulk the simplest is the least and weakest, as the point; and therefore in that genus approach to simplicity is diminution; but recession from the simplicity of the point is by addition: but in the how-much of virtue, the simplest is the greatest, namely God; therefore approach to simplicity is by addition; for the more degrees of perfection a creature has, the more it approaches the perfection, and accordingly the simplicity, of God: thus the Soul and the Angel excel the other creatures in the imitation of God, and yet do not exclude the simplicity of quantity. Therefore also charity, the more perfect, the more like to God.

You will object thirdly. If some degree is added to charity; either it is charity, or it is not. If not: Therefore it does not increase it. If the first: Therefore the first charity, with respect to the incoming charity, is material: Or if they do not stand thus, one will not be made, because one is not made out of many, unless one be as matter; the other, as act.

The Saintly Doctor answers that the imperfect stands in the manner of the material with respect to a more perfect degree; thus heat as four stands with respect to itself intensified as eight; and in this way charity as four stands as in potency to the eighth degree, nor is there any inconvenience.

¶ From this the argument of Valencia assert. 4. is resolved, by which he strives to prove that charity is not increased by the addition of some degree of charity, otherwise there would be several charities: for by those degrees one intensified quality is made; as from several degrees of heat one heat is made as four, or as eight.

¶ But what he himself teaches, assert. 5. that the augmentation of charity is made by a certain mode of perfection actualizing the subject; I confess to be unintelligible to me, because a natural virtue always acts with its whole self in the same subject: ergo, remaining the same, it always does the same: Therefore the just man is not apt to elicit more perfect acts, even if he grows in charity, as the Saintly Doctor argued in quaestione 1, fundamento 5. For the greatness of the effect comes from the greatness of the virtue; and the greatness of the virtue from the greatness of the essence. For either that virtue is the essence itself, or not. If the first: Therefore, the virtue being increased, the essence is increased. If the second: Either that virtue has an essence from which it flows, or not; if it has one; either it is the essence itself of charity, or another; if the essence itself of charity: Therefore, the virtue being increased, charity must have been increased; but if it has another essence, I ask about it: whether it is charity or not; and then it will be necessary either to go on to infinity, or to arrive at some new entity of charity, which may be the cause of that virtue.

It is confirmed by St. Bonaventure fundamento 1, and quaest. 2, fundamento 4, because the moral act by which that charity is increased is new, from St. Augustine epist. 106. Likewise the physical act of God influencing: Therefore a new entity of Charity is produced.