On the Subject, Cause, Increase, and Loss of Charity

You will ask 1° what is the subject of charity.

I answer. that it is the will¹³¹, because the act of charity, which is love, is elicited from the will; but a virtue is in that power in which its act is. ¹³¹ Here q. 24, a. 1, o.

You will ask 2° what is the efficient cause of charity.

I answer. that the habit of charity is not acquired by our acts, but infused by God¹³², according to that, Rom., V, 5 : The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. The reason is, because charity is a certain friendship of man with God, which is founded in the communication of beatitude. But this communication is not according to natural goods, but according to gratuitous gifts. Therefore charity exceeds the faculty of nature. Add that its object is supernatural good, and that it is a property consequent upon the infusion of grace. ¹³² Ibid., a. 2, o.

If you say, that from acts of infused charity some habit of love is generated, as the Author teaches, q. 17 de Veritate, a. 1, ad 4,

I answer. that this habit is not the charity by which we are friends and adopted sons of God, but a habit of different species arising from the acts of this infused charity, and therefore acquired, yet not natural absolutely — namely in the sense that it be caused by nature — but in some way supernatural, namely arisen from supernatural acts. Whence, when St. Thomas, 1ae 2ae, q. 51, a. 4, ad 3, says that from acts no habit of an infused habit is produced, he understands a habit of the same species, as the argument required. So interprets Sylvius.

You will ask 3° whether charity can increase.

I answer. That the charity of the wayfarer can increase without limit¹³³ : so it was defined in the council of Vienne, Clementina Ad nostrum, against the Beghards and Beguines¹³⁴. Likewise in the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 10 : «This increase of justice, he says, holy Church asks when she prays : «Give us, Lord, an increase of faith, hope and charity.»» ¹³³ Ibid., a. 4, c., and a. 7, o. ¹³⁴ Ibid., a. 4, o.

Proof. moreover 1° from Scripture. Ephes., IV, 15 : Doing truth in charity, let us grow in him through all things, who is the head Christ. Philip., I, 9 : I pray that your charity may abound more and more.

Proof. 2nd by reason. From this we are called wayfarers, that we tend toward a destined term, which is God. But it is of the notion of wayfarers that they can tend toward the term in such wise that they approach it more and more; otherwise the way of progress would cease. Ergo we can tend toward God in such wise that we approach him more and more. — I subsume. But it is charity that makes this approach; for we do not approach God with steps of the body, but with affections of mind whereby we are united to him. Ergo charity can always be increased in this life.

You will ask 4° how charity is increased.

I answer. 4°. Charity is not increased extensively, but intensively only¹³⁵ ; because even the least charity extends itself to all those things which are to be loved out of charity. For since it is efficacious love of the last end, namely God, it has in itself sufficient power for loving other things for God's sake. And if actually it is not extended to counsels and to goods of supererogation, this is not from defect of habitual charity itself, but of the will; because we use habits when we will. ¹³⁵ Ibid., a. 5, o.

I answer. 2°. Charity is not increased intensively by the addition of charity to charity¹³⁶ ; for this would be to multiply charity, not to increase it : but by deeper rooting in the subject, or by greater actualization of the subject, or by closer adherence to the subject; for to be an accident is to inhere. All these are one and the same thing, and St. Thomas uses now one, now another, while he treats of the intension of qualities. Likewise whether you call this greater a new degree or a new mode, it is all one for our purpose; for this question, about the intension of qualities, is philosophical, and therefore we remit it to the physicists. ¹³⁶ Ibid.

[You will ask 5° whether charity can be perfect in this life.

I answer.¹³⁷ If perfection of charity be taken on the part of the lovable, no creature's charity can be perfect. For God is infinitely lovable. But any created virtue is finite. Ergo no creature can love God infinitely. On the part indeed of the lover, charity is perfect when he loves as much as he can; which happens threefoldly : 1° When the whole heart of man is actually always borne toward God; and this is the perfection of the charity of the homeland, than which nothing is possible in this life, in which it is impossible, because of the weakness of human life, always actually to think of God and be moved by love of him. 2° When man devotes his study to occupying himself with God and divine things, others being set aside, except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires; and this perfection is possible in the wayfarer's state, yet it is not common to all having charity. 3° When habitually someone places his whole heart in God, so that he wills nothing that is contrary to divine love; and this perfection is necessary and common to all who have charity.] ¹³⁷ Ibid., a. 8, o.

You will ask 6° whether charity is increased by every act of charity, even remiss.

Before the answer, I suppose 1° that our acts do not efficiently and physically cause the increase of charity, because the reason of increase and of production of habit is the same; for increase is as it were the continued production of a thing. But our acts preceding charity, however elicited with supernatural help, do not efficiently produce charity, as we said above. Ergo.

I suppose 2° that our acts concur dispositively to the increase of charity, not only morally or meritoriously, but also physically; because, as I was already saying, the reason of increase and of production of habit is the same, and our acts are physical dispositions to the production of grace and charity. Both suppositions we proved in the tract. on Grace, dissert. VI, art. 3. See it.

I answer. Every act of charity, even remiss, whether elicited or imperate, merits de condigno the increase of charity¹³⁸. ¹³⁸ Ibid., a. 6, ad 1, and elsewhere.

Proof. 1° from the council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 32, where it defines thus : «If anyone shall say..., that the justified man does not truly merit by good works done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, an increase of grace... ; let him be anathema.» But the act of charity, even remiss, is a good work done by the just man through the grace of God and the merit of Christ. Ergo it merits the increase of grace, consequently of charity, which is a property consequent upon grace.

Proof. 2nd. An act of charity, even remiss, has all the conditions required for merit de condigno of an increase of charity. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. A remiss act of charity is supernatural, made by grateful and friendly man in homage of God, and ordained by God to reward, since he promises a reward even to the least acts, such as the giving of a cup of water in his name. These however are the conditions of merit de condigno, as we explained in the tract. on Grace, dissert. VI, art. 1. Ergo.

You will ask 7° when the increase of grace and charity due to remiss acts is conferred.

Before the answer, note that grace and charity are considered two ways : 1° in physical being, insofar as they are qualities; 2° in moral being, insofar as they give right to glory as reward.

If you say that right to glory is founded on grace and charity taken physically, answer that this is true of physical and intrinsic right to glory as inheritance, such as belongs to infants dying after baptism, but not of moral and extrinsic right to glory as reward; for this latter is founded on good works which God accepts unto glory as crown and reward. As if the son of a king, heir of a kingdom, had merited a crown by insignia and heroic deeds proposed by the father, he would have a twofold right to the kingdom : one physical and intrinsic, founded in birth, to the kingdom as inheritance; the other moral and extrinsic, founded in distinguished deeds, to the kingdom as crown and prize.

I answer. 1°. Grace and charity are increased morally straightway by remiss acts, or, which is the same, man by remiss acts of charity acquires new right to the increase of grace, charity and glory. It is evident from what was said above, where we proved that man by remiss acts merits de condigno an increase of grace, charity and glory. Merit moreover is right to reward.

I answer. 2°. Grace and charity are not straightway increased in physical being by remiss acts.

Proof. The increase of grace and charity is not conferred except according to the disposition of the subject. But remiss acts, say up to two in one having charity as six, are not sufficient dispositions for increasing charity physically beyond six, since they are disproportionate to such increase and less perfect than the habit itself. Ergo. — Proof of the major. 1° Grace and charity are not infused into adults except according to the dispositions of the subject, as we proved, On Grace, dissert. VI, art. 3. But the reason of increase and of first production is the same, as we already said, since increase is as it were the continued production of a thing. Ergo. 2° Of spiritual things, proportion observed, we must speak as of natural things, unless the contrary appear from revelation; for the sweet providence of God requires this, to dispose of supernatural things as of natural things known to us : otherwise it would be licit for anyone to feign anything whatever concerning supernatural things. But natural effects, whether in growth or in first production, are produced only according to the dispositions of the subject. Ergo.

I answer. 3°. When the just man breaks forth into a more fervent act, the increase of charity which he acquires corresponds to this single more fervent act alone, not to the prior remiss acts, so that there be not one reward conferred under a double title. This is against Bannes and Contenson.

Proof. 1°. Between merit de condigno and reward equality ought to be observed. But if the increase of grace and charity which responds to the more intense act were conferred under another title to the remiss acts, equality is not preserved; for those remiss acts are defrauded of their reward. As if one laboring through six days in the vineyard deserved twenty asses daily, and at the end of the week there were given to him only once twenty asses under several titles, he is defrauded of his hire, nor is equality preserved between merit and reward. Ergo.

Proof. 2nd from absurdities. From the opposite opinion it follows 1° that the just man who through many years should have elicited more than a thousand remiss acts, if he elicit not a more fervent act, and thus die, will perpetually lack the reward owed to his remiss acts. 2° It follows that one who during a long life should have elicited countless remiss acts, as eight, and dying elicit an intense act as ten, obtains no greater essential reward than the most flagitious man who at the end of life elicits an act of charity as ten.

I answer. 4°. The increase owed to remiss acts is not conferred in this life, but deferred until entry into glory, or until the first instant of glorification. So John of St. Thomas, Serra, de Marinis, Gonet, etc.

Proof of the first part. The just man is never sufficiently disposed in this life to the increase of grace and charity owed to remiss acts. Ergo. — Proof of the antecedent. When the just man elicits a more fervent act, he is disposed thereby to increase corresponding to this act, and at once merits it and receives it. But this increase adequately responds to the more fervent act and is given for it alone, as though no remiss act had preceded, as was proved. Ergo no disposition remains for the increase owed to the remiss acts.

Proof of the second part. The just man at entry into glory, or in the first instant of glorification from the clear vision of God, breaks forth into a most fervent act of such intensity as was the merit of the remiss acts : and since that act is not meritorious, because it is no longer the act of a wayfarer, but only a physical disposition, the whole increase proportioned to this disposition will correspond to the remiss acts alone elicited in the way. Ergo.

It is confirmed. Remiss acts by which man merited de condigno an increase of grace and charity cannot be defrauded of their reward. But they cannot receive it in this life, by lack of disposition, as was proved. Ergo they receive it in the homeland.

[You will ask 8° whether charity can be lost.

I answer. affirmatively, against Calvin, who, condemned by the council of Trent, had renewed the error of Jovinian and of the Beghards and Beguines already proscribed by the council of Vienne, Clement. Ad nostrum, On Heretics.

It is of faith, as is evident from the following definition of the council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 23 : «If anyone shall say that a man once justified cannot sin more, nor lose grace, and hence that he who falls and sins was never truly justified... ; let him be anathema.»

Proof. 1° from Sacred Scripture. Ezech., XVIII, 26 : When the just man shall turn himself away from his justice and shall commit iniquity, he shall die in them. Galat., V, 4 : You are made void of Christ, you who are justified in the law; you have fallen from grace. Rom., XI, 20 : Thou standest by faith : be not highminded, but fear. I Cor., IX, 27 : I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, while I preach to others, I myself become a castaway.

It is confirmed. Adam, David, St. Peter were just, and yet by sinning fell from justice and charity. Likewise all infants who are baptized receive grace and charity through baptism. Who would say that none of them ever falls from grace and charity by sinning?

Proof. 2nd from the holy Fathers, who in this are unanimous. Cyprian, de Unitate Ecclesiae and de Lapsis. Tertull., de Praescript., cap. 3. Ambrose, de Poenitentia. Hieron., lib. II contra Iovinian. Augustine, epist. 217¹³⁹ and lib. de Corrept. et Gratia, cap. 12, 13 and 14. Prosper, in Resp. ad capita Gallor., cap. 2 and 7, and elsewhere. ¹³⁹ Formerly 107.

Proof. 3rd by reason¹⁴⁰. Those forms alone are inamissible which fill the whole capacity of matter or object; but those which fill not the whole capacity of matter or subject are amissible by the introduction of another form. But although the charity of the homeland fills the whole capacity of the will, because it is exercised about the highest good clearly seen in itself and is always in act, and therefore inamissible; yet the charity of the wayfarer fills not the whole capacity of the will, because it is exercised about the highest good obscurely and imperfectly known only, nor is it always in act : whence, when actually it is not borne toward God, something can occur whereby charity is lost through the mutability of free choice. Ergo. ¹⁴⁰ Here q. 24, a. 11, o.

You will object : According to the Apostle, I Cor., XIII, 8, charity never falls away. Ergo.

I answer. Charity is compared here to faith and hope, which pertain to the condition of the wayfarer. For through faith we walk, and not through species, II Cor., V, 7. Through faith we know in part... But when that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away, I Cor., XIII, 9 and 10. Hope likewise shall be done away, the good which we now hope for being attained. But charity, far from needing to be done away in the homeland, will rather be perfected and remain forever, provided it have been finally had in the way : because God then will necessarily be loved as the highest good and possessed inamissibly. Therefore the cited text is beside the purpose.]

You will ask 9° whether charity is lost by one mortal sin.

I answer. affirmatively¹⁴¹. ¹⁴¹ Ibid., a. 12, o.

It is of faith, decided in the council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 15, in these words : «It must be asserted that the grace of justification once received is lost, not only by infidelity, whereby faith itself also is lost, but by any mortal sin whatsoever, although faith be not lost.»

It is proved moreover by theological arguments. 1° By mortal sin man becomes worthy of eternal death¹⁴², according to that, Rom., VI, 23 : The wages of sin is death. And everyone having charity is worthy of eternal life. But no one can be at once worthy of eternal death and of eternal life. Ergo. ¹⁴² Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

2° One contrary is expelled by another supervening contrary¹⁴³. But any mortal sin whatsoever is contrary to charity according to its proper notion. For charity is the union of friendship with God as last end; mortal sin is aversion from God as last end : charity makes man will to love God above all things, and to subject himself to all his precepts; mortal sin prefers a creature to God, and violates his precepts. Ergo. ¹⁴³ Ibid., o.

Nor does it stand in the way that an act is directly contrary to a habit, and that therefore one act does not destroy a habit; for this is true of acquired habits, but not of infused habits, such as charity is.