The Act of Doing Penance and Its Effects

(St. Thomas, part 3, question 85; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book VI, nn. 433-442.)

We shall speak of the notion, necessity, and effects of the act of doing penance; namely, of the salutary act, with which alone we are concerned.

The act of doing penance consists essentially in detestation and sorrow concerning a committed sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, with the purpose of no longer sinning, or, in other words, in contrition.¹ Therefore the act of doing penance requires:

I. Detestation and sorrow. This is laid down against Luther, who taught that penance consists in recognition of one's former error and a change of purpose, with detestation and sorrow excluded. But the doctrine stated is clear:

1. From Sacred Scripture, which, besides amendment of life, requires detestation and sorrow concerning sin: "Be converted to me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning, and rend your hearts."² Again: "Now I rejoice, not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance."³

2. From the testimonies of the Fathers. Thus Tertullian,⁴ St. Cyprian,⁵ St. Augustine,⁶ St. Ambrose.⁷

3. From reason. By sinning, a man has inflicted injury upon God. But one who has inflicted injury upon God cannot expect pardon unless he repairs the injury, at least by detesting it and sorrowing over it.

II. Concerning the sin committed, insofar as it is an offense against God, or, in other words, concerning sin taken formally, so that the offense against God is the object which the sinner detests. And indeed, in order that penance be salutary, that is, that it help to reconcile man with God, the sinner must detest his very aversion from God, or sin taken formally.

III. The purpose of no longer sinning. That this is required is clear both from Sacred Scripture,⁸ and from the fact that no one can be reconciled with God unless the will is simply opposed to offense against God. But such a will involves the purpose, at least implicit, of no longer sinning.

Corollary I. The act of doing penance can proceed from the motive both of the virtue of penance and of another virtue to which sin is opposed. Moreover, to some virtues, for example charity, religion, gratitude toward God - which are called universal - all sins are opposed; hence from the motive of these virtues we can repent of all sins. But to others, which are called particular, only particular sins are opposed, for example lust to chastity; hence from the motive of those virtues an act of doing penance cannot be elicited except concerning a particular sin.

Corollary II. The act of doing penance concerning sin considered under the aspect of an offense against God is simply an act of the virtue of penance. But if the said act is elicited under the influence of the motive of another virtue, there is an act elicited by the virtue of penance, but commanded by that virtue whose motive is specifically proper. The reason for the former is that an act is specified from the formal object which; but in this case sin is considered under the aspect of offense against God, which is the formal object which of the virtue of penance. The latter is set forth by St. Thomas in these words: "This is the difference between eliciting an act and commanding: that a habit or power elicits that act which it produces with no intermediary; but it commands an act which is produced by means of an inferior power or habit concerning the object of that power" (3, distinction 27, question 2, article 4, solution 3).

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, session 14, chapter 4.

² Joel 2:12.

³ 2 Corinthians 7:9.

⁴ De Poenitentia, chapter 9.

⁵ De lapsis, n. 35 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 4, col. 492).

⁶ Sermon 351, chapter 5, n. 12 (ed. Gaume, vol. 5, col. 2019).

⁷ De Poenitentia, book II, chapter 10.

⁸ Cf. Ezekiel 18:31 sq.

The act of doing penance is necessary by necessity both of means and of precept.

I. Necessity of means. We are not asking whether God, absolutely speaking, can remit sin to one who does not repent - concerning which there is dispute - but we are asking whether, in the present order of Providence, penance is necessary for the sinner. Now then: some penance¹ is necessary by necessity of means for those fallen into mortal sin. This is clear:

1. From Sacred Scripture, which presents penance as a necessary condition for obtaining remission.²

2. From the Council of Trent: "Penance was indeed necessary at all times for all men who had defiled themselves by some mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice, even for those who had sought to be washed by the sacrament of Baptism, so that, perversity having been cast off and amended, they might detest so great an offense of God with hatred of sin and pious sorrow of soul."³

3. From the holy Fathers. Thus teach, for example, St. Ambrose,⁴ St. Augustine,⁵ St. Jerome.⁶

4. From the reason of fittingness. For it is not fitting that sin, that is, an injury inflicted upon God, be remitted unless the sinner repairs it - which is done by detesting it - and now wills not to afflict God with a new injury (St. Thomas, 3, question 86, article 2).

In what way the proposition proved can be reconciled with the certain doctrine which teaches that an act of charity justifies is explained in n. 282.

¹ Namely, perfect contrition, or imperfect contrition together with the sacrament, or - as others add - together with martyrdom.

² Cf. Sirach 2:22; Ezekiel 18:21-32; Luke 13:5; Matthew 3:7; Acts 3:19.

³ Session 14, chapter 1.

⁴ Letter 51, n. 11 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 16, col. 1162).

⁵ Letter 93, chapter 13, n. 53 (ed. Gaume, vol. 2, col. 377).

⁶ Commentary on Ecclesiastes 8:12 (Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 23, col. 1077 C).

II. Necessity of precept. This brings it about that he who neglects the act of doing penance not only does not obtain justification, but also commits a new sin.

1. The existence of the precept is clear from the fact that penance is prescribed in the Scriptures by imperative words.¹ Next, every act necessary by necessity of means is also prescribed. Finally, reason dictates that an injury inflicted upon God must be repaired.

2. The object of the precept. The precept obliges either to an act of perfect contrition in the absence of the sacrament, or at least to attrition with the sacrament of Penance (or of Baptism as regards an unbeliever); likewise to undergoing the punishments inflicted by God because of sin. It seems that, in itself, no special precept is given of taking away or lessening the debts of temporal punishment, so that in itself the sinner does not sin who defers the expiation of the temporal punishment owed into the other life. I said in itself, because often from elsewhere there is an obligation of doing works which in fact diminish temporal punishment.

3. The time of the obligation. The precept of doing penance obliges the sinner:

a) In itself, that is, by reason of penance itself: 1. in danger of death or madness, because one who then neglects penance is judged in no way to will it. 2. It is disputed whether, in itself, there is an obligation not to defer penance for a long time after sin has been committed. St. Alphonsus rightly holds the negative opinion as sufficiently probable (VI, 437); for if a long delay of reparation owed to God is injurious, it seems that the same, by the same right, must be said of every delay. But no one admits that.

b) By accident, that is, by reason of another virtue: 1. when someone must or wishes to confect a sacrament; 2. when someone must or wishes to receive a sacrament of the living; 3. when someone would suffer grave temptations which he believed he could not resist unless he elicits an act of contrition; likewise, 4. when generally the delay of penance would expose someone to grave danger of sinning gravely. Concerning this, note these words of St. Thomas: without sanctifying grace, "that one remain for a long time without mortal sin is not possible" (1-2, question 109, article 8); likewise these words of St. Gregory: "Sin... which penance does not quickly wash away... by its own weight soon draws one to another";² 5. when the precept of charity toward God urges, and the memory of sin occurs to the sinner (St. Alphonsus, VI, 437). "Nevertheless, I do not deny that sinners, especially the rude, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance by reason of lack of advertence" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., doubt 1).

¹ Matthew 4:17; Acts 2:38.

² Moralia, book 25, chapter 9, n. 22; in Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 76, col. 334. St. Alphonsus, having considered this cause, judges a delay for the space of one year excessive (VI, 437, doubt 1).

Corollary I. One who neglects penance obligatory from the virtue of penance commits the sin of impenitence; one who omits penance prescribed from another source sins against that virtue from which penance is prescribed.

Corollary II. The faithful can indeed be taught the obligation of not deferring penance for a long time; nevertheless no statement should be made about a span of time which would constitute grave sin. Besides this, they should be stirred up to elicit perfect contrition every morning and evening, and also soon after committing a grave sin.

The Virtue of Repentance.—This virtue is a gift of God and a permanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man cooperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a sinner is converted through consideration of God’s goodness or of the rewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful delights are first deterred from them by the thought of God’s justice, and amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least virtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and usually they follow one another in that process in the order here given. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart: “Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted” (Lament, v. 21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to God must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow servile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to God, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of mercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its own sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of reverence.

The Character of Repentance.—(a) It is a virtue, since it is commanded (“Do penance,” Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates according to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the extreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.

(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by which reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those acts within the bounds of moderation.

(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to another’s right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there is not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose power the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative justice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;

The Excellence of Repentance.—(a) Its Dignity.—Repentance ranks below other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man, repentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the supposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain preeminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in justification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for justification come before those virtues.

(b) Its Necessity.—In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is remitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: “Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish” (Luke, xiii. 5). This is reasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by his own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial sin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and must be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection of the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover, since one should be restored to God’s friendship before being restored to His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail, unless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance need not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his sins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is, an act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the latter is not expressly taken into consideration.

Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?—(a) It is necessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation cannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent to his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable way in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a precept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury, make reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be converted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law prescribes annual confession.

Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.—(a) When one mortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same time. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his separation from God, and this means that he grieves over each individual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from God, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry for another.

(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also forgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to heaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the examples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of Moses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii. 13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a just Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even for sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of Magdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.

The Fruits of Repentance.—(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous, is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).

(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.

(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii. 12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part, which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with the greater or less excellence of repentance.

412. Penance, considered generally, signifies the same as sorrow of soul, which anyone experiences after he has done or omitted something which he would wish not to have done or not to have omitted. But in the strict and proper sense, penance is sorrow of soul insofar as it is referred to God offended and hostile to us ¹.

¹ Take care to distinguish properly the twofold sense in which an offense against God is the formal object now of charity, now of penance; otherwise you may perhaps fall into the false doctrine which finds penance only where there is contrition perfected by charity. Cardinal De Lugo speaks well concerning these things: It is one thing, and a far different one, to detest sin because it is opposed to God, or because it is an evil of God, at least extrinsically, and because it displeases God, which pertains to charity; but it is another thing to detest sin because it offends God, or because it provokes God and turns Him away from man, which pertains to this other virtue of Penance.... For even among men these two things are distinguished, and I can be unwilling to offend another lest I reasonably render him averse to me, although otherwise I have no friendship with him nor desire to have it; for friendship tends to avoid his evil because it is his evil; but this other virtue tends formally to avoid an offense, not because it is his evil, but rather because it is evil and dishonorable for me to have another reasonably averse to me (On Penance, disp. 2, no. 52).

But he had previously explained the object of Penance more clearly thus (ibid., nos. 50-51): Even among men another virtue inclines one to remove an offense, which prohibits giving someone a sufficient and reasonable cause of indignation and aversion..., and inclines one also to remove it when it has been committed, by offering sufficient satisfaction through acts of service, through a petition for pardon, and other similar things according to the magnitude of the offense; for when this satisfaction has been made, the offense is extinguished. For if the offended person were harsh in accepting satisfaction, prudent men would nevertheless no longer judge him to remain reasonably averse, but entirely unreasonably so.... This being supposed, we say that there is another similar virtue of man toward God, which inclines one to have peace with God, or to avoid an offense against God and to remove it by every means when it has been committed. Its formal object is the goodness of peace with God, or not to have God averse and indignant. But since God is offended by all sins, this virtue hates all of them under that formal aspect, because they are offenses against God; and it endeavors to remove all of them, so that it may again have God pacified and appeased. And therefore it is called a reconciliatory virtue, because it tends to this, that it may reconcile to us the God who is averse.... But that this virtue is Penance is proved from the fact that, etc. And in this sense indeed the Author is to be understood when he presently adds that Penance is a moral virtue which inclines to the detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, namely, insofar as it renders God averse and indignant toward us.

I. Penance, as a virtue, is defined: A moral virtue inclining to the detestation of sin insofar as it is an offense against God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice.

Penance is necessary for the sinner by a necessity of means for salvation. For in the present economy it is repugnant that an impenitent sinner be received by God into friendship.

It is also necessary by a necessity of divine precept, as is clear from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, for example, Luke 13.5: Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish, etc.

The effect of penance ², however, is twofold: 1. the remission of sins, as is established from six hundred passages of Sacred Scripture; 2. the remission of eternal punishment. For a justified man cannot be liable to eternal punishment. This is also established from Trent, sess. 6, ch. 7.

² Understand this of perfect penance, namely, that which leads to those acts of service by which God Himself has revealed that, from His immense mercy, He is appeased and reconciled with sinful man.

II. Penance, as a Sacrament, is defined: A Sacrament of the new law instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, to a contrite man who has confessed, sins committed after

Baptism.

This Sacrament differs from the others especially in this, that it is administered after the manner of a judgment; for there is present the penitent, at once the accused, witness, and accuser; and the Priest, the judge pronouncing sentence.

413. Things to be established. - I. Penance is a true Sacrament of the new law.

This is established, 1. from theological reason; for in it are found all the things which constitute a true Sacrament, namely: 1. A sensible sign through confession, or certainly through the absolution of the Priest, etc. 2. The institution of Christ in a permanent manner, as is clear from the text John 20.23: Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. 3. The promise of grace; this is clear from the remission of sins, since sins cannot be remitted without the infusion of grace.

This is established, 2. from constant tradition and the doctrine of the Fathers, to which is added the express definition of the Church; for thus Trent, sess. 14, can. 1: If anyone says that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a Sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling to God the faithful as often as they fall into sins after Baptism, let him be anathema. The same is clear from the Council of Florence in the Decree to the Armenians: The fourth Sacrament is Penance. - See what is to be said below concerning the necessity of confession, no. 464.

II. The Sacrament of Penance has the power of remitting all sins committed after Baptism.

This is established, 1. from Sacred Scripture; for Christ generally, without any distinction or restriction, gives the power of remitting sins: Whose sins you shall forgive.... Indeed, Matt. 16.19, Christ says to Peter: Whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven. And in ch. 18.18 He says to all the Apostles: Whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven.

This is established, 2. from tradition, from all the Fathers, and also from the definition of the Church in the Councils, especially in Trent, sess. 14, can. 1, cited above.

414. • III. The necessary parts of the Sacrament of Penance are: 1. contrition; 2. confession; 3. absolution; 4. satisfaction, insofar as it is to be accepted by the penitent. For the Sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a reconciliatory judgment; but this cannot be had without a sorrowful confession of guilt and a disposition of soul to undergo the satisfaction imposed, and without the absolution of the Priest. - Satisfaction, however, insofar as it is to be imposed or fulfilled, is only an integral part of this Sacrament, because the primary effect, namely, grace and the remission of sins as to guilt and eternal punishment, can be had without satisfaction ³.

³ This distinction, by which satisfaction is said at one time to be a necessary and even essential part of the Sacrament, namely, insofar as the purpose of fulfilling it is considered, and at another time only an integral part, insofar as its execution is considered, was introduced by some Authors so that they might better defend the acts of the penitent as being the matter from which, and thus as pertaining to the essence of the sign causing grace. For since satisfaction is commonly called an integral part by the Doctors (see Lugo, On Penance, disp. 12, no. 40), while the Council of Trent (sess. 14, ch. 3) numbers it together with contrition and confession as the quasi matter of this Sacrament, it seemed to follow therefrom that by the name of matter there was designated not merely an essential element of the Sacrament, but also the integral parts of Penance, as the Catechism of the Council of Trent in fact calls them (On Penance, sec. 21). Melchior Cano, a theologian at the Council of Trent, also employs this manner of speaking (Relectio de Poenitentia, part 6, q. 15), where without hesitation he writes: Contrition is not an essential part of this Sacrament, but an integral part. But not every integral part is necessary for the existence of the whole, as is clear of satisfaction, without which a true Sacrament exists. And Andrew Vega, another theologian of the Council of Trent, according to the testimony of Cardinal De Lugo (On Penance, disp. 14, no. 3), called that doctrine common.

Nevertheless, whatever this evasion may be worth with regard to satisfaction, it is not free from another difficulty. For in that opinion the matter of the Sacrament would not in fact be satisfaction, but the purpose of satisfaction, that is, the purpose of supplying the matter. Moreover, if that pertains to the matter of the Sacrament which the penitent must be prepared in the disposition of his soul, as the Author says, to perform, another could conclude by almost the same reasoning that the matter of the Sacrament is the Lenten fast, the hearing of Mass, and finally all things which divine or human law commands; for all these things must also be present in the purpose of the penitent.

Moreover, neither is it our intention, nor does the brevity of this Note permit, even lightly to touch upon those most intricate questions which are customarily disputed on both sides in the schools concerning the matter of this Sacrament. It is certainly very well known that the Council of Trent deliberately abstained from those formulas of words which might seem opposed to either opinion of the disputants. From this it is sufficiently clear that decretory force cannot reside in the arguments which some have attempted to elicit in support of either opinion from the doctrine both of that Council and of the Council of Florence, especially from the fact that the acts of the penitent are called by the name of matter or quasi matter, as though the word matter necessarily conveyed the notion of an element causing grace. This persuasion drove some so far that they sought some causality of grace even in sin (see Lugo, On Penance, disp. 12, nos. 22 and 37), because it also is the matter of this Sacrament. But this very thing is what others deny concerning the notion of matter; and very many Theologians - for I shall use the words of the Roman Theologian in his note to the Bibliotheca of Lucius Ferraris, s.v. Absolution, art. 2, no. 10 - establish the acts of the penitent not as the matter from which the Sacrament is made, but as that concerning which the Sacrament is occupied. They support this opinion with such reasons (see Maldonatus, On Penance, part 3, q. 3, ad Thesis 7) that even Cardinal De Lugo himself (On Penance, disp. 12, no. 29), although he fights for the opposite opinion with all his strength, nevertheless, pressed by the difficulties, was compelled to concede that the causality of the Sacrament could probably be attributed to absolution alone: Although the acts of the penitent, he says, are parts of the Sacrament, it is not required that all the parts of a Sacrament cause grace, but it is sufficient that the Sacrament cause it through some part of itself; but this Sacrament causes grace through the absolution of the Priest alone, in whom there is the power of the keys for absolving and destroying sins. Several seem to hold this opinion, whom Suarez adduces, disp. 18, sect. 2, no. 11, and he says that this is a probable solution. And in fact, in support of this opinion Suarez (loc. cit., nos. 1 and 12) adduces, together with Scotus, Major, Gabriel, Vega, Ferrariensis, Capreolus, and St. Bonaventure, even St. Thomas. He indeed contends that the last of these thought otherwise in the Summa (III, q. 86, art. 6) (ibid., no. 13); but others will perhaps gather from the reply to the first and to the last objection that the Holy Doctor there added more things indeed, but not contrary things. For since he speaks of acts caused by the grace which remits guilt, these certainly cannot be the cause of that same grace by which sins are remitted, since an effect cannot be prior to its cause. To those adduced by Suarez, not only can several others be added after Maldonatus, but the most grave Theologians, indeed those of the first rank, Francis de Vitoria, Melchior Cano, Dominic Soto, Francis Toledo, Vega, and, omitting others, Martin Navarrus, do not seem capable of being excluded, precisely because of the things which they wrote concerning the power of merely supposed contrition; for these things cannot in any way be reconciled with the opinion which regards the acts of the penitent as the matter from which.

But enough has now been said concerning these matters. They had to be intimated for this reason, lest, since it must be accepted that mere opinions of the school are being treated here, more than is right should afterward be attributed to doctrines which are mere consequences of these opinions; for conclusions cannot possess more force and firmness than the premises bear.

IV. The acts of the penitent required for the remission of sins are: 1. contrition; 2. confession; 3. satisfaction. This is established from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 4: If anyone denies that for the entire and perfect remission of sins three acts are required in the penitent, AS IT WERE THE MATTER of the Sacrament of Penance, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called the three parts of Penance..., let him be anathema.

V. The Sacrament of Penance is necessary by a necessity of precept in actual reception, and by a necessity of means in desire, at least implicit, for remitting mortal sins committed after Baptism. Thus in the new law the supreme legislator, Christ the Lord, has established it according to divine goodness and providence.

Hence, for those stained by mortal sin committed after Baptism, the Sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation at least by a necessity of precept; but penance or contrition ⁴, together with the desire for the Sacrament, or with a serious purpose, at least implicit, of confessing the sins when a suitable opportunity is given, is always necessary by a necessity of means.

⁴ If contrition here is understood as that which is perfected by charity, it is always necessary for justification when there is no opportunity of confessing sins; for, as is said below, imperfect contrition is sufficient with the Sacrament.

415. Questions. - QUESTION 1. When was the Sacrament of Penance instituted?

Reply. It was instituted when Christ, after His Resurrection, breathed upon His disciples, saying: Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them..., etc. For then, as the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 1, declares, He conferred upon them the judicial power which before the Passion He had only promised. Hence Trent says that this Sacrament was instituted principally after the Resurrection.

416. • QUESTION 2. Do sacramental and forensic judgments agree, and to what extent?

Reply. They partly agree and partly differ, as is clear from the form of each.

1. In sacramental judgment the procedure is as follows: 1. The whole matter is conducted between only two persons, namely, the judge and the accused. The penitent himself is the accused, accuser, and witness; but the Priest is the judge, who, after the cause is known, pronounces a sentence which God ratifies if the requisite conditions are not lacking. 2. The investigation of the cause and the pronouncement of the sentence are conducted entirely in secret. 3. The judge is bound to the strictest seal of silence concerning the crimes and the whole course of the cause.

2. In forensic judgment, however, the procedure is as follows: 1. Besides God and the judge, there are assessors who assist the judge by counsel. 2. There are accusers who convict the accused when he evades. 3. There are procurators and advocates who defend. 4. There are officers, attendants, and sometimes executioners, who execute the sentence.

Moreover, another essential difference is also found between the two judgments, namely, that forensic judgments tend to punish the accused and are vindicatory judgments; but sacramental judgment tends to absolve the accused, or to reconcile the sinner with God.

3. 1. Etymological notion. Penance, according to most ancient authors, is derived from the words poenam tenere, "to hold punishment," and therefore designates the act by which we undergo punishment in order to make satisfaction for sins.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85; Suarez, de Paenitent., disp. I and VII; Morinus, Commentar. in admin. Paenitentiae, bk. I, chs. 1-2; Billuart, diss. II; Billot, De Paenit., thesis 6; L. de San, de Paenit., P. 1, chs. 1-6; Pesch, n. 87 ff.

More truly, however, more recent authors say that penance takes its origin from poena, or penitus, and etymologically designates something inward, which affects the heart itself.¹

¹ Cf. M. Breal and A. Bailly, Dictionnaire etymol. latin, Paris, 1898, p. 240.

Among profane authors, this word especially signifies three things: (a) an interior sense of weariness or displeasure; thus in Cicero, in the book On Old Age, it is said: "If, therefore, he had lived a hundredth year, would he be weary of his old age?" (b) sorrow because of a deed previously admitted, whether good or evil: "We are accustomed to say paenitere then, when the things which we ourselves have done, or which have been done by our will and our counsel, afterwards begin to displease us, and we change our judgment concerning them";² (c) sorrow conceived concerning some crime or delict: "We see King Alexander," says Cicero,³ "who, when he had slain Clytus, his familiar friend, scarcely kept his hands from himself: so great was the force of repenting!"

² Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic., bk. XVII, ch. 1.

³ Cicero, in IV Tuscul. quaest.

In this last sense the sacred authors very often use the word penance, inasmuch as it signifies sorrow of the soul concerning a sin committed.

4. 2. Theological notion. Penance, whose scope is to repair the injury inflicted upon God through sin, is defined: a supernatural and moral virtue inclining the sinner to detestation of his own sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, and to a firm purpose of amendment and satisfaction.

In this definition four things are chiefly included: the nature, object, acts, and subject of this virtue.

(A) The nature of penance, which is: (a) a supernatural virtue. Speculatively and in itself there could be a natural habit of penance, acquired by repeated acts; but in fact penance in Christians must be supernatural. For they have been raised to a supernatural state, and therefore they can repent as they ought only under the influence of actual grace and from a supernatural motive known by revelation. Indeed, according to the more common opinion, this virtue is supernaturally infused, together with the other virtues, at the very instant at which the soul is justified.

(b) And moral, not theological: for it is not immediately concerned with God, nor is it founded upon one of the divine attributes; but it is concerned with sin insofar as it is amendable, and its motive is the honesty of expiation or satisfaction to be shown to God who has been offended.

(B) The object is twofold: (a) the material object, or that concerning which penance is concerned, is any personal sin whatever, insofar as it violates divine right and therefore must be destroyed and repaired by suitable satisfaction. Hence there is no penance properly so called concerning original sin, nor concerning the sins of others; for that alone can properly be retracted which was committed by one's own will. But penance taken broadly, insofar as it is hatred and detestation of sin, can be concerned with the sins of others, since we are bound to pursue them with hatred. In this sense Christ was penitent, insofar as He hated our sins and made satisfaction for them.

(b) The formal object or motive of this virtue is the honesty which is found in repairing an offense inflicted upon God. This is the special or proper motive, so to speak, of penance. Nevertheless, an act of detestation of sin can arise from other motives: of charity, gratitude, hope, fear of God, etc., because sin is opposed to these various virtues.

(C) The proper acts of penance are detestation and sorrow for sin committed, the purpose of not sinning thereafter, and satisfaction, or at least the will of making satisfaction.¹ In a broader sense, all those acts by which sin is repaired can be called acts of penance, for example prayer, fasting, self-denial, and other acts of the virtues, insofar as they are orderable to making satisfaction for sin.

¹ The genesis of these acts can be understood thus: when first the sinner apprehends the sin committed as evil, the will abominates and detests it, because it is evil; then he notices that this evil is present to himself, in itself or in its effects, and he grieves over it; but he cannot sincerely grieve over sin unless he firmly wills to avoid it in the future; and furthermore, since the past evil must be repaired, there now arises spontaneously the will of making satisfaction, as is explained below.

(D) The remote subject of penance is any man guilty of sin or capable of sin; for the act of penance properly so called indeed presupposes an act of sin, but the habit by which a man is rendered prompt for grieving over his own sin can be found in all who are capable of sin, since they ought to be prompt for grieving over sin, if perhaps it has been committed.

The proximate subject is the will, because hatred of sin is an act by which the will is turned away from sin; but this act of the will presupposes previous cognition by the intellect, by which sin is apprehended as evil; furthermore it often flows into the sensitive appetite, causing there sensible sorrow or sadness; but the will remains the proper seat of penance.

5. 3. Controversy concerning the nature of this virtue. (A) All theologians concede that penance is a virtue, but some have denied that it is a special virtue. A few, such as William of Auxerre and F. Mayronius, taught that sins are detested not through a special virtue, but through the virtue to which they are opposed; for example, intemperance is detested through the virtue of temperance. Others, such as Durandus, said that penance is nothing other than charity, insofar as it grieves over sin as an offense against God. Some, after Cajetan, maintained that penance is a complex of three virtues: charity, which hates sin; religion, which by confessing sins acknowledges the dominion of God; and vindicative justice, which furnishes satisfaction.

(B) Nevertheless, theologians commonly teach, after St. Thomas, that penance is a special virtue. For there is a special virtue where there occurs a praiseworthy act elicited because of a special motive or formal object; but the act of repenting is certainly a praiseworthy act, since it tends toward the destruction of past sin, and it is elicited because of a special motive, namely because sin is an offense against God. For this motive extends itself to all sins and differs from the motive of other virtues, and therefore it is a special motive. Therefore penance is a special virtue.

This virtue, moreover, is referred to commutative justice, not indeed as a subjective part, but as a potential part;¹ for through it the sinner in some way repairs the injustice committed against God, not indeed according to perfect equality, but in the best way possible. St. Thomas explains this thus (3, q. 85, a. 3): "Justice simply so called is between equals, because justice is a certain equality... But justice in a certain respect is said to be that which exists between those of whom one is under the power of the other, as a servant under a master, a son under a father, a wife under a husband. And such justice is considered in penance. Hence the penitent has recourse to God with the purpose of amendment, as a servant to a master, according to that:¹ 'As the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters, so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until he have mercy on us'; and as a son to a father, according to that:² 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee'; as a wife to a husband, according to that:³ 'Thou hast committed fornication with many lovers; nevertheless return to me, saith the Lord.'"

¹ The subjective parts of some virtue are, as it were, the species into which it is divided, or the parts which fully participate in the nature of that virtue; potential or annexed parts are those which are ordered to certain secondary acts and do not have the whole nature of this virtue, but only something of its perfection. But although penance is a certain species of justice, it participates in something of the other virtues, as is excellently declared by St. Thomas (q. 85, a. 3, ad 4): "Penance is with faith in the Passion of Christ, through which we are justified from sins, and with hope of pardon, and with hatred of vices, which pertains to charity. But insofar as it is a moral virtue, it participates in something of prudence, which is directive of all virtues; but from the very notion of justice, it has not only that which belongs to justice, but also those things which belong to temperance and fortitude, insofar as, namely, it abstains from those things which cause delight, which pertains to temperance, and bears hard things, which pertains to fortitude."

¹ Psalm 122:2.

² Luke 15:21.

³ Jeremiah 3:1.

6. 4. False notion of the Protestants. (A) It is set forth. This flows from the way in which they conceive sin and justification. Since man, according to Luther, sins necessarily, penance properly does not consist in a change of will, which remains evil, but in a change of feeling (sentiment) in relation to God; namely, the feeling of terror, struck into him once sin has been recognized, is changed into faith or confidence by which one believes that sins are forgiven to him on account of Christ, and thus he is justified.

Calvin, however, corrected this notion, asserting that penance is the beginning of a new life arising from confidence, or "a true conversion of our life to God, proceeding from a sincere and serious fear of God, which consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man and in the vivification of the spirit."⁴

⁴ Calvin, Institutes, bk. III, ch. 3, n. 4.

Both contend that no satisfaction must be paid to God, since Christ has abundantly made satisfaction for us.

Modern Protestants, however, coming nearer to the Catholic truth, admit that the beginning of a new life is a prior condition for justification, and that true penance embraces humble confession of the delict before God, horror of the sin committed, and amendment of life.¹

¹ Cf. Bovon, Morale chretienne, Lausanne, 1897, vol. I, pp. 224-237.

7. (B) The Lutherans are refuted. Genuine and salutary penance is not only the purpose of a new life, but also the detestation of sins committed. This is certain.

(a) For whatever may be said concerning the etymological meaning of the words paenitentia or metanoia,² it is certain from biblical usage that words of this kind signify not only a simple change of counsel, but also detestation of the past life. Thus, for example, pious Job said: "I have spoken unwisely... therefore I reprehend myself, and do penance in dust and ashes";³ again the Psalmist says: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise";⁴ nor do the Prophets speak otherwise: "Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities... and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit."⁵ Now in these and similar texts, besides a change of life, there is found detestation of sin; for what is it to reprehend oneself, to have a contrite heart, to do penance for sins, etc., if not to detest the past life? Moreover, St. Paul, addressing the penitent Corinthians, explicitly commemorates sadness as an element of true penance:⁶ "Now I rejoice, not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance... For the sorrow that is according to God works penance unto steadfast salvation."

² The word metanoia (meta, beyond or after; nous, mind) etymologically has the same sound as "trans-mentation," or change of mind; but from usage among both sacred and profane authors, it also signifies sadness and sorrow concerning the past, as is clear from lexicons even edited by Protestants, Schleusner, Robinson, Thayer, etc. Cf. Morinus, op. cit., bk. I, ch. 2. The same can be said of the word paenitentia; for from what was said above, this word sometimes signifies displeasure; this is confirmed from these verses of Ovid (bk. I de Ponto, Elegy I): "I repent: oh! if any trust is given to the wretched; I repent, and I myself am tormented by my deed."

³ Job 42:3-6.

⁴ Ps. 50:19.

⁵ Ezek. 18:30 ff.

⁶ 2 Cor. 7:9-10.

(b) Reason itself agrees: for he who comes to his senses, and changes his life for the better recalls his counsel for this reason: because he understands that the former life is evil; for why would he lead a new life unless he saw that the former one was contrary to equity? But just as we are bound to love the good, so also to hate evil, especially if it has been committed by us. Therefore penance imports detestation of sin. Moreover, reconciliation with an offended person requires more than cessation of the injury; for one who asks pardon from men must first manifest detestation and sorrow for the injury previously inflicted, so that, moved by this sorrow, the offended person may be willing to pardon the injury. In the same way, therefore, the sinner must conduct himself with God.

11. First, the precept of repenting can be considered as negative and affirmative: insofar as it is negative, it forbids one to take complacency in his sins; in this sense it obliges always and for always. Insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that one grieve over sins committed; and then it obliges at the opportune time, both per se, that is, by force of the virtue itself of penance, and per accidens, or by force of another precept which one is bound to fulfill.

(A) Per se, (a) it does not oblige immediately after sin has been committed. For a precept of this kind is affirmative, from what has been said; but it belongs to the nature of an affirmative precept that it does not oblige immediately and for always, but at a determined time, namely when the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, if it obliged immediately, one who did not immediately do penance would thereby sin, and would commit a new sin as often as, conscious of this obligation, he did not repent; but this is opposed to the common sense of the faithful, who by no means accuse themselves of these sins, and of confessors, who do not ask about them.

12. (b) It certainly obliges, however, in the article of death, or even in a very probable danger of death or of perpetual madness; for then each person is bound, by reason of justice toward God and charity toward himself, to be reconciled with God and to provide for his salvation, since otherwise either certainly or very probably no other opportune time remains.

(c) More probably, it also obliges sometimes during life. Thus more commonly against Durandus, Cajetan, Vasquez, and a few others, who contend that no time can be assigned within which this precept obliges outside the article of death. For excessive delay of conversion is gravely reprehended by the sacred authors: "Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer not from day to day: for his wrath shall come suddenly, and in the time of vengeance he will destroy thee";¹ "But according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath."² Moreover, delay of conversion is dangerous to salvation, because it easily induces into new sins,³ renders merit de condigno impossible, and exposes one to the danger of damnation if death should suddenly occur; it is also injurious to God, since for a long time the sinner remains His enemy and defers until death the compensation for the injury inflicted upon God, thus despising the grace of God which moves him to conversion. And so voluntary delay of penance for a notable time is a new sin, namely the sin of impenitence.

¹ Eccli. 5:8-9.

² Rom. 2:4-5.

³ For St. Gregory the Great rightly says (Moral., bk. XXV, ch. 9, in Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 334): "For sin which penance does not wash away, by its very weight soon draws one to another." The reason for this is that one who remains long in the state of mortal sin is deprived of those efficacious graces which are necessary for overcoming grave temptations. Cf. St. Thomas, 1.², q. 109, a. 8.

13. What time, however, is notable and sufficient to constitute a new sin cannot be accurately defined. Delay for many years is commonly considered a notable time, especially because by the ecclesiastical precept, which seems to be determinative of divine law, the sinner is bound to confess his sins at least once a year, and therefore to do penance.

According to Laymann⁴ and many others, one who satisfies the precept of annual confession does not defer penance beyond the due time, because the Church, by determining the time of confession, seems also to have determined the time of penance. And this opinion is very probable, especially because generally the faithful do not think themselves guilty of a new sin unless they have deferred penance beyond a year.

⁴ De Sacr. Paenitent., ch. 2, n. 6.

Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus⁵ does not wholly acquiesce in this opinion, but he thinks that one month is a notable time in the delay of penance, both because of the obligation of eliciting an act of charity once a month, which the sinner cannot fulfill unless he grieves for his sins, and because one who remains in mortal sin through an entire year cannot avoid the danger of easily falling back into other sins. Yet he adds, and this is to be noted for practice, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence.

⁵ St. Alphonsus, bk. VI, n. 437, and Homo Apostol., tr. XIV, n. 10.

14. (B) Per accidens it obliges whenever the sinner, from some other precept, is bound to recover the state of grace: (a) for administering the sacraments, if he is a priest, or for receiving the sacraments of the living; (b) for overcoming grave temptations, if the sinner is conscious that he cannot resist them unless he elicits an act of contrition; (c) for eliciting an act of charity toward God, if the obligation of fulfilling this precept is urgent. - But the precept of sanctifying feasts and the Lord's day does not import an obligation of eliciting an act of penance, since the state of grace is not required for keeping the Lord's day.

Therefore sinners are to be earnestly exhorted to do penance quickly, not indeed by asserting that the delay of penance is a new mortal sin, but by showing that impenitence is dangerous for the sinner and injurious to God,¹ as above.

¹ Among the passages of Scripture and of the Fathers which can be alleged, these especially are to be attended to: Prov. 1:22-23; Isa. 1:2-31; Jerem. 2, 3, 4; 18:5-17; Ezek. 18:21-32; Matt. 3:8-12; Luke 13:2-5; Acts 3:19-26, etc.; - St. Ambrose, De Paenitentia, bk. II, in Migne, P. L., XVI, 495 ff.; St. Augustine, sermon 20, in Migne, XXXVIII, 140-141, etc. - Cf. Bourdaloue, Careme, sermon for the Monday of the 2nd week, on final impenitence; Massillon, Careme, on final impenitence; Wiseman, Sermons on Moral Subjects, On delay of repentance; Newman, Sermons to Mixed Congreg., Neglect of divine calls and warnings.

188. The sacrament of penance, like the other sacraments, produces its effects ex opere operato, and consequently not only declares that sins have been remitted, but truly causes this remission. Trent openly defined this against the Protestants, who contended that sins are remitted by faith, and that the absolution of the priest is nothing other than a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been remitted:² "If anyone shall say that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act, but a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been remitted to the one confessing, provided only that he believes that he is absolved... let him be anathema."

² Trent, sess. XIV, can. 9.

But before the matter was defined, certain Scholastics held, with Peter Lombard, that by the absolution of the priest sins are not properly dismissed, but are shown to have been remitted (above, n. 131). Yet their opinion differed greatly from the errors of the Protestants. For they did not teach that sins are remitted by faith alone or confidence, but at the same time through contrition and the ministry of priests. Nevertheless they had not rightly understood what part the sacrament of penance has in the remission of sins; according to them, God worked this remission with the priest, but not through the priest.³ Afterward, the matter having been better examined, St. Thomas and Scotus and their disciples understood, from the sayings of Scripture and of the Fathers, that the sacraments are not only conditions without which not, but also secondary and instrumental causes of grace, as has been set forth in the Treatise on the Sacraments, n. 44-45.

³ Richard of St. Victor (de potest. ligandi atque solv., ch. 12) had already refuted this opinion: "There exists an opinion of certain persons concerning the power of binding and loosing so frivolous that it seems rather to be laughed at than refuted. For they think and preach that priests do not have the power of binding and loosing, but of showing men to be loosed or bound. But surely does the Lord say: whatever you shall show bound will be bound, and whatever you shall show loosed will be loosed? They say that apostolic men do not have the power of remitting or retaining sins, when the Lord says this. They say that they have only the power of showing, when the Lord does not say showing." Yet he himself did not think rightly; for he said that sins are remitted through contrition, before absolution is given, but only conditionally, that is, on this condition, that absolution afterward be received: therefore this was not the cause of remission, but only a condition without which not. Cf. Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 174.

199. From the things said in the dogmatic part of this Treatise, it can be inferred in what the virtue and the sacrament of penance agree and in what they differ: -

(a) By reason of nature. The virtue and the sacrament are concerned with one and the same object, namely personal sin insofar as it is to be retracted and expiated by congruous satisfaction. Wherefore they consist substantially in the same acts, confession, contrition, and satisfaction, yet to be elicited in a diverse way. The confession which the virtue requires is only confession before God, and therefore can be merely internal; confession, in the sacrament, must be made before a priest, and therefore must be manifested by some visible sign. - Contrition, in each case, imports detestation and sorrow concerning sin committed, and also a firm purpose of not sinning henceforth; but, in the sacrament, it must be manifested by some sensible sign, while, in the virtue, it can be merely internal. With the sacrament attrition suffices, while the virtue alone does not remit mortal sin without contrition. Satisfaction, in order to be sacramental, must be determined by the confessor himself; outside the sacrament, it can be chosen by the sinner himself, provided that it is morally proportioned to the sin committed.

The sacrament embraces more elements than the virtue; for, besides the three acts set forth above, it requires the absolution of the priest, which regularly must be preceded by an integral manifestation of mortal sins made to the minister. Moreover, however, not so perfect a contrition is required when absolution is received.

The virtue and the sacrament can be repeated indefinitely, whether with respect to the same sins or with respect to different sins.

200. (b) By reason of effect. In each case, the intended effect is the same, namely the remission of sin through the infusion of sanctifying grace; and so each can be called the second plank after shipwreck. But the mode of operating is diverse: the virtue is only a disposing cause, which does not produce, but obtains the remission of sin ex opere operantis; the sacrament is truly an efficient cause, although secondary and instrumental, insofar as, from the power of the passion of Christ, it truly confers grace remissive of sin ex opere operato.

(c) By reason of necessity. Each is necessary once grave sin has been posited, yet in a diverse way. The virtue is necessary by necessity of means, and indeed by natural law, not only in intention, but also in reality; the sacrament, as a positive institution, is necessary indeed by necessity of divine precept, indeed, according to some, by necessity of means, but only in intention. Therefore one who cannot actually receive absolution can be saved through perfect contrition with the intention of the sacrament.

(d) By reason of subject. The subject of the virtue is any sinner, even a pagan; while the subject of the sacrament is only a baptized sinner, since baptism is the gate of all the sacraments.

(e) By reason of antiquity. The virtue, which is required by natural law, was necessary at every time, as soon as any mortal sin had been committed; the sacrament, as something positively instituted, was not necessary except at the time when the necessity of it was sufficiently promulgated.

These are the chief differences; the others are already clear from the things said, or will be better understood from the things to be said in the moral Part.

201. Once those things chiefly to be believed concerning the sacrament of Penance have been declared in the dogmatic part, there remain to be set forth the things which have more regard to practice.

All those who have the care of souls know how great is the importance of applying themselves diligently to the study of this matter: for frequently they sit in the sacred tribunal, and there, whether for raising sinners from the mire of vices, or for raising pious persons to higher perfection, they ought to be endowed with accurate and abundant knowledge, all the more because they have manifold and intricate questions concerning every matter that pertains to the spiritual life, which must be solved alone and frequently without delay.

Now the practical doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance is referred to two heads, namely the duties of the penitent, and also the power and duties of the confessor.

Duties of the penitent:
  Contrition.
  Confession.
  Satisfaction.

Confessor:
  Power:
    Approbation.
    Jurisdiction.
  Duties:
    With respect to all penitents.
    With respect to different penitents.
    With respect to abuses to be avoided.

I. Historical development. In order that we may omit many things which are disputed among Catholics themselves (for example, concerning the interpretation of places in which confession made to God alone is commended), and hand down only those things which serve our purpose and plainly suffice, three epochs are conveniently distinguished concerning the administration and use of the sacrament of Penance.

The first epoch, from the beginnings up to the fourth century. Penance is exhibited as the second plank after shipwreck, as another Baptism, but one that is laborious. Grave fault makes the sinner a debtor toward the Church and toward God, if indeed the Church is one with Christ. Public confession for occult sins, as the Council of Trent itself testifies, was never commanded by the Church; but the arguments by which the use of private penance and secret confession is demonstrated from the first centuries are set forth at length by R. P. Galtier, S.J., Dict. d'Apol. d'Ales, v. Pénitence, from n. 311. Yet he who sought penance showed himself ready to take up the public state of penitents. Therefore the ordinary process embraced these parts:

a) the petition for penance, on account of grave faults, directed to the bishop or to a priest delegated by the bishop. The accusation or confession itself accompanied the petition;

b) after the accusation had been made, the reduction of the guilty party to the state of penance, and his exclusion from the offering of the sacrifice and its participation by Holy Communion. This exclusion (which in the East had various grades) was at first prolonged for several years, then, already from Innocent I (417), only up to Thursday in the Lord's Supper, unless grave sickness required a swifter reconciliation;

c) on Thursday in the Lord's Supper (the last liturgical day before Easter), reconciliation with the Church and thence with God. The one reconciled did not for that reason put off the state of a penitent; but, to the end of life, he had to persevere in the works of a holier life. Public penance was conceded only once. The reconciliation of a penitent who was not sick was per se reserved to the bishop. But by the very reconciliation with the Church the sinner was judged to have recovered the peace of Christ.

Nor, during the first three centuries, did there exist a special liturgical rite for conferring absolution. None, moreover, is required by the nature of this sacrament. For the sentence can be signified by the competent judge once every will of dismissing sins has been set forth (cf. d'Ales, Dict. d'Apologétique, Pénitence, III, col. 1791, or Xiberta, Clavis Ecclesiae, p. 32).

As is clear, an administration of penance of this kind supposes a relatively rare use. In the rite of admission to the state of a penitent, which otherwise is little known, there was a certain imposition of hands, a vestige of which can be discerned in the present rite, in which the priest, with his right hand raised toward the penitent, says: "May he have mercy on you... Indulgence, etc." A prayer also was said by the minister. In his treatise De Pudicitia, which Tertullian composed when he was already a Montanist, thus, reproving Pontiff Callistus on account of his indulgence, he describes the reconciliation of the penitent sinner thus: "You indeed, bringing the penance of the adulterer into the church to entreat the brotherhood, prostrate him in the midst, wrapped in sackcloth and ashes, arranged with dishonor and horror, before widows, before presbyters, invading the hems of all, licking the footprints of all, holding the knees of all; and over that exit of a man, with as many allurements of mercy as you can, good Pastor and blessed Pope, you preach, and in the parable of the sheep you seek your goats, and fill the other sheep also with fear lest your sheep again leap out of the flock, as if from then on that were lawful which was not lawful even once, especially while you are indulgent" (c. 13, P. L., II, 1003).

In the second epoch, from the fourth or fifth century to the twelfth-thirteenth, many catechumens deferred Baptism, and many baptized sinners deferred penance for a long time. Again, however, the more fervent faithful began to seek penance from devotion. The state of penance thus undertaken became honored and was regarded as very meritorious.

In the East, already in the fourth century, public penance seems to be removed by desuetude. And canonical epistles, for example those of St. Basil the Great, wished to order the manner of penance. In the West, although public penance persevered there to the eleventh century, the very custom of the barbarians of establishing for various delicts a compensation by a pecuniary fine (Wehrgeld) could contribute to changing ecclesiastical discipline, so that not a perpetual state of penance but definite expiations were prescribed. Hence also it was lawful to have recourse to penance several times. These expiations, first defined very severely in penitential books (in which they were contained; propagated from Great Britain into various parts of Europe, these books already had their beginnings from the fifth century), and at least in a broad sense prescribed for the confessor, subsequently had to be tempered, so that they were entrusted more to the prudent judgment of the priest.

Then also, on account of the greater frequency of confessions, the entire administration of the sacrament was permitted to priests who shared episcopal jurisdiction by delegation or office.

The juridic formula of absolution was not yet well determined, since the efficacy of remission was attributed indiscriminately to the whole rite. Thus the deprecatory formulas, which were then circulated, are more easily explained, such as the following: "Holy Lord, Almighty Father, eternal God, who through Jesus Christ your Son our Lord deigned to heal our wounds, we humbly ask and beseech you, we your humble priests, that you deign to incline the ear of your goodness to our prayers, and remit all crimes and forgive all sins, and give to this your servant, for punishments pardon, for sorrow gladness, for death life" (from Morin, Commentarius historicus de disciplina in administratione sacramenti paenitentiae, where, in book VIII, c. 7 ff., several examples are found).

Around the sixth century, as we learn from the Gelasian Sacramentary (ed. Wilson, p. 14), at Rome penitents on Wednesday of Ashes were received by the priest; over them, covered with haircloth, prayer was poured out, and they were shut up in a monastery until Thursday in the Lord's Supper.

On Thursday in the Lord's Supper they were solemnly reconciled. Mass was begun without the Introit and without Dominus vobiscum. After a preliminary prayer of the priest, the penitents, brought in by the deacon, lay on the ground in the church. In their name the deacon, using a rather long but very beautiful formula, sought reconciliation for those who by their tears had merited pardon. An exhortation of the Pope or priest followed. The ceremony ended with prayer and eucharistic prayer.

In the Mozarabic rite, however, reconciliation, which was called Indulgence, took place on Friday in Parasceve. After the preludes in which are found the Reproaches, "My people, what have I done to you," the office was begun with three readings: a prophetic one, from Isaiah 52, 53; an apostolic one from 1 Cor. 5, 6; and an evangelical one, of the Lord's Passion composed from the four Gospels. Afterward those assisting, who are all addressed by the names of penitents, are invited three times to prostrate themselves and implore divine mercy. Then the archdeacon, turning himself to the whole assembly of clerics and faithful, exhorts them to cry out: Indulgence. When silence has been restored, the same archdeacon sets forth the image of the Good Shepherd who gave his life for his sheep, and then invites them to pray. The bishop expresses the prayer of the kind of rhythmic litanies, to which, with new cries, Indulgence is answered (We beseech you, Lord, Indulgence, etc.). There follows the collect, which the bishop alone recites in the name of all, imploring divine clemency in favor of the penitents. Again Indulgence is cried out; the same prayer of the bishop follows with other formulas, the same order nevertheless being preserved. A third series of cries and prayers is had. In this third recitation the final prayer is omitted, and the Office of the Adoration of the Cross and the Mass of the Presanctified is continued (Duchesne, Origines du culte chrétien, pp. 463-465).

In the third epoch, from the twelfth-thirteenth century, the theological construction of the sacrament was made, which the Council of Trent authentically sanctioned. But the very necessity of submitting sins to the keys of the Church seems to preserve the primitive notion of reconciliation with the Church, which signifies reconciliation with God. And even now the prayer Misereatur, etc., can be called a vestige of the deprecatory formulas which formerly were used. The present formula of absolution is to be traced back to the thirteenth century, although even then it varied accidentally.

II. The names of confession. The words by which, in various languages, access to the sacrament of Penance is designated are of the same origin: Confessio, Confession (in French and English), Biecht (in Flemish), Beicht (in German); they indicate spontaneous accusation.

III. In the administration of penance, besides the bishop and priests, deacons intervene in an extraordinary manner, and also, in the East, monks. St. Thomas also testifies to us to the usage of confessing to a layman, when a priest is lacking. But then, as is clear, what is had is not the sacrament but a certain sacramental. Several synods after the thirteenth century forbade deacons to impart absolution.

E. DE M., S. F.

Definition. The virtue of penance is a supernatural habit whereby a man is rendered prompt to grieve over a sin committed insofar as it is an offense against God, with a purpose of amendment.⁴

⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 85, aa. 1-3. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 434) gives the following definition: "Penance is a virtue tending toward the destruction of sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, by means of sorrow and satisfaction."

307. Explanation. It is said, first: penance is a supernatural habit, because, although a man even by natural powers and on account of natural motives can repent of sins committed, nevertheless such penance is neither a perfect virtue nor does it destroy the stain of sin. Hence the Council of Trent⁵ defined: "If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His assistance a man can ... repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema." The same Council⁶ and, after it, the Roman Catechism⁷ teach that a man arrives at the true virtue of penance through five supernatural movements or degrees, namely, there is required:

a) An act of divine mercy moving and illuminating us, according to that saying: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."⁸

b) An act of faith. For a man moved and illuminated by the merciful God must tend toward God through faith. For whoever wishes to approach God must believe that God exists and rewards human works.⁹

c) An act of fear. For a man, believing God to be the just avenger of crimes, is necessarily struck by fear of God angered and punishing.

d) An act of hope. For the sinner cannot approach God unless the hope of obtaining divine mercy and the remission of sins shines upon him.

e) An act of initial love. For a man believing in a God equally just and merciful is necessarily induced to love such a God. Moreover, no justification is possible for an adult man unless he wills to turn himself toward God and to be united with Him. Now such conversion and union include at least an imperfect act of love.

A man prepared by these five movements or degrees can elicit an act of true penance and thus be justified, his sins having been blotted out. Certainly it is not always required that these five movements or degrees be really distinct or separated before the act of true penance; but sometimes a man moved by divine grace elicits one formal act of penance which nevertheless virtually contains all the other requisites.

It is said, second: whereby a man is rendered prompt to grieve over a sin insofar as it is an offense against God. Therefore not every sorrow over sins committed is an act of the true virtue of penance, but only when sin is held in hatred as an offense against God; and therefore the formal object of penance is the offense or injury against God to be repaired. For example, sorrow over sins arising from the natural turpitude of sin or from its evil natural effects is not an act of true penance. It is not indeed necessary that the motive of penance be perfect love of God, but it is required that it be referred to God in some manner; for example, temporal or eternal punishments are a sufficient motive, not indeed as they are in themselves, but as they are to be inflicted by divine justice.

Finally it is said, third: with a purpose of amendment, because true sorrow for sin includes detestation of the past and a purpose of amendment for the future.

⁵ Session 6, can. 3, On Justification (Denz., n. 813).

⁶ Ibid., c. 6 (Denz., n. 798).

⁷ Part 2, c. 5, q. 7.

⁸ Lam. 5:21.

⁹ Cf. Heb. 11:6.

308. Acts of penance. From what has been said, it follows that several acts are contained in the virtue of penance, namely: a) hatred and detestation of sin; b) sorrow over the offense inflicted upon God; c) the will to destroy sin in us; d) the will to make satisfaction to God who has been injured; e) the will to avoid future sin. Commonly, however, only three acts included in penance are assigned: sorrow, detestation, and purpose.

309. The proximate subject of penance is the will.

For penance is a potential part of justice, which resides in the will, as was stated above, II, n. 70. Although other faculties of the soul concur in the act of penance, for example, memory represents the sin committed and its malice, and sorrow is sometimes felt in the body, nevertheless it belongs to the will to elicit and command the act of penance; and therefore the faithful are not to be disturbed if, when eliciting contrition, they do not sensibly perceive sorrow, as they say; for acts of the will are not always felt in the body.

310. The remote subject of penance is every man guilty of sin or at least capable of it.

Since penance is an infused virtue, it is in all who are in the state of sanctifying grace and who have sinned or at least can sin. Therefore it is also in baptized infants. In Gehenna there is no true penance, because true virtue does not exist there; but in heaven the virtue of penance remains in the blessed, insofar as they have displeasure over sins formerly committed and joy over the satisfaction rendered. Neither Christ nor probably the Blessed Virgin has the virtue of penance properly so called, since they were not capable of any sin.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cf. Billuart, De poenit., diss. 2, a. 2. Hence the Holy Office on July 5, 1893, deservedly proscribed the following formulas: "Penitent Heart of Jesus, penitent Jesus, Jesus doing penance for us."

311. The material object of penance is any actual personal sin insofar as it injures divine justice and accordingly demands satisfaction.

Hence penance properly concerns neither original sin nor the sins of others, because no one can retract anything except that which was done by his own personal will. In a broader sense, however, insofar as penance signifies detestation, someone can repent of all sins, just as Christ Himself also detested all sins. In this broader sense Christ can be said to have had the virtue of penance.

312. The formal object of penance is an expiable offense against God, or the divine right injured and reparable through satisfaction.

Penance therefore does not regard God as He is the supreme lovable good or as He is worthy of the highest worship, but as He is the supreme lord over all human actions, which therefore must be done according to His good pleasure. The sinner injures this right. The penitent repairs the same right. If these things are kept before the eyes, it is easily understood why St. Thomas and theologians commonly teach that penance is a special virtue, and not something intrinsically composite or a quality annexed to every virtue. For since penance has a special material and formal object, it must be a special virtue. St. Thomas¹¹ writes most rightly: "Penance, although it is directly a species of justice, nevertheless in some manner comprehends those things which pertain to all the virtues." Perhaps in no other virtue does the connection of all the virtues shine forth as it does in perfect penance. A truly penitent man exercises all the other virtues. Wherefore it is also easily understood why many truly penitent sinners, both men and women, arrived at great sanctity. The Angelic Doctor treats excellently of the virtue of penance in several articles of the Summa theologica, 3, q. 85.

¹¹ S. theol. 3, q. 85, a. 3 ad 4.

313. Necessity of the virtue of penance. Penance, either within or outside the sacrament, is necessary for all sinners by a necessity both of means and of precept.

a) Necessity of means. St. Thomas¹² says: "It is impossible for an actual mortal sin to be remitted without penance, speaking of penance which is a virtue"; and the Council of Trent¹³ defined: "Penance was necessary at every time for all men who had defiled themselves with some mortal sin in order to attain grace and justice." The Savior said: "Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish."¹⁴ The reason, however, is that mortal sin is essentially an aversion from God. Now this aversion must be destroyed through conversion to God or through detestation of sin, which is certainly penance. Cf., however, below, n. 346.

b) Necessity of precept. Penance is commanded by natural law, divine law, and ecclesiastical law alike. Natural law requires that injured justice be repaired. But sin injures justice by violating the honor due to God. The reparation of justice injured in this manner is made through penance. That penance is also necessary by a necessity of divine precept is evident from several texts of Sacred Scripture, for example: "Do penance, and be baptized every one of you.... Be penitent, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out."¹⁵ "Do penance therefore for this thy wickedness, and pray to God, that perhaps this thought of thy heart may be forgiven thee."¹⁶ Ecclesiastical law prescribing annual confession also commands penance.

¹² Ibid., q. 86, a. 2.

¹³ Session 14, c. 1, On Penance (Denz., n. 894).

¹⁴ Luke 13:5.

¹⁵ Acts 2:38 and 3:19.

¹⁶ Acts 8:22.

314. You will ask: When does the precept of penance oblige?

Theologians do not agree. The following things seem to be admitted: The precept of penance obliges per se and per accidens.

It obliges per accidens whenever some precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without true penance, for example, if a priest existing in the state of mortal sin must administer some sacrament, or if someone cannot otherwise overcome a grave temptation.

The precept of penance obliges per se at the moment of death or in grave danger of death, because then a sinful man must obtain the remission of sin; but it does not oblige immediately after sin has been committed. For although it is greatly to be counseled that a man repent as quickly as possible after sin has been committed, nevertheless neither natural law nor positive law contains a clear precept of this kind. Hence St. Thomas¹⁷ says: "It is not of the necessity of bodily salvation that medicine be sought immediately, except when the necessity of a cure presses; and it is similar with spiritual illness." The reason, however, is that the precept of penance is an affirmative precept which does not oblige at every time, but at a determinate time. Moreover, if someone were held under grave sin to repent immediately, then he would sin gravely as often as, while thinking about an obligation of this kind, he deferred penance, which certainly is asserted gratuitously and is taught by no one in practice.

Nevertheless, a notable delay of penance is a special and mortal sin. Thus holds the truer opinion against Cajetan, Durandus, and a few others. It seems at least that penance cannot be deferred beyond a year, since the precept of the Church concerning annual confession does not seem to anticipate the natural and divine obligation of penance. St. Alphonsus¹⁸ does not altogether acquiesce in this opinion, saying: "For the space of a year seems sufficiently notable to me that one who remains in mortal sin for so long a time could avoid the danger of easily relapsing into other sins. Nor is it valid to say that the Church determined the period of a year indiscriminately for all; for the Church determined this period only for the obligation of confession, but not of penance. I do not deny, however, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance because of inadvertence." Since, therefore, the Holy Doctor almost always excuses sinners from the grave special obligation of doing penance within a year, let the confessor indeed strongly counsel frequent penance, but let him not condemn for a special mortal sin those who have deferred penance until annual confession.

¹⁷ In IV Sent., dist. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 4 ad 2.

¹⁸ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 437.

315. Scholion. On resipiscence insufficient for penance. Luther taught that true penance is nothing other than resipiscence toward a good life. Against this error the Council of Trent¹⁹ declares "that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin and the purpose and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old life." And in truth, he who considers the cries of the penitent Psalmist and the Prophet, for example: "I have labored in my groaning; every night I will wash my bed,"²⁰ and: "I will recount to Thee all my years in the bitterness of my soul,"²¹ easily understands that they flowed from a certain vehement hatred of the life previously led and an immense detestation of sins. Wherefore St. Gregory aptly says: "To do penance is both to bewail the evils committed and not to commit the things that must be bewailed."²²

¹⁹ Session 14, c. 4, On Penance (Denz., n. 897).

²⁰ Ps. 6:7.

²¹ Isa. 38:15.

²² Book 2, Homily 34 on the Gospels, n. 15 (Migne, Patr. lat. 76, 1256).

The Sacrament of Penance is the virtue itself of penance elevated by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a Sacrament. Wherefore, we must speak: 1. of Penance as it is a virtue; 2. of Penance as it is a Sacrament.¹³

1644. DEFINITION. Penance is "a virtue tending to the destruction of sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, by means of sorrow and satisfaction."¹⁴

It is called a virtue, namely one which is referred to justice as a potential part, and is supernatural, as is clear from Trent, which teaches (sess. 6, can. 3) that without the grace of God man cannot repent as he ought; - tending to the destruction of sin, by which words the MATERIAL Object of penance is expressed, namely every sin, both mortal and venial, as to be destroyed or avoided; insofar as it is an offense of God, by which its FORMAL Object is shown, which is the reparation of the injured right of the divine Majesty; wherefore, he does not rightly repent who indeed sorrows for his sin, but without respect to the offense of God; by means of sorrow and satisfaction, which are the acts by which penance obtains its end, that is, peace with God. Moreover, sorrow for sin and detestation of it, with the desire of making satisfaction and the purpose of not sinning thereafter, pertains to the very essence of penance. - Nor therefore does a simple purpose of beginning a better life suffice; in this Luther erred, who affirmed that penance is contained in novelty of life alone, or reconsideration.¹⁵

DIVISION. Penance can tend to the destruction of sin in a twofold way: 1. through an act of perfect sorrow, which is also called contrition, and is detestation of sin from the motive of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things; 2. through an act of imperfect sorrow, which is also called attrition, and is detestation of sin from motives of an inferior order, for example from fear of eternal punishment.

1645. Principles. I. Through true penance ALL SINS can be destroyed. - This is of faith from Trent, sess. VI, cap. 14, and sess. XIV, cap. 1. But true penance, through which sins, whether mortal or venial, ARE REMITTED, is either perfect contrition, even outside the Sacrament, yet with the desire, at least implicit, of receiving it; or attrition, with real reception of the Sacrament. These things will be expounded more fully below (n. 1673). - Concerning the other effects of penance it will be said more conveniently where the effects of the Sacrament are treated (n. 1653).¹⁶

1646. II. Penance is altogether NECESSARY for all men who have defiled themselves with some mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice. This is of faith, from Trent (loc. cit.). But it is necessary: 1. BY NECESSITY OF MEANS: for since the offense of mortal sin proceeds from this, that the will of man is turned away from God through a turning toward some changeable good, it cannot be that the offense be remitted unless the will, through a true change, turns itself again to God, with detestation of the turning it had toward a changeable good, and with the purpose of amendment; both of which pertain to the notion of penance. - 2. BY NECESSITY OF PRECEPT, both natural, by which each one is bound to make satisfaction for an injury inflicted and to seek again the divine friendship, and positive, often mentioned in the sacred writings. St. Thomas suitably says to the point:¹⁷ "By natural reason man is moved to repent concerning the evils which he has done; but that man do penance in this or that way is from divine institution."

Nor yet is penance so necessary that it is always required explicitly; for accidentally implicit and virtual penance can suffice, such as is contained in an act of perfect love of God, for example if someone, forgetful of his sin, elicits an act of perfect charity.¹

1647. Questions. Q. 1. WHEN does the aforesaid precept of penance oblige?

Resp. The precept of reconciling oneself with God through penance obliges: 1. of itself in the article, or in probable danger, of death or of perpetual insanity, because then no other time is available for doing penance; 2. accidentally, when one who has fallen into mortal sin must administer a Sacrament, or receive some Sacrament of the living; likewise, when he suffers grave temptations which he judges himself unable to resist unless he elicits an act of contrition; - finally, when he is bound to elicit an act of charity toward God; for then, if the memory of sin occurs, he is bound to detest it. - But the precept of sanctifying Feasts does not import an obligation of contrition.²

Q. 2. Whether the precept of penance, outside danger of death or insanity, ever obliges OF ITSELF, so that its delay involves a special sin?

Resp. Many authors indeed affirm; but the denying opinion is probable, because, apart from a positive precept, for example annual confession, the time of penance is not determined, although it ought to be determined of itself by reason of an affirmative precept. - Hence St. Thomas teaches³ that final impenitence is not a special sin.

But accidentally, certainly he sins gravely who, existing in mortal sin, delays and procrastinates his conversion for a notable time; because he violates at least the precept of charity both toward God and toward himself, since St. Thomas teaches⁴ that it cannot be that a man without justifying grace keeps himself immune from new sin for a long time. - Hence, a delay of one month seems grave to St. Alphonsus, who adds: "Yet it is true that the rude with difficulty notice that obligation."⁵ (cf. 472, q. 2).

1648. Things to be noted beforehand. 1. Venial sin is never remitted in those contaminated by mortal sin; for the remission of any fault is founded in the friendship of God and in sanctifying grace. Hence the guilt of those venial sins will inhere in the damned eternally.

2. The remission of mortal sin can occur without the remission of venials; for venial sin does not conflict with sanctifying grace.

3. One venial sin can be remitted without other venials, namely if a man truly sorrows for one, and not for the rest. The contrary must be said of mortal sins, all of which conflict with habitual grace.

Questions. - Q. 1. Whether penance is required for the remission of venial sin?

Resp. Venial sin is never remitted without penance, whether formal, that is, express and explicit, or virtual and implicit, namely one which is contained in some supernatural act. - This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which universally requires penance for the abolition of any sin; and from the Doctors expressly affirming this;⁶ and finally from reason itself, which sanctions that he who sinned by his own will should not obtain pardon unless by his own will through penance he withdraws from sin.

Q. 2. What penance is required for the remission of venial sin EX OPERE OPERANTIS, or outside the Sacrament?

Resp. Several things must be distinguished: 1. If someone is guilty of mortal and venial sin at the same time, perfect contrition is required, which takes away both, as is gathered from the things noted beforehand. Yet not every act of contrition or charity takes away all venials, but only those to which it is opposed formally, or at least virtually. Hence the full remission of all venials is obtained only when the act of charity generally excludes affection for all venials, or when someone is so disposed that he wishes never to admit any venial sin, and sorrows, or would sorrow if it occurred to memory, for any one admitted. Thus commonly (cf. n. 471, 2).

2. If someone is guilty only of venials, an act of charity or of perfect contrition does not seem to be required; but more probably a motion of imperfect contrition suffices, for example prayer, by which pardon is humbly implored, or an act of some virtue which is repugnant to venial fault, or detestation of venials proceeding from consideration of their supernatural turpitude, for example because they are against the obedience owed to God, or elicited from the motive of hope. The reason is that, since venial sin conflicts neither with charity nor with habitual grace, it suffices that the disordered adhesion to a creature be removed from some supernatural motive and from a motion of actual grace.⁷

Q. 3. What penance is required for the remission of venial sin EX OPERE OPERATO, or through a Sacrament?

Resp. Distinguish. Remission can be obtained either in the Sacrament of Penance, or in other Sacraments. Now:

1. In the Sacrament of Penance, formal sorrow is required,⁸ so that the matter of the Sacrament be present (cf. n. 1659). But through this Sacrament are also remitted, more probably, venials involuntarily omitted,⁹ concerning which there is no formal or virtual complacency; for by the force of absolution, to which no obstacle is placed, there is conferred an increase of grace which of itself is remissive of sin; and besides, either in part or wholly, the punishment due to venials is remitted, if any remains.

2. In other Sacraments the matter proceeds otherwise. For: - 1. Baptism remits venials joined with original sin or with actual mortal sins, provided no obstacle is placed to this remission, that is, provided there is not a will actually or habitually adhering to venial sin. Thus commonly with St. Thomas.¹⁰ - 2. Extreme Unction likewise remits, according to a probable opinion, all venials, if they have in some way been retracted; for this Sacrament also was instituted to take away sins, as we shall see below (n. 1873). - 3. The Eucharist gives, ex opere operato, actual grace for exciting fervor, by which the just man obtains remission of venials (cf. n. 1513, 1). And the Sacrifice of the Mass produces this same effect, but only by way of impetration (n. 1591, 1). - 4. Whether other Sacraments also have a special power for the remission of venials is indeed uncertain, but the affirming opinion is more probable.

How venial sins are remitted through SACRAMENTALS, see what was said at n. 1441.

1649. DEFINITION. Penance is a Sacrament consisting in the acts of the penitent and in the absolution of the priest; - or, it is an external rite instituted by Christ, by which, through juridical absolution given by a priest, sins committed after Baptism are remitted to a contrite and confessed man, with competent satisfaction enjoined.

1650. Principles. I. There exists in the Church a SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, by which sins committed after Baptism are truly remitted. This is of faith from Trent (sess. 14, can. 1), defining thus: "If anyone shall say that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a Sacrament, instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling the faithful themselves to God, as often as they fall into sins after Baptism: let him be anathema." But the reason for this definition is clear; for Penance bears before itself everything which is required for the notion of a true Sacrament, namely a sensible and sacred sign, divine institution, and annexed grace, as will be clear from the words of Christ to be cited immediately.

1651. II. The Sacrament of Penance was instituted IN THE MANNER OF A JUDGMENT, in which the penitent is at once the accused and the accuser of himself, while the judge is the absolving priest. - This is clear from the words of the Savior (John 20:22-23): "Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose you shall retain, they are retained." By these words all the faithful of Christ who have fallen into fault are commanded to present themselves before this tribunal, so that through the sentence of priests, as often as they have sinned, they may be freed from the incurred guilt. Therefore it is clear that the Sacrament was instituted in the manner of a judgment. Hence Trent thus says (sess. 14, can. 9): "If anyone shall say that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act: let him be anathema."

1652. III. The Sacrament of Penance, either in reality or in desire, is NECESSARY for all who have fallen into mortal sin after Baptism, by necessity of PRECEPT, indeed also of MEANS. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 2, end), where it is said: "But this Sacrament of Penance is necessary for those fallen after Baptism, as Baptism itself is necessary for those not yet regenerated." Namely, thus from the positive ordinance of Christ, who mercifully conceded to those fallen after Baptism, or having suffered shipwreck, this second plank, by which they may safely, although laboriously, escape again from the abyss of perdition. - But that it is conceded as a single remedy and one necessarily to be taken, is clear from the words of Christ: I will give the keys... they are forgiven... they are retained; for keys would be given in vain if entrance lay open without their help; nor would sins be retained through the Church if remission of them could be obtained by another way.

We said either in desire, namely explicit or implicit; for as for those not yet baptized the desire of Baptism suffices for justification and salvation, which is called baptism of the Spirit, or of the love of God above all things, so also for the baptized after a fall the desire of the Sacrament of Penance suffices, included in perfect contrition, yet in such a way that, if afterward the Sacrament can be received, it is altogether necessary.¹¹ (Recall what was said at n. 1645 and 1646.)

But when the reception of this Sacrament is obligatory will be said below, where Confession is treated (n. 1683 sqq.).

1653. Questions. Q. 1. What are the EFFECTS of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. They are principally the following: 1. Sins are remitted, as to fault and eternal punishment, so perfectly that they never revive through a subsequent sin; and this is through the infusion of sanctifying grace. 2. Temporal punishment is remitted both by reason of absolution, and by reason of the satisfaction imposed by the confessor; and indeed in a greater or lesser degree, according to the disposition of the penitent. But never, Trent being witness, can we arrive at complete newness and integrity without great weepings and labors on our part, divine justice requiring this. 3. Good works previously done in charity, and mortified through sin, revive. 4. Sacramental grace is conferred, through which we pursue sin with always greater hatred and are more efficaciously preserved from it.

To these add many other SECONDARY EFFECTS which well-disposed penitents, indeed also the whole Christian society, obtain from this benefit of God.¹² On this matter see the Dogmaticians.

Q. 2. In what things does the SACRAMENT of Penance differ from the VIRTUE of penance?

Resp. Especially in these: 1. Penance, insofar as it is a virtue, is placed under the genus of habit; as it is a Sacrament, it is placed under sacred sign. 2. The virtue through its acts is a part of the Sacrament; but this is the whole itself, which, besides the acts of the virtue, also includes absolution. 3. The virtue requires, for causing justification, a perfect act or contrition; the Sacrament justifies even with attrition alone, as will be seen below. 4. The virtue is a cause of grace by way of disposition, and ex opere operantis; the Sacrament, by way of an instrumental efficient cause, and ex opere operato.¹³ (cf. n. 1659, end.)

1337. - Penance, considered generically, sounds the same as the sorrow of soul which anyone experiences after he has done or omitted something which he would wish had not been done or had not been omitted. But in the strict and proper sense penance is sorrow of soul, insofar as it is referred to God offended, and hostile to us.

I. Penance, as a virtue, is defined: A moral virtue inclining one to detestation of sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future, and of satisfying divine justice.

Penance was never not necessary to the sinner by necessity of means unto salvation. For it is altogether repugnant that an impenitent sinner be received by God into friendship.

It is also necessary by necessity of divine precept, as is clear from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, e.g. "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish," etc.¹

The effect of perfect penance, namely of that which leads to those acts of obedience by which, from His immense mercy, God Himself has revealed that He is placated and reconciled with sinful man, is twofold: 1° remission of sins, as is clear from countless places of Sacred Scripture; 2° remission of eternal punishment. For a justified man cannot be liable to eternal punishment. It is clear also from Trent.²

II. Penance, as a Sacrament, is defined: A Sacrament of the new law instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, to a contrite and confessing man sins committed after Baptism.

This Sacrament differs especially from the others in this, that it is administered after the manner of a judgment: for the penitent is present at once as accused, witness, and accuser; and the priest as judge pronouncing sentence.

1338. Points To Be Established. - I. Penance is a true Sacrament of the new law. See Dogmatics.

II. The Sacrament of Penance has the power:

1. Of remitting all sins committed after Baptism.

2. Of restoring infused virtues, yet according to the measure of disposition.

3. Of revivifying works made dead. See Dogmatics.

III. The necessary parts of the Sacrament of Penance are 1° contrition; 2° confession; 3° absolution; 4° satisfaction, insofar as it is to be accepted by the penitent. For the Sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a reconciling judgment; but this cannot be had without sorrowful confession of guilt, a disposition of soul for undergoing the satisfaction enjoined, and the absolution of the priest. - But satisfaction, insofar as it is to be imposed or fulfilled, is only an integral part of this Sacrament; because the primary effect, namely grace and the remission of sins as to guilt and eternal punishment, can be had without satisfaction.

IV. But the acts of the penitent required for the remission of sins are: 1° contrition; 2° confession; 3° satisfaction in the sense explained. This is clear from Trent.¹

V. The Sacrament of Penance is necessary - by necessity of precept in reality, and by necessity of means in desire, at least implicit - for remitting mortal sins committed after Baptism. Thus in the new law Christ the Lord, the supreme legislator and provider, has established by His divine goodness and providence.

Hence for those stained by mortal sin committed after Baptism, the Sacrament of Penance is necessary unto salvation at least by necessity of precept; but penance or contrition with the desire of the Sacrament, or with a serious purpose, at least implicit, of confessing sins when the opportune occasion has been given, is always necessary by necessity of means.

394. The fourth sacrament is Penance. - By the three prior sacraments we are born, strengthened, and nourished in the divine life of grace; these three are required of themselves. But the life of grace can be lost; then incidentally, not indeed for all but for those sinning, a sacramental remedy is necessary for recovering that life; and this is the sacrament of Penance. This sacrament has this as proper to it: that it is not confected from external matter which is applied to the subject, but is materially constituted from the very human acts of penitents. Whence by way of introduction one must speak of the act and virtue of Penance itself, "not only," as the Roman Catechism says, "because the faithful people ought to be instructed by pastors toward every kind of virtue, but also because the actions of this virtue furnish, as it were, the matter in which the sacrament of Penance is concerned; and unless first what the virtue of Penance is be rightly understood, it is also necessary that the force of the sacrament be unknown." Therefore let the discourse be made:

We shall speak in seven articles: 1. of the virtue of penance itself; 2. of its object; 3. of its distinction from other virtues; 4. of the acts of penance; 5. of its subject; 6. of its necessity; 7. of its relation with the sacrament.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 5 and 7; q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 1; suppl., q. 2, a. 3; q. 6, a. 5.

411. State of the question. - It is asked whether penance is necessary for justification and salvation. Something is said to be necessary for an end in two ways: insofar as it is commanded by a legitimate superior, or insofar as it is a means without which, if it is not employed, the end is not obtained; - whence this latter is so necessary that without it, even if it is omitted involuntarily and inculpably, the end absolutely cannot be obtained; on the contrary, the former is so prescribed that he who has omitted it voluntarily and culpably sins and therefore does not attain the end, but he who has omitted it involuntarily and inculpably can nevertheless attain the end. Now:

1. It is Catholic doctrine that penance in general, i.e., some detestation and retraction of sin, is necessary by necessity of means for justification and salvation, once mortal sin has been posited; but it was disputed whether a formal act of penance is required, or whether a virtual one suffices.

For a) the Scotists and Nominalists held that a virtual act of penance suffices, such as is contained in the act of perfect charity: for it is contradictory to love God above all things by a perfect act and to will sin above God; hence in the act of charity there is power for being contrite concerning sin, so that the act has the power of producing penance or perfect contrition. Whence it includes penance in desire. b) On the contrary, Thomists generally require a formal act of penance; some of these, such as Melchior Cano, think that it is always required without exception. c) Nevertheless, the more distinguished Thomists, conformably to the principles of St. Thomas, whom Suarez and many others also follow, say that a formal act is required per se when someone thinks about his sins, but that per accidens remission of sin can be obtained through virtual penance when someone, from forgetfulness or lack of consideration, does not think about his sins.1

2. The common opinion of theologians is that penance is also necessary by necessity of precept.

They say that only Fr. de Victoria contradicts this,2 who says that the texts of Scripture are to be understood of the necessity of means alone, which can exist without necessity of precept, since grace, although necessary for salvation, does not fall under a precept. Yet illogically: for when the necessary means is not something habitual or extrinsic to us, but our act, by that very fact it is also prescribed.

412. Thesis I. Once mortal sin has been posited, it is certain that an act of penance, at least virtual, is necessary in the present order of things by necessity of means for justification and salvation. - It is said:

a) It is certain; thus at least from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 1 and 4, sess. 6, c. 6 and 14, which speaks of formal penance, so that this is required at least per se and regularly.

b) In the present order, because several theologians think that God by absolute power can forgive sin and infuse grace without any act of penance or retraction of the sinner, but that He does not do this because it is not fitting to wisdom, justice, and holiness: we do not expressly exclude this opinion, although we judge it not true.

c) Once mortal sin has been posited, by which namely men are turned away from God the last end: for if the sin is only venial, penance, although desirable, is not necessary for justification and salvation.

It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures, which absolutely require penance, and so join salvation with penance that without it salvation cannot be had.

a) Thus frequently the Prophets, for example Jeremiah (XVIII, 8-10): "If that nation shall do penance from its evil, against which I have spoken, I also will repent of the evil which I thought to do to it...; if it shall do evil in my eyes, so that it does not hear my voice, I will repent of the good which I spoke to do to it" (cf. XXXI, 18-20; Joel II, 12-14). Likewise Ezekiel (XVIII, 21-32): "But if the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... he shall live with life and shall not die... but if the just man turns himself away from his justice, and does iniquity according to all the abominations which the wicked man is accustomed to work, shall he live? All his justices, which he had done, shall not be remembered; in the prevarication by which he has prevaricated, and in his sin which he has sinned, in them he shall die"; which penance is so necessary that, if the prophet has not warned him that it is to be done, nevertheless there will not be pardon for the wicked man without it (XXXIII, 8): namely, it is equally necessary as perseverance is for the just man for obtaining the reward (XXXIII, 12-16). Whence Eccli. II, 22 (in the Vulgate): "If we shall not do penance, we shall fall into the hands of the Lord."

b) Likewise Christ in the New Testament: "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish" (Luke XIII, 5; Matt. IV, 17; III, 2-8; Luke III, 8).

c) Whence also the Apostles promulgated penance as necessary, both for Baptism (Acts II, 38): "Do penance and let every one of you be baptized... unto the remission of your sins," and for the remission of sin (Acts III, 19): "Therefore repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out" (cf. VIII, 22; XI, 18 and Apoc. II, 5).

By all these things penance appears as a necessary condition that sins be blotted out. Therefore penance, in the present order, is joined with the remission of sin and salvation as means with end.

2. From Tradition, which is established from the history of the primitive Church concerning penitential discipline.

Not only Tertullian, in the treatise On Penance, and Chrysostom, in the book On Compunction, and in homily 9 On Penance (cf. hom. 4 and 11), are wholly engaged in inculcating the necessity of penance; but the same doctrine is already found in the Shepherd of Hermas, mand. IV, 2-3; simil. VII, 4 and 6; Justin, in the dialogue with Trypho n. 141; Irenaeus, Against Heresies I, 13, and Cyprian, On the Lapsed, and ep. 31. Later it is found in Ambrose, ep. 28 (otherwise 51); On Penance II, 10; On the Fall of a Virgin 33-34; Augustine, on Ps. XXX, 5 and in ep. 50 to Boniface; Gregory, hom. 20 on the Gospel, etc. The Council of Trent ratified this doctrine, as we have said.

3. From theological reason: On the one hand, sin is imputed to man until he has retracted it; - on the other hand, God cannot forgive sin to which man adheres habitually, and cannot love except him whom He renders intrinsically worthy of His love. Therefore He cannot justify a sinner without an immutation of this man's will, i.e., unless he wills, unless, having been voluntarily turned away from God, he is also voluntarily converted to God with detestation of the aforesaid aversion and with the purpose of amending. But this is penance (q. 84, a. 5, ad 2; q. 86, a. 2).

There is added the reason of fittingness. A sinner cannot be saved unless he has first obtained from God the remission of his sin. But without penance God cannot, at least fittingly, remit sins: for wisdom forbids that He reconcile to Himself or receive into friendship one whom He knows to be voluntarily turned away from Himself and obstinate in the love of sin; namely, it forbids that by His manner of acting He foster sin; - justice demands that what was injured be repaired, and prohibits that offense be remitted without some reparation; - holiness likewise forbids that God unite to Himself something impure still adhering to sin. Now he who has gravely sinned remains turned away from God, at least habitually, until he does penance; nor does he repair, as far as he can, the offense inflicted upon God, but he perseveres in it, and continues to adhere to sin. Therefore God cannot remit sin, His attributes being considered, unless the sinner converts himself to God through an act of penance, and therefore without penance the sinner cannot be saved.¹

¹ Tanquerey, On Penance, n. 9, 2.

413. Thesis II. An act of penance, once mortal sin has been posited, is also necessary by necessity of natural and divine precept. - This is the common opinion, from which it seems rash to recede.

It is proved:

1. From the Scriptures in which, as we said in the preceding number, God, by declaring the necessity of penance so emphatically, so insistently, so many repeated times, and by threatening the impenitent with very grave punishments, manifests clearly enough that He wills and commands that all are bound to do penance.

Moreover a) with Scripture as witness, he who refuses to repent is convicted of disobedience, and indeed grave disobedience, since he is punished with a grave punishment: "Because I called and you refused, I stretched out my hand and there was none who regarded,... I also will laugh in your destruction" (Prov. I, 24-33; cf. Is. I, and Jer. XVIII).

Besides b) Christ and the Apostles preached penance under the form of a precept: "From that time Jesus began to preach and to say... Do penance; for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near" (Matt. IV, 17). "Do penance and let every one of you be baptized"; "Therefore repent, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts II, 38; III, 19).

2. By reason: a) By force of justice toward God: each one is bound, by force of natural justice, to repair and compensate an injury inflicted upon another; but man, through mortal sin, has inflicted a grave injury upon God; therefore, from the natural precept of justice, he is bound to do penance in order to compensate this injury.

b) By force of charity toward God and toward oneself: By the very fact that we are obliged to love God above all things, by that very fact, if we have sinned, we are bound to retract the sin which is opposed to the love of God, and thus from natural right, because from natural right we are bound to love God above all things. Similarly, once the ordination of God granting pardon to penitents has been posited, reason dictates, on account of right love of ourselves, that the necessary and unique means to salvation not be neglected.

And thus we are obliged from the virtue itself and the special precept of penance. For the special justice which intervenes between offended God and us, and which is called penance, requires that the object directly opposed to it, namely, the injury inflicted upon God through sin, be repaired and removed insofar as it is an obstacle to the last end, God, who is the last end simply insofar as He is the highest Good in Himself, and our last end insofar as He is our highest good.²

² An infused virtue, since it is essentially a means to the last end, obliges per se, when it is per se a necessary means for justification and salvation. Therefore it obliges not per accidens, but per se, to remove that which is directly opposed to or obstructs the last end.

414. The precept of penance is not negative but affirmative, and therefore it does not oblige for always or for each single moment, but at some time and at a suitable time. - Therefore it does not oblige immediately after the sin has been committed, both because such an obligation is not of the nature of an affirmative precept, and because neither the faithful nor confessors are conscious of such an obligation. And although the sinner ought immediately to desist from sin and from the actual affection of sinning, nevertheless he need not immediately do penance. But:

A. The virtue itself and the precept of penance obliges per se, i.e., in circumstances common to the condition of all sinners:

1. at the article of death, and also in a very probable danger of death (from war, difficult childbirth, dangerous navigation, etc.) or of perpetual insanity; otherwise it would never oblige, since the whole reason of the obligation is reconciliation with God and eternal salvation, which in this case is exposed to proximate danger;

2. also sometimes in life, because he who gravely offends God and for a long time neglects reconciliation seems to neglect and contemn God Himself, whence an excessive delay of conversion is gravely reprehended in the Scriptures (Eccli. V, 8-9; Rom. II, 4-5);

3. indeed not only once (as is also prescribed by ecclesiastical precept), but probably even several times in a year, as we also said concerning charity (I, n. 972).

This is drawn from the doctrine concerning the necessity of habitual grace for observing the whole law and for avoiding mortal sin (I-II, q. 109, a. 4; De Ver. q. 24, a. 12). Ordinarily, namely, the sinner through the whole year will not abstain from a new sin; not indeed from a lack of sufficient strength, but because he who is turned away from the end easily acts against the end, and he who is turned toward a contrary end often works for the sake of that end, according as Gregory says (Mor. XXV, c. 9): "For sin which penance does not wash away, by its own weight soon draws one to another." For each one works according to that end which he loves and intends; nor is he accustomed to choose for himself difficult means toward another end which he loves less. Therefore, since through mortal sin someone puts the love of a created good before love of God and of the law, it cannot happen that, although he retains some affection toward God and toward his own salvation, from that weak affection he overcome the difficulties which are found in all the commandments occurring over a long time, unless with his whole soul he efficaciously prefer his own salvation and God Himself to all other things. But this is efficacious retraction or penance (cf. I-II, q. 109, a. 8; De Verit. q. 24, a. 12).

But the time at which the precept obliges cannot be determined more exactly, but varies according to various individuals, temptations, and internal or external circumstances.

B. The virtue itself and the precept of penance obliges per accidens, i.e., on the occasion of some special circumstance, for example:

1. when someone wills to manifest penance externally, for otherwise that manifestation would be simulation;

2. when he must or wills to receive the sacrament of penance itself.

Penance can be considered simply as a virtue, and as a sacrament. If it is considered in the first way, it is defined: A moral virtue inclining to detestation of sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice. - I said, insofar as it is an offense of God, that is, insofar as it brings injury to God and harms His rights over man; but not insofar as it offends the supreme goodness and perfection of God considered in itself: for this pertains to contrition perfected by charity. Hence most theologians after St. Thomas teach that penance, as it is a particular virtue, pertains to justice, by which man renders to God what is His. - Cf. St. Thom. 3, q. 85, art. 3.

But if Penance is considered as a sacrament, it is defined: A sacrament of the new law, instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting through priestly absolution sins committed after Baptism to a contrite and confessed man. - Moreover concerning the truth, necessity, and constitutive parts of this sacrament, the following things must be held:

I. Penance is a true and properly so called sacrament of the new law, and by force of divine institution it has the power of remitting all sins committed after Baptism. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 1, where it is said: "If anyone shall say that, in the Catholic Church, Penance is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for the faithful, as often as they fall into sins after Baptism, to be reconciled to God Himself, let him be anathema." - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 13, p. 155.

II. The sacrament of Penance is necessary by necessity of means, in reality or, if it cannot be received in reality, at least in implicit desire, for remitting mortal sins committed after Baptism. This is clear from the Council of Trent, which in sess. 14 declared these two things, namely in chap. 2: "But this sacrament of Penance is necessary unto salvation for those fallen after Baptism, as Baptism itself is for those not yet regenerated"; and in chap. 4: "The Holy Synod teaches that, although it sometimes happens that contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament [of Penance] is actually received; nevertheless this reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it." - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 26, p. 197.

III. The parts of the sacrament of Penance are contrition, confession, absolution, and satisfaction. For the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a reconciliatory judgment: but this judicial reconciliation is situated essentially, on the part of the penitent, in the sorrowful accusation of sins, that is, in contrition and confession; on the part of the priest bearing the place of Christ, in the remission of the same sins through absolution; but it is perfected and completed by satisfaction, by which the guilt of temporal punishment also is removed. Therefore satisfaction, insofar as it must be fulfilled, is only an integral part of this sacrament; because the primary effect, namely grace and remission of sins as to fault and eternal punishment, can be had without satisfaction. Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 18, p. 227.

I. QUESTION I. What is penance taken generally? ANSWER. The word penance extends widely. First, it signifies grief for anything whatsoever, whether good or evil, which a man would wish otherwise. Second, it is a grief conceived for a crime perpetrated, not for God's sake but for one's own, such as was the grief of Esau. Third, it is grief for sin, for this reason, that it is an offence of God.

II. Three things among theologians penance includes. First, a repentance of and a change from the former life. Second, a grief for and detestation of the same life. Third, a punishment which the sinner imposes upon himself, or willingly bears when imposed upon him, that he may satisfy God.

III. One penance is true, which is an inward grief of soul for a sin perpetrated, conceived for God's sake, with a detestation of the past and a purpose of a better life, joined with a deliberation of satisfying. The other is false, by which a man is afflicted not for God's sake but for his own — suppose because sins generate infamy or temporal loss. Again, one true penance is interior, which is the virtue of penance already described; the other exterior, which is the sacrament itself of the new law instituted by Christ.

IV. Penance is a true virtue. Since those things which are commanded by God pertain to virtue. But penance is frequently commanded by God, Matthew 3: Do penance. … Bring forth fruit worthy of penance. Again, Luke 6: Do penance. See St. Thomas, III, q. 85, art. 1.

V. This virtue of penance is infused, as is gathered from the holy Scriptures, and Trent defined, session 6, canon 3: If anyone shall say that without the preventing inspiration of the Holy Ghost and his help a man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema. This virtue of penance was at every time necessary to those who had sinned, with the necessity of means and of divine precept, as Trent defined, session 14, chapter 1.

VI. QUESTION II. By how many degrees is one to arrive at the virtue of penance? ANSWER. Six are numbered by theologians. First, God's operation converting us. Second, the motion of faith. Third, the motion of servile fear. Fourth, the motion of hope. Fifth, the motion of charity. Sixth, the motion of filial fear. Which doctrine St. Thomas explains, III, q. 85, art. 5, and Trent, session 6, chapter 6.

VII. QUESTION III. What are the effects of penance? ANSWER. First, it is the remission of all sins. Second, it is the remission of eternal punishment. The temporal punishment nevertheless is not always wholly remitted. Venial sins also are remitted. Sins once remitted by penance do not absolutely and simply revive through a subsequent sin perpetrated after penance. They return nevertheless in a certain respect, says St. Thomas, III, q. 88, art. 1, inasmuch as they are contained virtually in the subsequent sin. Wherefore the malice of the subsequent sin is so much the graver, the more and the more heinous were the sins remitted by penance. Through penance we also recover the virtues lost, not nevertheless always in an equal degree, but according to the greater or lesser fervour of the penitent.