On the Virtue of Penance (Preliminaries)

1. Object. The spiritual life which is conferred in Baptism, strengthened through Confirmation, and nourished in sacred Communion, can be lost through mortal sin and sometimes is lost; but it is repaired through the Sacrament of Penance, which for that reason is deservedly called the Sacrament of Reconciliation, the second plank offered to the sinner after shipwreck, and a laborious baptism, which cleanses us from sin only by arduous labors.

Penance is at once an act, a virtue, and a sacrament. Right reason shows that some act of penance is necessary after sin has been committed. For the injury inflicted upon God must be repaired; moreover, after the grave sinful act has passed, man remains turned away from the last end until he is freed from sin by penance. Therefore, even before the Sacrament of Penance had been instituted, some act of penance was required for recovering justification lost through mortal sin.¹

¹ To the point, the Council of Trent says (sess. XIV, chap. 1): "Penance was indeed necessary, at every time, for all men who had defiled themselves with any mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice, even for those who had asked to be washed by the Sacrament of Baptism; so that, after perversity had been cast off and amended, they might detest so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and pious sorrow of soul."

For exercising acts of penance, according to the common opinion, there is infused into the justified the virtue of penance, which inclines us to detestation and expiation of sin.

Besides this, Christ instituted a Sacrament by which, once certain acts of penance have been placed, and by means of priestly absolution, sins committed after Baptism are remitted.

2. Division. We shall treat of this Sacrament in this Treatise, with a few preliminary matters, however, concerning the virtue of penance.

There will be two parts: in the former, which is chiefly dogmatic, we shall set forth the divine institution and nature of the Sacrament of Penance; in the latter, which is moral, we shall explain the duties of the penitent and of the confessor; in an Appendix, we shall hand down a few things concerning Indulgences, by which the temporal punishment owed to sin is diminished or taken away.

Dogmatic part:

• Concerning the power of the keys granted to the Church.
• Concerning the acts of the penitent required for the exercise of this power.
• Concerning the Sacrament itself: concerning matter and form; concerning effects.

Moral part:

• Duties of the penitent: contrition; confession; satisfaction.
• Concerning the confessor: concerning his power; concerning his duties.

Appendix: concerning Indulgences.

Before we treat of the Sacrament of Penance, a few things must be noted beforehand concerning the virtue of penance: 1. concerning its notion; 2. concerning its necessity. For, even after the Sacrament has been instituted, it is necessary to exercise acts of penance both within and outside the sacred tribunal.

3. 1. Etymological notion. Penance, according to most ancient authors, is derived from the words poenam tenere, "to hold punishment," and therefore designates the act by which we undergo punishment in order to make satisfaction for sins.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85; Suarez, de Paenitent., disp. I and VII; Morinus, Commentar. in admin. Paenitentiae, bk. I, chs. 1-2; Billuart, diss. II; Billot, De Paenit., thesis 6; L. de San, de Paenit., P. 1, chs. 1-6; Pesch, n. 87 ff.

More truly, however, more recent authors say that penance takes its origin from poena, or penitus, and etymologically designates something inward, which affects the heart itself.¹

¹ Cf. M. Breal and A. Bailly, Dictionnaire etymol. latin, Paris, 1898, p. 240.

Among profane authors, this word especially signifies three things: (a) an interior sense of weariness or displeasure; thus in Cicero, in the book On Old Age, it is said: "If, therefore, he had lived a hundredth year, would he be weary of his old age?" (b) sorrow because of a deed previously admitted, whether good or evil: "We are accustomed to say paenitere then, when the things which we ourselves have done, or which have been done by our will and our counsel, afterwards begin to displease us, and we change our judgment concerning them";² (c) sorrow conceived concerning some crime or delict: "We see King Alexander," says Cicero,³ "who, when he had slain Clytus, his familiar friend, scarcely kept his hands from himself: so great was the force of repenting!"

² Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic., bk. XVII, ch. 1.

³ Cicero, in IV Tuscul. quaest.

In this last sense the sacred authors very often use the word penance, inasmuch as it signifies sorrow of the soul concerning a sin committed.

4. 2. Theological notion. Penance, whose scope is to repair the injury inflicted upon God through sin, is defined: a supernatural and moral virtue inclining the sinner to detestation of his own sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, and to a firm purpose of amendment and satisfaction.

In this definition four things are chiefly included: the nature, object, acts, and subject of this virtue.

(A) The nature of penance, which is: (a) a supernatural virtue. Speculatively and in itself there could be a natural habit of penance, acquired by repeated acts; but in fact penance in Christians must be supernatural. For they have been raised to a supernatural state, and therefore they can repent as they ought only under the influence of actual grace and from a supernatural motive known by revelation. Indeed, according to the more common opinion, this virtue is supernaturally infused, together with the other virtues, at the very instant at which the soul is justified.

(b) And moral, not theological: for it is not immediately concerned with God, nor is it founded upon one of the divine attributes; but it is concerned with sin insofar as it is amendable, and its motive is the honesty of expiation or satisfaction to be shown to God who has been offended.

(B) The object is twofold: (a) the material object, or that concerning which penance is concerned, is any personal sin whatever, insofar as it violates divine right and therefore must be destroyed and repaired by suitable satisfaction. Hence there is no penance properly so called concerning original sin, nor concerning the sins of others; for that alone can properly be retracted which was committed by one's own will. But penance taken broadly, insofar as it is hatred and detestation of sin, can be concerned with the sins of others, since we are bound to pursue them with hatred. In this sense Christ was penitent, insofar as He hated our sins and made satisfaction for them.

(b) The formal object or motive of this virtue is the honesty which is found in repairing an offense inflicted upon God. This is the special or proper motive, so to speak, of penance. Nevertheless, an act of detestation of sin can arise from other motives: of charity, gratitude, hope, fear of God, etc., because sin is opposed to these various virtues.

(C) The proper acts of penance are detestation and sorrow for sin committed, the purpose of not sinning thereafter, and satisfaction, or at least the will of making satisfaction.¹ In a broader sense, all those acts by which sin is repaired can be called acts of penance, for example prayer, fasting, self-denial, and other acts of the virtues, insofar as they are orderable to making satisfaction for sin.

¹ The genesis of these acts can be understood thus: when first the sinner apprehends the sin committed as evil, the will abominates and detests it, because it is evil; then he notices that this evil is present to himself, in itself or in its effects, and he grieves over it; but he cannot sincerely grieve over sin unless he firmly wills to avoid it in the future; and furthermore, since the past evil must be repaired, there now arises spontaneously the will of making satisfaction, as is explained below.

(D) The remote subject of penance is any man guilty of sin or capable of sin; for the act of penance properly so called indeed presupposes an act of sin, but the habit by which a man is rendered prompt for grieving over his own sin can be found in all who are capable of sin, since they ought to be prompt for grieving over sin, if perhaps it has been committed.

The proximate subject is the will, because hatred of sin is an act by which the will is turned away from sin; but this act of the will presupposes previous cognition by the intellect, by which sin is apprehended as evil; furthermore it often flows into the sensitive appetite, causing there sensible sorrow or sadness; but the will remains the proper seat of penance.

5. 3. Controversy concerning the nature of this virtue. (A) All theologians concede that penance is a virtue, but some have denied that it is a special virtue. A few, such as William of Auxerre and F. Mayronius, taught that sins are detested not through a special virtue, but through the virtue to which they are opposed; for example, intemperance is detested through the virtue of temperance. Others, such as Durandus, said that penance is nothing other than charity, insofar as it grieves over sin as an offense against God. Some, after Cajetan, maintained that penance is a complex of three virtues: charity, which hates sin; religion, which by confessing sins acknowledges the dominion of God; and vindicative justice, which furnishes satisfaction.

(B) Nevertheless, theologians commonly teach, after St. Thomas, that penance is a special virtue. For there is a special virtue where there occurs a praiseworthy act elicited because of a special motive or formal object; but the act of repenting is certainly a praiseworthy act, since it tends toward the destruction of past sin, and it is elicited because of a special motive, namely because sin is an offense against God. For this motive extends itself to all sins and differs from the motive of other virtues, and therefore it is a special motive. Therefore penance is a special virtue.

This virtue, moreover, is referred to commutative justice, not indeed as a subjective part, but as a potential part;¹ for through it the sinner in some way repairs the injustice committed against God, not indeed according to perfect equality, but in the best way possible. St. Thomas explains this thus (3, q. 85, a. 3): "Justice simply so called is between equals, because justice is a certain equality... But justice in a certain respect is said to be that which exists between those of whom one is under the power of the other, as a servant under a master, a son under a father, a wife under a husband. And such justice is considered in penance. Hence the penitent has recourse to God with the purpose of amendment, as a servant to a master, according to that:¹ 'As the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters, so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until he have mercy on us'; and as a son to a father, according to that:² 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee'; as a wife to a husband, according to that:³ 'Thou hast committed fornication with many lovers; nevertheless return to me, saith the Lord.'"

¹ The subjective parts of some virtue are, as it were, the species into which it is divided, or the parts which fully participate in the nature of that virtue; potential or annexed parts are those which are ordered to certain secondary acts and do not have the whole nature of this virtue, but only something of its perfection. But although penance is a certain species of justice, it participates in something of the other virtues, as is excellently declared by St. Thomas (q. 85, a. 3, ad 4): "Penance is with faith in the Passion of Christ, through which we are justified from sins, and with hope of pardon, and with hatred of vices, which pertains to charity. But insofar as it is a moral virtue, it participates in something of prudence, which is directive of all virtues; but from the very notion of justice, it has not only that which belongs to justice, but also those things which belong to temperance and fortitude, insofar as, namely, it abstains from those things which cause delight, which pertains to temperance, and bears hard things, which pertains to fortitude."

¹ Psalm 122:2.

² Luke 15:21.

³ Jeremiah 3:1.

6. 4. False notion of the Protestants. (A) It is set forth. This flows from the way in which they conceive sin and justification. Since man, according to Luther, sins necessarily, penance properly does not consist in a change of will, which remains evil, but in a change of feeling (sentiment) in relation to God; namely, the feeling of terror, struck into him once sin has been recognized, is changed into faith or confidence by which one believes that sins are forgiven to him on account of Christ, and thus he is justified.

Calvin, however, corrected this notion, asserting that penance is the beginning of a new life arising from confidence, or "a true conversion of our life to God, proceeding from a sincere and serious fear of God, which consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man and in the vivification of the spirit."⁴

⁴ Calvin, Institutes, bk. III, ch. 3, n. 4.

Both contend that no satisfaction must be paid to God, since Christ has abundantly made satisfaction for us.

Modern Protestants, however, coming nearer to the Catholic truth, admit that the beginning of a new life is a prior condition for justification, and that true penance embraces humble confession of the delict before God, horror of the sin committed, and amendment of life.¹

¹ Cf. Bovon, Morale chretienne, Lausanne, 1897, vol. I, pp. 224-237.

7. (B) The Lutherans are refuted. Genuine and salutary penance is not only the purpose of a new life, but also the detestation of sins committed. This is certain.

(a) For whatever may be said concerning the etymological meaning of the words paenitentia or metanoia,² it is certain from biblical usage that words of this kind signify not only a simple change of counsel, but also detestation of the past life. Thus, for example, pious Job said: "I have spoken unwisely... therefore I reprehend myself, and do penance in dust and ashes";³ again the Psalmist says: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise";⁴ nor do the Prophets speak otherwise: "Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities... and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit."⁵ Now in these and similar texts, besides a change of life, there is found detestation of sin; for what is it to reprehend oneself, to have a contrite heart, to do penance for sins, etc., if not to detest the past life? Moreover, St. Paul, addressing the penitent Corinthians, explicitly commemorates sadness as an element of true penance:⁶ "Now I rejoice, not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance... For the sorrow that is according to God works penance unto steadfast salvation."

² The word metanoia (meta, beyond or after; nous, mind) etymologically has the same sound as "trans-mentation," or change of mind; but from usage among both sacred and profane authors, it also signifies sadness and sorrow concerning the past, as is clear from lexicons even edited by Protestants, Schleusner, Robinson, Thayer, etc. Cf. Morinus, op. cit., bk. I, ch. 2. The same can be said of the word paenitentia; for from what was said above, this word sometimes signifies displeasure; this is confirmed from these verses of Ovid (bk. I de Ponto, Elegy I): "I repent: oh! if any trust is given to the wretched; I repent, and I myself am tormented by my deed."

³ Job 42:3-6.

⁴ Ps. 50:19.

⁵ Ezek. 18:30 ff.

⁶ 2 Cor. 7:9-10.

(b) Reason itself agrees: for he who comes to his senses, and changes his life for the better recalls his counsel for this reason: because he understands that the former life is evil; for why would he lead a new life unless he saw that the former one was contrary to equity? But just as we are bound to love the good, so also to hate evil, especially if it has been committed by us. Therefore penance imports detestation of sin. Moreover, reconciliation with an offended person requires more than cessation of the injury; for one who asks pardon from men must first manifest detestation and sorrow for the injury previously inflicted, so that, moved by this sorrow, the offended person may be willing to pardon the injury. In the same way, therefore, the sinner must conduct himself with God.

8. 1. State of the question. The question concerns fallen man, or the sinner, and concerns both the necessity of means and the necessity of precept. That is necessary by necessity of means which is a means, and indeed a necessary means, of justification and therefore of salvation, without which, consequently, even if it is inculpably omitted, salvation cannot be obtained. That is necessary by necessity of precept which is so prescribed that its omission, if culpable, is a sin, but if inculpable, does not harm salvation. (a) Now all Catholics teach that penance in general, that is, some detestation and retraction of sin, is necessary by necessity of means, once mortal sin has been posited; the controversy is only whether a formal act of penance is required, or whether a virtual act suffices, such as is contained in an act of perfect charity. The Scotists maintain that a virtual act of penance suffices; many Thomists think that a formal act is required. Suarez, however, distinguishes, saying that a formal act is required per se when someone thinks of his sins, but that remission of sin can per accidens be obtained by a virtual act of penance when, through forgetfulness or lack of consideration, someone does not think of his sins. We embrace this opinion as the more probable.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 2; Suarez, disp. IX and XV; Salmanticenses, disp. IV, dub. 2; disp. V, dub. 6; Drouin, q. I, ch. 3; Palmieri, thesis 7; de Augustinis, thesis 11; Sasse, thesis 6.

(b) Victoria² denies that there is a special precept of repenting, and therefore denies that impenitence is a special sin. For the texts of Scripture, he says, must be understood of the necessity of means, which is not always joined with a precept: thus, for example, sanctifying grace, although necessary for salvation, does not fall under a precept. But this opinion is commonly rejected by theologians.

² Tr. de Septem Sacram., q. 121.

9. 2. Thesis: Supposing mortal sin, it is certain that at least a virtual act of penance is necessary by necessity of means in the present order of things; it is commonly held that the same is necessary by necessity of precept. I said: once mortal sin has been posited, by which, namely, we are turned away from God, the last end; if the sin is only venial, penance, although desirable, is not necessary for salvation. I said also: in the present order, because some theologians think that God can, by His absolute power, pardon sin and infuse grace without any act of the sinner; but, considering His attributes, especially wisdom, justice, and holiness, He cannot.

(A) As to the necessity of means. (a) Scripture. For that is necessary by necessity of means which is so joined with the end that without it the end cannot be obtained; but, once grave sin has been posited, salvation is so joined with penance that without it salvation cannot be had, as is gathered from these and similar testimonies: "If that nation shall repent of its evil, against which I have spoken, I also will repent of the evil which I thought to do to it... if it shall do evil in my eyes, so that it does not hear my voice, I will repent of the good which I have spoken that I would do to it";¹ "But if the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... he shall live by life and shall not die... but if the just man shall turn himself away from his justice and shall do iniquity according to all the abominations which the wicked man is accustomed to work, shall he live? All his justices which he had done shall not be remembered; in the prevarication by which he has prevaricated, and in his sin which he has sinned, in them he shall die."² Nor is it otherwise in the New Testament: "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish";³ "Do penance, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,"⁴ as if it were said: the necessary condition that your sins be blotted out is that you do penance. Therefore, in the present order, penance is joined with the remission of sin as a means with the end.

¹ Jer. 18:8-10.

² Ezek. 18:21-27.

³ Luke 13:5.

⁴ Acts 3:19.

(b) Tradition. From the Council of Trent cited above: "Penance was indeed necessary, at every time, for all men who had defiled themselves with any mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice." From this it follows that penance is necessary by necessity of means, since at every time, even before a positive law had been established, it was required for the remission of sin.

(c) Theological reason. The sinner cannot be saved unless he has first obtained from God the remission of his sin; but without penance God cannot remit sins. For wisdom forbids that He reconcile to Himself and receive into His friendship one whom He knows to be voluntarily turned away from Himself and obstinate in the love of sin: for this would be nothing other than to foster and reward sin itself. Moreover, justice forbids that an offense be remitted without some reparation; holiness forbids that He unite to Himself something impure still adhering to sin. Now one who has gravely sinned, even from frailty, remains turned away from God, at least habitually, until he repents, and does not repair, as far as he can, the offense inflicted upon God, but perseveres in it and continues to adhere to sin. Therefore God cannot remit sin, considering His attributes, unless the sinner turns himself to God through an act of penance; therefore without penance the sinner cannot be saved.

10. (B) As to the necessity of precept. (a) Scripture. The texts adduced already demonstrate the matter; for God, by declaring the necessity of penance so emphatically and by threatening the gravest punishments to the impenitent, manifests clearly enough that He wills all to be bound to do penance. Furthermore, according to the testimony of Scripture, one who refuses to repent is convicted of disobedience, and indeed of grave disobedience, since he is punished with a grave penalty: "Because I called and you refused, I stretched out my hand, and there was none who regarded... I also will laugh in your destruction."¹ Moreover, Christ preached penance under the form of a precept: "From that time Jesus began to preach and to say: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."² In vain, however, is it objected that grace, although necessary for salvation, does not fall under a special precept; for grace is not a virtue, but a means to virtue, and therefore it is not directly prescribed; but penance is a special virtue, from what has been said, and therefore falls under a precept.

¹ Prov. 1:24-33.

² Matt. 4:17.

(b) Reason. Each person is bound, by force of justice, to repair an injury inflicted upon another; but man, through mortal sin, has inflicted a grave injury upon God; therefore, from the precept of justice, he is bound to compensate this injury by doing penance. Another reason is added: everyone is commanded to have care for his spiritual salvation; but the sinner cannot save his soul unless he repents of grave sins; therefore by force of charity toward himself he is bound to do penance.³

³ From this St. Thomas infers (3 p., q. 84, a. 7, c. and ad 1) that penance is prescribed by natural law: "For by natural reason man is moved to repent of the evils which he has done, but that he do penance in this or that way is from divine institution."

11. First, the precept of repenting can be considered as negative and affirmative: insofar as it is negative, it forbids one to take complacency in his sins; in this sense it obliges always and for always. Insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that one grieve over sins committed; and then it obliges at the opportune time, both per se, that is, by force of the virtue itself of penance, and per accidens, or by force of another precept which one is bound to fulfill.

(A) Per se, (a) it does not oblige immediately after sin has been committed. For a precept of this kind is affirmative, from what has been said; but it belongs to the nature of an affirmative precept that it does not oblige immediately and for always, but at a determined time, namely when the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, if it obliged immediately, one who did not immediately do penance would thereby sin, and would commit a new sin as often as, conscious of this obligation, he did not repent; but this is opposed to the common sense of the faithful, who by no means accuse themselves of these sins, and of confessors, who do not ask about them.

12. (b) It certainly obliges, however, in the article of death, or even in a very probable danger of death or of perpetual madness; for then each person is bound, by reason of justice toward God and charity toward himself, to be reconciled with God and to provide for his salvation, since otherwise either certainly or very probably no other opportune time remains.

(c) More probably, it also obliges sometimes during life. Thus more commonly against Durandus, Cajetan, Vasquez, and a few others, who contend that no time can be assigned within which this precept obliges outside the article of death. For excessive delay of conversion is gravely reprehended by the sacred authors: "Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer not from day to day: for his wrath shall come suddenly, and in the time of vengeance he will destroy thee";¹ "But according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath."² Moreover, delay of conversion is dangerous to salvation, because it easily induces into new sins,³ renders merit de condigno impossible, and exposes one to the danger of damnation if death should suddenly occur; it is also injurious to God, since for a long time the sinner remains His enemy and defers until death the compensation for the injury inflicted upon God, thus despising the grace of God which moves him to conversion. And so voluntary delay of penance for a notable time is a new sin, namely the sin of impenitence.

¹ Eccli. 5:8-9.

² Rom. 2:4-5.

³ For St. Gregory the Great rightly says (Moral., bk. XXV, ch. 9, in Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 334): "For sin which penance does not wash away, by its very weight soon draws one to another." The reason for this is that one who remains long in the state of mortal sin is deprived of those efficacious graces which are necessary for overcoming grave temptations. Cf. St. Thomas, 1.², q. 109, a. 8.

13. What time, however, is notable and sufficient to constitute a new sin cannot be accurately defined. Delay for many years is commonly considered a notable time, especially because by the ecclesiastical precept, which seems to be determinative of divine law, the sinner is bound to confess his sins at least once a year, and therefore to do penance.

According to Laymann⁴ and many others, one who satisfies the precept of annual confession does not defer penance beyond the due time, because the Church, by determining the time of confession, seems also to have determined the time of penance. And this opinion is very probable, especially because generally the faithful do not think themselves guilty of a new sin unless they have deferred penance beyond a year.

⁴ De Sacr. Paenitent., ch. 2, n. 6.

Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus⁵ does not wholly acquiesce in this opinion, but he thinks that one month is a notable time in the delay of penance, both because of the obligation of eliciting an act of charity once a month, which the sinner cannot fulfill unless he grieves for his sins, and because one who remains in mortal sin through an entire year cannot avoid the danger of easily falling back into other sins. Yet he adds, and this is to be noted for practice, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence.

⁵ St. Alphonsus, bk. VI, n. 437, and Homo Apostol., tr. XIV, n. 10.

14. (B) Per accidens it obliges whenever the sinner, from some other precept, is bound to recover the state of grace: (a) for administering the sacraments, if he is a priest, or for receiving the sacraments of the living; (b) for overcoming grave temptations, if the sinner is conscious that he cannot resist them unless he elicits an act of contrition; (c) for eliciting an act of charity toward God, if the obligation of fulfilling this precept is urgent. - But the precept of sanctifying feasts and the Lord's day does not import an obligation of eliciting an act of penance, since the state of grace is not required for keeping the Lord's day.

Therefore sinners are to be earnestly exhorted to do penance quickly, not indeed by asserting that the delay of penance is a new mortal sin, but by showing that impenitence is dangerous for the sinner and injurious to God,¹ as above.

¹ Among the passages of Scripture and of the Fathers which can be alleged, these especially are to be attended to: Prov. 1:22-23; Isa. 1:2-31; Jerem. 2, 3, 4; 18:5-17; Ezek. 18:21-32; Matt. 3:8-12; Luke 13:2-5; Acts 3:19-26, etc.; - St. Ambrose, De Paenitentia, bk. II, in Migne, P. L., XVI, 495 ff.; St. Augustine, sermon 20, in Migne, XXXVIII, 140-141, etc. - Cf. Bourdaloue, Careme, sermon for the Monday of the 2nd week, on final impenitence; Massillon, Careme, on final impenitence; Wiseman, Sermons on Moral Subjects, On delay of repentance; Newman, Sermons to Mixed Congreg., Neglect of divine calls and warnings.

15. 1. Notion of the Sacrament of Penance. Before the coming of Christ, Penance was not a sacrament; but in order that the faithful might more securely obtain the remission of sins committed after baptism, the Lord raised penance to the dignity of a sacrament, by handing over to the Church the ministerial power of remitting sins, and by determining the acts to be furnished by sinners for obtaining pardon.

Penance, insofar as it is a sacrament, is commonly defined by theologians: A Sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ, by which, through the juridical absolution of a priest, sins committed after baptism are remitted to a man who is contrite, has confessed, and promises satisfaction.

It is said (a) by which, through the juridical absolution of a priest, so that there may thus be declared the form of this sacrament, namely, the absolution of the priest; the minister, or priest; and the mode in which it is administered, namely, the judicial form; (b) to a man who is contrite, etc., by which words are designated both the subject and the dispositions of the subject: contrition, confession, and the intention of making satisfaction, which, according to many, are also the proximate matter of the sacrament; (c) sins are remitted, etc., and thus are expressed not only the principal effect, but also the remote matter of the sacrament, namely, all sins, whether mortal or venial, committed after baptism. From what is to be said, it will be clear that this definition is legitimate.

16. 2. Division of this part. In the dogmatic part of this Treatise, we intend to demonstrate the existence, or divine institution, of the sacrament of Penance, and also to declare its nature.

For accomplishing this, we shall examine three things:

I. The power of the keys granted to the Church;

II. The acts of the penitent required for the exercise of this power;

III. The nature of the sacrament, insofar as it can be inferred from these two.

The reason for the division is this: according to the Council of Trent, the Lord especially instituted the sacrament of Penance when He conferred on the apostles the power of remitting sins, which is called the power of the keys; therefore it is necessary to explain this before all else. But since this power is not exercised unless certain acts of the penitent have been posited, namely confession, contrition, and satisfaction, these must be treated afterward. And since the sacrament itself is constituted from the power of the keys and from the acts of the penitent, it is fitting to discuss the sacrament itself by way of corollary, describing its matter and form as well as its effects.¹

¹ In this new edition, we have revised the dogmatic part with the kind cooperation of P. Callou, professor of dogmatic theology in the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris.