Use of the Infertile Periods

954. Excess or abuse in the use of marriage can be:

a) by reason of the end, as if it is done exclusively for delight;

b) by reason of an undue circumstance, for example position, if the act is done in another mode besides that which nature indicates;

c) especially by reason of a mode contrary to nature, if it is done in such a way that generation itself is thereby impeded, for example in a sodomitical mode, in an unnatural vessel and an undue organ, namely, in the posterior vessel or in the mouth.

Now the mode of sinning by excess contrary to nature which in present times is very frequent is Onanism, so called from the deed of Onan narrated in Gen. XXXVIII, 9.

That practice is often called Neo-Malthusianism. On account of economic reasons Malthus (1798) had proposed the limitation of conception, but by licit means, namely, by abstaining from the conjugal act. Now, however, Neo-Malthusians promote illicit means.

It is vaginal copula sought in that mode by which generation is positively impeded and cannot follow from the effusion of seed; whether because the man withdraws himself before the sowing of seed and pours forth the seed outside the vagina, or because he himself or the woman employs an instrument or other means by which the seed is impeded from passing to the uterus.

It can be done in various modes:

1° On the part of the man: a) if he begins copula in the vagina but withdraws himself before the sowing of seed and pours forth the seed outside the vagina; b) if he clothes the virile member or only its glans with some thin covering or cloak (condom, capote anglaise) within which the seed is retained.

It is so called because it had Doctor Condom as inventor.

2° On the part of the woman: a) if, during copula, she uses an occlusive pessary (sterilet), i.e., a certain thing introduced into the deepest part of the vagina for closing the mouth of the uterus lest the seed pass into it, for example a metal clasp, sponge, cotton, linen threads, etc.; or a pseudo-vagina, i.e., a thin membrane disposed within the whole vagina, into which the seed is emitted; b) if, after copula has been completed, she makes a vaginal washing, by which, with the aid of a syringe or irrigator, the seed is expelled by water or an antiseptic substance; or if, immediately before or after copula, she performs an injection of a chemical substance (for example anticonceptional powder) or of an acid liquid, by which the seed is killed.

Nevertheless no mode is altogether certain. For the preservative covering (condom or pseudo-vagina) can be torn; the occlusive pessary can be badly adapted or, during copula, moved from its place; simple withdrawal or vaginal washing does not always prevent some sperm from being ejaculated before withdrawal or from already having passed into the uterus before washing; a chemical substance sprinkled through the whole vagina before copula does not always have perfect efficacy.

955. Principle. Onanism and every other mode of performing copula by which it is deprived of its natural order to generation is intrinsically against nature and therefore essentially and gravely evil. - This is certain from the constant and formal doctrine of Christian tradition and of the Church.

It is a mortal sin, as directly contrary to the primary end of matrimony and matrimonial copula, and opposed to conjugal fidelity, a mere abuse of the genital organs against the order instituted by God and nature, by which they pervert a most noble thing into the most base act of a passion of ignominy: for it lacks the due order to its natural end and to the good of the species. Hence malice is intrinsic to the act, so that it cannot be made honorable by any cause, however urgent.

It is proved:

1° By natural reason: to turn an act deliberately away from the end for which it is naturally destined is to act against nature and is intrinsically evil. But every conjugal act is naturally destined to the procreation of the human race. Therefore to turn it away from this end is against nature and intrinsically evil. And this gravely, because it is against the natural order of human nature itself and directly against the common good itself of the human race.

2° From the doctrine of the Church, which is clear from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI and from many and repeated declarations of the Holy Office (May 20, 1851; Apr. 19, 1853; Mar. 26, 1897; Nov. 23, 1922) and of the Sacred Penitentiary (twelve times from Nov. 15, 1816, to June 3, 1916), and most recently from the encyclical Casti Connubii, in which Pius XI did not hesitate to declare that such is the very Christian doctrine handed down from the beginning and always: "Since therefore certain ones, manifestly receding from the Christian doctrine handed down already from the beginning and never interrupted, have recently judged that another doctrine concerning this mode of acting must be solemnly preached, the Catholic Church, to which God himself has committed the teaching and defending of integrity and honesty of morals, placed in the midst of this ruin of morals, that she may preserve the chastity of the nuptial covenant immune from this foul stain, in sign of her divine legation, lifts high her voice through our mouth and again promulgates: any use of matrimony whatsoever in the exercise of which, through the design of men, it is deprived of its natural power of procreating life, violates the law of God and of nature; and those who have committed any such thing are stained with the blemish of grave guilt." Here three things are affirmed: the use of matrimony which by design is deprived of its power of generating is 1) against divine law; 2) against the law of nature; and 3) a grave sin.

Hence concerning Onanism the following conclusions are established:

1° An onanistic man cannot be absolved unless he repents and resolves; likewise a woman formally cooperating or consenting, or one who tries to expel the seed by washings. Indeed, one who uses a preservative means is bound to destroy it as an occasion of sin before absolution; and this is per se and regularly to be urged by the confessor.

2° A wife does not sin if, for a moderately grave cause, she renders the debt to an onanistic man withdrawing himself before the sowing of seed, or even seeks it from him. But a grave cause, as is clear from the responses of the Sacred Penitentiary, exists if otherwise she would incur grave evils, for example dissensions in marriage, blows, adultery of the husband, her own incontinence, or prolonged abstinence from the use of marriage, etc. The reason is that the action begins in the due mode, so that of itself it is apt for generation; but if it is unduly terminated, the whole guilt is held to be on the part of the man, and on the part of the woman there is only material and mediate cooperation, which on account of a grave motive can be furnished to the sin of another. For this is, as Pius XI says, to suffer sin rather than to commit it. This is to be understood provided the wife does not consent to that mode of acting against nature, but detests it and bears herself merely passively toward it; otherwise it would be formal cooperation. Nevertheless she could actively cooperate, immediately before copula and during it by exciting herself, and rejoice in the pleasure (even perfect pleasure), as long as the action is done in the due mode; likewise she may rejoice in the good effect of such copula, for example in preservation from the troubles and labors of pregnancy or childbirth, although this is dangerous.

Therefore she can seek copula from a man withdrawing himself, and only sometimes, namely once or another time, is she bound to abstain by reason of charity; not more often, because then it would already be a grave inconvenience, while charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience for avoiding merely passive scandal.

The same holds theoretically for a man, when before the sowing of seed the woman withdraws herself; but in practice there ordinarily is not a grave sufficient reason on the part of the man, because he can rather easily impede the withdrawal of the woman, even by physical force.

But even then the woman is bound because of charity to warn the man and show her own repugnance, and this not once or another time only, but rather often; yet not inopportunely, but opportunely. Indeed, if she can, she must deter the man from this crime by endearments, prayers, and other testimonies of affection (S. Pen., Nov. 15, 1816), even by denial of the debt if she thus hopes to procure the amendment of the husband.

3° But a wife cannot voluntarily cooperate and render the debt to an onanistic man employing a preservative instrument, whether he himself puts on a covering or imposes an occlusive covering upon the wife, because this is immediate participation in an intrinsically evil action, and therefore truly is to commit sin; for then there is no copula of itself apt for generation. Such congress, namely, admitted on each side, is vitiated from the beginning and intrinsically evil; whence voluntary cooperation, even merely material and passive, is altogether illicit. And therefore the wife is bound to resist positively according to her powers (for example by moving herself or using her hands), and she cannot yield except to prevailing force, after the likeness of an oppressed woman; in which case, from such a most grave cause, as to that which she cannot impede, she can bear herself merely permissively, provided she excludes every consent to delight (S. Pen., Apr. 19, 1853, and June 3, 1916; Prov. Counc. of Mechlin, n. 84).

4° Likewise a wife would sin gravely if she induced the man to onanism, whether directly or indirectly, for example by producing insistent complaints concerning more numerous offspring, concerning the pains of childbirth, concerning the inconveniences of gestation, etc.

5° When a wife uses an occlusive pessary or other means impeding generation, the husband ought by marital authority to prohibit it and remove her from those things; indeed, if it can be done, to take away and destroy the means and instruments. But if nothing is accomplished and grave inconveniences are to be feared, certain authors judge that the husband can even seek the debt and complete copula, provided he bears himself merely materially and passively as regards the impediment of generation. Now:

a) It would certainly be illicit if the wife used a pseudo-vagina, because then the act would be intrinsically evil from the beginning.

b) On the contrary, it is probably licit if, with the man contradicting her, she uses anticonceptional powder or a medicine by which the seed is killed, at least if it is done after the act, or if by vaginal washing she tries to expel it; because then both the act and the genital organ of the woman remain substantially the same: for the act itself is done well and the seed is deposited in the due vessel, but the vice is not from the mode of acting, but exists independently from the act and is posterior to it and is to be attributed to the wife alone.

c) But if the wife uses a sponge or an occlusive pessary, whether the same reason holds, we ourselves would not dare to settle, but let wiser men see to it. The matter is not so clear, whether in the case the copula itself is vitiated from the beginning, although from the beginning and during copula there is present an impediment of conception from the closing of the uterus; because the mouth of the uterus is not an organ which, like the penis, has a part in copula, but the latter is completed in the due mode if the seed is deposited in the natural vagina. This happens in the case, although the action of nature, to be continued after copula, is impeded, but by the woman. Hence in practice, until the Church pronounces, the husband can be absolved, provided he is prepared to stand by the commands of the Holy See.

Nor is it an objection: if it is illicit for the woman to cooperate with a man using a preservative instrument, by equal right it must also be illicit for the man to cooperate with a woman who uses a similar instrument. For it can be doubted whether the instrument, as regards copula, is altogether similar. And although the rights are equal, nevertheless the parts of the man and of the woman in the conjugal act are not the same, but greater parts belong to the man; and therefore the man will be able to cooperate with the sin of the wife more easily than she with the sin of the man.

Fr. Vermeersch affirmed this in the first edition of his work De Castitate, but afterward retracted himself (cf. Periodica de re canonica, 1925, fasc. II, and Th. M., vol. IV, 69). The act now seems to him evil from the beginning, because the vagina is already substantially vitiated: for this is essentially a canal leading to the uterus; but since in the case it is closed, it also ceases to be a canal. Hence a woman who has a naturally closed vagina is impotent. - The argument, saving a better judgment, does not seem certain. For natural closing is one thing, merely artificial closing another; an organ closed because of its structure is one thing, an organ suitably constructed but closed on account of an accidental impediment placed from without is another, which leaves the vagina perfectly whole. It is also helpful to note that by this mode only the passage of the seed into the uterus and thus to the ovum is impeded. Now if the uterus has been removed or the oviduct interrupted, and the passage to the ovule has already been made impossible, the conjugal act nevertheless remains licit; likewise, during pregnancy, when passage into the uterus is impeded because it is closed.

956. Corollaries. - 1. From the principles stated, response can be made to the question: whether a wife can cooperate with sodomitical copula? This also is opposed to the natural end of copula and to conjugal fidelity, which requires that spouses not use the body except in a mode apt for generation; for neither has a right over the body of the other against nature. Now, one must answer as for artificial onanism: with such copula, as being intrinsically evil and vitiated from the beginning, it is never licit to cooperate positively or actively, nor even to cooperate merely passively; but the wife must try, by resisting positively as much as she can (for example by movement and with her hands), to impede the sodomitical intercourse of the man; and if unwillingly nevertheless she is compelled to yield to prevailing force, she must never consent to venereal delight perhaps arising from it. For if it is never licit for her to cooperate with artificial onanism, a fortiori this holds concerning the sodomitical mode, which is more perverse (cf. S. Pen., Apr. 3, 1916).

From onanism and sodomy improperly so called there must be distinguished the act by which spouses come together after the manner of animals, yet in such a way that copula is done in the vagina; in this case some say that they have come together backwards or from behind. Then the confessor ought to ask whether in this mode generation was possible; if they answer that it was possible, it is inferred that the act was not against nature but only disordered in position, beside nature; and this sin does not exceed venial sin. The confessor should never of his own accord have discourse concerning the position to be had in copula.

From onanism there differs altogether the practice of having copula only in the time of agenesis, during which time conception in no way or more rarely occurs; whence by this practice generation becomes little probable. For such a manner of acting is not of itself sinful, since spouses can contain themselves as long as they wish, and besides they do nothing against the end of matrimony at the time when they come together (S. Pen., June 16, 1880), provided this is done from a right intention or a just motive and with the due circumstances observed. Nevertheless the bishops of Belgium deservedly warn: "that the time of agenesis should not, however, be proposed to spouses themselves as if by it generation would certainly be avoided."

The time of agenesis formerly was established thus by the physician Capellmann and others: from ten or fourteen days after the menstruation begun up to three or four days before the new menstruation; for they thought that ovulation and therefore fertility coincided with menstruation, so that during the month the woman would be:

	fertile	sterile	fertile
	from day 1 to 14	from 15 to 25	from 26 to 28

But it was discovered that menstruation does not coincide with ovulation, although it is a connected phenomenon; rather it has place between two ovulations. Thus Dr. Siegel established that a woman is fertile from day 5 to 20 after menstruation has occurred, sterile from day 1 to 4, and from 21 to 28. But now, according to the most recent experiments of Dr. Knaus, a woman would be fertile from day 11 to 17 after menstruation has occurred, sterile from day 1 to 10 and from day 18 to 28. According to Dr. Ogino, a woman would be fertile from day 12 to 19 before the following menstruation (exceptionally to day 24), but sterile for 11 days before the following menstruation and for 9 days (exceptionally only for 4) after menstruation has occurred. This can be proposed schematically thus:

	sterile	fertile	sterile
According to Siegel	from day 1 to 4	from 5 to 20	from 21 to 28
According to Knaus	from day 1 to 10	from 11 to 17	from 18 to 28
According to Ogino	from day 1 to 9 (exceptionally from 1 to 4)	from 10 to 17 (exceptionally from 5 to 17)	from 18 to 28

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, Natural Family Planning and Sexual Vice · Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, Other Errors Discussed · Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, An Analogy with Agriculture: NFP’s Causal Structure · Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, An Analogy with Communication: NFP’s Pseudo-Frustration of a Faculty · Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter Two: Magisterial S…, Early Sources

Concerning these things it must be noted:

…and 44 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers

Eamonn Clark, S.T.L. — 126 passages

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, Natural Family Planning and Sexual Vice

The two genera of sexual vice are the “natural” and the “unnatural.” Natural vice is procreative (or “integral,” “natural,” “unitive”) sexual intercourse outside of the bonds of marriage, principally deriving its immorality from the risk to potential children proceeding from the act by the absence of the protection of a stable household such as is provided in principle by marriage. Unnatural vice is essentially infertile sexual activity, whether inside of marriage or not, deriving its immorality from a corruption of the right end of the sexual faculty in the very use of that same faculty, which is a direct affront to the Creator Who designed that faculty for the weighty purposes of keeping the human race in existence and bringing souls to Himself.³⁵ Using the sexual faculty’s associated external organs in a way that makes use of the pleasures which are designed to incentivize and complete natural sexual union but either does not dispose gametes (sex cells, viz. sperm and ova) for procreative union according to the natural design of the body (i.e. sodomitic acts, autoeroticism) or actively impedes the well-functioning of gametes in view of preventing procreative union (contraception) is unnatural vice. ³⁵ See ST II-II q. 154, a. 11; it is true some conceptive sexual relations are arguably categorized by St. Thomas as “unnatural,” but these are unnatural in a secondary way, viz., as to mode rather than as to end, and they are not as grave as sins against the end. It is unfortunate that St. Thomas was as ambiguous as he was about what he was exactly referring to. See ST II-II q. 154, a. 11; a. 12, ad. 4. I propose later on in this work that IVF is unnatural vice by way of “excess,” that is, by conceiving outside the natural order. Of course, there is no treatment of such things by St. Thomas.

Of course, there are many objections to the claim that these latter acts are “unnatural” by appealing to false analogies – “using a straw,” “walking on one’s hands,” “spitting,” “running on a treadmill” – which presume to show that many acts which seem unnatural are morally unproblematic and so the claim that unnatural sexual vice is true vice is indefensible.³⁶ ³⁶ St. Thomas actually addresses the example of walking on one’s hands in SCG III, ch. 122: “Nor, in fact, should it be deemed a slight sin for a man to arrange for the emission of semen apart from the proper purpose of generating and bringing up children, on the argument that it is either a slight sin, or none at all, for a person to use a part of the body for a different use than that to which it is directed by nature (say, for instance, one chose to walk on his hands, or to use his feet for something usually done with the hands) because man’s good is not much opposed by such inordinate use. However, the inordinate emission of semen is incompatible with the natural good; namely, the preservation of the species.”

These sorts of arguments also fail to make proper distinctions about how diverse faculties actually work. For example, the digestive faculty is an “inward facing” faculty – it takes matter (food) and uses it to do something to oneself (deliver nutrients). To “pervert” or fundamentally undermine the digestive faculty would not mean using indigestible food, or even to purge oneself of digestible food; rather, it would mean somehow hijacking the digestive system as such to do something other than pass nutrition into the cells of the body. The use of the digestive faculty’s organs which are by their nature directed to a certain end by making them act upon something which is not and cannot be conducive to its natural end of delivering nutrients to the body. For example, to create a kind of “human battery” which somehow saps away the nutrients and calories prepared for the body’s use by the act of digestion accomplished by the digestive organs insofar as they are exclusively designed to deliver nutrients to the body. (Of course, this would quickly end in one’s death if not reversed.) Breathing is much the same – if one’s lungs could somehow be rewired to filter the air in a room rather than oxygenate one’s bloodstream, we would see the perversion of the faculty of breathing. The faculty of communication is “outward facing,” as it terminates in something other than oneself, namely, another person’s mind. The sexual faculty is also an “outward facing” faculty. Its object is “another,” first being its procreative pair as a primary agent (man acting upon woman) and second its procreative pair as a secondary causes (sperm acting upon ovum). Third, there is the final terminus itself, namely, the child which results from the union of gametes. The terminus being “another human” is what makes the sexual faculty’s intentionality “outward facing” even in the woman, whose principal act is a direct function of the vegetal soul (rather than the animal soul, as with the man).³⁷ More will be said momentarily about the importance of “secondary causes” in the sexual faculty’s structure. The point is that making proper distinctions about what is actually occurring in “abnormal” uses of various faculties is critical to having a clear way to explain what is at issue. ³⁷ The “vegetal soul” is the “part” or “dimension” of a human being’s soul which is “plant-like” – its powers are augmentation (growth), nutrition, and reproduction (the production of gametes and their fundamental disposition for procreative union). The “animal soul” is the part of a human being’s soul which is “animal-like” – its powers include especially sensation and locomotion. The man’s sexual act is principally animal in that it requires movement and sensation in a way that the woman’s principal sexual act (ovulation and reception of male gametes) does not, as it is fundamentally involuntary and passive, though of course normal sexual acts involve the use of the rational soul (the free choice to engage in the act), and sensation and motion on the part of the woman. The point is that the most fundamental structure of human reproduction does not include these as necessities.

Without an exhaustive “debunking” of objections based on false analogies about “perverting” or “opposing nature,” we can say such analogies always at least miss the core of the argument, over and above what has been said about the structure of faculties: the matter being disposed for the infusion of a rational soul meant to benefit the earth and ultimately to worship God forever in Heaven (rather than maintaining one’s own equilibrium or good pleasure) is not rightly subjected to the direct control of a mere individual human being the way bodily motion or other such things are,³⁸ and the order of human generation and its act are essentially and primarily related to the aforementioned weighty purposes, which purposes are thwarted by subverting that order by using wrong matter (i.e. homosexual acts, autoeroticism, etc.) or by actively impeding generation (contraception).³⁹ This is an affront more or less directly against the Creator Who designed the order of human generation to work in a certain way through particular organs and acts, which order is being opposed by the practitioner of unnatural vice. Mere human beings are not set over the matter into which God wishes to infuse a rational soul insofar as that matter is part of an unfolding process which God designed for Himself to use; the matter regards what is equal to man (another human being) and what is above man (the creative power of God); sex cells are not like a normal plant or animal in this sense.⁴⁰ ³⁸ We have a special kind of authority or discretion over faculties and powers which directly affect ourselves because of our own natural knowledge and love for our own being and good. So long as we respect the principal of totality (the good of the whole) and avoid indecency and scandal, we enjoy great freedom – i.e., to walk on our hands. ³⁹ There is no shortage of ways to misunderstand the point. What must be grasped is that Christian moral science fundamentally concerns order rather than consequences. God put an order into human generation’s act and its secondary causes, which order must be respected. To disrespect the design of the Creator, especially in such a serious matter, is to offend Him as its architect. Beyond this, it is relatively easy to see the social contagion of unnatural vice together with its catastrophic social effects. For a historical study on general laxity in sexual morals and the resulting tendency towards civilizational collapse, see J.D. Unwin’s monumental study documenting this phenomenon, Sex and Culture (1934). ⁴⁰ The older theory of “delayed ensoulment” in which a “second conception” occurs (viz., the infusion of the rational soul into pre-human matter resulting from the “first conception”) is a helpful foil; here, to kill the pre-human matter is treated as the sin of abortion on account of that which God will do to that matter, that is, give it a rational soul, even if the juridical consequences might have differed at times. The killing takes away this matter from God, Who designed the process of human generation. It would perhaps be appropriate to call the killing of conceived pre-human matter “supercontraception.” (Note that John Paul II leaves space for the “delayed ensoulment” position, even though this opinion is presently out of favor. See Evangelium Vitae, §60.)

n. 5.

The average presentation that is made in parochial environments for natural family planning (“NFP”) leaves many people wondering whether and how it differs from contraception. To summarize, NFP involves monitoring the fertility cycles of the woman, usually in view of using the infertile periods for relations which will not result in children or are at least minimally likely to. (NFP can also be used in order to specify the most fertile periods of the woman in view of maximizing the chance of conception, which use does not concern us here – the term “NFP” in this book means “continence during fertile times combined with conjugal acts during infertile times in view of avoiding conception.”) The rigorist objection raised against the use of NFP is that it amounts to contraception, insofar as it uses and presumes upon infertility as a condition for the marital act. The typical rigorist supposes that one forms an intention against having children, then acts in the course of using marriage to guarantee this, with the interior disposition summarized by the statement, “I would not use marriage if it would result in conception,” and thereby sins against the nature of the marriage act and therefore against God just the same as “normal contraception.” It is also sometimes said that a “contraceptive mentality” animates this practice.⁴¹ The argument appears strong – the same result is obtained as with artificial contraception, and the same condition is set down, namely, that there is no reasonable possibility of conception. The couple appears to “use” the infertile period of the woman as a contraceptive means. What difference is there between NFP and artificial contraception which does not reduce to “physicalist” morals? ⁴¹ This phrase lends itself to many meanings, such that it is not particularly useful for precise moral discourse.

n. 6.

The familiar rejoinder is twofold: first, that merely abstaining from sexual activity when there is fertility is not a sin, and second, that NFP trains the couple in virtue and communication. Both of these statements are (mostly) true, but they largely miss the point. The first argument does not address the reality that the commission of the sexual act during infertile periods specifically depending upon the infertility of the woman is not merely abstaining from sexual activity during fertile periods, it is to do something. In other words, the default state of an individual person is not conjugal activity; to use marriage requires a positive choice. Therefore, this particular choice of a conjugal act must find a justification for itself within the context of trying to avoid conception in the same act, and, if we are to save Catholic moral theology, this justification must somehow avoid collapsing into a justification of artificial contraception. The second argument does not respond to the central objection at all but merely gives a probable good consequence of the discipline. Unfortunately, one does not often find much discussion beyond these two points in the popular literature. There is a marked failure to grapple with the objection seriously, when in fact this point confuses an enormous amount of people.

n. 7.

St. Thomas definitively rejects natural relations which happen to be naturally infertile from the category of unnatural vice:

n. 8.

It is evident from this that every emission of semen, in such a way that generation cannot follow, is contrary to the good for man. And if this be done deliberately, it must be a sin. Now, I am speaking of a way from which, in itself, generation could not result: such would be any emission of semen apart from the natural union of male and female. For which reason, sins of this type are called contrary to nature. But, if by accident generation cannot result from the emission of semen, then this is not a reason for it being against nature, or a sin; as for instance, if the woman happens to be sterile.⁴² ⁴² Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG), III, 122, 5: “Ex quo patet quod contra bonum hominis est omnis emissio seminis tali modo quod generatio sequi non possit. Et si ex proposito hoc agatur, oportet esse peccatum. Dico autem modum ex quo generatio sequi non potest secundum se: sicut omnis emissio seminis sine naturali coniunctione maris et feminae; propter quod huiusmodi peccata contra naturam dicuntur. Si autem per accidens generatio ex emissione seminis sequi non possit, non propter hoc est contra naturam, nec peccatum: sicut si contingat mulierem sterilem esse.” Note that “accident” here is referring to the nature of a thing itself as distinct from its essential characteristics; it is not about one’s knowledge of infertility, but rather the condition of infertility inhering in what is designed to be fertile.

n. 9.

The fundamental order of the sexual faculties of the man and the woman are preserved in the material order in the case of infertility, they are simply inhibited on account of a defect in the functioning of the sexual faculty itself, in this case, of the woman. It is the system itself which constitutes the sexual faculty whence the defect comes which renders the woman infertile. To make use of the sexual faculty when it is thus defective is not a deliberate frustration of the sexual faculty’s end, like contraception; the latter introduces something alien to the sexual faculty in order to subvert its end in an otherwise natural and voluntary sexual act⁴³ (such as an “intrauterine device” or “IUD”) or removes something from the sexual faculty by force in order to subvert its end (such as a hysterectomy done for the sake of sterility). Otherwise, even to pay the debt in the case of a spouse who is known to be habitually sterile would constitute a grave sin against nature, which is untrue on St. Thomas’ account of the duty to pay the debt. ⁴³ Non-abortifacient retroactive contraception can be justified when the act was not voluntary or was in and of itself illicit – one is certainly not bound to will the natural consequences (viz., resulting procreation) of what is immoral in itself according to its species (i.e. adultery) – but in so contracepting one must also at least implicitly repudiate the act itself. A voluntary natural act of adultery is actually made more evil by the use of retroactive contraception if the evil act itself is not repented of, as one consents both to the adultery and to the perversion of its act. In fact, one is bound to use contraceptive means to expel seed from such a union, just as one is bound to repent of the act.

n. 10.

The core of the difference between NFP and contraception regards the role of secondary causes with their own proper finality towards fructification or attainment of the naturally indicated end, namely, procreation. The point reduces to the distinction between the intentional occasion of failure and the prevention of success. This distinction is subtle and easily missed.

n. 11.

Secondary causes (gametes) set in motion by the principal agents (the man and the woman) are not the same as the principal agent itself.⁴⁴ Gametes (sperm and egg) have their own causative power ordered towards the end of procreation and thus have a kind of “natural intention” or inclination. This inclination is worked toward by exterior dispositions flowing from the nature of the male and female reproductive systems, including locomotion (self-movement) on the part of the sperm. Due to the design of nature, subsequent to natural completed sexual union, gametes are “supposed to” meet and cause procreation by principles belonging to their own constitution as cells, and to do so is their “responsibility” so to speak, which responsibility is not to be usurped by any other cause. This is because in fact the sexual faculty is designed to work by means of the disposition of gametes for meeting their procreative pair by the natural union of man and woman through the exterior reproductive organs. Therefore, the only responsibility that a man or a woman has with respect to gametes insofar as gametes are causative of procreation is to dispose gametes to causing procreation by such natural bodily union, and to usurp the role of the gametes themselves in finding their procreative pair is itself to do something unnatural by excess, such as with IVF or other artificial insemination procedures.⁴⁵ What this ultimately means is that if the gametes do not meet and cause procreation after natural union, it is not primarily the case that the man or the woman failed to cause procreation, it is primarily the case that the gametes failed to cause procreation. The question is then whether the man or woman did something to interfere with the well-functioning of the gametes or the processes which affect their reproductive disposition, somehow impeding their natural intentionality toward each other. Interference with the well-functioning of gametes or the process by which they are disposed for reproductive union in view of restricting or eliminating the possibility of conception is contraception properly speaking.⁴⁶ ⁴⁴ The “principal cause” or “primary cause” is the being which reproduces its like, in this case a human. ⁴⁵ It is probably advantageous to speak of IVF and similar procedures as “unnatural vice by excess” and non-procreative acts as “unnatural vice by defect.” ⁴⁶ This would include the use of chemical agents which directly impede gametes (like spermicide), and it would also extend to the use of chemical agents that reduce ovulation (“the pill”) specifically in order to prevent conception. Inducing functional hypothalamic amenorrhea (excessive stress or exercise interrupting menstruation) to prevent conception would also seem to come under this category, albeit without introducing a foreign substance into the body; the point is that the hypothalamic-pituitary-ovarian system is supposed to work a certain way, namely, producing regular menstruation, according to its nature in relation to the whole person, which well-functioning is being interrupted in view of preventing conception. Even though it is natural “as a reaction,” the stress is the kind of thing which should not be there, just like blood should be in the extremities but if shock is induced then it is natural that blood gathers in the torso. Such inflictions upon oneself can only be justified under the principle of totality, to which the inhibition of the proper functioning of a faculty in its very use would never correspond. (Of course, the pill and extraordinary amounts of exercise could theoretically licitly be used for other reasons without the desired effect of infertility, which risky and harmful behavior calls for its own justification through the principle of totality but would not be contraceptive strictly speaking except materially. To be formally contraceptive, the will must specifically incline to interrupting the well-functioning of the reproductive system in order that gametes are prevented from meeting their reproductive pair in a freely chosen sexual act. Accidentally obtaining such a state would become formally contraceptive when a woman has the will “to have achieved this state in order to avoid conception in conjugal acts” – merely delighting in the lack of fertility in a given act on account of the abnormal state of her body, while likely immoral in many or even nearly all cases due to a lack of generosity in procreation and an excess of desire for carnal union and even lack of love for one’s own health, is not itself contraceptive strictly speaking – it is only toeing the line.)

n. 12.

This intermediate step in the chain of causation in the procreative use of the sexual faculty is absolutely critical to understand. It bears repeating: the sperm and the egg fail to cause procreation when they do not meet or otherwise do not unite to form a new individual life when the principal agents (the man and the woman) engage in the exterior act which nature ordains for the procreative disposition of gametes (conjugal union). The man and the woman only fail to procreate by way of extending to them what is properly said of the gametes. If something is added or removed which is part of the natural system in which gametes are disposed for union (the entire reproductive system) so that they fail to unite, the gametes are prevented from procreating; if the gametes are simply foreseen not to unite because of infertility, and that infertile condition is chosen intentionally to accompany the act yet without the will to cause infertility by an intervention if needed to procure it, the gametes are merely intentionally occasioned to fail to procreate.

n. 13.

This intentional occasioning of failure could be due either to an intrinsic problem with the gametes themselves (viz., unhealthy sperm or eggs which cannot cause procreation due to that condition), or more frequently some disposition of the reproductive system (usually in the woman) towards not facilitating procreative union of gametes. With NFP we are concerned with the condition characterized by the lack of a fertile egg having been released from an ovary within a certain timeframe which would allow for natural union of that egg with a sperm cell. This condition of “periodic natural infertility” is one which would not allow for the gametes to reach their natural end of procreative pairing following a normal use of the sexual faculty (viz., a conjugal act). To engage in conjugal acts during known periodic natural infertility so that the meeting of gametes will not occur is merely to occasion the failure of procreation rather than to prevent it.⁴⁷ To add something to the reproductive system, or to remove something from the reproductive system, either of the man or the woman, so that conception will not occur is to prevent conception, not merely to occasion its failure.⁴⁸ ⁴⁷ Habitual infertility can also be such a condition, but it is not the main concern with respect to NFP. ⁴⁸ Beyond an actual intention to create infertility by a positive intervention in the present (i.e. the normal case of using a birth control pill), the key question is whether an intervention into the reproductive system to prevent conception is virtually intended, whether by having previously created habitual infertility and continuing indirectly (or mindlessly) to will its efficacy in preventing conception, or a willingness to cause infertility by a temporary or permanent intervention in the reproductive system if it was actually necessary in order to prevent conception (as opposed to there being presently a condition making procreation unlikely or impossible, such as illness, age, or periodic natural infertility); this is to say, if one would contracept if needed to prevent pregnancy, then one’s sexual act is contraceptive by a conditional (and normally virtual) intention and comes under the same kind of moral judgment. This is the most appropriate use of the phrase “contraceptive mentality” from a casuistic point of view. The will for naturally occurring processes to cause infertility, whether cyclical (ovulation, etc.) or permanent (menopause), is equivalent to willing the woman’s health, up to the point where one is too desirous of sexual activity done on account of that infertility but it will not be contraceptive absent a willingness to intervene positively if necessary to precent conception (virtual intention). Desiring injury or sickness that causes infertility, yet without actually intervening to cause injury or sickness, is indeed a perverse will insofar as one wants injury or sickness and insofar as the infertility caused by it is willed out of immoderate desire for conjugal acts which would be done on account of that infertility, but if there is no will to make a positive intervention by causing injury or sickness (actually or virtually) then there is not contraception properly speaking.

n. 14.

In other words, contraception is a means or a method which is applied to the man or the woman⁴⁹ to make a conjugal act infertile. Simply using marriage when it will be infertile when such infertility is insisted upon as a condition for the act is not a means applied to make a conjugal act infertile; this would amount to saying that the act was used upon itself – an absurdity. ⁴⁹ Or, one might say it is a means applied to the gametes of the man or the woman, even if applied through affecting an organ of the man or the woman.

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, Other Errors Discussed

One of the great problems with the way the problem is set up is that rigorist critics of NFP wish to jump into analyzing the avoidance of conception in a given conjugal act before asking the question, “What is the motive for the act in the first place?” As already mentioned, conjugal activity is not the default state of a person. Not attempting to conceive at the present moment is certainly not immoral – it is the habitual state of all human beings most of the time – and few people would argue that there are no circumstances which would justify a couple from intending not to have children for a considerable amount of time (i.e. war, famine, serious health problems, etc.) Given that intending not to have children is certainly not morally problematic in itself, nor is abstaining from relations, the question of motives for individual conjugal acts is then perhaps a better starting point for the conversation than “conjugal acts as desired to be infertile in the context of periodic continence.” If a couple is habitually intending not to have children, this is one object of moral evaluation – if they use conjugal acts, why they are doing so in each instance is a separate albeit connected object of moral evaluation. “NFP” actually refers to a bundle of conditions, acts, and non-acts, in relation to contrary ends (achieving conception or avoiding conception); caution is warranted in speaking about “NFP” as if it was clear what one is actually talking about, especially with respect to an individual person’s will, which is the fundamental subject of sin, not “acts” and certainly not “non-acts and conditions,” even if united around a single intention. Each conjugal act is in fact its own choice requiring its own moral evaluation, including an evaluation of the motivation for that particular act. These acts and non-acts based on various circumstances are informed by the more general or universal intention of “such-and-such kind of family situation.” As long as the intended result is itself good and just to pursue, and as long as each act will be in itself morally upright, there is good moral order towards such an end in those various acts which converge thereto, even if other ends are pursued besides.⁵⁰ Some skeptics of NFP might be very confident that the overall “planning” of the family while using conjugal acts during infertile times is immoral, but they might not be able to say which particular act is a sin – either this or that conjugal act (by commission), this or that non-act (by omission), or the intention of this or that end (such-and-such a family situation). Simply because an infertile time was specifically chosen for a conjugal act a few days ago, and there is a conscious choice not to engage in a conjugal act now during a fertile time on account of fertility, and an intention to engage in another conjugal act once infertility returns, does not mean one is acting against nature; it means one is attempting not to conceive through one’s natural conjugal acts. There is not some mysterious piece of the moral puzzle in between the acts with their intended secondary goods, the non-acts to avoid conceiving, the circumstances of fertility and infertility which accompany these, and the greater intention being sought of a particular family situation. There are simply these things, no “planning” or “system” which is somehow itself a distinct object of volition and therefore subject to its own moral analysis. ⁵⁰ See ST I-II, q. 18, a. 2; a. 6; a. 7.

The reality of gametes as secondary causes helps to explain why it is not obligatory to will conception in a sexual act – a topic which will be discussed in particular in Chapter Three. It is the gametes which have the immediate (or proximate) natural inclination towards conception, not the primary causes (human beings). All that nature insists upon from the primary causes is the proper disposition of gametes according to the natural order of human generation through the use of the body according to its design (“natural union”). It is the “responsibility” of the gametes to achieve conception, whereas it is only the couple’s responsibility to use their bodies in a natural (“integral”) way. The parsimony reflected by this principle is echoed in the minimal duty of one who speaks to tell the truth without necessarily willing that it be understood or believed by anyone (an example to be discussed momentarily) – the secondary cause (the statement itself in words) has its own causative power, in cooperation with the intellect of the hearer. In a sense, with the use of faculties involving secondary causes we are only absolutely responsible for willing what we can ourselves achieve by the means of our rationally coordinated action, as a matter of natural ethical parsimony. Conception in the natural way goes beyond this ability (unlike artificial conception). With the use of faculties whose use just is to achieve their purpose we see that this principle is not at work – for instance, to use the faculty of locomotion really is the same as to move, the logical distinction notwithstanding. With such faculties there is also not a duty that they achieve their end, because the achievement of their end is the same as their use. Even with inward-facing faculties like digestion or breathing, which have unconscious and essentially involuntary processes which work to achieve the proper end, it seems one is only bound to will the end be reached insofar as it relates to the principle of totality (namely, doing good to oneself overall). The stomach and the lungs as designed by God are “responsible” for achieving the end, not the one eating or breathing.

Frequently, one hears that it is required to be “open to life” in a conjugal act and that using NFP means one remains “open to life.” It is important to note that this phrase can be used in different ways and that only one of these senses addresses the bare minimum requirements for a licit conjugal act. The first sense is with respect to the act itself being “open to life” in that there remains some probability of conception in a conjugal act. This is not a very helpful criterion, as acts which are contraceptive simply speaking can and do sometimes result in pregnancy by accident, and acts which are totally sterile on account of some physical condition (i.e. the absence of a uterus) can still be licit. The second sense is with respect to the individual being “open to life,” and it is to say that one must will that conception be achieved, or at least not find its achievement to be repugnant. This is false, as explained above, and as taught by St. Alphonsus, as we will see. One is not bound to desire conception and may even will that it not occur. The third and correct sense, or at least the most useful sense, is said with respect to the physical integrity of the act being “open to life,” that is, according to its externalities and circumstances willed there is not anything which would impede the well-functioning of gametes in view of procreation. (A fourth sense, which confuses the issue further, is to speak of being “open to life” as a matter of habitual disposition – a sort of positive attitude toward having children in general.)

The objection that NFP violates the “hierarchy of ends” of the use of marriage is an understandable error. This claim confuses the finis operis (the “end of the work”) and the finis operantis (the “end of the worker”) by collapsing them together. The finis operis of a natural sexual act is primarily the generation of offspring, and secondarily it has a natural tendency towards causing other goods (i.e. mutual affective inclination, relief of concupiscence).⁵¹ I propose that the more dependent upon special rational or physical dispositions the more “secondary” these goods are.⁵² What is most important to understand is that the hierarchy of ends of the moral agent (indicating the finis operantis) does not in principle need to match the finis operis in order for the hierarchy of ends of the act and its finis operis to be maintained. Rather, the finis operis must have equality with (or “match”) its principle, namely, the sexual faculty, which has the generation of offspring as its exclusive end. (The sexual act may have several naturally ordained ends, but the sexual faculty as such only exists for procreation.) This is to say that the act which one does when using the sexual faculty (viz., any sexual act of any kind) must have a natural hierarchy of ends which includes human generation by not acting on undue matter which of its essential nature does not admit of conception in the act (homosexual acts, barriers, self-abuse, etc.).⁵³ Human generation is both the greatest good able to be obtained by any sexual act through a per se order, and the good toward which everything about any use of the sexual faculty and its directly annexed pleasures are ordered: by incentivizing union, preparing the body for union, and by disposing gametes for procreation – the man immediately, actively, and (normally) indirectly voluntarily in the sexual act itself; the woman habitually, passively, and (normally) involuntarily irrespective of the sexual act itself (she will ovulate regardless of whether or not there is union). Therefore, as long as conception is possible according to the matter acted upon (viz., man and woman as such) and the gametes are not impeded from pursuing their own ends (viz., procreative union/conception), procreation will be the primary end of the act itself, the finis operis, both as to its goodness and its order. To summarize, the completed union of man and woman through the generative organs just is to be doing an act that has procreation as its primary end, as the man does what is necessary to allow for male gametes to pursue union with their female pair, and the woman cooperates and consents to such disposition, while her own sexual faculty’s use is essentially involuntary in its principal act (the release of ova). There is no other primary end of the marriage act. ⁵¹ Here we are speaking of a per se order, rather than an order per accidens, which in this author’s view is best summarized by the connection between a choice to act upon a particular substance and effects which actually occur in that substance, and to some extent those effects which would occur without intervention. To light a tree on fire has a per se order with respect to the production of ash, smoke, heat, and light from the tree, but it has a per accidens order with these same things in an adjacent tree which is foreseen and even intended to be lit on fire by means of the fire of the first tree. A classical Aristotelian-Thomistic example illustrating per accidens order is theft to give alms or to commit adultery. (See ST I-II, q. 18, a. 6; a. 7.) ⁵² Later we will also see a treatment of “extrinsic” goods of conjugal acts, as opposed to “intrinsic” goods. ⁵³ Like onanism (withdrawal), the use of barriers (condoms) would be better construed as acting on undue matter rather than as contraception strictly speaking. This is because the man acts on inanimate matter (rubber), with the woman consenting to this and cooperating in it. All sexual contact properly speaking is mediated contact. This means in the order of depravity the use of barriers lies somewhere in between invasive chemical contraception (i.e. the pill, a temporary intervention harming the well-functioning of the body) and self-abuse, and it likely exceeds mutilation (a habitual intervention harming the well-functioning of the body) and certainly exceeds invasive physical intervention (such as an “IUD,” an “intra-uterine device”). It seems the least depraved kind of contraception would be non-invasive physical intervention (such as attempting to remove all male gametes from the birth canal after an act), followed by non-invasive chemical intervention (i.e. spermicide); lighter than this would be various interventions meant to reduce but not eliminate the chance of conception, even if biologically misguided (i.e. certain spatial modes of natural union, certain kinds of diets, etc.). Intentionally partial penetration in natural completed union stands between contraception and the amplexus reservatus (intentionally incomplete natural union) in terms of depravity. (To me it seems that medical use of a perforated condom – i.e. to collect sperm to study them for therapeutic reasons – is legitimate if it is sufficiently clear that male seed can still substantially access the cervix and that no substantial reduction of access is intended.)

n. 5.

Opposing the primary end of natural union by contraception does not render the finis operis non-conceptive, as interfering with the well-functioning of gametes in view of their pursuit of conception does not change the matter that is acted upon from due to undue. The act of contraception is an opposition to the intentionality of the secondary causes of conception within the male-female reproductive complex by intentionally rendering them unable to pursue their proper ends. The contraceptive hysterectomy ensures that ova cannot be prepared to receive a sperm cell, and that a sperm cell cannot survive past the birth canal and cervix. The use of “the pill” interferes with the normal well-functioning of the process of ovulation (among other things) so that an ovum will not be released when it otherwise would be in order that it is prevented from meeting its reproductive pair. The use of a spermicide kills male gametes as they attempt to pass through the birth canal and the cervix in their act of seeking an ovum to fertilize. And so on.

n. 6.

The use of marriage during a known infertile period on account of its infertility is also not an “unnatural act” by acting upon undue matter, as it is the exterior generative organs themselves which constitute “due matter” for sexual acts. This is the matter the primary causes (humans) act upon as objects, whereas the secondary causes have matter beyond this, namely, their procreative pair. In searching for an ovum, sperm cells attempt to make use of the matter of the woman’s body (i.e. moving through the uterus); if the conditions of her body are made bad, or an ovum is made unavailable, or sperm cells are made unable to pursue an ovum by blocking them or making them unhealthy, this is contraceptive, as it has created matter unsuitable for the secondary causes to pursue their ends or has harmed the secondary causes themselves. It is not, however, the creation of “undue matter” for a sexual act, except in a metaphorical sense. In fact, it is only because there is due matter that such an act can be properly called “contraceptive.”

n. 7.

If a contraceptive act is not “acting on undue matter,” much less will an act without such an intervention be an act on undue matter. Rather, a conjugal act done together with the condition of infertility not caused by a positive intervention is simply a natural act, even if the infertility is desirable and chosen as a condition for doing the act itself. This is what is involved in NFP.

n. 8.

To reiterate: contraception is a positive intervention which intends to harm the well- functioning of the secondary causes of procreation as such and the processes which dispose them for union with their reproductive pair in view of restricting or eliminating the possibility of conception in a freely chosen sexual act between a man and a woman as such.⁵⁴ This definition is altogether unsuited to describe NFP. ⁵⁴ Note that a woman might lawfully take a “contraceptive pill” not only for reasons aside from preventing conception which actually have nothing to do with ovulation (which decision would require sufficient motivation, especially given the temptation to begin tacitly willing the effect of infertility in conjugal acts as instrumentally caused by the pill, thus drifting into sin), but she might even use such a pill in favor of conception. Suppose a 42-year-old woman’s husband goes away for months at a time working on a fishing vessel; she wants to have one more child, and so she takes a “contraceptive” pill when he goes away for work in order to prevent ovulation in view of attempting to conceive later. Such a practice may not be advisable for medical or practical reasons, but this use of “the pill” would not be contraceptive.

n. 9.

We are left then concluding that “NFP” – as individual acts, and as a bundle of acts, non-acts, and circumstances united by a more general intention towards a particular family situation, is not and cannot be included under the heading of “unnatural vice.”

n. 10.

As it stands, the normal case of using NFP is that a particular couple wishes to have relations for various non-procreative goods (affective/social goods, health, pleasure, etc.) and wishes these acts not to result in conception. It is simply to choose not to have relations during fertile times to avoid having more children, and to choose to have relations during infertile times to pursue other goods. Abstinence from relations during fertile times is unobjectionable in itself. Having relations during an infertile time very much seems conducive to the end of avoiding conception from a conjugal act and also conducive to the pursuit of other goods which can be procured from relations. The hierarchy of ends within the act itself remains unaffected, as it is a natural act, even though the hierarchy of ends in the moral agent (the one doing the act) does not match. So – what is the problem?

n. 11.

The questions which remain are whether the pursuit of such non-procreative goods are sufficient to excuse the marriage act, and whether the motivations for avoiding children are sufficient. These questions are taken up in subsequent chapters. However, given how widespread is the error of conflating NFP with contraception in diverse ways, and given how damaging that error can be, more time is warranted in explaining the difference both in causal structure and in relation to the faculty’s end.

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, An Analogy with Agriculture: NFP’s Causal Structure

An additional example of acts with different causal structures which have similar outcomes can help to elucidate the distinction between preventing conception and occasioning the failure of conception.

Trees have their own natural intention toward growth, like gametes have toward procreative union. If a farmer were to plant a tree in good soil found in a climate that he knew was ill-suited to its growth (such as not enough sunlight or rain) so that the tree would fail to grow due to the lack of good weather, we would not say that the farmer prevented its growth so much as we would say the tree failed to grow because of the bad climate. We would also say that its lack of growth was intentionally occasioned by the farmer. Suppose further that his goal was simply to enjoy planting trees but did not desire them ever to grow, and so he repeated this many times, always avoiding planting trees in good weather, until one day he knew it was the right time to plant a tree that would grow. This is like NFP, which disposes the sexual act to fail to achieve what nature intends by using the condition of infertility until such a time as it seems right to attempt conception by using marriage during a known fertile time.

On the other hand, if the farmer planted the same tree in good soil found in a climate conducive to growth but then covered the tree with a tarp so that the necessary amount of sunlight or water could not reach it, or he poured acid on the tree so that it became sick and therefore could not grow, we would say that the farmer prevented the growth of the tree; it is not merely that the tree failed to grow, the farmer intervened in the system in which the tree is naturally supposed to grow so that it would be unable to do so, instead of an internal principle of the tree failing to achieve its purpose merely due to something inside of the ecosystem not being conducive thereto. This is analogous to contraception, which is a positive intervention that prevents the success of what nature intends for the gametes in the sexual act.

The point of this analogy is to help illumine the difference between preventing success and intentionally occasioning failure. Of course, trees can morally be covered with tarps, poisoned with acid, planted in cement, or even cut down. The moral difference with procreation is that humans are not set over other humans or the means by which they are generated to the extent we are set over trees and their growth.

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter One: The Marital D…, An Analogy with Communication: NFP’s Pseudo-Frustration of a Faculty

An additional case of using a faculty in a natural way while willing its failure to achieve its natural purpose by targeted action can help to explain how NFP is not a perversion of the sexual faculty. It will also help us to begin exploring another important aspect of the problem which will preoccupy us in the following pages.

The sexual faculty can be compared to the faculty of communication. Each has its associated organs and powers and natural, proper ends, and they regard “another” rather than oneself. Each also has its misuses and its perversions. A misuse of communication would be idle speech – speaking when there is insufficient reason to speak such that it is undue, speaking simply for the immoderate pleasure of speaking. Obvious misuses of the sexual faculty would include having relations at an inappropriate time or in an inappropriate place. Contraception, insofar as it is the perversion of a faculty, is analogous to lying. In a lie, the use of the communicative faculty is perverted by introducing falsehood into one’s communication in order to subvert that faculty’s purpose, viz., the communication of truth. Contraception perverts the sexual faculty by destroying the possibility for procreation, the proper and primary end of the sexual act and the exclusive end of the sexual faculty as such.⁵⁵ ⁵⁵ It seems an extension of this analogy to “frivolous contraception” is also possible – where one uses a contraceptive method when it would not be necessary to prevent conception (i.e. using a pill when the woman has had a hysterectomy). This would be like lying for fun, knowing the listener would misunderstand the truth and believe the same falsehood which is communicated by the lie. It seems that one may not presume upon misunderstanding in this way, nor presume upon infertility in this way.

The presumption upon natural (or non-contraceptive) infertility seems to be like telling the truth, perhaps in an obscure way, to gain some good, meanwhile hoping and even knowing that the listener will not understand what is said (a “broad mental reservation”), as opposed to staying silent (abstinence) or telling a lie (contraception or other unnatural vice). One can certainly wish the listener not to understand the truth which one tells, and one can even use deceptive language to avoid this from occurring. Of course, broad mental reservations may not be used indiscriminately: they require sufficient justification. In some cases, one has a clear right to be told the plain truth.

Is NFP the sexual version of ineffective communication, or even of broad mental reservations – licit, despite the intention for the faculty not to achieve its purpose, but requiring sufficient justification? Or is it like “idle speech” of some sort, unjustifiable due to a natural sort of excess and inordinateness? Does the good being sought have anything to do with the act’s lawfulness, unlike with speech except insofar as justification is needed for the use of broad mental reservations?

n. 5.

The position I propose here is that intentionally infertile natural conjugal acts are analogous to broad mental reservations and are in some cases analogous to idle speech. This subsequently requires a double justification for the use of such acts. One the one hand, there must be a compelling reason for not wanting the act to succeed in its chief purpose (procreation), despite using it without perverting the faculty (by contraception).⁵⁶ On the other hand, there must also be an adequate motivation for using the act in this or that particular instance, which I will later argue is contained only in a legitimate need for the relaxation of concupiscence other than to pay the debt when requested. ⁵⁶ It should be noted that the analogy between sexual activity and language was not unknown to St. John Paul II.

n. 6.

An objection might be raised to the analogy with communication, specifically as to its fittingness given that it is not an abuse of the faculty of communication to say something false to “undue matter,” such as an inanimate or unconscious object, or a person who is asleep. However, this simply shows that the analogy has its limitations – speaking to a rock is not actually a use of the communicative faculty on account of communication’s total dependence upon reason, whereas the use of the sexual faculty occurs based merely on biological forces. One could only lie to a rock if he thought the rock could understand him. The communicative faculty is rooted in the intellect, while the sexual faculty is rooted in the body as informed by the vegetative soul. A further difference is that truth-claims have various levels of import (from light to grave) and intentions for lying have varying degrees of goodness and evil (i.e. saving a life, defrauding a bank), while every human life in principle is of equal value in itself and is always of great importance. This is why lies can be venial sins or mortal sins but contraception (and other unnatural vices) are mortal sins.⁵⁷ ⁵⁷ A more complex difficulty with the analogy relates to the intentionality of words, which are useful only by convention, unlike gametes which have power of themselves, though this does not seem to harm the value of the analogy with respect to the most important aspects. The faculty of communication simply works in a somewhat different way than the sexual faculty.

n. 7.

It is important to note that, while linguistic conventions that are strained by an abnormal use of them, as is done in broad mental reservations (such as using the word “house” to refer to one’s family – i.e., “There are no Jews in my house,” meaning, “There are no Jews in my family,”) this is a dimension where analogy breaks down with respect to NFP. One may be inclined to say that NFP is not contraceptive because there is simply less probability of conception, or that conception is still theoretically possible. While these conditions with respect to fertility do obtain, they are not what makes NFP to be non-contraceptive; rather, it is the lack of any action upon the reproductive system in view of interfering with its well-functioning that is the key. Plenty of chemical and even surgical interventions that are clearly contraceptive can and do fail to prevent conception – yet they are still contraceptive. And as science progresses, one could eventually know with functionally perfect certitude that conception on a given day is impossible short of a miracle. The point is that in NFP there is no intervention which perverts the use of the sexual faculty, preventing it from reaching its natural end, there is simply a use of it which intentionally occasions its failure to do so, as with a broad mental reservation.

Clark, New Questions, Old Answers, Chapter Two: Magisterial S…, Early Sources

The investigation into magisterial texts on NFP begins with the famous list of laxist propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679, in the bull Sanctissimus Dominus.⁷² The bull includes one opinion seemingly addressing what I have called “sexual recreation.” The bull condemned a list of theses, especially associated with the Jesuits, as “at least scandalous and pernicious in practice,” attaching an automatic excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See to the propagation or defense of the condemned items. ⁷² Of course, there are earlier magisterial treatments of marriage and the 6th Commandment with indirect bearing on the topic, but the place to start very much seems to be with Innocent XI.

It is the 9th proposition which we must consider. It reads: “The conjugal act exercised only for pleasure (solam voluptatem) is completely devoid of all fault and venial defect.”⁷³ This significantly tracks the treatment of the topic by St. Thomas. A conjugal act undertaken not for procreation or not to pay the debt but simply because it is enjoyable does not fit into either of their systems. ⁷³ Denzinger-H. 2109 (quoted in Robert Fastiggi, Catholic Sexual Morality, Wipf and Stock (2018), 40). Original: “Opus Conjugii ob solam voluptatem exercitum omni penitùs caret culpa, ac defectu veniali.” (The previous proposition also regards “pleasure alone,” in eating and drinking: “Comedere, et bibere usque ad satietatem ob solam voluptatem non est peccatum, modò non obsit valetudini, quia licitè potest apptitus naturalis suis actibus frui.”)

Despite attempts to read into Innocent XI (and St. Thomas) a subtle teaching that acts which are altogether void of procreative intent (or the intention to pay of the debt when requested, at least by signs) can still be good if the pleasure desired is for the sake of a social or psychological good, there is a serious dearth of evidence for that position. To suggest that the idea of pursuing “affection” or “bonding” or any similar good is a justification for the act on their account, as if this was distinct from “pleasure” in the context of the teaching of the Angelic Doctor or Innocent XI is simply eisegetical.⁷⁴ While it is clear that for St. Thomas there are only two licit motivations for the use of marriage (procreation and to pay the debt), it is less clear that Innocent XI excludes other motivations, as the interpretive tradition of Innocent XI shows, wherein many authors have tried to understand “pleasure alone” as something much narrower, thus allowing for motivations which include pleasure and other goods, or to drive a wedge between pleasure itself and affective goods which in some way depend upon pleasure. We will examine the solam voluptatem debate in Chapter Three. Here we simply note that this condemned proposition exists and is in the background as a kind of anchor or boundary. ⁷⁴ See, for example, the undefended assertion made by Dr. Robert Fastiggi in his otherwise generally excellent book Catholic Sexual Morality, Wipf and Stock (2018), emphasis original: “On the other hand, he [St. Thomas Aquinas] believed marital intercourse would be sinful if pursued only for the purpose of pleasure and not for other goods such as procreation, fidelity, or spousal friendship. In this, he was expressing the common teaching of the Church, which reappears in Pope Innocent XI’s 1679 censure of the following laxist thesis: The conjugal act exercised only for pleasure is completely devoid of all fault and venial defect.” (Robert Fastiggi, Catholic Sexual Morality, 40) If Dr. Fastiggi has positive evidence that the pursuit of “spousal friendship” absent both procreative intent and the obligation to pay the debt is the true thought of St. Thomas or Innocent XI, despite neither saying as much, he does not share it. It evidently rests on St. Thomas’s allusion to spousal friendship in the SCG, which we have already noted, and which does not say what Dr. Fastiggi seems to imply it says. The first time that “fostering affection” is given as legitimate motive for the use of marriage by a notable moralist comes with Fr. Jean-Pierre Gury, SJ’s Compendium Theologiae Moralis (second edition, appearing in 1852), no. 933-934. (See Jordan Olver, “Love and the Sexual Sphere: A Study of the Relationship Between Love and Sexuality in Karol Wojtyła’s Love and Responsibility,” University of Saskatchewan, 2006.) Gury tries to avoid the scope of Innocent XI’s censure, viz., solam voluptatem, by allowing for a motive such as the expression of affection to modify the act, for then the act is no longer done for “pleasure alone” but for pleasure and for another motive, namely, expressing affection. However, it is not clear that the plenary sense of St. Alphonsus’s teaching on the matter, whom he cites in support of his position, would allow for “pleasure and another good” (in this sense) to excuse the marriage act, though this would be a plausible reading of Sánchez, one of St. Alphonsus’s chief authorities on marriage. Furthermore, and perhaps notably, Gury does not discuss the use of marriage in the context of periodic continence used to avoid procreation.