When a secret may or must be revealed

The obligation to observe a natural secret will cease after the secret has become public property. The party whose secret it is may sometimes be reasonably presumed not to be unwilling that the matter should be communicated to another, as, for example, to somebody who can and who will be of assistance to him. If the public good requires that the secret should be made known in order to prevent public wrong, the obligation of secrecy will cease, for the public welfare is of greater importance than that of an individual. If serious harm threatens one’s self or some other innocent person, or the party whose secret is in question, and the harm can only be averted by making known the secret, this will be allowed in the case of natural or promised secrets. The right of defence from impending evil prevails over that of natural and promised secrets.

Even the obligation of the third class of secrets will cease when they cannot be observed without serious harm to the public weal. The natural law, however, which requires that people should be able to consult others in their difficulties in all security, demands that this class of secret should be observed in the case when even serious harm threatens some innocent person, unless he whose secret is in question is the cause of the impending evil. Thus, if I know as a professional secret who is the real culprit in the case of a crime wrongly imputed to an innocent person, I may disclose the real culprit if by some special means he caused the false accusation of the innocent person, otherwise I must keep the secret. ‘It is a disputed point among theologians whether I am bound to observe a secret at the peril of my life when it was entrusted to me under that express condition, some maintaining that no one can pledge his life in that way, others more probably holding the contrary. ’Whether or not I am bound at my own serious loss to keep a secret entrusted to me under the condition of secrecy depends to some extent on circumstances, Sometimes I cannot be supposed under the circumstances to have bound myself by so strict an obligation; but as a rule professional secrets will continue to be binding even when the observance of them entails serious loss.

We are bound to make known natural and promised secrets at the command of lawful superiors. The obligation of obedience to lawful authority prevails over that of secrecy due to individuals in those cases. And so a witness in a court of justice when lawfully questioned about what he knows under the obligation of natural or promised secrecy must give the evidence required. Similarly, secret impediments to marriage must be declared according to the precept contained in the proclamation of banns. Professional secrets, however, and, in general, secrets which belong to the third class, are privileged, and must not be declared, unless they have ceased to be binding for some such reason as those mentioned above. Secrecy in this case is demanded by the natural law, which gives the fullest possible security to those who consult others in their difficulties, and even the precept of one’s superior cannot avail against the natural law, as St Thomas teaches.¹

English law acknowledges the privilege of state secrets and of the professional secrets of lawyers, but in the case of doctors and clergymen it does not as yet go the full length of the doctrine laid down above.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 70, a. I, ad 2.

470. Questions. - Q. 1. What are the just causes of manifesting a secret?

Resp. 1. The rightly presumed consent of him whose interest it is that the secret be hidden. - 2. The divulgation of the matter proceeding from elsewhere. - 3. Damage to the Republic or to private persons going to follow from the secret. Nevertheless if there is question of damage already inflicted, you cannot lawfully reveal a committed secret, so long as the one causing the damage is not himself bound to betray himself ³. - St. Lig., n. 971, Lugo, Sanchez, etc.

³ And in this a committed secret differs from a merely promised one: in this latter the one promising has not received knowledge of the matter by force of his promise, but gratuitously promises secrecy concerning knowledge received in whatever way. Further, when he thereafter promises this, even with an oath added, he cannot by his promise exempt himself from an obligation by which he is already held. Therefore, since each one is bound to open the truth to a judge legitimately interrogating, a promise of secrecy cannot extend to the case of a judge legitimately interrogating. But the contrary happens in a committed secret. For the common good demands that, through fear of revelation, men not be deprived of the advantage of seeking necessary counsel or help, which nevertheless they would never seek unless they were certain that the secret would be kept. Therefore the common good demands that, as long as the one committing the secret can lawfully keep his secret, he retain the right that the other not betray it. Hence the reason why physicians, advocates, midwives, theologians consulted, etc., are not bound, even to a judge interrogating, to open a matter known under a committed secret; indeed why they are bound not to open it.

Q. 2. Whether you can reveal a secret if you have promised to keep it even with loss of life?

Resp. 1. It is affirmed, if the common good requires it, because a promise made against the common good is null.

Resp. 2. It is denied, if there is question of your own damage simply grave, because it is better to keep the secret promised by this special contract. It is also denied more probably, if there is question of your extreme damage, because you have expressly renounced your right, nor is it illicit to omit the preservation of life in order that you may keep a promise ⁴. - Thus Lugo, Lacroix, and St. Lig., n. 971. - Nevertheless the Holy Author deservedly says that the opposite is sufficiently probable.

⁴ In order that this opinion can be held probable, it would further be necessary that the business to be kept secret be of the gravest moment. For otherwise the promise would be prodigal, which we are not bound to keep.

471. • Q. 3. Whether he sins gravely who reveals a secret to one or another upright man under the same secret?

Resp. It is denied probably per se; because in this case grave injury toward another does not seem to be committed. Except provided that it is not revealed to a person to whom the one committing the secret to you is deservedly presumed to have especially wished it to be concealed. - St. Lig., n. 971, and others.

I said per se; because in practice, on account of circumstances, the revelation of a secret will easily become grave, namely when you suppose too lightly that the persons to whom you commit a secret received by you are so discreet that they will certainly keep it, especially if there is dealing with women. For the secret was committed to you because you were thought discreet; but if you violate it, do you think that another, to whom you entrust it, will be more discreet than you yourself?

Q. 4. Whether one opening or reading another's letters sins gravely?

Resp. It is affirmed per se, or from its genus. The reason is that by natural right and the law of nations there is present an obligation of leaving the secrets of letters uninjured; otherwise human intercourse would be ruined. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., tr. 11, on the 8th Precept, n. 5; and others commonly.

Except the following cases: 1. if there is present the tacit or presumed consent of the one who writes, or of the one to whom the letters are sent; 2. if it is known or presumed that the letters contain matters of light moment; 3. if it is done for a just cause, for example, to avert public or private damage, provided that in order to ward off that evil one has the right of opening the letters, and reads no more than is necessary for this end ⁵; - Scav. - 4. if the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence. - St. Lig., l. 5, n. 70.

⁵ ** To this can be recalled the question which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 969) calls great: Whether, in order to avoid your own grave damage, you can reveal the hidden crime of another, if you have received knowledge of it unjustly by force or fraud, suppose by opening letters, etc. But after relating the opinions of others he adds: Among these so various opinions, the opinion of Lugo (de Iust., disp. 14, n. 101) pleases me more. This great theologian teaches that, generally speaking, you cannot use that knowledge unjustly received with the damage of another, for escaping any damage whatever of your own... Lugo rightly admits only then that you can manifest the crime, when it would have been permitted to you even by force and fraud to seek it out and to open the letters. Thus St. Alphonsus.

But Lugo explains this doctrine of his thus by an example (l. c.): In order that this distinction may be explained and proved, we can use that example from goods of fortune, which anyone, as I suppose, can usurp even by deceit and force in order to free himself from extreme danger: wherefore, although you had previously usurped goods of this sort by injury and theft, yet if afterward you are in extreme need of them, you will now be able lawfully to retain and consume them, because you have been reduced to the state in which you could again take and consume them in whatever way. Thus, therefore, although you had unjustly received knowledge of another's crime, yet if you have been reduced to the state in which, on account of necessity, you could procure that knowledge in whatever way, you will be able lawfully to use that knowledge, just as if you had lawfully had it from the beginning.

It is a debated question in Medical Jurisprudence whether the Doctor’s professional knowledge of criminal acts should be privileged before the courts, so that he should not be forced to testify to a crime that he has learned from his patients while acting as their medical adviser. Dr. Ewell speaks thus on the subject (p. 2): “The medical witness should remember that, by the common law, a medical man has no privilege to avoid giving in evidence any statement made to him by a patient; but when called upon to do so in a court of justice, he is bound to disclose every communication, however private and confidential, which has been made to him by a patient while attending him in a professional capacity. By statute, however, in some of the United States, communications made by a patient to a physician when necessary to the treatment of a case are privileged; and the physician is either expressly forbidden or not obliged to reveal them. Such statutes exist in Arkansas, California, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, and Wisconsin. The seal upon the physician’s lips is not even taken away by the patient’s death. Such communications, however, must be of a lawful character and not against morality or public policy; hence, a consultation as to the means of procuring an abortion on another is not privileged, nor would be any similar conference held for the purpose of devising a crime or evading its consequences.

“A report of a medical official of an insurance company on the health of a party proposing to insure his life is not privileged from production; nor is the report of a surgeon of a railroad company as to the injuries sustained by a passenger in an accident, unless such report has been obtained with a view to impending litigation.”

The practical rule for a Doctor’s conscience on the subject of secrecy is, that he must keep his professional secrets with great fidelity, and not reveal them except in as far as he is compelled to do so by a court of justice acting within its legal power or competency. If so compelled, he can safely speak out; for his duty to his patient is understood to be dependent on his obedience to lawful authority.

As to the question of Jurisprudence whether the courts ought to treat the physician’s official secrets as privileged, in the same way as they do a lawyer’s secrets, this will depend on the further question whether the same reasons militate for the one as for the other. The lawyer’s privilege is due to the anxiety of the state not to condemn an innocent man nor a guilty man beyond his deserts. To avert such evil, the accused party needs the assistance of a legal adviser who can guide him safely through the mazes and technicalities of the law, and, even should he be guilty, who can protect him against exaggerated charges and ward off unmerited degrees of punishment. Now, this can scarcely be accomplished unless the attorney for the defence learn from his client the entire truth of the facts. But the client could not safely give such information to his lawyer if the latter’s professional secrets were not held sacred by the court of justice.

Can the same reasons or equivalent ones be urged in behalf of the physician? I do not see that they can. And I notice besides that, if he be excused from testifying against his patients, all their servants and attendants would seem to be entitled to the same privilege. Many persons, I think, labor here under a confusion of ideas; a Doctor is as sacredly bound to keep his patients’ secrets as a lawyer is in regard to his clients, but it does not follow that the law cannot grant a privilege to the one and refuse the same to the other, for reasons which require it in the case of the lawyer and not in that of the Doctor.

180. Just causes of manifesting a secret. Just as the neighbor's material thing can lawfully be taken away under certain conditions, so equally also a secret, to which otherwise the neighbor has a right, can sometimes be revealed, indeed must be. For the keeping of a secret is prescribed on account of both private and public good. But the general principle is: When the end of a law ceases contrarily, i.e., when the law has become not only useless, but even harmful, the law itself ceases. Hence in the case in which the law concerning keeping a secret by no means profits but rather harms private or public good, this law ceases; or in other words: a just cause of manifesting a secret is urgent necessity of public or private good. For in that case the neighbor is irrationally unwilling that the secret be revealed; or he is considered to renounce his right concerning the keeping of his own secret.

1. Therefore urgent necessity of the public good demands the manifestation of a secret; and therefore the Angelic Doctor: "Against the common good it is lawful to receive no secret."³⁵¹ But I say: urgent necessity; for if only some utility is present, it is not lawful to disclose a secret. For this reason the same principles are to be applied here which above were established concerning the obligation of denunciation. E.g., a physician is held to denounce some sick person who could easily infect others gravely.

2. Necessity of a private good regards either a) the one knowing himself, or b) a third person, or c) the very one who handed over the secret.

a) The proper good of the one knowing is then a just cause of manifesting a secret when otherwise grave damage would follow for him. This damage indeed ordinarily must be graver than that which follows for the other from revelation of the secret. If there is question of keeping a secret which is altogether necessary for the common good, it can in no way be revealed, even if death threatens; e.g., a soldier captured by enemies can in no way reveal the secrets of his fatherland. But if there is question only of the secret of some private man, then almost always no one is held to keep a known secret with great damage to himself, because no one is supposed to undertake such a secret with so great an inconvenience. The exception is if someone explicitly promised to keep the secret even with the greatest inconvenience. For then, according to the truer opinion, the promise is to be kept. There are nevertheless several authors who even in this case permit violation of the secret from a most grave reason.³⁵²

b) The good of a third person requires revelation of a secret if otherwise he would unjustly suffer great damage. E.g., Peter, knowing under secret that Paul is preparing death for Andrew, must first, as far as he can, turn Paul away from a perverse plan of this kind; but if he does not wish to desist, Peter must make Andrew more certain concerning the danger threatening him. Or a physician, knowing by force of his office that a bridegroom, who feigns himself healthy, labors under a grave and contagious syphilitic disease, must turn him away from marriage; but if this will have been vain, he can manifest the matter to the bride, in order to forestall the greatest danger to her and to the offspring perhaps to be born. Thus at least from natural law. For in practice the statutes of positive law in this matter must also be attended to, because otherwise grave penalties are usually inflicted.³⁵³

But what must be said if Peter knows from an entrusted secret that Titius is the murderer, but in his place innocent Sempronius has been accused, condemned, and is now about to be punished by death? The general rule is: I am held to keep an entrusted secret so long as the one entrusting the secret has a right that I not betray it. But in that case Titius is not held to confess his crime with the most immediate danger of his own death. Therefore he retains the right to the secret. Therefore Peter cannot manifest the entrusted secret for saving Sempronius.³⁵⁴ - Nevertheless this opinion does not seem sufficiently proved. For although the rule proposed is excellent, nevertheless it is not sufficiently proved that in that case Titius still has a right to the secret. For although he is not held to betray himself, because he can love his own life more than the life of another, nevertheless it by no means follows from this that neither can nor ought I betray him for saving an innocent man. For in this case two lives are endangered, namely, the life of the innocent man and the life of the guilty man. Now, other things being equal, I ought rather to save the life of the innocent man than the life of the guilty man. But the guilty man cannot be reasonably unwilling that I save the life of the innocent man, although this cannot be done without revelation of the entrusted secret.

c) The good of him who handed over the secret permits or requires manifestation of the secret if otherwise great damage would come to him. For he is not presumed to be unwilling in that case, and if nevertheless he resisted the manifestation of the secret, he would be irrationally unwilling. Hence if someone secretly entrusts to you that he wishes to enter marriage notwithstanding the impediment of bond, and you cannot impede him otherwise, you are held to reveal this impediment to the proper pastor, so that concubinage may thus be avoided.

³⁵¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 68, a. 1 ad 3.

³⁵² Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 971; St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 70, a. 1 ad 2.

³⁵³ Cf. German Penal Code § 300.

³⁵⁴ Thus Laymann in Noldin, De praeceptis n. 670.

852. A secret, subjectively taken, is knowledge of a thing hidden from others and to be hidden, or the knowledge and obligation of not manifesting some hidden thing; objectively, it is the hidden thing itself and to be hidden, which can be very diverse: an invention of art or science, or some fact, for example that an office is vacant, or an unknown crime. In the present matter, secret is chiefly taken subjectively. It is threefold:

a) Natural, whose obligation arises without contract from the very nature of the thing, because it cannot be manifested without harm or displeasure of the neighbor, and accordingly without his being reasonably unwilling. Thus if by chance or by effort you know another's money laid away, an invention, or a hidden crime, it is not licit to manifest it.

b) Promised, whose obligation arises from a gratuitous promise following upon knowledge of the matter, or because someone has promised to keep it, even if the matter from its nature does not induce an obligation of secrecy; for example, if someone concerning a thing previously known or now already received, spontaneously or at a friend's request, promises silence.

c) Committed or rigorous, whose obligation arises from an onerous promise antecedent to the reception of the secret, or because it is committed under an express or tacit pact of keeping it and is thus accepted by another.

Namely, first, expressly or tacitly, it is promised that it is not to be revealed: expressly indeed if someone says that he will not manifest the matter except under the express condition that the other keep silence about it (a private secret, which is required on account of a private good); tacitly when from some fact it is clear that the matter is committed under secrecy and that the other accepts it thus, as if it is committed to someone who by office, by force of the duty he bears, or by the special title of kinship or friendship, is bound not to manifest it (an officious or professional secret, which is required on account of the public good), for example, to a counselor, physician, midwife, advocate, theologian, confessor, visitor, parents, friends, etc., to whom a matter is manifested only because it is supposed to be faithfully guarded by them.

Consequently a committed secret obliges in varying degree: less when it was committed wholly freely, more if to a private person for the sake of counsel, still more if to one established in office, most of all when it is committed to a counselor in a public cause.

853. Principles. - Everyone has a strict right to his own secret. That right is proximately founded partly in dominion over one's own thoughts and the fruits of one's own genius or labor, partly in the right to reputation and external goods, insofar as, namely, from a violated secret there can be harm to reputation or fortune, or ceasing gain; ultimately it is founded in the common good. Hence the right of secrecy is relative and limited. Therefore of itself it is illicit, and indeed gravely, 1. to explore a secret; 2. to manifest a secret; 3. to use knowledge of a secret.

I. To explore a secret is illicit without legitimate authority or a just cause. For a secret is another's thing; therefore one who illegitimately explores it, for example by force, deceit, or fraud, usurps another's thing and takes it away from its owner. The gravity of this sin depends on the gravity of the thing which is extorted.

Hence a) of itself and generally it is illicit to listen at a wall or door, or to open letters, or to break open a chest, or to corrupt servants or workers in order to know another's secret, even an invention of art or science.¹

¹ An invention of art or science can licitly be detected by art or study; but this properly is not directly to explore another's secret, but to devise a similar invention by one's own ingenuity, whereby another's secret indirectly becomes known.

b) From legitimate authority, superiors (bishops, magistrates, judges) sometimes can and ought to explore secrets on account of the common good, for example, for detecting crimes committed or to be committed; and parents can do so on account of the good of children and of the family.

c) From a just cause, for example to avoid unjust harm, whether proper, common, or of an innocent third party, it is licit to explore the secret of him from whom harm threatens, for example, a crime committed or probably to be committed against oneself or against an innocent third party, the forces and positions of enemies in a just war.

II. To manifest a secret of itself is illicit, as being against charity and at the same time against fidelity or justice, because it is apt to be done with harm or displeasure of another, or also violates a promise or pact.

III. To use knowledge of a secret for one's own advantage or that of a third party, against the owner's will, is illicit, especially if it is done with his harm; a fortiori it is illicit if someone has detected the secret unjustly, because it would be to continue injustice.

Unless, however, it is in those circumstances in which there is a sufficient just cause for exploring a secret. But one who by unjustly using another's secret, as by revealing it, has brought harm upon another, is bound to restitution.

854. What the obligation of secrecy is. - I. A natural secret obliges from justice, by reason of harm; and one who violates it without just cause commits a grave sin from its genus.

II. A merely promised secret of itself obliges from fidelity alone, by reason of a simple promise; and one who violates it without just cause commits a venial sin, unless he intended to bind himself from justice, or the secret is at the same time natural.

III. A committed secret obliges from justice, by reason of a special contract; and one who violates it without just cause therefore sins gravely, and indeed more gravely, other things being equal, than for a natural secret. Especially if the secret is officious, because the common good regularly demands that it be preserved inviolate: for it pertains to the common good that all may safely seek counsel or help from those who by office or special title are able to furnish it. Hence such a secret ought not to be manifested to a judge or superior interrogating, and it also obliges if otherwise it would have had to be manifested; so that it is never to be revealed unless the common good demands it and by the law of nature it must altogether be revealed.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2.

855. There is a threefold just cause for manifesting a secret, on account of which the obligation of secrecy ceases:

1. The consent of him whose secret it is, at least reasonably presumed; for example, if a subject is denounced under secrecy, the superior can manifest, not indeed the denouncer, but the offense, in order to correct the delinquent.

2. Divulgation of the matter made from elsewhere; hence it is licit for him who had otherwise known a committed secret to speak about the secret, or to speak with a man who has knowledge of it.

3. The necessity of averting harm: generally it is licit to reveal a secret whenever this revelation is necessary for averting proportionately grave harm, public or private, proper or another's; indeed charity and legal justice sometimes require this manifestation. But a greater necessity is required the stricter and graver the obligation of keeping the secret is, which depends both on the nature of the secret and on the harm to be brought by manifestation.

But a fourfold necessity is given on account of which it is licit to manifest a secret as much as is sufficient for averting harm:

a) Grave common harm of civil society or of the Church: for the obligation of secrecy, which is principally introduced on account of the public good, ceases where the public good requires the manifestation of the secret, according to the adage: the safety of the republic is the supreme law. Therefore not just any harm to be avoided suffices, for example from the fact that otherwise some guilty man remains unpunished, but urgent necessity from a most grave impending harm.

Thus if someone under secrecy, even committed secrecy, has known another's purpose of greatly harming the city or the Church, from which he cannot otherwise be recalled, he can and ought to reveal the secret to authority. So also a physician is bound to denounce a sick person who could easily infect others gravely.

b) Grave harm of the very person committing the secret: for then he cannot be reasonably unwilling.

Thus, to prevent a marriage from being invalid, a hidden impediment which someone has known under secrecy must be revealed to the proper priest.

c) Grave harm of an innocent third party to be averted by revelation of the secret of the harmful person: for charity demands that we prevent grave harm of an innocent person, even with harm of the guilty person.

Yet if the matter concerns a committed secret, especially an officious one, it will not be able to be manifested unless the harm is still to be inflicted and by the very person who committed the secret about the harm to be inflicted. For the common good regularly requires that such a secret be kept, except in the case in which the one committing it is himself an unjust aggressor, against whom the innocent person can be defended. Thus if someone from a committed secret should know Peter to be a murderer, he could not reveal the matter to free Paul unjustly accused; yet he could do so if the accusation had been made by Peter himself. Likewise a physician, knowing by professional secrecy that a bridegroom is infected with venereal disease, could manifest the matter to the deceived bride, indeed he ought to do so, if the bridegroom, having been warned, would not desist from marriage.

d) Grave proper harm, for example danger of death, even if similar grave harm threatened another: for no one is judged to have bound himself with so great an inconvenience, unless he has expressly promised it and the promise was valid.

Yet if the matter concerns a committed secret, it will not be able to be manifested with great harm (for example, of life) to the one committing it, unless the danger comes from him, because then he is an unjust aggressor; otherwise, however, it is illicit. But in practice, the one committing it can first be warned about taking precautions against the harm which threatens him from the revelation to be made. Thus one who is falsely accused of homicide, whose author he knows from a committed secret, if it is necessary, can reveal the name of the guilty person after he has warned him to protect himself by flight.

Let it be noted that a secret can never be manifested, even for averting a most grave harm of death, proper or another's, if the common good demands that the hidden matter be wholly kept, as if the custody of the secret is altogether necessary for the security of society or of an army. Thus the secret of the seal of the sacrament of Penance can never be violated, because the greater good of religion and the salvation of the faithful always demands that it be preserved inviolate.

856. Corollary: on the secrecy of letters. - To open another's letters, or to read those already opened and kept in a closed place, for example in a desk, or lost by chance, of itself is a sin grave from its genus against justice: for everyone has a strict right to his own secret; and one who explores it without the owner's consent acts after the manner of a thief.

1. Hence they sin gravely who intend to know in this way secrets of great importance (matters regarding family, business, or conscience), or expose themselves to the danger of knowing them.

2. Nevertheless the sin will be only slight: a) of itself, if it is morally certain or can reasonably be presumed that nothing is found in these letters except matters of lesser importance, such as greetings, narrations of lesser events, commercial notes, and that grave infamy or grave harm cannot arise therefrom; b) accidentally, if letters are read from levity of mind or without full advertence, for example, to know news, to laugh at a barbarous manner of writing, and the reading is interrupted as soon as it appears that the matter is grave.

3. There will be no sin: a) if the consent of the sender or recipient is present, express or tacit, which nevertheless is not easily presumed: thus if spouses or friends are accustomed to hand over to each other letters received from a common friend to be read; b) in communities, institutes, or colleges in which it has been established by law, rule, or custom that superiors can read the letters of inferiors; in which case, however, letters sent to higher superiors are exempted, and in other letters those parts which it is clear deal solely with secrets of conscience; c) if on account of entirely grave motives someone judges that the letters contain injury, and the reading is necessary for averting harm threatening himself or others or the republic: nevertheless he will not be able to read more than the end requires. Thus in time of war it is licit for combatants to intercept the letters of enemies; likewise parents can read the letters of children, the rector of a college those of students, the rector of a prison those of the justly detained, a religious superior those of subjects; but not a master the letters of servants, nor a husband the letters of his wife, unless they judge with moral certainty that something harmful is contained in them.

4. Letters thrown away by the owner or knowingly left in a public place can be read without injustice, because he is deservedly judged not to vindicate his strict right; yet if something is contained there which, if revealed, would turn to the detriment of the owner, by reason of harm it must be kept hidden. But to read torn letters whose fragments are thrown away is not licit, at least if they are torn into pieces so small that the parts cannot be compared and the letter read except by an exquisite diligence which men are not accustomed to employ. For such tearing, by common estimation, is as it were destruction.

5. One who has acquired knowledge of a secret by unjustly opening letters nevertheless seems able to use it when circumstances have so changed that he now has the right of procuring for himself knowledge of that secret.

Question 1. What are the just causes of manifesting any secret whatsoever, even if it is committed?

Response. They are 1st. the rightly presumed consent of him whose interest it is that the secret be hidden; 2nd. divulgation of the matter arising from elsewhere; 3rd. harm that will follow from the secret to the commonwealth, or to innocent private persons, or to the one entrusting it, or even to him to whom the secret is committed. I said, that will follow, because if it concerns harm already inflicted, a committed secret cannot licitly be revealed as long as the one causing harm is not himself bound to betray himself, although a natural or promised secret can, indeed ought, to be manifested to a judge legitimately interrogating, so that the harm already inflicted may be redressed. The reason for the difference is that the obligation which affects a natural or promised secret is essentially conditioned, and as it were supervenes upon the pre-existing obligation of responding to a judge legitimately interrogating. But if the matter concerns a committed secret, a judge or superior cannot abrogate the right of nature, which requires that it ought to be kept, unless the matter is already known by another way. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 970 and 971. - Baller., note (a), p. 441.

Question 2. Can you reveal a secret if you promised to keep it even with loss of life?

Response. Affirmatively, if the common good requires it, because then a promise of this kind is invalid by its own nature. But otherwise one must answer if it concerns your own simply grave harm, because you expressly renounced your right, and it is not illicit to permit yourself to incur grave harm for keeping a promise. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 971.

Question 3. Does he sin gravely who reveals a secret to one or another upright man under the same secret?

Response. Negatively, probably of itself; because in this case grave injury against another does not seem to be committed, unless nevertheless it is revealed to a person from whom the one entrusting the secret to you is rightly presumed to have especially wished it to be concealed. - I said, of itself; because in practice, on account of the circumstances of the secret, the revelation will easily become grave, namely when you suppose too lightly that the persons to whom you commit the received secret are so discreet that they will certainly keep it. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 971.

Question 4. Does he sin gravely who opens or reads another's letters?

Response. Affirmatively, because by natural right and the right of nations there is present a grave obligation of preserving the secrets of letters inviolate; otherwise human commerce would be overthrown. Except, however, the following cases: 1st. if there is tacit or presumed consent of him who writes, or of him to whom the letters are sent; 2nd. if the letters are known or presumed to contain matters of slight moment; 3rd. if it is done from a just cause, e.g., for averting public or private harm, provided no more is read than is necessary for this end; 4th. if the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence. Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Peccatis, n. 70; and Hom. Ap., nn. 5 and 6.

Question 5. Can you ever use knowledge unjustly acquired for freeing yourself, for example?

Response. Affirmatively, in the case in which, if you had not had that information, you could, by your own right, in order to provide for yourself, have searched it out and inquired into the secret even by deceit; otherwise you cannot. Therefore this can be done 1st. when that possessor of the secret vexes you unjustly, since it is licit to repel force by force; 2nd. when he is held to reveal the secret, because then he does not have the right of retaining it; 3rd. when it is of interest to the commonwealth that it be manifested for the common safety. Yet you cannot use it on account of some good of yours resulting from the revelation, or some evil of your own to be avoided, nor on account of that evil for the sake of which you can reveal a justly acquired secret. But if that were permitted, a door and license would be opened of searching out, by right and wrong, the secrets of one's neighbor for our utility; letters would be intercepted and other frauds employed to the ruin of human commerce and public quiet. Such a person unjustly acquiring another's secret steals his good: nothing is more intimate to a man or more his own than the secret of the heart; it is a right belonging to him from intrinsic principles, which God protects by concealing it in such a way that not even angels penetrate the secrets of man. Against this right acts he who obtains a secret by fraud or deceit and communicates it to others. Hence there would be a violation of a most strict right if someone employed the new instrument which is commonly called a dictograph, against the peace of human society: e.g., while an advocate hears his clients, or such privileged persons receive most secret things, or officials communicate hidden things of government to one another. Thus Lugo, disp. 14, nn. 100 and following.

Question 1. Must impediments known under a secret, even a committed secret, be revealed?

Resp. Affirmatively, probably, even if an oath of not revealing them has been added. The reason is that a natural secret, even committed and sworn, does not oblige when grave damage threatens the community or a third person.

Question 2. Are you bound to reveal an impediment if you alone know it and cannot prove it?

Resp. Affirmatively, and the reason is that in matter of this kind the testimony of one person can suffice. Thus the most common and truer opinion, says S. Alphonsus, n. 995.

Lucius, a physician, asked a confessor what was to be done by him in these circumstances. Caius, a workman employed by Titius, had charge of a certain machine full of danger. One day Caius carelessly applied his mouth to a valve in the machine which he ought to have touched only with the instrument given for this purpose. A violent explosion followed and inflicted a grave wound upon Caius, so that he soon died. Before death he disclosed the cause of the explosion to Lucius alone, lest the insurance company hear of it and deny to his wife, destitute of other means of support, the sum of one thousand pounds for which his life had been insured. This in fact happened; for, because it suspected that some negligence of Caius had intervened, it refused to pay the money, and, when the wife of Caius brought an action against the company in a civil court, the company summoned Lucius as a witness. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a contract of insurance?

2. Can an entrusted secret be revealed, and when can or must it be revealed?

3. When questioned in courts, is a sole witness bound to disclose what he alone knows?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the contract of insurance?

In a contract of life insurance, with which we are here concerned, the insurer undertakes to pay a given sum to another upon the happening of a particular event contingent upon the duration of human life in consideration of the immediate payment of a smaller sum or certain equivalent periodical payments.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 554.

2. May a professional secret be revealed, or ought it to be revealed, and when?

Professional secrets may and ought to be revealed when this is necessary to avert serious harm to the public weal, and also when the person whose secret is in question is abusing it to cause serious harm to an innocent person.²

2 The same work, p. 472.

3. Is an only witness who is examined in court bound to give evidence on what he alone knows?

In canon law the axiom held—Testis unus testis nullus. However, in English law, as in most modern systems, a solitary witness is admitted as sufficient evidence of a fact, and so an only witness, if interrogated, will be obliged to give evidence, unless there is some reason to the contrary.³

3 The same work, p. 595.

4. The case. If Lucius knew how the accident happened from other sources than from Caius himself, as, e.g., from his examination of Caius’ wounds, or from other informants, he will be bound to state it when required in court to do so. If the only source of his knowledge was the communication made under secrecy by Caius himself, he should say that he does not know how the accident happened, if he is asked about it. It would then be a professional secret, which he is not bound to reveal in the circumstances of the case before us. Caius was not guilty of fraud; he was only thoughtless, and his wife may take the insurance money if she can get it.

Some years ago “Whole-time medical officer of health” wrote to the British Medical Journal, asking what he was to do in the following case: “A medical practitioner has consulted me under the following circumstances: He is attending a railway signalman for asthma. The attacks come on suddenly and are so severe that the patient falls on the floor, struggling for breath, and is totally incapacitated for an hour or longer. He has not yet had an attack in his signal-box, where he is on duty alone, sometimes for many hours at a time. The man declines to inform the railway company of his illness, thinking it would result in his discharge, or at least reduction of wages. The doctor is afraid that if he reports the case to the railway company who are not his employers, and therefore not entitled to a report from him, he will have to stand an action for damages brought against him by the patient. On the other hand, he fears that unless he breaks the seal of professional secrecy, there will probably be a railway accident, possibly on a large scale, as many London and other expresses traverse the line.”

We must take the facts of the case as stated. The signalman's complaint might at any time make him incapable of attending to his duties, and in the doctor's opinion there would probably be a big accident. The signalman had no right to continue at his post to the public danger; under the circumstances he was unfit to hold the post, as he could not, with reasonable certainty, guarantee that he would be able to fulfil its duties. His refusal to tell his employers threatened injury to them and to the public. In such a case the obligation to preserve even professional secrets ceases, and charity obliges anyone who is acquainted with the facts to make them known in the proper quarter. The doctor should therefore inform the company that the man is unfit to be left alone at his post. The rights of the public must be safeguarded, even at the expense of the individual.

Titius had entered into an engagement with Caia; when Julius, the physician of both families and a most intimate friend of the father of Caia, heard this, he was tormented by doubts of conscience. For under the secrecy of consultation he knew that Titius suffered from a syphilitic disease which would most certainly infect his future wife; hence he was uncertain whether he could or ought to disclose the condition of Titius to the father of Caia or not. Therefore, being a good Catholic, he approached a confessor to seek counsel. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and under what obligation is it to be concealed?

2. Is it lawful to reveal a secret, and when is it lawful or even obligatory?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This first question is answered on p. 337.

2. This question is answered on p. 338.

3. The case. While Titius is suffering from his disease, he can indeed marry, but he should not use marriage rights until he is cured, or at least without the consent of his wife after telling her about his state. In these circumstances Julius has no right to tell Caia's father about the disease from which Titius is suffering. As he is the family doctor he may and should tell Titius either to defer marriage, or at least not to use his marital rights, for a time until he is cured.

Julius, a boy being educated in a certain college, one day approached Caius, a master, and asked that he might consult him under secrecy. When Caius consented, Julius indicated another, very wicked boy in the college who was corrupting the others by teaching them a certain most grave sin and crime. Caius answered that Julius was bound to denounce that boy to the superiors; the latter, however, denied that he would do that or anything else that would bring the boy into danger. When Caius made no progress with Julius, he began to think about his own obligations in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and what is its obligation?

2. Is it lawful to reveal a secret, and is it sometimes obligatory?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered on p. 337.

2. This question is answered on p. 338.

3. The case. The only way of preventing very serious harm being done in the future among the boys of the college is to denounce the bad boy to the authorities. Julius is bound to do this in the first place, but he refuses to do his duty. Under these circumstances the public good requires that Caius should undertake the task. The obligation even of a strict secret ceases in such circumstances. Caius should therefore inform the authorities about what he has heard from Julius.