Appendix. On the Violation of a Secret

468. • A secret in general is called whatever is hidden: as concerns our matter, we call a secret whatever either from its own nature, or from a special contract, ought to be kept hidden.

A threefold secret is distinguished:

1. Natural, if it is imposed by nature itself, for example, if you know something which you cannot manifest without grave injury to another, whether in estimation, or in goods, etc.

2. Promised, if someone hearing a private matter from another or learning it by chance promises that he will not reveal it.

3. Committed, if someone manifests something to another, and at the same time tacitly or expressly requires silence from him concerning it.

469. Principles. - I. A natural secret in a grave matter obliges per se under grave sin, and indeed from justice, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that from the revelation of a secret there follows per se damage to the neighbor, who has a right not to be injured without a reasonable cause. - St. Lig., n. 970. - Salm., etc.

II. A promised secret obliges per se gravely or lightly according to the quality of the matter and the nature of the obligation undertaken, which for the most part is from fidelity alone. The reason is that a contract is contained in a simple promise, which per se obliges only from fidelity and according to the intention of the one promising, as was said concerning a vow ¹. - St. Lig., ibid., and others commonly.

¹ When the matter of a promised secret, even apart from any promise, by its own nature requires that it be kept hidden, because evidently it is also the matter of a natural secret, it is easily understood that the law of a promised secret can also oblige gravely. It is not so if you derive the whole obligation of the secret from the promise, and then in general establish that a promise obliges from mere fidelity; since the obligation of fidelity according to common doctrine is light from its genus. Therefore you will settle the matter more clearly when you notice with Card. De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 23, n. 14 and 90-91), that by force of a promise someone can oblige himself either from mere fidelity or from justice, and that it depends on the intention and free will of the promiser in what way he obliges himself; to this can also be recalled the words of the Author saying: and according to the intention of the one promising. Therefore a promise will oblige under light sin if one promises from mere fidelity; but if from justice, according to the measure of the matter it will also be able to oblige under grave sin.

III. A committed or communicated secret, which is also called rigorous, obliges per se under grave sin from justice, and indeed more strictly than a merely natural and also than a promised secret; because besides the natural obligation there also presses an obligation from a contract undertaken expressly or tacitly ². - St. Lig., n. 970.

² A contract intervenes also in a promised secret; but it differs from the contract of a committed secret, because the former is a gratuitous contract, but the latter is onerous; for another would not commit to you knowledge of the matter unless he received from you the promise of secrecy.

470. Questions. - Q. 1. What are the just causes of manifesting a secret?

Resp. 1. The rightly presumed consent of him whose interest it is that the secret be hidden. - 2. The divulgation of the matter proceeding from elsewhere. - 3. Damage to the Republic or to private persons going to follow from the secret. Nevertheless if there is question of damage already inflicted, you cannot lawfully reveal a committed secret, so long as the one causing the damage is not himself bound to betray himself ³. - St. Lig., n. 971, Lugo, Sanchez, etc.

³ And in this a committed secret differs from a merely promised one: in this latter the one promising has not received knowledge of the matter by force of his promise, but gratuitously promises secrecy concerning knowledge received in whatever way. Further, when he thereafter promises this, even with an oath added, he cannot by his promise exempt himself from an obligation by which he is already held. Therefore, since each one is bound to open the truth to a judge legitimately interrogating, a promise of secrecy cannot extend to the case of a judge legitimately interrogating. But the contrary happens in a committed secret. For the common good demands that, through fear of revelation, men not be deprived of the advantage of seeking necessary counsel or help, which nevertheless they would never seek unless they were certain that the secret would be kept. Therefore the common good demands that, as long as the one committing the secret can lawfully keep his secret, he retain the right that the other not betray it. Hence the reason why physicians, advocates, midwives, theologians consulted, etc., are not bound, even to a judge interrogating, to open a matter known under a committed secret; indeed why they are bound not to open it.

Q. 2. Whether you can reveal a secret if you have promised to keep it even with loss of life?

Resp. 1. It is affirmed, if the common good requires it, because a promise made against the common good is null.

Resp. 2. It is denied, if there is question of your own damage simply grave, because it is better to keep the secret promised by this special contract. It is also denied more probably, if there is question of your extreme damage, because you have expressly renounced your right, nor is it illicit to omit the preservation of life in order that you may keep a promise ⁴. - Thus Lugo, Lacroix, and St. Lig., n. 971. - Nevertheless the Holy Author deservedly says that the opposite is sufficiently probable.

⁴ In order that this opinion can be held probable, it would further be necessary that the business to be kept secret be of the gravest moment. For otherwise the promise would be prodigal, which we are not bound to keep.

471. • Q. 3. Whether he sins gravely who reveals a secret to one or another upright man under the same secret?

Resp. It is denied probably per se; because in this case grave injury toward another does not seem to be committed. Except provided that it is not revealed to a person to whom the one committing the secret to you is deservedly presumed to have especially wished it to be concealed. - St. Lig., n. 971, and others.

I said per se; because in practice, on account of circumstances, the revelation of a secret will easily become grave, namely when you suppose too lightly that the persons to whom you commit a secret received by you are so discreet that they will certainly keep it, especially if there is dealing with women. For the secret was committed to you because you were thought discreet; but if you violate it, do you think that another, to whom you entrust it, will be more discreet than you yourself?

Q. 4. Whether one opening or reading another's letters sins gravely?

Resp. It is affirmed per se, or from its genus. The reason is that by natural right and the law of nations there is present an obligation of leaving the secrets of letters uninjured; otherwise human intercourse would be ruined. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., tr. 11, on the 8th Precept, n. 5; and others commonly.

Except the following cases: 1. if there is present the tacit or presumed consent of the one who writes, or of the one to whom the letters are sent; 2. if it is known or presumed that the letters contain matters of light moment; 3. if it is done for a just cause, for example, to avert public or private damage, provided that in order to ward off that evil one has the right of opening the letters, and reads no more than is necessary for this end ⁵; - Scav. - 4. if the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence. - St. Lig., l. 5, n. 70.

⁵ ** To this can be recalled the question which St. Alphonsus (Lib. 3, n. 969) calls great: Whether, in order to avoid your own grave damage, you can reveal the hidden crime of another, if you have received knowledge of it unjustly by force or fraud, suppose by opening letters, etc. But after relating the opinions of others he adds: Among these so various opinions, the opinion of Lugo (de Iust., disp. 14, n. 101) pleases me more. This great theologian teaches that, generally speaking, you cannot use that knowledge unjustly received with the damage of another, for escaping any damage whatever of your own... Lugo rightly admits only then that you can manifest the crime, when it would have been permitted to you even by force and fraud to seek it out and to open the letters. Thus St. Alphonsus.

But Lugo explains this doctrine of his thus by an example (l. c.): In order that this distinction may be explained and proved, we can use that example from goods of fortune, which anyone, as I suppose, can usurp even by deceit and force in order to free himself from extreme danger: wherefore, although you had previously usurped goods of this sort by injury and theft, yet if afterward you are in extreme need of them, you will now be able lawfully to retain and consume them, because you have been reduced to the state in which you could again take and consume them in whatever way. Thus, therefore, although you had unjustly received knowledge of another's crime, yet if you have been reduced to the state in which, on account of necessity, you could procure that knowledge in whatever way, you will be able lawfully to use that knowledge, just as if you had lawfully had it from the beginning.

472. Resolves. - 1. A promised secret in no way obliges whenever otherwise you were bound to manifest the matter, for example, if you are interrogated by a Superior or by a judge. - St. Lig., n. 970.

2. A committed secret must be kept by you generally, even if you are interrogated by a Superior or judge, etc.; but you must answer that you know nothing about this, since indeed you have knowledge of this sort in the same way as if you did not have it. - St. Lig., n. 970.

3. A secret only implicitly or tacitly committed must be kept in the same way as if it had been expressly committed. Thus counselors of Princes, generals of war, advocates, physicians, theologians consulted about some question, and absolutely all to whom a secret is committed for the sake of counsel or consolation or help, are strictly bound to secrecy.

4. A religious Superior lawfully opens the letters of his subjects, or of others sent to them, whether from the statute of the Religion, or from custom, or from prudent suspicion that they contain something less right. - St. Lig., l. 5, n. 70.

5. Yet a Superior cannot open and read the letters which subjects send to mediate Superiors and, in turn, those Superiors send to subjects; for right reason of governing demands that supreme Moderators be able to communicate freely with all subjects. - St. Lig., ibid. - See Cases, n. 436 and following.

END OF THE TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS OF THE DECALOGUE