When another's faults may be made known

649. Declarations. Another's crime which is manifested is either public or hidden.

a. A crime is called hidden which is not publicly known, even if it is known by some persons or some rumor about it has already been spread, provided there is hope that it will not come to the knowledge of the community. A crime is called public or notorious which is already known to many men of some community.

b. A twofold publicity or notoriety must be distinguished: of law and of fact. A delict is called public by law if it is established concerning it by the sentence of a judge; and it is called public by fact if it is known to many men of some community, whether because the crime was publicly committed before many, or because it was indeed committed hiddenly, but afterward became public through divulgation.

How many persons a crime must be known to in order that it can be called public by fact cannot be determined. Universally one must say: when it has become known to so many persons that, with attention given to the community, the quality of the matter, the talkativeness of men, etc., it can no longer be concealed, but will become known within a short time, it must be considered public by fact. Most theologians establish these rules: a crime is publicly known if in a college which consists of thirty persons, seven know it; in a college which consists of one hundred persons, fifteen; in a village which consists of one thousand persons, twenty dispersed through it; in a town of five thousand citizens, forty dispersed through it.

c. The community in which some crime is known is either a closed community, such as a college, monastery, seminary, etc., or an open community, such as a city, town, village, etc. Now a crime which is known in an open community is called absolutely and simply public; but a crime which is known only in a closed community is called relatively and in a qualified sense public.

Note. 1. A defect or delict which is committed to the damage of the community by him who holds a public office is also considered publicly known: for he who accepts an office of this kind submits himself to public judgment, so that his public acts can be judged by others. In like manner all matters are considered public which are carried out publicly, such as the acts of preachers and professors, which therefore are subject to the prudent estimation of others.

2. A crime whose divulgation the delinquent does not care about, indeed even shows to be pleasing to himself, is equated with a publicly known crime: for injury is not done to one consenting.

650. On the revelation of a hidden crime. 1. From a just cause it is permitted to manifest another's hidden crime, provided the due conditions are observed. A just cause of this kind is the common good or the private good either of the one revealing, of the hearers, or of the delinquent himself. For the right to false reputation ceases when either public or private good is promoted by the manifestation of the hidden defects of others.

a. Therefore not only from the precept of fraternal correction can the hidden crime of children be licitly signified to parents and of subjects to superiors, so that the guilty may be amended, but also from true charity hidden defects can be revealed to others so that either by prayers or by other means they may concur toward the amendment of the delinquent: for the spiritual good of the delinquent must be preferred to his reputation.

b. Therefore those are excused who for the sake of consolation or counsel narrate to a friend an injury done to themselves by another; likewise servants revealing injuries inflicted on themselves by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, religious by a prelate, etc., although from this some infamy may come to the author of the injury. Likewise if someone is accused of a false crime, he can licitly open the hidden crime of the accuser in order to diminish his trustworthiness and authority. Indeed even the accused may do this, provided the manifestation is necessary for invalidating the force of testimony. For no one is bound with so great an inconvenience to himself to protect the reputation of another, especially one unjustly injuring him.

c. Therefore another's reputation is licitly diminished where a false estimation concerning his learning and uprightness is harmful to others, if grave and notable damage which threatens others cannot be impeded in another way. For the good, especially the spiritual good, of the innocent must be preferred to the reputation of the guilty.

Therefore when there is question, for example, of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of entering religion, of taking on a physician, teacher, servant, etc., it is permitted to manifest another's hidden defects, incapacity, and vices, from which some detriment is deservedly feared. He who knows that someone is a thief can manifest it to those with whom he lives so that they may be on guard for themselves. Any private person can report the delict of another to the judge, so that by the punishment of that person the common good may be promoted.

2. In revelations of this kind a twofold condition must be observed: a. that the damage which is avoided through revelation be proportioned to the damage which is inflicted on another from the manifestation of the vice; but it is considered proportioned if the damage to be avoided is grave, although greater damage follows for the one defamed, because the right of the innocent is superior, yet not if it is light or far less; b. that the revelation be made with the least damage of the guilty person, that is, that it not be manifested to more persons than is necessary, nor the person revealed if this is not necessary, nor be manifested without the delinquent first being warned, if warning can be done without grave inconvenience and is hoped to profit for the intended end.

651. On the revelation of a public crime. 1. A crime which is public by law can everywhere be manifested without another excusing cause, unless it has been amended and wiped away by oblivion.

a. For the judge by judicial sentence deprives the delinquent not only of reputation, but also of the right to reputation in this matter, and this in perpetuity; and just as he himself takes care that the sentence be published, so he gives to all others the license of further divulging it, so that all can guard themselves against criminal men.¹ Wherefore it is not a sin to write or speak publicly about a crime because of which someone has been punished by prison or another penalty.

b. To reveal again a crime which was public by law, but is now amended and wiped away by oblivion, is not indeed against justice, because the force of the judicial sentence which had despoiled the delinquent of the right to reputation always endures; but it is against charity if someone without utility restores the memory of the crime in those circumstances in which he foresees that the hearers are going to hold as criminal one who has already amended himself, and that he is going to suffer grave damage.

2. A crime which is public by fact and indeed simply public can be manifested both to members of the same community and outside the community without another excusing cause, unless it has been amended and wiped away by oblivion.

a. It is expedient for the public good that each one be known as he publicly truly is, lest men suffer damage because the wicked or unskilled are held for upright or skilled. Therefore concerning publicly known matters and those things which are publicly done, anyone can speak freely before all, even those not knowing, although the estimation of others is diminished by it. Yet he must take care not to exceed the limits of truth, nor without utility inflict damage on others.

b. To reveal again a crime which was public by fact, but is now amended and wiped away by oblivion, is not only against charity, but also against justice, because through oblivion the matter returns to that state in which it was before the publicity of the crime, and therefore the right to reputation also revives.²

c. To the question whether a crime public by fact in one place can be divulged in another distant place, these things must be noted:

alpha. If the crime will justly become public in that place within a short time, it can licitly be divulged: for reputation certainly to be lost within a short time is no longer of any value; therefore its loss inflicts no damage. Something else must be said about anticipated loss of life, because any moment of life in which we can merit eternal reward is of the greatest value.

beta. If the reputation of the crime is not going to come to that place, at least within a short time, some indeed permit all crimes to be manifested, because it is expedient for the public good that each one be known by others as he publicly is, lest men be deceived in the relations which they have with him;³ but others permit this only concerning those crimes which render a man harmful to others, such as crimes of homicide, treason, scandalous impurity, etc. The first opinion is also probable, since its reason has force concerning all crimes and defects.⁴

3. A crime which is public by fact, but only relatively public, can be manifested to the members of the same community; but outside that community the same cannot be manifested without injustice.

For the delinquent has not lost reputation outside his own community, since members of a closed community are accustomed to conceal outside the community those things which are known within the community, and ordinarily there is no reason which shows further divulgation to be necessary or useful. Therefore members of a household indeed speak licitly among themselves about the crime of a religious which is known in the house or monastery; but it is not permitted to them to speak about it with outsiders, nor with religious of another monastery, whether of the same or of a diverse order.⁵

¹ Lugo, disp. 14, n. 72.

² Lugo, disp. 14, n. 85, with Molina; cf. nevertheless Lessius, l. 2, c. 11, n. 82, who thinks that one sins only against charity.

³ Lugo, l.c., n. 80 ss.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 974.

⁵ Cf. Lacroix, l.c., n. 1221.

652. On writers of newspapers. In order to determine what is permitted and what is not permitted to writers of newspapers, the conditions of the present time must be kept before one's eyes, in which public papers by their office have so great an influence on public life, both political and social. Wherefore to those who direct Catholic papers there must be conceded a broad faculty, insofar as it is permitted by moral laws, of speaking and judging: for unless this were done, the place would be wholly ceded to depraved papers.

a. They can narrate all new matters: for since readers expect that they be taught about all things recently done, whether good or evil, they licitly report even crimes, defects, etc., which are public either by law or by fact, at least in one place. But things which are hidden they are not permitted to investigate and divulge once investigated, unless the common good or a truly grave good of a third person renders the manifestation licit. Since that matter is difficult to judge, great discretion and caution are needed.

b. They can publicly judge public matters: for things which are done publicly, especially by those who hold public office, can be subjected to public censure. Therefore they can report unjust acts and defects which are committed by magistrates in fulfilling office to the damage of the community. In this way enemies of the Catholic religion can be deterred from inflicting vexations either on religion or on pious men, since officials greatly fear lest their unjust actions be divulged through newspapers and subjected to censure.

c. It is licit for writers of newspapers, which is especially valid at the time of elections, to manifest the hidden crimes or defects of those who are to be elected to the supreme magistracies of the republic or community, or to assemblies, and which render the candidate unworthy, both because the common good demands this, and because from universal custom candidates are considered to yield their right as to this as soon as they seek a public office. Yet certainly those publicists must be condemned "who, led away either by an itch for divulging everything or by partisan zeal, also touch those crimes whose knowledge contributes nothing to the public good," especially if they inveigh against the crimes and defects of men who discharge a higher office.

653. A certain greater license is customarily conceded to historians in narrating the vices and crimes of the dead: for they can, without a peculiar reason of public or private good, consign to letters even hidden crimes of those whose history they weave, so that memory of them may stand; and they can stir up again crimes already wiped away by oblivion, and this for a manifold reason. First from the general end of history: for in order that history can be that which it ought to be, the teacher of life, witness of truth, vindicator of divine justice, etc., it is altogether required that the causes and effects of deeds also be manifested, which demands the revelation even of hidden crimes. Then the prudent narration of vices and crimes contributes to public utility: for horror and abomination of crime is struck in, men are frightened away from evil, and princes are excited to punishing vices. Finally, although of itself it is not permitted to tear away the reputation not even of a dead damned person, supposing that it is known that he is damned, yet it is permitted to narrate the hidden crimes of an impious man who even after death continues to exercise harmful influence, so that his authority may be destroyed or diminished.

Yet three things must be noted about this matter: a. In writing the history of a recent age, care must be taken lest from the narration of the crimes of a deceased person surviving relatives suffer damage. b. In writing the history either of a recent or of an earlier age, care must be taken lest from the narration of crimes some state, for example, the clerical or episcopal, be so defamed that scandal arises from it which is greater than the good hoped for from the manifestation. c. Since in present times archives, even the more secret, are opened to all, and a true desire has seized learned men of divulging whatever can be found in them, it is better that a Catholic narrate according to truth those things which of themselves ought to be covered by silence, than that they be brought forth adulterated by an adversary of the Church.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 87 ss.; Lehmkuhl I, n. 1183; Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 1097.

When a man has been tried and condemned in an open court of justice, there is no wrong done him by publishing the fact in the newspapers, or telling it to those who would not otherwise have heard of it. The judicial sentence penalizes him and deprives him of the right to his reputation in the matter touched by the sentence. .This holds true of distant places and countries, and even of distant times. No injustice, then, is committed against one who has been legally convicted of crime by making this known in a place to which he has come in the hope of its not being known. Uncharitable harm might be done against such a one if he was trying to lead a good life in his new surroundings.

Similarly, the sin of detraction is not committed when a sin which is matter of common report in one place is made known in another, if the knowledge of it would be sure to penetrate there before long. It is a disputed point among theologians whether or not sin is committed in such a case if otherwise the knowledge would not penetrate to the place where it is made known. At any rate, it is advisable to keep silence about such cases unless there be some good reason for making known the truth. If someone is thinking of employing an unknown servant whom we know to have committed theft from her - former mistress in another part of the country, we are justified in making the fact known to the person concerned. It does not follow that we are justified in publishing elsewhere the sin of another which was well known indeed to a particular circle or community, but which was not really public. In such a case the right to one’s reputation with the outside world has not been lost.

The right to one’s reputation is not absolute. We are, of course, never justified in calumniating another by imputing false charges to him. But for just and sufficient reasons we may make known the secret sin of another. There are cases when this is necessary for the public good or for the protection of the rights of the innocent, and in a conflict of rights the stronger should prevail. Thus, when lawfully summoned to give evidence in a court of justice we may witness to secret crime, and generally, whenever the defence of ourselves, or of the innocent, or the good of the delinquent himself, or of our hearers, require the truth to be made known.

I. Calumny is never licit, as is clear both from what has been said about lying and from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."¹

II. The following can render simple detraction licit:

1. The consent of the delinquent, since he is master of his own reputation, and therefore per se can abdicate himself from that good.

2. The public good to be protected. Hence, if you know that a man given over to lust wishes to receive Sacred Orders, you are held to denounce him to the Superior (St. Alphonsus, III, 968); likewise, per se, you ought to manifest a dishonest physician who is to others an occasion of sinning.

3. The spiritual good of the delinquent himself; hence they rightly excuse "those who indicate to parents the hidden crime of children, or to masters that of servants, or to the prelate of religious as to a father, in order to correction; as also a wife speaking with her husband about the hidden crimes of children or servants" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

4. A temporal or spiritual good, grave with respect to defamation, whether of the revealer himself or of a third party. Hence it is lawful to manifest the guilty person if an innocent person is accused; likewise to inform a mistress about the bad morals of a maidservant whom she intends to hire; likewise, sometimes, to indicate a hidden crime to someone for the sake of taking counsel or help, etc. (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. and n. 969).

5. With respect to historians, I note:

a) It is lawful for them to write down the public things of their own time, even if these, consigned to letters, are transmitted to the knowledge of posterity, and thus injure in perpetuity the reputation of the authors of those deeds.²

b) With respect to those things which were public but have been completely obliterated, authors commonly concede more to historians on account of the integrity of history and for the instruction and terror of others. Besides, since archives, even more secret ones, in our age are easily accessible to all students of history, it can be doubted whether hidden crimes which are contained in old documents ought to be called hidden.³ And this can be urged all the more because it is better that many things, which of themselves would better remain buried in eternal oblivion, be narrated according to truth by an upright historiographer, than that they be mixed with falsehoods by the impious and propagated for wicked ends.³

Yet note that, in a historical book which is intended for the common people, many things can be passed over in silence which cannot be passed over in others.

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1194.

² Sweens, De virtute iustitiae, n. 473.

³ Lehmkuhl, Theologia Moralis, I, 1426.

386. 1. Principle. From what has been said, it is never licit to calumniate; indeed generally it is illicit to uncover the hidden defects of the neighbor; but, when a proportionately grave reason is added, this can be licit; for the obligation of keeping silent about the defects of others ceases when their revelation is demanded by the public or private good, proportionate to the damage which follows from the manifestation itself, provided the intention is held not of harming, but of obtaining a good effect; for the manifestation of a vice which really exists is not of itself something intrinsically evil, and therefore can be permitted from a proportionately grave reason.

Now a sufficient motive can be:

387. (A) The public good, namely when the revelation of the offense is necessary for impeding an evil which threatens society or the community; for it is better to avert such damage than to preserve the reputation of a harmful person. Thus, if there is question of conferring an office upon someone unworthy or incapable, it is licit to uncover his hidden vices to the superior, when these are going to harm the whole community; newspaper writers can uncover the vices of candidates who seek public dignities or offices, as often as this knowledge contributes to the public good; if any secretly teach a very bad doctrine, from which faith or morals are corrupted, they must be denounced to superiors.

388. (B) Private good: (a) of the offender himself, as often as it cannot be procured without injury to his reputation, e.g., when children or subjects cannot be corrected unless their secret vices are manifested to parents or superiors; when someone cannot be kept away from an invalid marriage without manifestation of a hidden impediment. - Many also teach that this is licit for obtaining the prayers of the pious for the amendment of the offender; yet this must be done only prudently and with a right intention; for there are some who, under this pretext, but in reality from an itch for manifesting the vices of others, say to many: "pray for such a person, who greatly needs prayers, because..."; and this often is nothing other than open detraction or calumny veiled by hypocrisy.

(b) The good of the one revealing, when someone, for the sake of consolation or counsel, narrates to a friend injuries inflicted upon himself, even if thus another's hidden vice is uncovered; or uncovers to a judge the hidden crime of an accuser, in order to destroy the force of his testimony; for we can prefer our own good to the good of the neighbor.

389. (c) Also the private good of the neighbor; namely, when innocents can easily be deceived and seduced by the wicked, it is often expedient to manifest the secret offenses of these, so that the temporal or spiritual ruin of the unwary may more easily and efficaciously be averted; for the good of the innocent must be preferred to the reputation of the guilty. - Therefore if inquiry is made concerning the honesty of some servant, concerning the skill of a certain physician, etc., it is licit to disclose the truth, yet prudently and while observing the laws of charity.

In all these cases, revelation ought to be made with the least damage to the guilty person, - namely by manifesting only that which is truly useful for averting the evil, and only to those for whom the matter can be useful. - But it is never licit to impute what is false to someone in order to avoid one's own damage or that of others: for this would be a pernicious lie; therefore deservedly the following propositions (43-44) were condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "Why should it be anything but venial to destroy the great authority of one detracting from oneself by a false crime? - It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imputes a false crime to someone, in order to defend his own justice and honor."¹

¹ In Denzinger, n. 1060-1061.

Hence more probably it is not licit to manifest a hidden crime when knowledge of it has been acquired unjustly (e.g., by unjustly reading another's letters), even for defending oneself.¹ For the public good demands that fraud and injustice be able to patronize no one; therefore if someone has known another's secret by truly unjust means, the common good demands that he cannot use it. But otherwise it would have to be said if someone had the right of examining private letters, according to the rules to be set forth below.

¹ Thus Lugo, disp. XIV, n. 100-108.

390. 2. Corollary: on the manifestation of a public crime. When a crime is public, generally it is licit to manifest it without injustice even to those who are ignorant of it, because the right to reputation has been lost. Yet, so that the matter may be determined more accurately, certain distinctions are necessary.

(A) When an offense is public by notoriety of law, that is, by force of "a judicial sentence publicly promulgated,"² it can be manifested, even without cause, in the region where it has been denounced, unless it has been amended and already destroyed by oblivion; for the judge by a legitimate sentence deprived the offender of the right to reputation, at least in this matter; and, by promulgating this sentence, gave to others license to divulge the offense, so that citizens may more easily beware of criminal men. - Yet I said in the region where the sentence has been promulgated; for if the offender has gone away into a distant region, and there harms no one, charity at least can demand that his crime not be revealed, lest otherwise he come into despair. I likewise said unless it has been amended and already destroyed by oblivion; for if, even in the region where the sentence was made public knowledge, the offender has amended himself and enjoys a good reputation, it would be against charity, and perhaps against justice, to recall the memory of the past and expiated crime, and to deprive the guilty man, now amended, of his restored reputation.

² There is question of a sentence which passed into a judged matter, or of the confession of the offender made in judgment, according to the norm of the Code, c. 1750 and 2197, 2.

391. (B) But if the fact is public only by notoriety of fact, insofar, namely, as it is publicly known and cannot be concealed by any evasion,³ it can be manifested unless it has been amended and destroyed by oblivion. - For, even if no judicial sentence has intervened, the public good demands that criminal men, who have offended not once but several times and can inflict damage upon others, become known to all. - But if the offender is truly amended, and therefore by no means harmful to society, and otherwise his offense has been destroyed by oblivion, he who recalls the memory of this offense certainly sins against charity, and more probably against justice; for the offender, who had lost the right to reputation by a public offense, recovered it by amendment of life.

³ Code, can. 2197, 3.

392. (C) If the crime is public by notoriety of fact in one place, more probably it is not licit, whether from charity or from justice, to divulge it in another distant place, unless it is foreseen that the same will shortly be public in that place, or it is feared lest the offender harm others in that place. The reason of the general rule is that the offender has not lost the right to reputation in that remote region; but if reputation is going to be lost within a short time, it can morally be held as already lost; on the other hand, if the guilty man is harmful to others, on account of the public good it is expedient that he be denounced. - Even when the neighbor has lost the right to reputation, to narrate his offenses from an itch for speaking wittily is often a venial sin against charity, as being very unpleasant to the neighbor.

429. Thesis II. It is lawful for a proportionately grave reason to manifest the hidden defects of others. - The reason is that it is lawful, under due conditions, to posit the cause of an evil effect. But in the case 1° there is an action of itself not evil but indifferent: the manifestation or narration of a defect which really exists; 2° from it there follows equally immediately a double effect: one evil, namely, the infamy of one's neighbor, another good, namely, knowledge very useful to another who from it procures a good or prevents an evil. Therefore it is lawful to manifest the hidden defects of others, provided the other two required conditions are present: 3° the intention not of harming but of obtaining the good effect, whence no more nor to more persons can be revealed concerning the defect than is necessary for avoiding evil or obtaining good; 4° a proportionately grave reason for revealing with respect to the defamation, namely, notable damage to be avoided or a great good to be obtained for notable defamation.

But as Billuart notes, diss. XV, a. 2, § III: "it is not necessary that the good to be attained outweigh or even equal the good of reputation... because the guilty and the innocent are not equal in right; and otherwise it would follow that for avoiding temporal damage, for example, theft, it would not be lawful to reveal to the master the thefts of domestics... which nevertheless no one will admit." Namely, to preserve the right, which is greater, of an innocent person to a notable good of a lesser order, namely, of riches, morally equals the lesser right of a guilty person to a greater good, namely, reputation.

But the special reasons on account of which the reputation of another can lawfully be injured or ought to be injured can arise

1° from religion, for example, if there are revealed to superiors the vices of one to be ordained, who would be for scandal and detriment to the Church;

2° from justice, if someone from office ought to disclose and denounce the crime of another;

3° from charity, for forestalling damage of the narrator, of the delinquent, of a third party, or of society.

Therefore there suffices:

a. The common good of society, when revelation of the delict is necessary for impeding grave damage which threatens society. Thus, lest a public office be conferred upon one unworthy or incapable, his hidden vices can be revealed to a superior, if they are going to harm the whole community; likewise those who secretly spread doctrine harmful to faith or morals are to be denounced to superiors; and editors of newspapers can disclose the vices of candidates who seek dignities or public offices, if this knowledge contributes to the public good.

b. The good of the delinquent, whenever it cannot be procured without his defamation. Thus the secret vices of sons or subjects can be manifested to parents or superiors for their correction; and a hidden impediment must be manifested if someone cannot be restrained from contracting an invalid marriage.

c. The good of the revealer, if, for the sake of consolation, counsel, or defense, he narrates to some friend hidden injuries inflicted upon himself, or to a confessor, or to another prudent counselor, or to a judge for weakening the testimony of another. Nevertheless one must take care that it not be said to several persons, or that the person not be named more openly than is necessary for consolation or counsel.

d. The good of a third party, namely, lest the dishonest harm or innocents be deceived and seduced by them. Thus we can warn someone to avoid the company of a perverse man lest he be perverted; to manifest a thief to those with whom he dwells; and if inquiry is made concerning the honesty of a servant, the skill of a physician, the morals of a youth about to enter marriage, etc., to respond according to the truth.

Nevertheless in these cases let it be noted: 1) revelation must be made with the least damage to the guilty person, so that we manifest only that which is truly useful for averting evil, and only to those to whom it is necessary; - 2) it is never lawful to impose a false crime, even for avoiding one's own or another's damage, but this is a grave evil, as is clear from propositions 43 and 44 condemned by Innocent XI; - 3) it is unlawful to manifest a hidden crime whose knowledge was acquired unjustly, for example, by reading another's letters unjustly; unless in the present circumstances someone already had a right of using such a means, in the case, of opening private letters.

430. To manifest a public or notorious crime to others who are ignorant of it generally and of itself is not against justice, because the right to reputation has been lost; although it can be against charity. Notorious or public is that which can be hidden by no evasion, or, as Cajetan says, that which of itself is apt to come into common knowledge. One thing is notorious by law, concerning which it is established by the sentence of a judge; another by fact, which was done openly with many present or has already come to the ears of many. Now:

1. A delict notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a legitimate judicial sentence publicly promulgated, can be manifested even without cause, in the region where it has been so denounced, because the judge deprived the accused of the right to reputation in this matter and granted permission of divulging it.

Nevertheless it is unlawful to manifest it: a) in another region where the judicial sentence has no force, because there the accused has not been deprived of the right to reputation, and therefore this is against justice; b) if the accused has amended himself or the delict has already been destroyed by oblivion; this is against charity, if from this others would think him not thoroughly amended, - not however against justice, because the faculty given by the judge continually exercises its force, and therefore it is not unjust to renew the memory of the condemnation, unless however the law should concede perfect rehabilitation.

2. A delict notorious by notoriety of fact alone, which because of the number and quality of witnesses now cannot be hidden, can be manifested in the place where it is notorious, because the right to reputation has there in fact been lost; - unless it has already been amended and destroyed by oblivion: for then to recall it to memory without reason would be unjust, because the delinquent has recovered the right to reputation.

3. A delict notorious in one place by notoriety of fact cannot be manifested without injustice in another distant place, because the delinquent has not lost the right to reputation there; - unless it is foreseen that shortly it is to be legitimately made known in that place, or unless there is deserved fear lest the delinquent harm others in that place.

431. Concerning detraction through newspapers and daily papers. - For these, in this matter, the same laws and principles hold of themselves as for private persons; but the applications can be varied and diverse according to circumstances. For common utility has more force in public writers than in private persons. Public papers are an essential condition of modern life and a necessity of our time; they also exercise great influence in political and social life. Whence Catholic writers are to be allowed as ample a faculty as the moral law permits, if there is serious competition on the part of non-Catholics.

This will easily be done for the greater papers. But a) it is not so easily to be admitted for lesser and local papers, or for periodicals; - b) nor are opposing papers always truly to be feared; - c) and also it will not always be necessary to indicate the names of persons: for facts can be narrated with names omitted, or with only their initial letters indicated, if it is feared that the crime will be divulged where it is not yet known; and this is to be done, unless however it has certainly been divulged by others.

With these things noted beforehand, the following rules can be established:

1. To narrate public facts is lawful, but with the precautions noted above.

2. To investigate or divulge hidden things is not lawful except by reason of a great common good, or on account of a great good of a third party; for judging this, great discretion is needed.

3. Public matters can be publicly judged, as befits modern democratic societies: thus, for example, defects and unjust acts in magistrates or in their functions; unless however a greater evil is to be feared. For it is good that officials fear such judgment, and that Catholic writers dare to denounce their defects and iniquities.

4. Concerning candidates to be elected to public functions, to manifest hidden crimes and defects which render a candidate unworthy is lawful, both by reason of the common good and by reason of the custom by which candidates tolerate this.

But let it be noted for the third and fourth rule, that crimes whose manifestation contributes nothing to the common good cannot be manifested, and indeed so much the less the higher the office someone holds. Newspaper writers must attend altogether to this, since they easily and often exaggerate.

432. Can reputation which the defamed man has renounced be lawfully and justly violated? - Resp. 1° Given a just cause, it is lawful to detract from one's own reputation and to permit it to be detracted from by others: for man of himself has dominion over his own reputation, and so he can dispose of it from a just cause, for example, for saving life, for repressing pride, for his own humiliation and the exaltation of divine mercy.

2° Without a just cause it is not lawful (Eccli. XLI, 15): nevertheless this of itself is only a sin of prodigality and of defect of charity toward oneself; by accident it can be against justice and charity owed to one's neighbor.

For our reputation can be necessary to one's neighbor in three ways:

a) when the reputation of others depends upon our reputation: thus the reputation of a monk or priest;

b) when our reputation is necessary so that we may render to our neighbor an office owed by strict right, for example, the reputation of a pastor or magistrate;

c) when not from justice but from charity we are bound to benefit our neighbor, and by infamy we are reduced to being unfit for this.

In the first and second case defamation of oneself is against justice; in the third case he who defames himself sins against charity, just as he sins against charity who throws away money by which he could have benefited the poor.

Question 3. Can a public crime be revealed to those ignorant of it, but living in the same place where the crime is already public?

Response. Affirmatively, at least without grave sin, because reputation lost in relation to the community in which one lives, through publicity of the crime, whether this is of law or of fact, can no longer have grave harm inflicted upon it. But if it is asked whether a crime already public in one place can be revealed where the crime is still unknown, the response is that there is much dispute among theologians; but according to St. Alphonsus and not a few others, probably it is not mortal, whether the crime is manifested where it will easily and shortly be made public, or whether it concerns places to which the divulgation either will never come or will not come except after a long time. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 974 and 975; and Hom. Ap., n. 12. Lugo, de just. et jur., disp. 14, sect. 5.

Question 5. Does he sin gravely who reports grave and hidden sins of another only as heard from others, e.g., if he says: it is reported, they narrate, I have heard this or that about such a one?

Response. He certainly sins gravely against charity and justice if he reports these things in such a way that others will with reason believe them, e.g., if he asserts that he has heard the things which he narrates from a person worthy of trust, because then he furnishes a sufficient cause for believing the evil; but otherwise if probably belief is not given to the words, because then no infamy will arise from them. But if he reports things heard before those who probably will believe them from levity or malice of their own, he does indeed sin against charity, because each person is bound under grave matter from charity to remove an occasion of harm to another when he easily can, but not against justice, because he is not the efficacious cause of the harm. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 977.

The FIRST opinion is assertive. So Salonius, and Bannes 2. 2. question 73, article 2 — the former in controversy, the latter indeed in doubt 1 — and others, as at Sayrus book 11, chapter 6, number 12; Bonacina On Controversies, disputation 4, question 4, part 3; Malderus 2. 2, tract 7, chapter 1, doubt 4; Vega, Summa, vol. 2, chapter 8, case 12; Azorius vol. 3, book 5, chapter 9, question 2. D. Bonaventure seems so, loc. cit., in the Mirror of the Soul, chapter 1. So Valentia on question 73, p. 2, doubt 1; Suarez, Tomus 4, disputation 34, section 1; Filliucius, Tomus 2, tract 10, chapter 3, number 90; Molina, Tomus 2, disputation 29; Fagundez book 8, chapter 2, number 24; Sayrus book 11, chapter 6, number 11; Bassaeus, s.v. Detractio, 1. number 11, who says this is the common opinion.

The OPPOSITE opinion seemed probable to Diana, p. 1, tract 17, resolution 22, citing Lessius book 2, chapter 11, number 7; Cajetan 2. 2. question 73, article 2, dist. 1; Pererius, Nauarre, book 2, chapter 4, number 335. To these Reginaldus may be added, Tomus 2, book 2, chapter 4, number 75, and others, from whom Diana deduces, resolution 24, that the hearer is not bound to correct that detractor; and Corduba also may be added, question 2, conclusion 2.

I ASSERT with the former opinion, which holds that it is a mortal sin to lay open a hidden crime even to one or another prudent man.

It is PROVED by S. Bonaventure, because the order of fraternal correction is commanded; and it commands that you do not bring before two, even prudent, superiors for amendment before secret correction. That this order is commanded I have shown in the Treatise on Charity, Disputation on fraternal correction.

It is PROVED secondly, for rash judgment about anyone is mortal, even if one single person lose his good opinion of him; and that there is parity is proved from James 4: He that detracteth from his brother, or judgeth his brother, detracteth from the law, and judgeth the law.

Bonacina ANSWERS, denying the parity, because the judge ascribes a perhaps false sin, and so infers a grave injury.

AGAINST: then to reveal a true crime is not mortal in its genus, if done indiscreetly? At last, because, as our Father Marinus used to say, greater loss is inflicted when it is told to a few prudent men than to many others who are not reckoned prudent; and Fagundez teaches so, number 24; Sayrus loc. cit. This also ceases in the disputation on Restitution.

The first is, if one tells a close friend of an injury secretly inflicted upon him by someone, in order to lessen the pain; for it is too hard, and contrary to human custom, that anyone should bear injuries alone and not be able to share them with a friend; this is lawful, not with the intention of detracting, but so that he may bear it more lightly. So Sylvius 2. 2. quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 15. Bassaeus verb. Detractio 12. Less. lib. 2. cap. 11. dub. 12. num. 72. Navar. lib. 1. cap. 4. num. 345. Molina tract. 4. disp. 29. num. 5. Layman lib. 3. sec. 3. tract. 4. parte 2. cap. 3. Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 145. and other Doctors in common, with whom Diana subscribes Tom. 3. tract. 15. resol. 32. But Ioan. de Cruz adds more in his directory, p. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3. concl. 1.

Saying: If a person gravely injured in secret, unable to restrain himself from grief, bursts forth into public complaints, he is not for that reason condemned to mortal sin, if the injurer is defamed; for it seems hard to restrain an afflicted mind so that it does not burst into complaints, since this is most natural, so says the same author, also citing Ludovicus Lopez. This is the opinion of D. Bonav. in speculo animae, cap. 1. circa medium, where he says: Yet it matters greatly whether it proceeds from envy; for sometimes it happens that the evil deeds of others are recounted, or even exaggerated, against someone out of a certain indignation, or levity of speech, without the intention of defaming him, which would be a hard judgment to call mortal.

The second case is, when someone narrates the sins of another which he has heard, and expressly asserts that he knows nothing for certain, but is only reporting what was related.

That this person sins mortally is taught by Sotus de Iust. lib. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 4. and in 4. disp. 15. quaest. 4. Navar. cap. 18. num. 50. Villalob. sum. tom. 2. tract. 11. dub. 36. num. 6. Tanner. 2. 2. disp. 4. quaest. 8. dub. 7. num. 139. Malder. tract. 7. cap. 1. dub. 17. Sylvius quaest. 62. art. 2. quaeritur 16. concl. 3. Turrianus disp. 52. dub. 10. num. 8. and others, with whom Diana subscribes Tom. 3. Tract. 5. resol. 28. The reason is, because he defames; Sylv. subscribes quaest. 4. D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 4. in corpore. Caiet. there, Less. lib. 2. cap. 9. de iniuriis in corpore, dub. 16. num. 113.

Many Recent authors say this is true in the case, if the one reporting is a man of authority, so that he is believed, or because of the levity of the hearers. So Azor. p. 4. l. 13. cap. 16. Sotus loco citato Less. l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 5. Salon. apud Tannetum, Layman. l. 3. sect. 5. tract. 3. p. 2. cap. 3. num. 7. Ioan. de la Cruz in direct. art. 8. quaest. 2. art. 2. dub. 3. concl. 4. They say, however, Less. loc. cit. Nauar. Man. cap. 17. num. 71, that it is not against justice, but against charity, which Bassaeus n. 13 judges more probable with Fagundez num. 19, because here he does not defame directly, but per accidens.

Yet there are not lacking those who deny that he sins mortally, and thus hold at least the opposite opinion as probable: Tannerus loc. cit. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 33. art. 2. disp. 2. Sotus in 4. disp. 15. quaest. 4. art. 1. Sylvest. v. detractio, quaest. 4. except. 5. Armilla v. restitutio, num. 4. except. 7. Sà verbo informare, after Gabriel, Adrian, and others. And thus Faber teaches this opinion in 4. de restit. disp. 53. num. 29, and Diana judges it probable.

Tannerus adds num. 140. with Lessio dub. 5: if anyone reports in such a way that he probably thinks no one will believe it, it is not mortal; but if he thinks some will believe it out of mere idle levity, it is not against Justice, but against charity.

The Seraphic Doctor, who in speculo animae, cap. 1. et 2. relates all the modes of excusing in Confession, also appends this one. Therefore I judge that he stands for the first opinion, because, as the holy Doctor himself argues, when reputation is gravely damaged, it is enough that there be no cause; yet if these things are reported out of mere talkativeness, the holy Doctor judges it probably not mortal. But if the detraction is from malice, it will be mortal against Justice; indeed this kind of detraction is pestilential, and more colored toward defaming. So Sotus especially.

The third case, which the holy Doctor notes in speculo animae, cap. 1. §. secundus ramus invidiae, etc., is levity of matter. So Lessius l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 3. num. 11, adding that the same must be said of one revealing natural defects, such as that someone is ignorant, of weak judgment, etc.; and Petrus Nauar. l. 2. cap. 4. num. 307. with others judges the same must be said of natural defects; as if you say that someone is the son of a cleric, born of adultery, and the like; provided, however, the person is not so distinguished that to speak even lightly of him would be grave, as to be a liar. Diana subscribes p. 1. tract. 5 resol. 69. Lessius num. 14. Salonius 2. 2. quaest. 6. art. 3. dub. 3. Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, l. 8. cap. 2. before the fourth number. Tannerus disp. 4. quaest. 8. num. 156. To this he also reduces levity of mind, or talkativeness, with D. Thom. quaest. 73. art. 3, understanding it by reason of indeliberateness, with Valentia quaest. 17. puncto secundo. Bassaeo, v. Detractio 1. from num. 6.

The general rule of S. Bonav. in speculo, cap. 1. et 2. attests: whenever from detraction a grave loss of reputation of itself follows, it is mortal. So Fagundez n. 4. Less. num. 15. Petrus Nauar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 347. Filliuc. tract. 32. de restit. cap. 9. num. 230. Nauar. Summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 22. 23. 25.

THEREFORE OFTEN to speak venial things will be mortal: and conversely, to speak mortal things will not be mortal with respect to certain persons; as if you say of some young man that he has dishonorable loves; of a soldier, that he has killed, or fought a duel, or seduced a girl, or keeps a concubine. So Sotus l. 4. de Iustitia, quaest. 6. art. 3. §. sequetur in medio. et l. 5. quaest. 10. art. 2. concl. 4. Less. l. 2. cap. 11. de detract. dub. 3. num. 17. Lopez p. 1. Instruct. cap. 285. Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 66. Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 73. Filliuc. tomo 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 231. Corduba de detract. quaest. 1. Fagundez l. 8. cap. 2. num. 51.

Say the SAME, if you detract by general terms, it will be only venial; as if you say someone is proud, avaricious, irascible. So Less. l. 2. cap. 11. de detract. dub. 3. num. 18. Sylvester v. detractio. Filliuc. t. 2. tract. 32. cap. 9. num. 232. D. Antonin. 2. p. tit. 8. cap. 4 Nauar. Summa, cap. 18. num. 24. Fagundez num. 6.

The reason is, because these are mostly received as defects, not defamatory, or are taken for a natural inclination. Yet it can happen that they gravely wound. Therefore prudence must be used, to discern whether they gravely defame, considering the persons, both those defamed and the hearers; and therefore confessors must employ great prudence in these matters. So Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 64. Nauar. num. 25. Less. cited above, Caiet. loc. cit. Fagundez num. 7.

MOREOVER, if one idly relates the sins of others to those whom he knows will not believe them, he will not sin, whatever those sins may be: Less. l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 5. num. 24. Sotus l. 4. quaest. 6. art. 3. Nauar. cap. 18. num. 49. The reason is, because no damage follows from it. D. Bonau. senses the same above; yet if the crime were atrocious, such as Sodomy, heresy, treason, and although they would not believe it, they would nevertheless entertain some suspicion, it will be lethal, if the person is honorable. The reason is, because since he is in peaceable possession of the best reputation, it is reduced to doubt and to the grave peril of losing it. So D. Bonau. loc. cit. D. Thom. quaest. 73. art. 2. in corpore, Caictanus there, Sotus l. 5. quaest. 10. art. 1. Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 63. Sylvest. v. detractio, num. 2. Lessius cited above, and Fagundez num. 17.

It is STILL ASKED concerning those who write Annals, and in them recount the hidden crimes of others.

HE ANSWERS Fagundez n. 25. that they do not sin mortally, provided they do not write out of envy or hatred. This is also the mind of D. Bonau. in the place often adduced above, in speculo, cap. 1. Yet let them beware lest they brand any family, and the living, with some stain that grows squalid among posterity. So note Sotus l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 10. art. 2. Malder. tract. 7. cap. 1. Molina above. Arrian. quodl. 11. quaest. 1. Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 143. Valentia quaest. 17. p. 2. for these things are not lawful.

FINALLY there are certain Astrologers who impose falsehoods upon some, and these gravely sin, as Fagundez notes num. 26.; for foolishly they assert, defaming men, things from the motion of the stars. Whence it happens that if an Astrologer, when questioned, names some thief, he is punished by municipal laws; yet one cannot bring an action of injury against him, as Leg. Item apud Labeonem, §. si quis Astrologus teaches. Therefore also by Leg. Nemo Cod. de maleficis it is provided that no one consult an Aruspex or a Mathematician, because they are impostors, and therefore to be cast out to the farthest lands, as Sotus teaches l. 5. de virtute quaest. 10. artic. 2., who nevertheless speaks of the Judiciarii, condemned by the Pontiffs, Sixtus V. and others.

The Sacred Canons condemn these detractions, extra de sortilegiis from the Penitential of Theodotus, and Alexander III. Granden. the Patriarch, apud D. Bonaventuram in Confessionali, cap. 3. periculis 37. et 38.

NOW the various modes divided in quaest. 1. must be examined.

It is MOST CERTAIN that it is never lawful to impose a false crime upon anyone; for this is most mortal in its kind. So D. Bonau. in speculo animae, cap. 1. 2. et 4. et p. 1. Centilog. sectione 13. et in 3. dist. 28. quaest. 3. et sequenti, et ad cap. 10. Eccles., where he urges that testimony of Scripture: If a serpent bite in silence, he is no better that detracteth his neighbour in secret, Eccles. 10. Do not curse the deaf, according to the exposition of D. Gregory 2. p. Pastoralis, cap. 1. admonit. 36. For to curse the deaf is to defame one who is absent and not hearing. The reason, as rehearsed by the holy Doctor, is because he unjustly takes away a good better than riches, according to Prouerb. 22: A good name is better than great riches. By which reason they commonly argue. This is the worst detraction, as the Doctors cry out in common with D. Thom. quaest. 73. art. 2., whom Sayrus reports l. 11. cap. 3. num. 7. et Fagundez in octavum praeceptum, l. 8. cap. 3. Therefore not even to avoid tortures, or to avert any grave evil whatsoever, is it lawful, as all Theologians teach with D. Bonau. and D. Thom., and the Canonists ad C. super eo, de usuris, et C. mihi, 22. quaest. 11. See Fagundez l. 8. cap. 5.

But it is ASKED: Whether it is ever lawful to uncover a true crime of someone.

THE HOLY DOCTOR ANSWERS in speculo animae, cap. 1. §. secundus ramus invidiae; that it is possible, when an unworthy man is praised beyond his merits, and from this some deception can arise, then it does not have the nature of sin. Therefore, if we hear some secretly depraved and pernicious man, who could deceive to the ruin, whether of faith or of life; such as an Apothecary or Physician; or of conscience, such as a Confessor; or of causes, such as an Advocate, being commended, then it is lawful to uncover his depravities; but not, if someone is a hypocrite and evil only toward himself, as if someone outwardly feigns piety and inwardly is full of private sins. The Doctors consent in common: Filliuc. tomo 2. tract. 40. in octavum praeceptum, cap. 4. num. 107. Sotus l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 10. art. 2. Less. t. 1. l. 2. cap. 11. dub. 10. num. 64. Petrus Nauar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 341. Corduba quaest. 2. de detract. concl. 4. ad 2. Tolet. l. 5. Summa, cap. 65. Fagundez lib. 8. cap. 3. num. 3. Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 17. punct. 2. dub. 3. Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 73. art. 2. Sayrus l. 11. cap. 6. num. 18. et the rest apud Tannerum disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 144., the same author adding that when due information is inquired by reason of office, marriage, etc., provided the damage be not so enormous that the other consideration ought rather to prevail. Bassaeus subscribes, v. Detract. from num. 10.

From this it ALSO happens that one inquiring into the defects of another, in order to avoid deceptions, does not sin, for instance for marriage, for a Chair, etc. So Fagundez warns loco citato.

You will ASK secondly: Whether uncovering the sins of someone who is already defamed in some crime is a sin.

It is ANSWERED, that uncovering other sins bearing a different infamy is mortal; as, if someone is publicly a drunkard, and you report that he is a thief. So Adrian. quodl. 11. art. 1. Nauarr. Summa Lat. cap. 18. num. 42. and others apud Fagundez num. 9. and Tannetum num. 141., who add that this is true even if the crime disclosed is lesser, as if you wished to defame a homicide by theft. Yet this example indicates something greater as to belief. So also Bassaeus num. 9.

You will ASK thirdly: Whether detracting from the dead is a mortal sin.

It is ANSWERED, that it is an atrocious sin. So in common Petr. Nauar. l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. a n. 351. Angelus in 4. quaest. de restit. honoris. Malderus de Iustitia t. 7. cap. 1. dub. 8. Molina disp. 28. Fagundez num. 11.

You will ASK fourthly: Whether detracting from the Religious Orders is a special fault.

It is ANSWERED first, that in these times it is dangerous to the faith, because of the heretics eager to carp at the Religious Orders, especially in chastity, which they proclaim as contested among us, judging, or impiously proclaiming, the conjugal life to be better, indeed necessary; otherwise concubinage would be had with others, whence that foul saying of the most filthy Luther l. de vita coniugali: si non vult uxor, veniat ancilla. Yet both Christ and the Apostle proclaim the celibate and virginal life servable by the help of God. And in Apoc. 14. John beheld virgins of this kind innumerable, as Fagundez disserits cap. 3. num. 13. after D. Bonav. in Diaeta salutis, tit. 10. ad finem: See Bassaeus 7.

Against these our Seraphic Doctor, the most valiant Achilles of the Church, often fought, as is seen in Libris Apologeticis contra magistrum Gulielmum, contra Magistrum innominatum in Apologia pauperum, and in other places.

These enemies and detractors of the Religious Orders, utterly hostile to the Gospel (since Christ issued the Evangelical Counsels of Chastity, Obedience, and Poverty, but these men revile them), the holy Doctor proclaims Adversaries of the Church. For the Church approved and venerates the Religious Orders; but these men reprove and spurn them.

He shows them guilty of death with a weighty testimony Deuter. 17.; for there it is prescribed: If you perceive that among you there are hard and doubtful judgments in cause of blood, etc. Thou shalt go to the priests of the Levitical race, and shalt follow their sentence, and shalt not decline to the right hand or to the left. But he that will refuse to obey the commandment of the priest who ministereth at that time to the Lord thy God, by the decree of the judge, that man shall die. Whence the holy Doctor argues: If to resist gravely, or to cry out against a shadowy Pontiff defining or decreeing, the penalty of death was deservedly imposed, how much more worthily will it be imposed upon the most unworthy, who detract from the Sacred and Apostolic sanctions of the Supreme Pontiff, the Vicar of God on earth? The holy Doctor proclaims such detractors of the Religious Orders, which the holy Mother Church erected, confirmed, and made firm, to be rebels and subverters of the Church. For with what face do these enemies of God proclaim as impostors those poor in spirit by voluntary choice, whom Christ Matth. 5. acclaims as blessed? Do they bark that those who for the straight road to the kingdom of heaven cut themselves off spiritually, and live most continent, and abstain from all things, that they may win the unfading crown, have wandered from the way of salvation? Lovers of Virginity do not revile marriages (says S. Bonan.) but prefer virginity with the Apostle prima Corinth. See the holy Doctor treating this matter at length.

Therefore MERITEDLY anathema was imposed upon these rotten members, detractors especially of the Orders of Sisters, of S. Dominic, and D. Francis, as Bartholomeo Medina witnesses cap. 14. fol. 184. Which excommunication is reserved to the Pope. But Petrus Nauar. notes l. 2. de restit. cap. 4. num. 354. Sylvest. v. Excommunicatio, 7. excom. 48. Sayrus l. 4. cap. 4. num. 10. Graff. l. 2. decisionum, cap. 137. Nauar. cap. 27. num. 109. Fagundez l. 8. cap. 3. num. 14. that the excommunication does not strike those detracting privately from these Religious Orders, but those publishing libellos famosos, songs, and rhymes to the infamy of these Orders. And the same holds for all the other mendicant Orders by extension of the same privilege, as is clear from a certain privilege of Alexander IV. which begins Ex alto; and from another, which begins Non sine multa. Those, however, are bound to sing a palinode in writing.