Article Third. On the Licit Revelation of Another's Crime

649. Declarations. Another's crime which is manifested is either public or hidden.

a. A crime is called hidden which is not publicly known, even if it is known by some persons or some rumor about it has already been spread, provided there is hope that it will not come to the knowledge of the community. A crime is called public or notorious which is already known to many men of some community.

b. A twofold publicity or notoriety must be distinguished: of law and of fact. A delict is called public by law if it is established concerning it by the sentence of a judge; and it is called public by fact if it is known to many men of some community, whether because the crime was publicly committed before many, or because it was indeed committed hiddenly, but afterward became public through divulgation.

How many persons a crime must be known to in order that it can be called public by fact cannot be determined. Universally one must say: when it has become known to so many persons that, with attention given to the community, the quality of the matter, the talkativeness of men, etc., it can no longer be concealed, but will become known within a short time, it must be considered public by fact. Most theologians establish these rules: a crime is publicly known if in a college which consists of thirty persons, seven know it; in a college which consists of one hundred persons, fifteen; in a village which consists of one thousand persons, twenty dispersed through it; in a town of five thousand citizens, forty dispersed through it.

c. The community in which some crime is known is either a closed community, such as a college, monastery, seminary, etc., or an open community, such as a city, town, village, etc. Now a crime which is known in an open community is called absolutely and simply public; but a crime which is known only in a closed community is called relatively and in a qualified sense public.

Note. 1. A defect or delict which is committed to the damage of the community by him who holds a public office is also considered publicly known: for he who accepts an office of this kind submits himself to public judgment, so that his public acts can be judged by others. In like manner all matters are considered public which are carried out publicly, such as the acts of preachers and professors, which therefore are subject to the prudent estimation of others.

2. A crime whose divulgation the delinquent does not care about, indeed even shows to be pleasing to himself, is equated with a publicly known crime: for injury is not done to one consenting.

650. On the revelation of a hidden crime. 1. From a just cause it is permitted to manifest another's hidden crime, provided the due conditions are observed. A just cause of this kind is the common good or the private good either of the one revealing, of the hearers, or of the delinquent himself. For the right to false reputation ceases when either public or private good is promoted by the manifestation of the hidden defects of others.

a. Therefore not only from the precept of fraternal correction can the hidden crime of children be licitly signified to parents and of subjects to superiors, so that the guilty may be amended, but also from true charity hidden defects can be revealed to others so that either by prayers or by other means they may concur toward the amendment of the delinquent: for the spiritual good of the delinquent must be preferred to his reputation.

b. Therefore those are excused who for the sake of consolation or counsel narrate to a friend an injury done to themselves by another; likewise servants revealing injuries inflicted on themselves by masters, wives by husbands, children by a father, religious by a prelate, etc., although from this some infamy may come to the author of the injury. Likewise if someone is accused of a false crime, he can licitly open the hidden crime of the accuser in order to diminish his trustworthiness and authority. Indeed even the accused may do this, provided the manifestation is necessary for invalidating the force of testimony. For no one is bound with so great an inconvenience to himself to protect the reputation of another, especially one unjustly injuring him.

c. Therefore another's reputation is licitly diminished where a false estimation concerning his learning and uprightness is harmful to others, if grave and notable damage which threatens others cannot be impeded in another way. For the good, especially the spiritual good, of the innocent must be preferred to the reputation of the guilty.

Therefore when there is question, for example, of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of entering religion, of taking on a physician, teacher, servant, etc., it is permitted to manifest another's hidden defects, incapacity, and vices, from which some detriment is deservedly feared. He who knows that someone is a thief can manifest it to those with whom he lives so that they may be on guard for themselves. Any private person can report the delict of another to the judge, so that by the punishment of that person the common good may be promoted.

2. In revelations of this kind a twofold condition must be observed: a. that the damage which is avoided through revelation be proportioned to the damage which is inflicted on another from the manifestation of the vice; but it is considered proportioned if the damage to be avoided is grave, although greater damage follows for the one defamed, because the right of the innocent is superior, yet not if it is light or far less; b. that the revelation be made with the least damage of the guilty person, that is, that it not be manifested to more persons than is necessary, nor the person revealed if this is not necessary, nor be manifested without the delinquent first being warned, if warning can be done without grave inconvenience and is hoped to profit for the intended end.

651. On the revelation of a public crime. 1. A crime which is public by law can everywhere be manifested without another excusing cause, unless it has been amended and wiped away by oblivion.

a. For the judge by judicial sentence deprives the delinquent not only of reputation, but also of the right to reputation in this matter, and this in perpetuity; and just as he himself takes care that the sentence be published, so he gives to all others the license of further divulging it, so that all can guard themselves against criminal men.¹ Wherefore it is not a sin to write or speak publicly about a crime because of which someone has been punished by prison or another penalty.

b. To reveal again a crime which was public by law, but is now amended and wiped away by oblivion, is not indeed against justice, because the force of the judicial sentence which had despoiled the delinquent of the right to reputation always endures; but it is against charity if someone without utility restores the memory of the crime in those circumstances in which he foresees that the hearers are going to hold as criminal one who has already amended himself, and that he is going to suffer grave damage.

2. A crime which is public by fact and indeed simply public can be manifested both to members of the same community and outside the community without another excusing cause, unless it has been amended and wiped away by oblivion.

a. It is expedient for the public good that each one be known as he publicly truly is, lest men suffer damage because the wicked or unskilled are held for upright or skilled. Therefore concerning publicly known matters and those things which are publicly done, anyone can speak freely before all, even those not knowing, although the estimation of others is diminished by it. Yet he must take care not to exceed the limits of truth, nor without utility inflict damage on others.

b. To reveal again a crime which was public by fact, but is now amended and wiped away by oblivion, is not only against charity, but also against justice, because through oblivion the matter returns to that state in which it was before the publicity of the crime, and therefore the right to reputation also revives.²

c. To the question whether a crime public by fact in one place can be divulged in another distant place, these things must be noted:

alpha. If the crime will justly become public in that place within a short time, it can licitly be divulged: for reputation certainly to be lost within a short time is no longer of any value; therefore its loss inflicts no damage. Something else must be said about anticipated loss of life, because any moment of life in which we can merit eternal reward is of the greatest value.

beta. If the reputation of the crime is not going to come to that place, at least within a short time, some indeed permit all crimes to be manifested, because it is expedient for the public good that each one be known by others as he publicly is, lest men be deceived in the relations which they have with him;³ but others permit this only concerning those crimes which render a man harmful to others, such as crimes of homicide, treason, scandalous impurity, etc. The first opinion is also probable, since its reason has force concerning all crimes and defects.⁴

3. A crime which is public by fact, but only relatively public, can be manifested to the members of the same community; but outside that community the same cannot be manifested without injustice.

For the delinquent has not lost reputation outside his own community, since members of a closed community are accustomed to conceal outside the community those things which are known within the community, and ordinarily there is no reason which shows further divulgation to be necessary or useful. Therefore members of a household indeed speak licitly among themselves about the crime of a religious which is known in the house or monastery; but it is not permitted to them to speak about it with outsiders, nor with religious of another monastery, whether of the same or of a diverse order.⁵

¹ Lugo, disp. 14, n. 72.

² Lugo, disp. 14, n. 85, with Molina; cf. nevertheless Lessius, l. 2, c. 11, n. 82, who thinks that one sins only against charity.

³ Lugo, l.c., n. 80 ss.

⁴ St. Alphonsus, n. 974.

⁵ Cf. Lacroix, l.c., n. 1221.

652. On writers of newspapers. In order to determine what is permitted and what is not permitted to writers of newspapers, the conditions of the present time must be kept before one's eyes, in which public papers by their office have so great an influence on public life, both political and social. Wherefore to those who direct Catholic papers there must be conceded a broad faculty, insofar as it is permitted by moral laws, of speaking and judging: for unless this were done, the place would be wholly ceded to depraved papers.

a. They can narrate all new matters: for since readers expect that they be taught about all things recently done, whether good or evil, they licitly report even crimes, defects, etc., which are public either by law or by fact, at least in one place. But things which are hidden they are not permitted to investigate and divulge once investigated, unless the common good or a truly grave good of a third person renders the manifestation licit. Since that matter is difficult to judge, great discretion and caution are needed.

b. They can publicly judge public matters: for things which are done publicly, especially by those who hold public office, can be subjected to public censure. Therefore they can report unjust acts and defects which are committed by magistrates in fulfilling office to the damage of the community. In this way enemies of the Catholic religion can be deterred from inflicting vexations either on religion or on pious men, since officials greatly fear lest their unjust actions be divulged through newspapers and subjected to censure.

c. It is licit for writers of newspapers, which is especially valid at the time of elections, to manifest the hidden crimes or defects of those who are to be elected to the supreme magistracies of the republic or community, or to assemblies, and which render the candidate unworthy, both because the common good demands this, and because from universal custom candidates are considered to yield their right as to this as soon as they seek a public office. Yet certainly those publicists must be condemned "who, led away either by an itch for divulging everything or by partisan zeal, also touch those crimes whose knowledge contributes nothing to the public good," especially if they inveigh against the crimes and defects of men who discharge a higher office.

653. A certain greater license is customarily conceded to historians in narrating the vices and crimes of the dead: for they can, without a peculiar reason of public or private good, consign to letters even hidden crimes of those whose history they weave, so that memory of them may stand; and they can stir up again crimes already wiped away by oblivion, and this for a manifold reason. First from the general end of history: for in order that history can be that which it ought to be, the teacher of life, witness of truth, vindicator of divine justice, etc., it is altogether required that the causes and effects of deeds also be manifested, which demands the revelation even of hidden crimes. Then the prudent narration of vices and crimes contributes to public utility: for horror and abomination of crime is struck in, men are frightened away from evil, and princes are excited to punishing vices. Finally, although of itself it is not permitted to tear away the reputation not even of a dead damned person, supposing that it is known that he is damned, yet it is permitted to narrate the hidden crimes of an impious man who even after death continues to exercise harmful influence, so that his authority may be destroyed or diminished.

Yet three things must be noted about this matter: a. In writing the history of a recent age, care must be taken lest from the narration of the crimes of a deceased person surviving relatives suffer damage. b. In writing the history either of a recent or of an earlier age, care must be taken lest from the narration of crimes some state, for example, the clerical or episcopal, be so defamed that scandal arises from it which is greater than the good hoped for from the manifestation. c. Since in present times archives, even the more secret, are opened to all, and a true desire has seized learned men of divulging whatever can be found in them, it is better that a Catholic narrate according to truth those things which of themselves ought to be covered by silence, than that they be brought forth adulterated by an adversary of the Church.¹

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 87 ss.; Lehmkuhl I, n. 1183; Ballerini-Palmieri II, n. 1097.