Question Two: On Detraction

S. Th., II-II, q. 73 and 74.

423. Detraction or defamation (diffamation, medisance; achterklap, kwaadsprekerij) is the unjust denigration of another's reputation by hidden words. It is said:

1° unjust: for it is not detraction if reputation is injured from a just and reasonable cause;

2° denigration: for just as a man is bright with good reputation, so by defamation he is blackened and obscured, although good reputation is not always totally taken away;

3° of reputation: thus detraction is distinguished from contumely and theft, which deprive one of honor or riches;

4° another's: for no one can commit injustice against himself in his own reputation;

5° by hidden words, i.e., while the one who is defamed is absent: for if it were done while he himself is present, it would now be Contumely, because first, of itself, and formally it would deprive him of honor, but of reputation only materially and consequently.

424. Detraction is divided in various ways:

A. On the part of the matter, one detraction is simple, another calumny (laster), according as it manifests a hidden vice of one's neighbor without just cause, or imputes to him a false crime or vice; therefore calumny adds to simple detraction a lie, and indeed a pernicious one, as bringing unjust damage.

B. On the part of the mode or efficacy of the exterior act, one is direct if a vice is clearly narrated, another indirect if a vice is insinuated by silence or a good quality is denied or diminished. Detraction happens in eight diverse ways: "directly indeed in four ways," says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 1, ad 3: "1° in one way, when he imposes a falsehood on another; 2° when by his words he increases a sin; 3° when he reveals something hidden; 4° when he says that what is good was done from an evil intention. Indirectly, however, either 5° by denying the good of another; or 6° by maliciously keeping silence"; or, others add, 7° by diminishing; or 8° by praising remissly; yet these two are easily reduced to the fifth and sixth.

Indirect modes of speaking or keeping silence are sometimes more malicious than direct modes, as for example: I do not say all things. There are other deeds of his concerning which it is enough to keep silence! If I could say all the things I know. These are certainly splendid things; would that he had always shown himself such; but what does it help to recall the past! This person is pious, but!... I could provoke his blushing. I know certain things which no one would suspect about him, etc. Sometimes it suffices to keep silence deliberately, and a fortiori to smile or to make a gesture.

C. On the part of intention or the interior act of the will, one is formal, which is done from the explicit intention of injuring reputation; another material, which is done from another motive not necessarily evil, of lightness, lack of reflection, loquacity, utility, without the intention of defamation but with foresight of it.

425. Thesis I. Detraction, whether simple or calumnious, is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus, less grave than homicide and adultery, graver than theft.

The thesis is to be understood not only concerning formal detraction, uttered from the intention of injuring the reputation of one's neighbor, but also concerning material detraction done with full or sufficient advertence to this. It is proved:

1° It is against commutative justice: To take from an unwilling neighbor a notable good to which he has a strict right is a grave sin against justice. But by detraction there is taken from an unwilling neighbor a notable good, to which he has a strict right, namely, reputation, which is a greater good than riches. Therefore. The minor is proved: a) it is evident when calumny is in question, which deprives an innocent man of due reputation, to which he has a right by reason of virtue; b) it also holds concerning simple detraction, which deprives a hidden delinquent of reputation to which he has a right by reason of possession: he possesses a very useful good which he needs and of which therefore he ought not to be despoiled, until it becomes harmful, and meanwhile he keeps the right not to be reputed evil in society as long as he has done nothing evil openly. - Nor should you say: because of sins he deserves justly to be despoiled of reputation. For to judge concerning delicts and penalties pertains to God or to a judge constituted in the name of God; but he who by private authority, without sufficient reason, takes away reputation unduly usurps to himself the rights of God and of judicial authority.

2° It is against legal justice and greatly harms the good of society: for the public good demands that the evils of others not be revealed without sufficient motive; for if it were lawful for all to manifest the hidden sins of one's neighbor, contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side, and the peace and tranquility of families and of the whole society would be disturbed.

3° It is also against charity, for as St. Thomas says, q. 74, a. 2, ad 2: "reputation is a disposition to friendship and infamy to enmity," and "he who detracts from his brother seems to detract from the law insofar as he contemns the precept concerning love of neighbor" (ibid. ad 3).

Hence a) Scripture holds detractors and evil-speakers to be hateful to God and men and assimilates them to those who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven;¹ this holds at least concerning calumniators; and b) the Fathers hold that vice as an abomination and a diabolical work. It is useful to remember that St. Bernard said of the detractor that with one breath he infects three souls lethally: he kills himself, the hearer, and him from whom he detracts.²

¹ Cf. Prov. XXIV, 9; Rom. I, 29-30; I Cor. VI, 10.

² Serm. XVII, De Diversis, n. 4-5.

Moreover, "among the sins which are committed against one's neighbor, homicide is graver, by which the life of one's neighbor already actually existing is taken away; consequently adultery, which is against the due order of human generation, through which there is entrance to life. Consequently there are exterior goods, among which reputation excels riches, because it is nearer to spiritual goods, whence it is said, Prov. XXII, 1: A good name is better than many riches. And therefore detraction according to its genus is a greater sin than theft; nevertheless less than homicide and adultery. Yet there can be another order because of aggravating or diminishing circumstances" (a. 3).

426. How great the right to reputation is. - So that both the right to reputation, and the malice of detraction, and the reasons excusing from it may be better understood, the following are to be noted:

A. To each one there belongs a right to ordinary good estimation or good name; although no one of himself has a right to the estimation by which special virtues are attributed to him, nevertheless each one has the right of demanding that in human intercourse he be treated as someone to whom the virtues common among upright men belong: each one, from the fact that he seems to act rightly, and as long as he has done nothing evil publicly, is to be held good until he is proved evil.

Moreover there is a right to this reputation not only true, which is founded in true goodness and excellence, but also to false reputation, which rests only upon apparent and estimated goodness:

1. One can have a right in true reputation directly and of itself: for this reputation is a good positively acquired by one's own acts, in which therefore he exercises full right and dominion; whence this right also is absolute and universal, which demands that each good man be held by all to be such as he truly is.

There exists, namely, a bond between the person and true reputation, which bond can justly be violated by no one except by permission of the owner himself. Therefore this reputation is never lawfully taken away and calumny is always an injury; - nor is public calumny lawfully repeated, because it is cooperation in evil: it confirms a false opinion.

2. The right in false reputation does not arise positively and directly from the internal probity and excellence itself of the man, but negatively from acts, insofar as nothing evil appears publicly in them, and indirectly from the inconveniences which would arise against the private and common good if the hidden defects of others could everywhere be published.

Therefore it is founded positively in public and private necessity:

a) in public necessity, for from the revelation of crimes one's neighbor could not usefully perform his office, he would lose all authority, would lack the good of conversation, and those closely joined would be affected with ignominy, and thus contentions, quarrels, envies, and hatreds would arise on every side by which peace and tranquility in society would be disturbed. And this is still more established because

b) it is also founded in private necessity: for he who lacks reputation is deprived of a great protection against greater vices; on the contrary, fear of losing reputation often restrains the evil themselves, while he who has lost reputation can be restrained by no bridle; besides, as long as the crime is not public, conversion is easier, since human fear is less to be feared. Whence, says St. Thomas, q. 73, a. 2: "to take away someone's reputation is very grave, because among temporal things reputation seems to be more precious, by the lack of which a man is impeded from doing many good things; on account of which Ecclus. XLI, 15 says: Have care for a good name: for this will remain to you more than a thousand great and precious treasures. And therefore detraction, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin."

That right is not absolute, but conditioned by the private and public good, and limited by it; and consequently it ceases when a notable good either of the revealer, or of the delinquent himself, or of others, or of society rather demands that hidden defects be revealed. And therefore no one can be deprived of this false reputation of his unless, from the reputation not taken away, proportionate damage would follow to a private man or to the community, whether in a right already possessed or in a right to be possessed.

B. No one of himself has a right to extraordinary reputation, which is founded in singular gifts and talents, for example, of an outstanding theologian, orator, physician, saint: he does not have a right to such reputation if he does not really possess these things. Wherefore manifestation of the error on which extraordinary reputation rests is not against justice; - nor against charity, provided there is a reasonable motive for manifesting it.

C. The preceding things hold not only concerning private persons, but also concerning moral persons because of similar reasons. Indeed also concerning the dead, in whom the subject of the right to reputation perseveres, namely, the immortal soul, which is not verified for goods of fortune, whose right rests upon the necessities of bodily life; moreover the reputation by which they live among men is a great good which they therefore esteem and desire to retain.

Nevertheless this holds concerning the dead in a lesser degree, because they need reputation less than the living, and therefore are less unwilling in the violation of the right, whence calumny is so much less a sin; and as to detraction, the common right to knowing historical truth is accustomed to prevail, provided notable damage is not at the same time brought upon persons still living or institutions still existing.

427. The gravity of detraction is taken not so much from the gravity of the crime divulged as from the gravity of the harm of infamy, or of the damage which the injured person suffers in reputation. This damage must be considered not only in itself, but also as to the injured person, and as to the efficacy of the detraction.

Therefore one must attend:

1° To the imputed defect in itself: if the defect is grave, ordinarily it notably injures reputation; if light, ordinarily lightly.

Hence a) detraction regarding honesty of life is much graver than that which regards natural defects of body or soul (for example, that someone is imprudent or unlearned), because these are not accustomed notably to lessen reputation, and easily become of public right; - b) if however a natural defect is very disgraceful and brings great sadness to the injured person, it can be a grave sin, for example, if it is said of an eminent man that he is a natural son, of someone that he is the son of a priest; - c) in general to call someone proud, angry, lazy, etc., is not as grave as to narrate particular facts from which those defects are actually manifested: such a general manner of speaking, rather than grave personal fault, denotes natural propensities or venial defects, which by their nature are accustomed to be public; on the contrary, to say that someone is lustful or unjust, because it indicates a habit; - d) it is not grave to report concerning one who is already defamed by sin something connected with that delict, for example, concerning a known adulterer to say that he sent love letters, concerning a husband who is known to be drunk, that he quarreled with his wife; otherwise if the fact is altogether dissimilar, for example, if it is said that he who has lost reputation in doctrine or faith is ruined in morals, or vice versa: for he who has lost reputation in one thing has not therefore lost it in a wholly diverse thing. But there is no sin of defamation if you say of a prostitute that she laid snares for a youth, because she suffers no detriment in reputation, since this is included in prostitution.

2° To the person injured and his condition and dignity. For the gravity of the defect which is manifested depends much upon the condition of the person, and he who enjoys an integral reputation and needs it for exercising an office or business suffers graver damage than he who neither enjoys nor needs it.

Hence a) an accusation of great ambition, hypocrisy, or lust harms a priest or pious monk more and gravely than a layman; likewise an accusation of immodesty harms a girl more than a soldier; on the contrary, an accusation of sloth brings greater detriment to a soldier than to a girl. Regularly it is not grave to say of a light and worldly youth that he is a lover of girls; on the contrary, to say that a bishop is lying, a merchant dishonest, a physician ignorant, is apt to harm gravely in reputation or also in temporal goods;³ - b) to detract from a family or community is unlawful, because the disgrace redounds to the whole community, for example, that in such a monastery certain religious indulge in such a vice, or that regular discipline is not observed, or that such a crime, for example, of fornication, was committed; in such a city nearly all are infected, all the girls corrupted, all the merchants plunderers; - otherwise if in a general way it were said that in monasteries there are not lacking some who sin gravely, in a great city there are many unjust persons, many corrupted girls.

³ It can happen that the injury of reputation is slight in itself, but apt for bringing grave damage in goods of another genus, as if someone narrated that the man whom a hearer wished to take on for the office of secretary was talkative. Then to the light sin of detraction there would be added a grave injury of charity or justice in temporal goods.

3° To the efficacy of detraction, which depends both upon the quality of the detractor, and upon the number, disposition, and quality of the hearers.

a) Upon the quality of the detractor: a man who is held to be grave, prudent, and truthful harms more than one light, talkative, and lying; and he who reports something as seen harms more than if he reports it as heard from persons of uncertain authority; if however he narrates a grave thing as heard from a trustworthy person, or if from the circumstances he foresees that the hearers will believe it, or if he reports a thing so enormous that the mere suspicion of it gravely defames, such as sodomy committed by a priest, he sins gravely.

b) Upon the number, disposition, and quality of the hearers: other things being equal, detraction is worse before talkative men who will divulge the matter than before men tenacious of secrecy, uttered before many than in the ear of one. Indeed many estimate that manifestation made without reason to one prudent man who will not divulge the matter is never a grave sin; but if it were done for a just cause of counsel or consolation, there would certainly be no sin, because there is a proportionately grave reason.

From these things it follows that he who narrates a hidden crime concerning an indeterminate person, whether by not naming him, or by naming him in a region where he is unknown and never to be known, does not commit detraction if he knows the hearers cannot know the person; on the contrary if he foresees that he can be known.

428. The moral species of detraction is formally one and the same, because all detractions injure one and the same right of reputation. Hence:

1. Simple detraction and calumny under the aspect of detraction are of the same species, because they regard the same good of reputation and injure the same right, although calumny also contains the species of lying; but this difference is material as to the injury brought upon reputation. Besides, a lie of itself is venial; and although in the case it is pernicious and therefore grave, nevertheless it is pernicious only because it injures reputation, and in this it agrees with detraction. Whence the circumstance of calumny is only aggravating and therefore is not to be declared in confession, unless by reason of reparation and restitution to be enjoined in a diverse way.

2. Detractions imputing diverse crimes (for example, adultery, theft, sacrilege) are sins of the same species, because this difference is merely material, just as money and clothing for theft: namely, they injure reputation in the same way. Whence in confession they are not to be specified.

3. Detractions made before several or diverse persons, although they are aggravated from this, nevertheless are not multiplied in species or number, because the right to reputation is one among all, not multiple; therefore the number or quality of the hearers is not to be declared, but it suffices to confess: I detracted before several persons.

429. Thesis II. It is lawful for a proportionately grave reason to manifest the hidden defects of others. - The reason is that it is lawful, under due conditions, to posit the cause of an evil effect. But in the case 1° there is an action of itself not evil but indifferent: the manifestation or narration of a defect which really exists; 2° from it there follows equally immediately a double effect: one evil, namely, the infamy of one's neighbor, another good, namely, knowledge very useful to another who from it procures a good or prevents an evil. Therefore it is lawful to manifest the hidden defects of others, provided the other two required conditions are present: 3° the intention not of harming but of obtaining the good effect, whence no more nor to more persons can be revealed concerning the defect than is necessary for avoiding evil or obtaining good; 4° a proportionately grave reason for revealing with respect to the defamation, namely, notable damage to be avoided or a great good to be obtained for notable defamation.

But as Billuart notes, diss. XV, a. 2, § III: "it is not necessary that the good to be attained outweigh or even equal the good of reputation... because the guilty and the innocent are not equal in right; and otherwise it would follow that for avoiding temporal damage, for example, theft, it would not be lawful to reveal to the master the thefts of domestics... which nevertheless no one will admit." Namely, to preserve the right, which is greater, of an innocent person to a notable good of a lesser order, namely, of riches, morally equals the lesser right of a guilty person to a greater good, namely, reputation.

But the special reasons on account of which the reputation of another can lawfully be injured or ought to be injured can arise

1° from religion, for example, if there are revealed to superiors the vices of one to be ordained, who would be for scandal and detriment to the Church;

2° from justice, if someone from office ought to disclose and denounce the crime of another;

3° from charity, for forestalling damage of the narrator, of the delinquent, of a third party, or of society.

Therefore there suffices:

a. The common good of society, when revelation of the delict is necessary for impeding grave damage which threatens society. Thus, lest a public office be conferred upon one unworthy or incapable, his hidden vices can be revealed to a superior, if they are going to harm the whole community; likewise those who secretly spread doctrine harmful to faith or morals are to be denounced to superiors; and editors of newspapers can disclose the vices of candidates who seek dignities or public offices, if this knowledge contributes to the public good.

b. The good of the delinquent, whenever it cannot be procured without his defamation. Thus the secret vices of sons or subjects can be manifested to parents or superiors for their correction; and a hidden impediment must be manifested if someone cannot be restrained from contracting an invalid marriage.

c. The good of the revealer, if, for the sake of consolation, counsel, or defense, he narrates to some friend hidden injuries inflicted upon himself, or to a confessor, or to another prudent counselor, or to a judge for weakening the testimony of another. Nevertheless one must take care that it not be said to several persons, or that the person not be named more openly than is necessary for consolation or counsel.

d. The good of a third party, namely, lest the dishonest harm or innocents be deceived and seduced by them. Thus we can warn someone to avoid the company of a perverse man lest he be perverted; to manifest a thief to those with whom he dwells; and if inquiry is made concerning the honesty of a servant, the skill of a physician, the morals of a youth about to enter marriage, etc., to respond according to the truth.

Nevertheless in these cases let it be noted: 1) revelation must be made with the least damage to the guilty person, so that we manifest only that which is truly useful for averting evil, and only to those to whom it is necessary; - 2) it is never lawful to impose a false crime, even for avoiding one's own or another's damage, but this is a grave evil, as is clear from propositions 43 and 44 condemned by Innocent XI; - 3) it is unlawful to manifest a hidden crime whose knowledge was acquired unjustly, for example, by reading another's letters unjustly; unless in the present circumstances someone already had a right of using such a means, in the case, of opening private letters.

430. To manifest a public or notorious crime to others who are ignorant of it generally and of itself is not against justice, because the right to reputation has been lost; although it can be against charity. Notorious or public is that which can be hidden by no evasion, or, as Cajetan says, that which of itself is apt to come into common knowledge. One thing is notorious by law, concerning which it is established by the sentence of a judge; another by fact, which was done openly with many present or has already come to the ears of many. Now:

1. A delict notorious by notoriety of law, or by force of a legitimate judicial sentence publicly promulgated, can be manifested even without cause, in the region where it has been so denounced, because the judge deprived the accused of the right to reputation in this matter and granted permission of divulging it.

Nevertheless it is unlawful to manifest it: a) in another region where the judicial sentence has no force, because there the accused has not been deprived of the right to reputation, and therefore this is against justice; b) if the accused has amended himself or the delict has already been destroyed by oblivion; this is against charity, if from this others would think him not thoroughly amended, - not however against justice, because the faculty given by the judge continually exercises its force, and therefore it is not unjust to renew the memory of the condemnation, unless however the law should concede perfect rehabilitation.

2. A delict notorious by notoriety of fact alone, which because of the number and quality of witnesses now cannot be hidden, can be manifested in the place where it is notorious, because the right to reputation has there in fact been lost; - unless it has already been amended and destroyed by oblivion: for then to recall it to memory without reason would be unjust, because the delinquent has recovered the right to reputation.

3. A delict notorious in one place by notoriety of fact cannot be manifested without injustice in another distant place, because the delinquent has not lost the right to reputation there; - unless it is foreseen that shortly it is to be legitimately made known in that place, or unless there is deserved fear lest the delinquent harm others in that place.

431. Concerning detraction through newspapers and daily papers. - For these, in this matter, the same laws and principles hold of themselves as for private persons; but the applications can be varied and diverse according to circumstances. For common utility has more force in public writers than in private persons. Public papers are an essential condition of modern life and a necessity of our time; they also exercise great influence in political and social life. Whence Catholic writers are to be allowed as ample a faculty as the moral law permits, if there is serious competition on the part of non-Catholics.

This will easily be done for the greater papers. But a) it is not so easily to be admitted for lesser and local papers, or for periodicals; - b) nor are opposing papers always truly to be feared; - c) and also it will not always be necessary to indicate the names of persons: for facts can be narrated with names omitted, or with only their initial letters indicated, if it is feared that the crime will be divulged where it is not yet known; and this is to be done, unless however it has certainly been divulged by others.

With these things noted beforehand, the following rules can be established:

1. To narrate public facts is lawful, but with the precautions noted above.

2. To investigate or divulge hidden things is not lawful except by reason of a great common good, or on account of a great good of a third party; for judging this, great discretion is needed.

3. Public matters can be publicly judged, as befits modern democratic societies: thus, for example, defects and unjust acts in magistrates or in their functions; unless however a greater evil is to be feared. For it is good that officials fear such judgment, and that Catholic writers dare to denounce their defects and iniquities.

4. Concerning candidates to be elected to public functions, to manifest hidden crimes and defects which render a candidate unworthy is lawful, both by reason of the common good and by reason of the custom by which candidates tolerate this.

But let it be noted for the third and fourth rule, that crimes whose manifestation contributes nothing to the common good cannot be manifested, and indeed so much the less the higher the office someone holds. Newspaper writers must attend altogether to this, since they easily and often exaggerate.

432. Can reputation which the defamed man has renounced be lawfully and justly violated? - Resp. 1° Given a just cause, it is lawful to detract from one's own reputation and to permit it to be detracted from by others: for man of himself has dominion over his own reputation, and so he can dispose of it from a just cause, for example, for saving life, for repressing pride, for his own humiliation and the exaltation of divine mercy.

2° Without a just cause it is not lawful (Eccli. XLI, 15): nevertheless this of itself is only a sin of prodigality and of defect of charity toward oneself; by accident it can be against justice and charity owed to one's neighbor.

For our reputation can be necessary to one's neighbor in three ways:

a) when the reputation of others depends upon our reputation: thus the reputation of a monk or priest;

b) when our reputation is necessary so that we may render to our neighbor an office owed by strict right, for example, the reputation of a pastor or magistrate;

c) when not from justice but from charity we are bound to benefit our neighbor, and by infamy we are reduced to being unfit for this.

In the first and second case defamation of oneself is against justice; in the third case he who defames himself sins against charity, just as he sins against charity who throws away money by which he could have benefited the poor.

433. Those cooperating in detraction, some directly consent to it, either because they induce the detractor to denigrate one's neighbor, or because they voluntarily rejoice over it; others indirectly, merely do not impede detraction.

1. Those who induce to detraction, by asking about the defects of one's neighbor, or by praising him in such a way that they move others to detract, or by approving their narration, sin in the same way as those who detract themselves: namely, against charity and against justice, and indeed externally; for they formally cooperate in an unjust action, and provide direct scandal, by provoking others to it. Whence they are bound to reparation in solidum with the detractor.

2. Those who internally rejoice over detraction, without themselves formally cooperating, sin not only against charity because they rejoice over the evil of one's neighbor, but also with an unjust affection, because they take complacency in the unjust action of detraction: gravely if they do it from hatred, envy, or vengeance and the matter is grave; lightly if from curiosity or concerning the manner of narrating, lightly sinful.

3. Those who merely do not impede detraction sin, unless they are excused by some reason, against charity alone, because they do not impede the evil of the defamed person, nor the sin of the detractor; not however against justice, because they are not bound from justice to avert that double evil. Thus especially superiors, who from justice or office are bound to correct subjects, nevertheless are not bound from justice, by force of their office, to watch over the reputation of others.

The obligation of impeding detraction is of itself grave in grave matter, unless some reason excuses. Nevertheless for mortal sin there is required: a) another certainly detracting unjustly; b) a founded hope of impeding detraction; c) without a relatively grave inconvenience, for example, of quarrel or insult.

Whence St. Alphonsus teaches: because in this matter it can be established with greatest difficulty that correction will profit, and on the other hand detractors corrected before others are very easily offended, the opinion excusing hearers ordinarily from mortal sin if they omit correction can reasonably be sustained. They are excused also from venial sin if, noticing the detraction, they depart or turn the conversation aside, etc., because these actions are true corrections. Nevertheless a superior is bound more strictly than a private man, because of the reasons adduced.

The obligation of impeding detraction can be fulfilled:

a) by restraining it through authority, if the hearer has it;

b) by correcting fraternally among equals;

c) by proving the falsehood if it can be done, or by otherwise bringing it about that faith is not given to the detractor;

d) by showing a sad countenance with displeasure or indignation, by turning the conversation to another thing, by reporting good things concerning the defamed person, by excusing him or interpreting him praiseworthily.

434. [Original misprint: 432.] Whispering (oorblazerij) is evil and secret speech against one's neighbor for dissolving true friendship, or the manifestation of some saying or deed of another for disturbing peace and friendship among families or friends. It differs in species from detraction by reason of the end, because it properly does not intend the denigration of one's neighbor but the sowing of discord, although for the most part it contains detraction.

It is a sin against charity and against justice, not only when it uses unjust means as often happens, but always, because it takes away from another the good of friendship, for preserving which, once friendship has been entered, he has a strict right by reason of possession.

But it is a grave sin from its genus, because of itself it tends to destroying friendship and peace, which is the greatest good, with Scripture as witness (Eccli. VI, 14-16): "A faithful friend is a strong protection: but he who has found him has found a treasure; to a faithful friend there is no comparison... a faithful friend, a medicine of life and immortality."

"And therefore," says St. Thomas, q. 74, a. 2, "whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor and to be loved than to be honored." For whispering deprives one of a greater good and brings greater harm. Hence in the Scriptures that sin is said to be hateful to God and men (Eccli. XXI, 31; XXVIII, 15; Prov. VI, 16-19), and worthy of death (Rom. I, 29, 32).

Hence a) it is graver according as the friendship which is dissolved is more intimate or more necessary, and according as worse effects are to be feared from it: thus it is very grave if discord is sown between spouses, between parents and children, among defenders of the Catholic faith, or if very great dissensions are foreseen;

b) on the contrary, it is not a sin to remove a friendship which is not true but harmful or dangerous, such as is had among thieves or with a concubine.