When thinking ill of another is no sin

It is no sin to think that another is wicked or has committed a sin if we know it to be a fact. Nor are we obliged to think that all men are good until we know something to the contrary. We may suspend our judgement about such as we do not know sufficiently well to be able to say whether they are good or bad. We know, moreover, that there are many bad people in the world, and prudence suggests that we should be on our guard against all whom we do not know well, though justice and charity incline us to think no evil of anyone.

Rash judgements frequently arise from the malice of our own hearts, or from hatred and envy.¹ If we purify our own hearts from vice and wickedness, we shall think thoughts of others. kindlier

¹ Rom. ii 1.

S. Th., II-II, q. 60, a. 2, 3 and 4.

418. Rash judgment (vermetel oordeel) or suspicious judgment is that which someone pronounces concerning those things which are doubtful or hidden because of certain slight conjectures; whence in the matter of justice it is that by which from slight and insufficient motives we judge evil concerning another.

To rash judgment there can be an ascent of the mind through various degrees of suspicion: the first is doubt concerning the honesty of one's neighbor, when concerning his probity we deliberately suspend judgment from insufficient motives; it is not mere doubt or absence of adhesion, a mere suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another, but a positive act by which, namely, we will to doubt and judge that one must doubt; - the second is suspicion, by which from slight motives and with great fear of erring we incline to judging that one's neighbor has done something evil; - the third is opinion, by which, not certainly but as likely and with fear, from insufficient motives we judge that one's neighbor has done something evil: it is therefore an assent of judgment, but not firm, concerning the evil of another; - the fourth follows, rash judgment strictly so called, or a firm and certain assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor given without sufficient reason. But how from an insufficient motive there can be a certain judgment is understood from the fact that the discussion is not concerning certainty properly so called, or concerning an absolutely certain assent from an evident motive, but concerning a morally certain assent which arises from an impulse of the will; but this can move the intellect to a rash assent, by bending it to assent without sufficient objective motives, even determining it to adhere firmly because of slight motives, graver motives being set after them (n. 73).

In all the aforesaid degrees, rashness or imprudence arises from this, that someone without a sufficient motive judges ill concerning his neighbor; but if he judged according to things proved and alleged, doubting when there is a sufficient reason for doubting, opining when a grave reason is present although merely probable and not certain, or pronouncing certainly when the reasons are morally certain, the judgment would be prudent, not rash nor sinful.

419. The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are indicated by St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3: It happens from three things; "in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as though conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it proceeds from this, that someone is badly affected toward another: for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evils concerning him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it proceeds from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because they have often experienced the defects of others.' But the first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; the third, however, lessens the nature of suspicion, insofar as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion."

420. Thesis. Rash judgment strictly so called is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - It is said:

1. judgment strictly so called, i.e., a firm and morally certain assent: for doubt or suspicion from its genus is not a grave sin but a light one;

2. rash, i.e., knowingly and deliberately uttered with advertence to the slightness and insufficiency of the motives;

3. it is a sin against justice, because it is a way of acting unjustly against one's neighbor. For an internal act also regards justice, insofar as of itself it is ordered to external things and operations just or unjust, as the will of stealing or of restoring. Thus internal rash judgment is ordered to an external judgment against reputation and honor (a. 3 ad 3);

4. grave from its genus: for it can be light not only from lack of deliberation or lightness, but also from smallness of matter, namely, from slight rashness.

Namely, mortal sin is not present except by great rashness, for which three conditions are required:

a) perfect deliberation or full advertence at least in a confused way to the gravity of the thing and the insufficiency of the motives; whence if the judgment is altogether sudden, or conceived rather from lightness than from malice, the sin will be light, as often happens among men of timorous conscience, who are not accustomed to consent to such judgments;

b) full rashness or notable disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that certain assent is given to motives altogether slight; whence the sin is light if the motives are not sufficient but approach sufficiency. Concerning this in practice judgment must be made with all circumstances considered:

Thus if a lascivious youth is seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl and in a somewhat dark place, it is a sufficient indication for judging that there is something evil; on the contrary if the same youth, or an upright man, is seen conversing with a girl in an open place in the middle of the day. If an unknown man secretly and by night enters another's house, it is not rashly judged that an evil intention is in him, otherwise if openly by day, or if a known person even by night;

c) gravity of matter, which is to be attended to from the harm inflicted, because with the quality of the persons and fact considered it is very disgraceful and notably harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor. Hence to hold a maidservant to be lying without reason is not a grave sin; on the contrary, to hold a bishop so; to hold an unknown soldier to be a fornicator is not grave; on the contrary, to hold a priest so.

It is proved: 1) Each one has a strict right to good reputation or the good estimation of others as long as he is not morally certainly proved evil. But that right is violated by rash judgment, which of itself is grave, because it imports contempt of one's neighbor and begets dishonoring. For he who judges evil concerning another, noticing that there is no motive for judging thus, maliciously contemns him. Thus St. Thomas says:

"If it concerns something grave it is a mortal sin, insofar as it is not without contempt of one's neighbor" (a. 3); "from this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another, without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore injures him" (ibid. ad 2). Whence Lugo: just as we sin against justice by taking away the reputation of one's neighbor among others through detraction, so among ourselves by rash judgment. And thus it differs in species from detraction.

2. For a judgment to be justly borne, three things are required: the authority of the one judging, the right reason of prudence or accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity (S. Th., a. 2). But these three are lacking in rash judgment: a) authority is lacking, since it is pronounced by a private person without office, and in circumstances in which it is done without any necessity or due office; b) accurate knowledge of the thing is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash, pronounced not from objective consideration of the thing but from an insufficient motive; c) integrity is often lacking, since for the most part it is pronounced from prejudice, envy, hatred, or from one's own perversity, not from the inclination of justice.

3. Whence Scripture often prohibits us from judging our neighbor; which at least must be understood concerning an unfounded and rash judgment (Mt. VII, 1-2; Lk. VI, 37; Rom. II, 1; Jas. IV, 11).

421. Rash suspicion (lichtvaardig vermoeden, ongegronde verdenking), under which name among theologians there also comes either rash doubting or rash opinion, of itself and regularly is only a venial sin, because it is not something full in the nature of judgment and contempt, but incomplete.

Nevertheless exceptionally and by accident it can be mortal: 1) if deliberately and without any probable foundation it is made concerning a very grave sin (incest, sodomy, bestiality) as to men altogether upright, as if a pious priest were doubted to be a heretic: for suspicion concerning such a sin can be more injurious than certain affirmation concerning an ordinary sin; but it is so only because of the special circumstances joined to it; 2) if it proceeds from envy or grave hatred: for then it is grave because of the affection from which it arises.

422. Practical admonitions. - 1. Although, if there is a serious reason for doubting concerning the goodness of one's neighbor, we cannot judge or opine evil concerning him, nevertheless we are not bound positively to esteem him good (this belongs to greater charity) unless his goodness is truly established, but we can suspend judgment.

2. In the external manner of acting we are by no means prohibited, for forestalling our own or another's damage, from employing due precautions, just as if one's neighbor were dishonest; for example, to shut money in a chest lest it be secretly taken by servants or unknown guests. For this belongs to prudence. It is lawful to judge concerning someone that he can become evil, and consequently, common frailty being considered, to apply a remedy lest he become evil, and thus to forestall damage, without however positively doubting without reason concerning the probity of someone in particular.

3. Rash judgments, although they are concerned with a diverse object, are probably of the same species, because they violate the same right of one's neighbor; and consequently those objects are not to be declared in confession, but it suffices to indicate the gravity or lightness of the matter.

To be noted for practice.

That suspicion or rash judgment be mortal sin in the individual, three things are required : First, that it be perfectly deliberate ; second, that it be fully rash ; third, that it be concerning the grave evil of one's neighbor : if any one of these is wanting, there will be only venial sin.

As to the first, Sylvius notes, after Lessius and others, that for mortal sin in suspicious or rash judgment it does not suffice to suspect or judge howsoever deliberately ; but that you must advert to and know, or at least doubt that you judge or suspect, from insufficient signs and concerning a grave matter ; otherwise, he says, the judgment will not be voluntary, at least as regards its being rash or concerning a grave matter. This indeed I admit as regards the condition of the grave matter, not only on account of the said reason, but because then you do not gravely contemn your neighbor. As to the insufficiency of the indications truly, it must, I think, be restricted thus : unless, blinded voluntarily by malevolence, envy, hatred, or similar passion, regarding the insufficiency of the indications you neglect to examine them and precipitate your judgment ; for then you virtually advert to it, since you ought and can advert. And besides, otherwise there would scarcely ever be any rash judgment, since a man ill-disposed toward another easily persuades himself that the indications he has of the evil of an enemy are sufficient.

As to the second, rightly did I say that rash judgment is not mortal sin unless it be fully rash, since its whole malice arises from rashness : so that, if it were in no way rash, that is, if altogether sufficient indications were present, it would by no means be sin ; for then it would be prudent and reasonable judgment, nor through it would injury be inflicted on one's neighbor. For the neighbor has lost his right of reputation and good estimation with respect to him whose guilt is proved by sufficient indications.

But if the indications are not indeed altogether sufficient, yet approach near sufficiency, neither will it be mortal sin ; because great probability does not much differ from moral certitude : whence there will not be grave rashness, nor consequently grave injury.

And because to judge with certainty is somewhat more than simply to opine, to opine than to suspect, and to suspect than to doubt, therefore greater indications are required for judging than for suspecting, and for suspecting than for doubting.

As to the third, note that grave evil in this matter, as in the matter of detraction, is that whole and only thing which, the quality of persons and fact being considered, is highly disgraceful and gravely harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor, whether sin or not ; because the malice of this sin consists in contempt of one's neighbor.

Although therefore mortal sin per se is grave matter, and venial sin light matter, nevertheless per accidens, from the quality of persons or of fact, the contrary often happens. For there are some who are not defamed among men even for certain mortal sins, nor are they ashamed themselves, but sometimes are counted to their praise, v. g., dueling or fornication with respect to a soldier, drunkenness with respect to a commoner in these parts, concerning which if you judge rashly you do not sin mortally, because with respect to them it is not grave matter. On the contrary there are some who are much contemned for venial sins, or even for things that are not sins : as if you judge rashly of a bishop or the supreme Pontiff that he is habitually a liar.

[On the contrary, S. Ligorius³³⁴ holds suspicion to be only venial sin of its genus. « Suspicion, he says, and rash doubt seem of their genus to be sins only venial, especially if they proceed from error of the intellect, whereby the indications are apprehended as sufficient. So Layman³³⁵, from Saint Thomas..., against many who think it mortal. The reason is, because commonly suspicion is only a kind of incitement to assent ; for there remains in the mind of the one suspecting in some way a good estimation of his neighbor. Therefore no grave injury is done him, since he is not wholly cast down from possession of a good name ; yet some injury is done, because he is rashly doubted. » I said, « especially if from error », because such, since it is not per se voluntary, nor pertinacious, merits excuse ; if truly from malevolence you persist in grave suspicion, it will be mortal, as Lessius etc. teach, on account of the gravity of the injury. However the same holds of positive doubting arising from malevolence, without cause ; for it proceeds from contempt of the other, and consequently is reckoned grave injury. »] ³³⁴ Lib. IV, n. 963. ³³⁵ N. 466, 3°.

With S. Ligori Gury agrees in this³³⁶. ³³⁶ Ubi supra, n. 964.

The same Doctor³³⁷ against Cajetan, Navarrus, and several others saying that suspicion howsoever rash can never reach mortal sin, holds as more probable the opposite opinion, « if suspicion or doubt were made without indications concerning most grave sins, as to suspect a pious religious that he is a heretic..., or a man commonly held as Catholic that he is a Jew or atheist. The reason, because perchance greater injury is inflicted on them by suspecting such things, than if a certain judgment were had of them concerning ordinary grave delicts ». And this accords with what Billuart said above concerning the third. ³³⁷

Thence it appears that disputants among themselves, whether evil suspicion be mortal or venial sin of its genus, agree in deciding that it can reach mortal sin, for diverse reasons, namely either from its nature, when grave matter occurs, or from aggravating circumstances. This must be retained, as regards practice, whatever be judged of the speculative question, about which it is licit for each to abound in his own sense.

[Note what S. Ligorius warns³³⁸ : « In this matter let the confessor observe that many simple persons accuse themselves that they judged rashly. He must bring it about that they know : 1° when sufficient grounds are present for judging thus of some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore not sin ; 2° very often, such judgments are those they are bound to hold, lest some sin be impeded, v. g. lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by consorting with men, and other things of this kind. Only let care be taken lest suspicions of this kind be communicated to others without necessity. »] ³³⁸ Homo apost., XI, 2.

A doubt can be interpreted in the better part in two ways: one way, negatively, by not declining into the worse; the other way, positively, by declining into the better.

I say 1°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor must be interpreted in the better part negatively. It follows from the preceding article and from the same principle.

Proof. By this very fact that someone has an evil opinion of another without sufficient cause, he despises him and injures him, as was said; which is illicit. Now he who does not interpret a doubt about the evil of his neighbor in the better part at least negatively, but declines into the worse, has an evil opinion of his neighbor without sufficient cause, since the reasons for doubting lie on both sides, and are therefore insufficient for suspecting or opining in the worse direction. Therefore.

The same is proved by all that we have said against suspicion and rash judgment.

I say 2°: Doubts about the evil of one's neighbor are not always to be interpreted positively in the better part, but only in certain cases.

Proof. 1° because the precept of judging one's neighbor well in doubt is affirmative, like the precept of honoring or loving him, which does not bind always.

Proof. 2°. Either there are sufficient reasons for doubting, or there are not. If the first, we can remain in doubt, suspending judgment and not declining to either side; because the doubt is not rash, but reasonable. If the second, the doubt must be rejected at once, because it is rash. But that is not our case; for we are dealing with a founded and reasonable doubt.

Nevertheless — and this is the second part of the conclusion — supposing that, with the matter doubtful on both sides, some act must be elicited concerning the goodness or malice of one's neighbor, that act must be done in the better part, and consequently the doubt must be interpreted positively in the better part; and the reasons of the first conclusion prove this directly.

Likewise, if a grave temptation pressed upon one to have an evil opinion or judgment of one's neighbor, which one could not conquer except by judging positively on the good side, one would also be bound to that, for the same reason.

Wherefore it is also licit, concerning the business undertaken, or on another day at that time, with caution intact, to doubt toward the worse parts by supposing, not that things appear to be worse there, or even by judging that they could be such. For thus it is expedient that the remedy or precaution be applied more securely, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil; nor do you injure anyone; for you do not judge, nor suspect or doubt that your neighbor is in fact vicious, but you merely suppose him to be such, or judge that he could be such, which is indeed true and not injurious to him, and from that supposition you provide for yourself and yours as if he were truly such.

We use this kind of supposition everywhere without sin. Thus a father prudently forbids his daughter the company of some young man, because she may be seduced by him. A master closes the chest more attentively and guards his money, because servants or unknown guests may be thieves. A traveler takes up arms on meeting an unknown man, because he may be a robber; he avoids meeting a deformed old woman, because she may be a witch. And so many other cases. Take care, however, always to keep in mind a right judgment about your neighbor, nor doubt, suspect, or judge beyond the sufficiency of the indications. Provide for your own likewise, so that through excessive caution you do not defame or sadden your neighbor.

[Whether public judgment is to be rendered according to the laws, and whether through usurpation it becomes perverse, which St. Thomas discusses here in art. 5 and 6³³⁹ , will be said below, when we treat of the injustice of the judge.] ³³⁹ Here q. 60, a. 4, ad 3.