Question One: On Rash Judgment and Suspicion

S. Th., II-II, q. 60, a. 2, 3 and 4.

418. Rash judgment (vermetel oordeel) or suspicious judgment is that which someone pronounces concerning those things which are doubtful or hidden because of certain slight conjectures; whence in the matter of justice it is that by which from slight and insufficient motives we judge evil concerning another.

To rash judgment there can be an ascent of the mind through various degrees of suspicion: the first is doubt concerning the honesty of one's neighbor, when concerning his probity we deliberately suspend judgment from insufficient motives; it is not mere doubt or absence of adhesion, a mere suspension of judgment concerning the evil of another, but a positive act by which, namely, we will to doubt and judge that one must doubt; - the second is suspicion, by which from slight motives and with great fear of erring we incline to judging that one's neighbor has done something evil; - the third is opinion, by which, not certainly but as likely and with fear, from insufficient motives we judge that one's neighbor has done something evil: it is therefore an assent of judgment, but not firm, concerning the evil of another; - the fourth follows, rash judgment strictly so called, or a firm and certain assent concerning the evil of one's neighbor given without sufficient reason. But how from an insufficient motive there can be a certain judgment is understood from the fact that the discussion is not concerning certainty properly so called, or concerning an absolutely certain assent from an evident motive, but concerning a morally certain assent which arises from an impulse of the will; but this can move the intellect to a rash assent, by bending it to assent without sufficient objective motives, even determining it to adhere firmly because of slight motives, graver motives being set after them (n. 73).

In all the aforesaid degrees, rashness or imprudence arises from this, that someone without a sufficient motive judges ill concerning his neighbor; but if he judged according to things proved and alleged, doubting when there is a sufficient reason for doubting, opining when a grave reason is present although merely probable and not certain, or pronouncing certainly when the reasons are morally certain, the judgment would be prudent, not rash nor sinful.

419. The causes from which rash judgment proceeds are indicated by St. Thomas, q. 60, a. 3: It happens from three things; "in one way indeed from this, that someone is evil in himself; and from this very thing, as though conscious of his own malice, he easily thinks evil of others... In another way it proceeds from this, that someone is badly affected toward another: for when someone despises or hates someone, or is angry with him or envies him, from slight signs he thinks evils concerning him, because each one easily believes what he desires. In a third way it proceeds from long experience; whence the Philosopher says that 'old men are especially suspicious, because they have often experienced the defects of others.' But the first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perversity of affection; the third, however, lessens the nature of suspicion, insofar as experience advances toward certainty, which is contrary to the nature of suspicion."

420. Thesis. Rash judgment strictly so called is a sin against justice, grave from its genus. - It is said:

1. judgment strictly so called, i.e., a firm and morally certain assent: for doubt or suspicion from its genus is not a grave sin but a light one;

2. rash, i.e., knowingly and deliberately uttered with advertence to the slightness and insufficiency of the motives;

3. it is a sin against justice, because it is a way of acting unjustly against one's neighbor. For an internal act also regards justice, insofar as of itself it is ordered to external things and operations just or unjust, as the will of stealing or of restoring. Thus internal rash judgment is ordered to an external judgment against reputation and honor (a. 3 ad 3);

4. grave from its genus: for it can be light not only from lack of deliberation or lightness, but also from smallness of matter, namely, from slight rashness.

Namely, mortal sin is not present except by great rashness, for which three conditions are required:

a) perfect deliberation or full advertence at least in a confused way to the gravity of the thing and the insufficiency of the motives; whence if the judgment is altogether sudden, or conceived rather from lightness than from malice, the sin will be light, as often happens among men of timorous conscience, who are not accustomed to consent to such judgments;

b) full rashness or notable disproportion between the reasons and the assent, so that certain assent is given to motives altogether slight; whence the sin is light if the motives are not sufficient but approach sufficiency. Concerning this in practice judgment must be made with all circumstances considered:

Thus if a lascivious youth is seen speaking or playing secretly with a girl and in a somewhat dark place, it is a sufficient indication for judging that there is something evil; on the contrary if the same youth, or an upright man, is seen conversing with a girl in an open place in the middle of the day. If an unknown man secretly and by night enters another's house, it is not rashly judged that an evil intention is in him, otherwise if openly by day, or if a known person even by night;

c) gravity of matter, which is to be attended to from the harm inflicted, because with the quality of the persons and fact considered it is very disgraceful and notably harmful to the honor, reputation, and good estimation of one's neighbor. Hence to hold a maidservant to be lying without reason is not a grave sin; on the contrary, to hold a bishop so; to hold an unknown soldier to be a fornicator is not grave; on the contrary, to hold a priest so.

It is proved: 1) Each one has a strict right to good reputation or the good estimation of others as long as he is not morally certainly proved evil. But that right is violated by rash judgment, which of itself is grave, because it imports contempt of one's neighbor and begets dishonoring. For he who judges evil concerning another, noticing that there is no motive for judging thus, maliciously contemns him. Thus St. Thomas says:

"If it concerns something grave it is a mortal sin, insofar as it is not without contempt of one's neighbor" (a. 3); "from this very fact that someone has an evil opinion concerning another, without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and therefore injures him" (ibid. ad 2). Whence Lugo: just as we sin against justice by taking away the reputation of one's neighbor among others through detraction, so among ourselves by rash judgment. And thus it differs in species from detraction.

2. For a judgment to be justly borne, three things are required: the authority of the one judging, the right reason of prudence or accurate knowledge of the cause, and perfect integrity (S. Th., a. 2). But these three are lacking in rash judgment: a) authority is lacking, since it is pronounced by a private person without office, and in circumstances in which it is done without any necessity or due office; b) accurate knowledge of the thing is lacking, since by hypothesis the judgment is rash, pronounced not from objective consideration of the thing but from an insufficient motive; c) integrity is often lacking, since for the most part it is pronounced from prejudice, envy, hatred, or from one's own perversity, not from the inclination of justice.

3. Whence Scripture often prohibits us from judging our neighbor; which at least must be understood concerning an unfounded and rash judgment (Mt. VII, 1-2; Lk. VI, 37; Rom. II, 1; Jas. IV, 11).

421. Rash suspicion (lichtvaardig vermoeden, ongegronde verdenking), under which name among theologians there also comes either rash doubting or rash opinion, of itself and regularly is only a venial sin, because it is not something full in the nature of judgment and contempt, but incomplete.

Nevertheless exceptionally and by accident it can be mortal: 1) if deliberately and without any probable foundation it is made concerning a very grave sin (incest, sodomy, bestiality) as to men altogether upright, as if a pious priest were doubted to be a heretic: for suspicion concerning such a sin can be more injurious than certain affirmation concerning an ordinary sin; but it is so only because of the special circumstances joined to it; 2) if it proceeds from envy or grave hatred: for then it is grave because of the affection from which it arises.

422. Practical admonitions. - 1. Although, if there is a serious reason for doubting concerning the goodness of one's neighbor, we cannot judge or opine evil concerning him, nevertheless we are not bound positively to esteem him good (this belongs to greater charity) unless his goodness is truly established, but we can suspend judgment.

2. In the external manner of acting we are by no means prohibited, for forestalling our own or another's damage, from employing due precautions, just as if one's neighbor were dishonest; for example, to shut money in a chest lest it be secretly taken by servants or unknown guests. For this belongs to prudence. It is lawful to judge concerning someone that he can become evil, and consequently, common frailty being considered, to apply a remedy lest he become evil, and thus to forestall damage, without however positively doubting without reason concerning the probity of someone in particular.

3. Rash judgments, although they are concerned with a diverse object, are probably of the same species, because they violate the same right of one's neighbor; and consequently those objects are not to be declared in confession, but it suffices to indicate the gravity or lightness of the matter.