Chapter — Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts
Commentary VII: On Fear
1.
- Fear is commonly defined: a trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger.
2.
- On account of an imminent or future danger, namely of an evil danger: for danger of a present evil is no longer present, since it is already there. But present evil does not bring in fear, but sadness. “Evil conjoined is the cause of pain or sadness by way of object.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 36. a. 4. “The object of fear is a future difficult evil, which cannot be resisted.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2. “Sadness is concerning present evil; fear is concerning future evil, which does not move in the same way as present evil.” Ibid. a. 1.
3.
- Trepidation of mind. “It is manifest that fear, since it is concerning evil, pertains to the appetitive power, which per se regards good and evil.” Ibid. a. 1.
4.
- Therefore fear carries before itself moral coercion, which namely is exercised upon the will itself; force or violence, on the contrary, brings in physical coercion, which is exercised upon other powers and exterior members, insofar as they are moved and impelled by some exterior force against their natural inclination.
5.
- Fear is divided into light and grave, by reason of the evil which is feared. The first is had either when the imminent or future evil is light, or when, although it is grave, nevertheless it is little probable and likely. But the other is had when the impending evil is grave, and is very probable or certain.
6.
- But evil is grave either absolutely or relatively. Hence grave fear is subdivided into absolutely grave and relatively grave. Absolutely grave harm is that which strikes fear of itself into a constant man, and is grave in itself and is commonly reputed such. Each point is explained by the Holy Doctor, 4. Dist. 29. q. 1. a. 2. And first concerning fear falling upon a constant man: “That fear falls upon someone means that someone is coerced by fear. But someone is coerced by fear when he does something which otherwise he would not will, in order to avoid something which he fears. But in this the constant man is distinguished from the inconstant man as to two things. First as to the quality of the danger which is feared, because the constant man follows right reason, through which he knows something for which one must fight or which must be done. But always the lesser evil, or the greater good, must be chosen. And therefore the constant man is coerced to sustaining a lesser evil by fear of a greater evil; but he is not coerced to a greater evil so that he may avoid a lesser evil. But the inconstant man is coerced to a greater evil on account of fear of a lesser evil, as to sin on account of fear of bodily punishment. But the pertinacious man, on the contrary, cannot be coerced even to sustaining or doing a lesser evil so that he may avoid a greater evil; whence the constant man is in the middle between the inconstant and the pertinacious. Secondly they differ as to the estimation of the imminent danger, because the constant man is coerced only from a strong and probable estimation; but the inconstant man from a slight one.... The constant man is intrepid, not because he does not fear at all, but because he does not fear the things which ought not to be feared, or where, or when, they ought not to be feared.” But concerning evil grave in itself and commonly reputed such, he adds these things: “Sins are the greatest of evils, and therefore to this in no way can a constant man be coerced; indeed man ought rather to die than to sustain such things.... But certain bodily harms are lesser than certain others, which are among the principal things which pertain to the person, such as death, blows, dishonoring through rape, and servitude; and therefore from these one is coerced to sustaining other bodily harms.... Nor does it differ whether these pertain to one’s own person, or that of wife, or children, or others of this kind.” And among other things infamy is to be reckoned with these, if it cannot easily be met, ibid. ad 3.; loss of all goods by theft, robbery, fire; dismissal from office; frustration of contracting matrimony; exclusion from an expected inheritance, etc. But relatively grave evil is that which according to itself, and according to the common estimation of men, is not grave, yet is grave with respect to this or that person, for instance, a boy, a girl, a woman, an old man, an infirm person.
7.
- Fear is further divided into intrinsic and extrinsic, by reason of the cause from which it proceeds. Intrinsic fear is that which arises from the intrinsic disposition of the subject itself, namely from each one’s own infirmity of body or soul. Fear of death stirred up from a grave illness is intrinsic fear, since it arises as from a cause from infirmity which is in the very subject of fear. Extrinsic fear is that which is stirred up by an extrinsic cause, whether this cause is natural or necessary, or whether it is a moral or free cause; as likewise fear of death from shipwreck, or from a robber encountered on the way.
8.
- Extrinsic fear struck by a moral or free cause is subdivided into just and unjust, according as that cause has or does not have a right of inflicting evil, as fear struck by a judge or by a brigand. And whether the fear has been struck justly or unjustly, such fear can be struck simply for obtaining something, or for inflicting some evil, as happens in robbers threatening death unless someone gives the things which he has, or in an enemy likewise threatening death in revenge; and it can be struck for extorting consent in some certain thing, for example in betrothals, in matrimony, in a contract, etc. In the first and third case, fear struck for obtaining something or for extorting consent, fear per se directly influences consent, either explicitly, as in the third case, or implicitly, as in the first case. In the second case fear per se does not directly influence consent, but per accidens it can influence the will, as, for example, if someone offers himself to an enemy threatening death to him, in order to gain peace for himself, to take that enemy’s daughter in marriage.
9.
- Fear by a special name is called reverential, when the fear is lest a superior be offended, or by which someone fears to resist him to whom he is subjected, namely father, mother, grandfather, father-in-law, husband, king, master, prelate, tutor, and curator, as the doctors commonly teach with Sanchez; likewise also an uncle, or cousin, or older brother, if the one suffering fear lives with them and receives sustenance from them. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 1056. “Pontius deservedly says that reverential fear per se is grave, because it is one thing to operate from reverence owed to a superior, another from reverential fear, which necessarily puts on fear of some grave harm impending from obedience not furnished, for instance lasting indignation, etc.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 717. Certainly the indignation of a father, master, etc., is an evil; and, if it is lasting, it is a grave evil. Wherefore, even with other evils excluded, for example blows, threats, etc., reverential fear per se is grave.
10.
- “It is one thing to operate with fear, but another from fear; for the first says concomitance. Whence what is done thus, although it is absolutely voluntary, nevertheless that voluntary does not arise from fear, but rather is opposed to and conquers that fear, which is a sign of a great will; as when Christ the Lord was going forth to death, fearing it, he embraced it with the highest will, which did not arise from fear of the Father and of men, and therefore conquered natural fear. But to be done from fear signifies that fear itself induces one to willing or doing something, and then fear is the cause of such voluntary, in the way in which among the acts of the will intention is the cause of election, and election of use; and love of good is the cause of hatred of the opposite evil. For in this way in the present matter, when someone fears death he decrees and intends to flee it; and by force of this decree he chooses this means, for example to cast merchandise into the sea, and use or execution follows upon this election. Therefore from first to last fear was the cause stirring and applying the will to that efficacious act by which it commanded that exterior action.” Suarez D. 3. S. 1.
11.
- Moreover, those things which are done from fear are more voluntary than involuntary: for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For each thing is such simply according as it is in act. But this act, according as it is exercised here and now, is simply willed; because although such an action considered per se is not lovable simply, nevertheless here and now it is proposed as absolutely to be chosen, as a fitting means for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore under that account it is here and now simply voluntary. For judgment concerning the voluntary must be borne with the thing considered in particular with all circumstances, and not through abstraction or precision of the intellect. “But that what is done through fear is taken as existing outside this case, according as it is repugnant to the will, this is only according to reason alone, and therefore it is involuntary in a certain respect, that is, according as it is considered as existing outside this case.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. Therefore that which is done through fear without condition is voluntary, that is, according as it is actually done; but it is involuntary under a condition, that is, if such fear were not impending.” St. Thomas, ibid. ad 3. “And because acts are in particulars, therefore it is simply voluntary, but involuntary in a certain respect.” St. Thomas, Suppl. q. 47. a. 1.; Suarez D. 3. S. 1. 2.
12.
- From what has been said the difference is clear between those things which are done from force and those which are done from fear. “Those things which are done through fear and through force differ not only according to present and future, but also according to this, that in that which is done through force the will does not consent, but is wholly against the motion of the will. But that which is done through fear becomes voluntary for this reason, that the motion of the will is borne into it, although not on account of itself, but on account of another thing, namely for repelling the evil which is feared. For it suffices for the account of the voluntary that it be on account of another voluntary thing. For voluntary is not only what we will on account of itself, but also what we will on account of another thing, as on account of an end. Therefore it is clear that in that which is done through force the interior will does nothing. But in that which is done through fear the will does something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1.
13.
- Likewise the difference is clear between fear and concupiscence in relation to the voluntary. “In him who does something through fear there remains a repugnance of the will toward that which is done, according as it is considered in itself. But in him who does something through concupiscence, as is the incontinent man, the prior will does not remain, which was repudiating that which is desired concupiscently; but it is changed to willing that which before it repudiated. And therefore what is done through fear is in some way involuntary, but what is done through concupiscence is in no way involuntary. For the incontinent man of concupiscence acts against that which he previously proposed, but not against that which he now wills. But the fearful man acts against that which even now he wills according to itself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 2.
14.
- From the preceding doctrine it follows that a contract per se is valid, if someone has been coerced to contracting by grave fear, but nevertheless justly. Whence he who has contracted betrothals from fear of excommunication can be compelled to matrimony, and the contract is valid. C. Ex litteris 10, On Betrothals. He who has violated a virgin is compelled to endow or marry her. He who promised something lest he be accused of a committed crime is bound to give it. The reason is that fear does not render a contract simply involuntary. For he who contracts with grave fear, all things considered absolutely, wills and consents. But since the fear was struck justly, there is no injury. Wherefore the contract cannot be invalid either on account of defect of consent or on account of inflicted injury. — Nor indeed is a contract invalid of itself, if someone has been coerced to contract by grave fear but unjustly, although it can be rescinded at the judgment of him who suffered the fear. For consent is not lacking, since consent is altogether the same, whether the fear is just or unjust. But a contract cannot be rendered invalid from injury. For the immediate cause of the contract is consent, not injury. But because he who unjustly struck fear inflicted injury upon another, he is bound to restore him to the prior state, and the other has a right of exacting this restitution, which can be done only by rescission of the contract.
15.
- Now those things which are done from fear are involuntary in a certain respect, when the thing is evil in itself, but good only in the present circumstances, as is clear in the example adduced of the casting of merchandise by a merchant, which in itself is evil to him, but is good to him in the present circumstance of shipwreck. But if the thing is good in itself, so that it is such even by abstracting from the present circumstances, then he who operates from fear can be borne by a perfect inclination of the will into that thing, so that the voluntary simply is had, without at the same time having the involuntary in a certain respect. And thus he who from supernatural fear of Gehenna wills to abstain from sin has the voluntary simply without an admixture of the involuntary, because observance of the divine law is simply good in itself, even by abstracting from that circumstance of fear of the divine judgments. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 442. Objection II. Moreover, “he who wills to preserve the precept from fear of hell, if he understands the force of that motive, cannot have a simple contrary affection: I would transgress the precept if there were no penalty, for through this very affection he would sin and would incur liability to the penalty, and consequently would act against his own motive. If therefore he is truly and efficaciously moved by that motive, and understands its force and the quality of his acts, it cannot happen that such an affection is with that motive.” Suarez D. 3. S. 2.
16.
- Whether importunate prayers constitute grave fear? — “Pontius affirms it, etc. But more truly it must be denied, unless the prayers are added to fear of reverence toward a Superior; thus Sanchez, etc. And Sanchez well notes that not all assiduous prayers are called importunate, but only those which are most insistent and more often inculcated.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 717.
17.
- Whether grave fear excuses from fault? — Either the discussion is of those things which are not intrinsically and per se evil, or of those things which from their nature are intrinsically evil, as would be, for example, apostasy from the faith, blasphemy against God. If the first, ordinarily speaking, grave fear excuses from all fault, because any positive law is not accustomed to oblige with grave proportionate inconvenience, as is common. It is said ordinarily speaking, because if someone by grave fear were compelled to the violation of some positive law which would yield to common harm, or to contempt of legitimate power, or of religion, with grave public scandal, then grave fear would not excuse from the fault of transgression; for in the first case the common good must be preferred to private good; but in the second the matter would now be concerning a thing intrinsically evil from its nature. But in this second case if the one suffering, when he violates the law, should protest publicly that he does not thus act in contempt of the law, but only to avoid violence, with which existing, he declares that the law no longer obliges, then, if public scandal ceases and the aforesaid contempt ceases, which, practically speaking, seems altogether difficult, he would be excused from fault. — If the second, it is certain that fear, however grave, provided that it is not such as to take away the use of reason, never excuses from all fault: for since those things include intrinsic and essential malice, if they are done voluntarily, they can never lack fault. An example is in that Christian who, struck by fear of punishments or even of death, would deny the faith of Christ. Nevertheless it diminishes fault, since it diminishes the voluntary. Yet, ordinarily speaking, grave fear still leaves such cognition of the things which are done as suffices for mortal sin. Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175.; Elbel 43-52.
18.
- Grave fear, for example of death, etc., often excuses not only from a positive precept, both divine and human, even ecclesiastical, but sometimes also from an affirmative natural precept; and thus someone is not bound with danger of life to receive baptism, to confess integrally, to receive communion, to preserve a deposit, to fulfill a vow, to aid a neighbor in extreme need of life. Lessius q. 6. a. 6.; Bus. apud St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 175. On the contrary, in order to avoid death a priest cannot violate the sacramental seal. Cf. Viva, On Human Acts.
19.
- Here the question is moved: whether a virgin is bound rather to permit herself to be killed than to be violated, if the invader of her chastity and life threatens death to her unless she consents to intercourse. — “There is a twofold opinion,” says St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 368. “The first, which Navarrus, Soto, Toledo, Lopez, and others hold, says that, although she can, nevertheless a woman is not bound to suffer death, but can then have herself permissively while intercourse happens, provided that by will she positively resists and the danger of consent is absent; because, as they say, that permission is not then moral cooperation, but only material, and therefore she is sufficiently excused on account of the danger of death. The second opinion, which the Salmanticenses hold with Lugo, Azor, Bonacina, Filliucci, Palaus, etc., teaches that this is altogether illicit, because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if, induced by fear, she rests, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary. For in a woman that rest in intercourse is reputed as action. Nevertheless this reason does not convince, because that rest of the woman in reality cannot be called action, since in no way is it positive. Therefore the first opinion, speculatively speaking, does not seem to lack its probability. Nevertheless it must not be denied that the second opinion in practice is altogether to be urged, at least on account of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission.”
20.
- Likewise the question is moved: whether a woman coerced by grave fear to matrimony, that grave fear remaining, and then coerced by her husband to intercourse by a graver fear of death, can then, by consenting to the matrimony, render it valid and consent to intercourse. — There are some who affirm, because a law constituting a diriment impediment in favor of an innocent person whom it intends to protect would yield to his gravest harm. If it were otherwise, someone would now be cast into the inevitable necessity either of sinning, if she could scarcely trust that she can have herself merely passively, or of undergoing death, and this to preserve her liberty. But one’s own liberty is not necessarily to be preferred to preserving one’s own life. But much more probably it must be denied altogether. For invalidating laws per se directly regard the common good, and do not cease on account of a particular inconvenience, even though very grave. If the impediment in the case ceased, now in reality the impediment of fear would be none. For if the impediment ceases when there is question of consummation of the marriage, then it would have to be said that the impediment had ceased from the beginning, since, speaking per se, that grave fear by which the marriage is contracted is directed and extended all the way to its consummation. Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 4. D. 18. n. 13 seq.; Tamburini, On Matrimony, Tr. 4. C. 7. § 4.; Mazzotta, On Matrimony, D. 3. Q. 2. C. 3. n. 2.