Chapter — Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience
1. On the Voluntary and the Free
- Arnulfus, an upright man, but of a petulant disposition, when, first, he had met his enemy, and had been provoked and attacked by him not only with words but also with blows, burns with the desire of killing him, and, having seized a dagger, rushes upon him. But, the impulse of anger having been restrained, he flees from the enemy. Afterwards, however, having become master of himself, he fears lest he has committed a mortal fault, and therefore, no delay having intervened, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor, about to accuse the sin.
- The same man, although he had made serious efforts to destroy the evil habit of blaspheming, in a quarrel had with a certain adversary breaks out into blasphemies, and therefore again seeks a confessor to wash away this stain of conscience.
- On another occasion, knowing that he was accustomed to quarrel in drunkenness, he carefully attends lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety. But behold, urged by his companions to drink beyond custom, he is overtaken by drunkenness before he has adverted to its danger, and, being furious, mixes in quarrels with others. But having returned to himself he strives to do penance, and again has recourse to the confessor.
Q. 1. What is the voluntary? 2. Has Arnulfus sinned in that threefold case?
R. To the first, cf. I. M. 6-8. To the second, Arnulfus does not seem to have sinned, at least gravely, in any of the three proposed cases. For the perfectly voluntary was lacking. Not in the first, for he is said, and appears, truly to be an upright man, and an upright man does not so easily resolve deliberately to kill a man. He is said, moreover, to be prone to anger, and that his enemy met him; whence, from his presence, he could at once be moved to anger. Likewise it is said that he was provoked and attacked with words and blows, and so he could be much moved to anger, so that he lacked at least full and perfect knowledge of the malice and deliberation of mind. Finally it is said that, the impulse of anger having been restrained, having become master of himself, he feared lest perhaps he had sinned, and at once went to the confessor to expiate the guilt of soul, if perhaps he had incurred it; and this indeed shows that Arnulfus acted at least without full deliberation of mind.
Not in the second; for, if he had sinned gravely, in the case this would have been only on account of the neglected habit of blaspheming. But he had made serious efforts to root it out. For since he is prone to anger, he is easily to be judged to have acted from a first-first movement.
Not in the third, since he carefully attended lest in drinking he exceed the limits of sobriety, and then, not adverting to the danger of drunkenness, he was seized by drunkenness. - G. 1.
- Elpidius, habitually given to drinking and of a quarrelsome disposition, furious in drunkenness, after having had a dispute with Titius, resolved to seek vengeance from him; yet he put off the purpose to another time. Afterwards he went to a nearby tavern, that he might calm his anger in wine; but behold, when at night he was leaving the tavern perfectly drunk, by an unfortunate chance he came upon Titius himself, and beat him so gravely that for many weeks he was forced to abstain from his accustomed work and suffered great damage.
Q. 1. What is the free? 2. Are the damages inflicted by Titius in drunkenness imputable to him, and therefore is he held to repair them?
R. To the first, cf. I. M. 10-12. To the second: "Affirmatively. The reason is that the damages are truly voluntary and sufficiently foreseen in the cause itself, at least confusedly. For Elpidius willed to inflict damage on Titius, and drank with the danger of drunkenness, since he was habitually given to drinking. Moreover he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages; since he could not be ignorant that in wine he became furious and could harm someone. Therefore Elpidius is excused neither from grave sin against justice, nor from the obligation of repairing the damages." Thus G. 3.
But that resolution is not without difficulty. For Elpidius entered the nearby tavern, not in order then to carry out his evil purpose, but, on the contrary, to calm his anger; and so it does not appear that even confusedly Elpidius then foresaw damage to be inflicted on Titius. Nor is it valid to say that he is judged to have foreseen, at least implicitly, that in the state of drunkenness he would inflict damages. For if in fact, in the case, he did not foresee it, this general presumption must yield to the truth. And the presumption in the case is rather the contrary; since, stirred by anger, he entered the tavern to calm his anger; whence Elpidius rather seems, for that time, to have willed to abstain from every vengeance and from inflicting damage. But when Elpidius gravely beat Titius, Elpidius was already perfectly drunk, and so then the voluntary, the free, and sin were entirely lacking. - I. M. 288.