57. On the Obligations of Masters, Disciples, Subjects

1. Vincentius has already rather often detected his male servant with the maidservant, occupied in lascivious intercourse; yet because he adverts that from the dismissal of the male servant, as being especially necessary to the domestic estate, no small detriment threatens him, hence, anxious, he asks whether he can dissimulate with a safe conscience.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of masters? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 693, 694. To the second. Vincentius cannot dissimulate the sins of the servants. For upon him, as superior and father of the family, there rests the obligation from justice of impeding the sins of subjects. And if, correction having been made, they are not amended, he is held under grave obligation to expel them from the house, if from such ejection it is prudently believed that they will return to good conduct. Indeed, even if this is by no means hoped, nevertheless he must altogether eject them, both because, since the servant has the concubine not outside the house but in the very house of the master, and sins with another maidservant, a present and far easier occasion of sinning is had from this; and also because of the grave danger and scandal of the family which is present, as is established by sad experience itself. Parents, retaining depraved servants at home, expose their own children most gravely to corruption. But it is scarcely credible that Vincentius, from the departure of the servant, can fear so great a loss that it would outweigh the most grave obligation of impeding the sins of subjects. And if danger and scandal to the family were present in fact, there certainly is no temporal detriment by which Vincentius could both dissimulate the sins of the servants and retain them at home. Indeed, the sins of subjects can in no way be imputed to a superior when he has tried according to his powers to impede them, by correcting, threatening, etc.; and for that reason only does he dissimulate something, because he cannot impede it without a graver, or certainly rather grave, detriment. But where danger and scandal are present to the family, to retain depraved servants at home is to constitute one's own children in a certain proximate and necessary occasion of sinning; and where servants advert that the masters know and are silent, and fear to expel them, they certainly become more bold for sinning and sin more securely, which is altogether illicit. - Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2106; Elbel 17, 18, 19; Tambur., in Decal., l. 5, c. 1, § 4, n. 21; G. 374, 375.

2. Mathurinus, a student of Moral Theology, is pressed by grave anguish of conscience. For a disciple, he says, owes love, reverence, and obedience to a master. I have love toward my master; I also have reverence for him; but I cannot have obedience to him. It is impossible for me to admit all the opinions of my master. For there is some opinion on which the master always and much insists, and it seems to me contrary to dogma; but there are also other opinions which seem to me at least equally probable, and even more probable, than those which the master defends as most probable, as uniquely probable, as at least altogether to be held practically.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of disciples toward masters? 2. What is to be held concerning Mathurinus?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 700. - To the second. Mathurinus, before he forms and pronounces judgment against the doctrine of his professor, ought first to understand it well and weigh it with mature consideration, lest perhaps he himself consider and attack as handed down by his professor a doctrine which the professor in no way taught. By acting thus he would both form a rash judgment against his master and, by speaking with others, would harm his reputation. But if, after serious study, and after other learned men have also been consulted, the doctrine of his professor seems erroneous to him, he is certainly not held to follow it. Likewise, if the opinions of others seem to him probable, more probable, or most probable, and are commonly held as such by authors, he is not held to follow the opposed opinions of the master as most probable, or uniquely probable, or altogether to be held. But with due modesty he will be able to think otherwise. Appositely St. Thomas, Quodlibet 3, a. 10: "It must be said that diverse opinions of doctors of Sacred Scripture, if indeed they do not pertain to faith and morals, hearers can follow either opinion without danger; for then what the Apostle says in Rom. 14:5 has place: Let each one abound in his own sense. But in those things which pertain to faith and morals, no one is excused if he follows the erroneous opinion of some master... otherwise those would have been immune from sin who followed the opinions of Arius, Nestorius, and other heresiarchs... Therefore he who assents to the opinion of some master against the manifest testimony of Scripture, or against that which is publicly held according to the authority of the Church, cannot be excused from the vice of error."

Moreover, if the confessor himself cannot impose his probable opinion on the penitent, who wishes to follow another probable opinion, much less will the teacher of moral theology be able to impose his opinion on his hearers when another opinion is truly probable and commonly held by authors as probable. Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26.

But this is directly confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 5 July 1831. For to the question: "Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology?" it responded: "Affirmatively, without nevertheless judging that those are to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors." Therefore both the teacher of moral theology and his hearers can and are held so to defend their own probable opinions that they do not exclude the contrary truly probable opinions of other Catholic doctors. This certainly, especially in moral theology, would not be to build up, but to destroy.

3. Honoratus, a Catholic, never salutes the Prince, although others commonly salute him in the public streets and halt their step. For he says that the Prince is non-Catholic and by no means virtuous, but honor is owed only to virtue. - What of Honoratus?

R. Honoratus neither reasons rightly nor, of itself, acts rightly. "Honor is a certain testimony concerning the virtue of him who is honored; and therefore virtue alone is the due cause of honor. Nevertheless, it must be known that someone can be honored not only on account of his own virtue, but also on account of the virtue of another, as princes and prelates are honored, even if they are evil, insofar as they bear the person of God and of the community over which they are placed... and by the same reason parents and masters are to be honored on account of participation in the divine dignity, who is the father and master of all. But elders are to be honored on account of the sign of virtue, which is old age, although this sign sometimes fails... But the rich are to be honored on account of this, that they obtain a greater place in communities. But if they are honored with a view to riches, it will be the sin of acceptance of persons." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; Quodlibet 8, a. 7. "If prelates are evil, they are not honored on account of the excellence of their own virtue, but on account of the excellence of dignity, according to which they are ministers of God; also in them the whole community over which they preside is honored." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3, ad 2; Quodlibet 10, a. 12. Cf. I. M. 701, 704.

4. "An infidel king lays snares for the Christians subject to him, or wishes to destroy them here and now and to blot out the Christian name in his kingdom. While he is meditating and preparing these things, other wicked men, by conspiring and warring against him, try to cast him out from his kingdom.

It is asked: Whether Christians are held positively to defend him, namely the tyrant who wishes here and now to slaughter them; or rather can behave negatively, neither warring against him nor helping him?

R. As it is set forth, negatively to the first part; affirmatively to the second part." S. O., 27 Jan. 1892; Collectan. S. C. de P. F., n. 2099; I. M. 706.