109. On the Minister of the Sacraments

1. Abundius, a priest, in the celebration of Mass, once uttered the words of consecration thus: This is the Body of Christ; This is the chalice of the Blood of Christ, etc. But he contended that this form was altogether legitimate, since it plainly and altogether explicitly signifies Christ’s Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. The form which Abundius pronounced is void. For the principal minister of the sacraments is Christ himself; we are instruments. This is evident from the very form of consecration: This is my Body. Wherefore the instrumental minister of the sacraments confers the sacraments in the person of Christ, and by his power, not by his own. Hence, if from the form it appears that the principal minister is someone other than Christ, the form is invalid. But in the form of Abundius someone other than Christ himself appears to be the principal minister of the sacrament; and therefore that form is void. St. Thomas, part 3, question 64, article 9; Suarez, d. 59, s. 2, at the end; La Croix, book 6, part 1, no. 37; I. M. 337.

2. When Lucillus was about to celebrate Mass, his server offered him a smaller host, asking him afterward to give him holy communion. Lucillus assented, and, receiving the smaller host, placed it on the paten together with the larger one. But in the consecration of the smaller host, which had been placed on the corporal, he was altogether forgetful. When he had come to Communion, however, he was astounded on seeing two smaller hosts, one on the corporal and the other outside the corporal. Doubting whether those two hosts were consecrated, he consumed them after the larger host, and left the server without communion.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. There is no doubt that the smaller host placed on the corporal was later placed by Lucillus himself from the paten, on which it was together with the larger host, onto the corporal together with the same larger host after the Offertory. Nor is there any doubt that it was consecrated, because for confecting any sacrament a virtual intention suffices. But Lucillus had such an intention, who, assenting to the server asking for communion, received the host, placed it on the paten, and carried it to the altar, namely, that he might consecrate it. Since, moreover, that smaller host truly was present on the corporal at the time of consecration, it was certainly consecrated, and Lucillus could give communion to the server with it, notwithstanding the forgetfulness had at the time of consecration. Elbel, 40.

But what if Lucillus, while placing the host on the paten, had said within himself, “I will afterward make the intention of consecrating”? “Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it was consecrated and therefore to be offered to the layman. The reason is drawn from what has been said, because an explicit formal intention is not required, but an implicit intention suffices, or even one in the act exercised. But he had such an intention when, at the petition of the layman, he carried the host with him to the altar. Indeed, according to Laymann, Gobat, and Sporer, the priest is to be judged to have such an intention by this very fact, that he knows or in a rational manner adverts that hosts to be consecrated by him are brought to the altar by another. Therefore, a fortiori, if he himself knowingly carries it.” Elbel, 41.

But the other host, which was found by Lucillus outside the corporal, with him being altogether unaware, was not consecrated, since no intention of consecrating it was present. I. M. 511. Nevertheless it is not to be put away with the other unconsecrated hosts, because perhaps it was joined with the other not only at the beginning of Mass, but even at the time of consecration, and by some accident, for example by the priest’s maniple, was thrown outside the corporal. G. 160.

Wherefore Lucillus did badly by leaving the server without communion. He also acted badly by at once consuming the consecrated host and the unconsecrated host, or at least doubtfully consecrated host, after the larger host; because this is against the rubrics, where it is established that, if anything is to be consumed, it is to be done after the reception of the Blood. Besides, since the host was either unconsecrated or only doubtfully consecrated, by consuming it before the reception of the Blood he violated the natural fast. G. 161; I. M. 545.

3. Medericus, a priest about to hear confessions, has the intention of not absolving this time Marcus, a habitual sinner, although he seems to him sufficiently disposed, judging that delay of absolution for some brief time will be very useful to him. But Marcus, approaching in the midst of the crowd, is not recognized by Medericus; and since he truly appears disposed to receive absolution, he is absolved by Medericus. But immediately after the absolution has been given, he notices the error, and, in doubt, hesitates whether he ought to absolve him again, or warn him not to approach Communion.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. The absolution in the Case is valid. The reason is that the predominant intention is the intention of absolving. For that is the predominant intention “which would be chosen if the incompatibility were known.” St. Alphonsus, 24. But if this error had been foreseen and known, the intention which would be chosen in the Case would certainly be the intention of absolving; otherwise the penitent, departing unabsolved, could undergo most grave harm, since, not knowing that he had not been absolved, he could not suitably provide for himself. Therefore Medericus can abstain from repeating the absolution, and permit Marcus Communion. Nevertheless, where Medericus seriously doubted about his own intention, because, for example, he had absolutely determined that in no way did he wish to absolve Marcus, then he ought to have repeated the absolution conditionally. I. M. 327, 344, 345; G. 162.

4. Rambertus, a parish priest, suddenly seized by illness, immediately summoned Albert, his vicar, so that he might hear his confession, and among other things said: “For thirty years I baptized all the infants of this place, and thee thyself, but I fear invalidly. For, having been attached to an impious sect from youth, I soon came to this, that in my mind I had utterly said farewell to the Christian faith, holding it as an empty tale. But as often as I was called to administer the sacraments, so often, in order that I might preserve myself in office, I complied with the parishioners; nevertheless I thought that I would do nothing other than a ludicrous and wholly useless thing. Hence I was not so much a minister as rather a mocker of the sacraments.” Having heard these things, Albert shudders, all the more because he had always seen Rambertus administering the sacraments with his face and the whole bearing of his body composed to devotion. But noticing that the same man was already at the point of death, he absolved him under condition.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. There seems to be no doubt that Rambertus validly administered the sacraments. For although he lost the faith, and in administering the sacraments he himself judged that he did nothing except a ludicrous and useless thing, nevertheless for that reason the true intention of administering the sacraments, and of doing in them what the Church does, is not excluded. Otherwise the sacraments administered by infidels and heretics would have to be held invalid. Besides, that Rambertus truly had sufficient intention in the administration of the sacraments of doing what the Church does is proved from this: that not only did he conduct himself externally with devotion in the administration of the sacraments, but also in his own mind he wished to comply with his parishioners, and therefore he wished to administer to them the sacraments which they were asking for. Furthermore, since Rambertus, led by true repentance, sincerely confesses his sins and humbly accuses himself of sin against faith, he says nothing about defect of intention. For that phrase, thinking that I would do nothing other than a ludicrous and useless thing, pertains to the intellect and to defect of faith, but by no means to the will and to the intention of doing even a useless and ludicrous thing. Since the minister of the sacraments bears the person of Christ, nothing harms the sacrament if the minister has neither right faith nor upright morals, provided he applies the sacramental rite instituted by Christ and by it acts, as it were, as a mandatary according to the intention of the one commanding, having either explicitly or implicitly the intention of doing what Christ wills to be done, or at least what the Church does. Nor indeed is it required that even that which the Church intends to do be explicitly intended.

As regards Albert, it does not appear why he gave Rambertus absolution under condition. For Rambertus exhibited signs of sincere repentance. Therefore he could and ought to have been absolved simply. Perhaps Albert, hearing that confession and being greatly disturbed and confused, did not well understand the force of that word thinking, confusing the false opinion of the mind with the intention of the will, and judging that he himself was not baptized, or at least having a doubt about his own baptism and about the validity of his ordination. What then in such a Case would Albert have had to do, if Rambertus truly had not had the intention of administering the sacraments and of doing in them what the Church does?

The question can be raised concerning the Eucharist, extreme unction, penance, marriage, and baptism, which are the sacraments that Rambertus the parish priest administered. As regards the Eucharist, extreme unction, and penance, nothing would have to be done, nor could be done. Those sacraments would all have been invalidly administered, nor is there an evident way of supplying the defect. Yet as regards the Eucharist, it would have been invalidly administered if, namely, Rambertus himself had consecrated the hosts without having the intention of consecrating. As regards marriages, there is no difficulty, and therefore they are valid with respect to baptized parishioners, even in the notion of sacrament; for the parish priest is not the minister in the sacrament of marriage, and it suffices that the marriage be contracted before the parish priest and two witnesses, whatever may be the good or bad intention of the assisting parish priest. As regards baptism also, where the greater harm is if it is administered invalidly, there is also no doubt that in the hypothesis of defect of intention on the part of Rambertus, the parishioners baptized by him and Albert himself would all have been invalidly baptized. But can anything be done, so that parishioners thus invalidly baptized and Albert himself may be baptized again? As regards the other parishioners, it certainly does not appear how in practice this could be done without revealing the sacramental seal. With respect to someone, or even only to some persons in particular, perhaps they can be rebaptized so secretly that no suspicion arises from it. But as regards all, especially adults, when the parish priest had baptized invalidly for many years, and especially if the parish were large, morally speaking, it seems impossible that they could be rebaptized, and the sacramental secret of confession be preserved, and that great scandal would not arise from it. But as regards Albert himself, the matter is easier; he himself can go to another place where he is unknown, and, after the Case has been set forth to the Holy See, so that he may be dispensed from the ordinary formalities, he himself can secretly be rebaptized and initiated into sacred orders. In the meantime, however, under some pretext of illness, journey, etc., he must altogether abstain from the celebration of Mass and from every administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed in this manner of acting is there any revelation of the seal, nor annoyance of the penitent, nor hatred of the sacrament. But, unless time had been altogether lacking, and immediately after confession Rambertus had either been deprived of his senses or had died, before absolution Albert ought to have asked permission from him, that it might be lawful for him to use that knowledge, with his reputation preserved as far as could be done, to avert the common harm of so many souls, namely by procuring baptism for so many persons invalidly baptized, who consequently also invalidly received confirmation, order, and other sacraments. I. M. 858, 860; G. 197.

5. Cunibertus, who was fulfilling the office of vice-parish priest, after committing a most grave sin, approached confession only after three days. Asked by the confessor whether during that time he had performed sacred ministries, he adds these things:

“I did indeed abstain from the celebration of Mass, and I only performed the office of the diaconate in a solemn Mass. At times, when the faithful asked, I ministered the Eucharist. Called to confer baptism on an infant who was being drawn from the womb of his dead mother, I was indeed prepared, because there was no question of the solemn administration of baptism. But I judged it better to entrust that to the surgeon, because, although he was a wicked man, nevertheless he was not a consecrated minister, but rather one of necessity. Nor do I deny that once or twice I conferred baptism and anointed a sick person with holy oil; but this was by order of the parish priest, and without there being time available for eliciting an act of contrition. All these things I indeed performed in the state of lethal sin; but I think that I did not sin gravely, since in each Case there is a probable opinion of theologians excluding grave fault.”

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Cunibertus, having performed the office of deacon in solemn Mass, probably did not sin mortally. For he did not confect the sacrament. I. M. 355. Ministering the Eucharist to the faithful he probably also did not sin, for the same reason. I. M. 353. “That a deacon and subdeacon,” says Lugo, d. 8, nos. 152, 155, “ministering in the state of sin; which same thing holds a fortiori for clerics of minor orders; or a priest solemnly chanting the prayer or the chapter in choir; or a bishop consecrating a church or chalices, or blessing corporals and sacred ornaments; or a preacher preaching even solemnly, do not sin mortally; because, although all these are sacred actions, and therefore there is some irreverence in exercising them in the state of sin, nevertheless it is not so grave that it reaches lethal fault. Some of them, however, seem to contain at least venial fault ... That it is not a mortal sin if a parish priest in the state of sin assists at marriage; for he does not confect that sacrament, but assists as a public witness, essentially required so that the contracting parties can validly confect the sacrament. Thus also it seems not to be a mortal sin if a priest ministers the Eucharist to others ... because then the priest does not confect the sacrament, nor does he sanctify or give grace, but he locally applies the sacrament, which alone gives grace, in exactly the same way in which it would give it if it had been applied by a layman or by an insane person, or if the layman himself were to take it from the altar; and although that action of offering the sacrament is in some way holy, and in some way requires holiness of the minister, nevertheless not so gravely as the action by which the sacrament is confected, through which the minister sanctifies and causes grace.”

But that Cunibertus in a case of necessity of baptism was prepared to minister it even in the state of mortal sin, because there was no question of the solemn administration of baptism, that is, of the confecting of a sacrament by office, can also be excused from mortal sin. I. M. 351. The reason is that it is not sufficiently clear whether the state of grace is required by office, or from the power of order, St. Thomas, part 3, question 64, article 6, ad 3, or from the holiness of the thing, Lugo, d. 8, no. 150; St. Alphonsus, book 6, nos. 32, 884. Likewise, as regards the fact that he committed baptism, in the aforesaid Case, to be ministered by the surgeon, although it is grave of itself, nevertheless Cunibertus seems excusable in that Case by reason of modesty and also of avoiding scandal, which could easily have been present. Roman Ritual, de Min. Bapt., § 2; I. M. 425.

Lastly, that Cunibertus, when necessity was urgent, ministered baptism and extreme unction in the state of mortal sin, without first eliciting an act of contrition, speaking of itself, can also be excused from mortal sin if there was only a very brief delay of time. The reason is “because, since the sacraments were instituted as a remedy of souls, it does not seem to be irreverence if, in that extreme necessity, in order that one’s neighbor may be helped, it is ministered by a sinner. For, just as we were saying above, that in that Case it can be ministered with doubtful matter or power, because present necessity outweighs the precept of not confecting with doubt, so it seems one must say that that necessity outweighs the precept of not confecting except in the state of grace. For thus we see many things done about the person of a King or Prince in a case of necessity which, if they were done outside that necessity, would contain most grave irreverence. But this reason proves not only concerning baptism, but also concerning sacramental absolution, which can sometimes be judged necessary for a man unto salvation; nor can the priest prepare himself in that narrowness of time by an act of contrition; and the case can occur more frequently in absolution than in baptism.” Lugo, d. 8, no. 151; I. M. 352. Speaking of itself; for, as regards the proposed Case, Cunibertus did not lack sufficient time for eliciting an act of contrition. For he could easily elicit it while he was going to minister baptism and extreme unction. Nor indeed is a longer delay of time required for eliciting contrition. For it is enough by the act of the will alone to detest sin as an offense of God, and to grieve over it, saying from the heart: I have sinned against the Lord, 1 Kings 15:24; 2 Kings 12:13. Nor is sensible sadness or grief needed. Nor certainly in such a case of necessity is the necessary help and grace of God lacking. Besides, since Cunibertus, from the office he has undertaken, often finds himself in necessity of ministering the sacraments, and certainly foreknows at least confusedly that this will sometime happen, he cannot be excused from grave sin at least in its cause. Roman Ritual, On Those Things Which Are to Be Observed in the Administration of the Sacraments in General; I. M. 352.

6. “In various regions ... Missals and Breviaries and also Liturgical Books are printed without the license or approval of the Ordinary ... It is supposed that in regions of this kind the Decree of the Council of Trent requiring the approval of books, and the Apostolic Constitutions of Clement VIII and Urban VIII, have not been received by usage, or have lost the force of obligation through contrary usage. Whether it is licit to buy books of this kind, printed without the required license of the Ordinary, to keep them in one’s possession, and to use them in regions where the Decree of the Council of Trent and the above-mentioned Apostolic Constitutions are commonly observed?

“R. It is not licit, unless the Apostolic Constitutions have been observed.” S. R. C., 16 March 1833, Namurcen.

7. Titius, who, when he first obtained the parish, applied himself with great zeal to the salvation of souls, in succeeding years declined not a little from his former fervor. For although he stands fairly assiduously at the tribunal of penance on the more solemn feasts, if on other days he is called to hear confessions, he shows himself morose toward those especially who are accustomed to approach the sacraments frequently, saying that excess even in spiritual things is vicious. But with regard to the sick who are gravely ill in bed, he conducts himself so that he hears their confessions as quickly as possible, offers viaticum and extreme unction to them, with the blessing in the article of death also given, and then commends them to the divine mercy, without returning to them any more.

When a certain contagious disease was raging within the boundaries of his parish, Titius, fearing for his own skin, took flight, yet leaving behind a suitable vicar. But ordered by the bishop, under threat of suspension, to return to the parish, he indeed obeys, but while he reserves for himself the care of the healthy, he leaves the assistance of the sick to the vicar.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Titius, showing himself morose as regards hearing confessions, except on the more solemn feasts, cannot be excused from grave sin. The reason is that he fails in a grave obligation of his office, and this in grave matter. And even if there is question of those who are accustomed to approach the sacraments frequently, whenever they reasonably ask to confess, it is grave to show himself morose very often toward them. For this redounds to the grave harm of the whole parish, and also to the grave harm of private persons, especially since it can easily happen that even those devout persons sometimes fall into grave sin and gravely need sacramental absolution. — I. M. 242, 360; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 8, no. 1 ff.; St. Alphonsus, book 4, no. 127, par. Hinc communiter.

He also sins gravely as regards that practice of ministering the sacraments as quickly as possible to the sick, and then abandoning them. For the sick, once the sacraments have been received, do not always immediately die; rather, ordinarily they continue to live for some time still, and consequently they can still gravely need the ministry of the priest. Wherefore, even prescinding from the obligation of visiting the sick and giving assistance to the dying, according to the Roman Ritual, this practice of not returning any more to the sick who are in danger of death, after they have already once received the sacraments, can in no way be excused from grave sin. La Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 760.

Likewise there is no doubt that Titius also sinned gravely by abandoning his sheep and fleeing like a hireling, and indeed, as is drawn from the Case, without license asked and obtained from the bishop. The reason is that again he acted against his grave obligation, namely, of providing for the salvation of his flock, when it is especially in necessity. I. M. 207. Nor indeed does he satisfy his office by reserving to himself the care of the healthy, and leaving the assistance of the sick to the vicar. For this assistance pertains of itself and principally to the parish priest himself. It belongs to the vicar only to help him, and therefore the parish priest cannot cast off entirely from himself the fulfillment of his own offices, and remit those offices to the vicar to be fulfilled. And although, generally speaking, he is not prohibited from using coadjutors or vicars in those things which bring a greater inconvenience with them, such as going to the sick at night, preaching, teaching boys, hearing confessions, etc., nevertheless he ought to use them as coadjutors and associates; and therefore he himself also, when a just impediment ceases, must necessarily perform these things, especially if he has been requested; otherwise he is not without grave fault. — I. M. 230; La Croix, book 3, part 1, no. 754 ff.; book 6, part 1, no. 133 ff.; St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; G. 169.

8. “Julian, a public sinner about to contract marriage, the banns having already been published, approaches the parish priest, who is hearing confessions, and declares that he does not wish to confess, but to simulate confession, so that he may please the bride. The parish priest denies that he will intervene in the marriage unless he has made a serious confession, since that sacrament requires the state of grace. Thereupon, when the parish priest had gone on to celebrate Mass, while he distributes communion to the faithful, behold, among the other communicants, he sees Julian himself standing there. What will he do? He hesitates, uncertain ... but soon, recalling the precept of the Lord, Do not give what is holy to dogs, he passes the man by. When Mass is finished, Julian, driven by anger, approaches the parish priest, assails him with imprecations, and threatens him with death unless he ministers the Eucharist to him and assists at his marriage. Terrified, the parish priest judges that the precept does not then urge, and he complies with Julian.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. 1. The parish priest of himself acted rightly at first by denying his assistance at the marriage ... because a parish priest cannot assist at the marriage of those who are public sinners. The reason is: 1. because by natural law no one can cooperate in another’s sin, even materially, except for a grave and proportionate cause; 2. because public sinners are unworthy to be admitted to the sacraments. Liguori, 54.

2. The parish priest could have assisted at the marriage of Julian in favor of the bride, if she had not been unworthy, because then he would have had sufficient reason for permitting his sin. Liguori, ibid.

3. He could assist at the marriage when impelled by fear of death, because the parish priest is not the minister of the sacrament, and besides he is excused from the sin of cooperation by a most grave reason. A parish priest can also be excused in a similar Case because of any other very grave inconveniences whatever, whether his own or those of the contracting parties, for example, lest they persevere in sin or in concubinage, etc. Liguori, ibid.

4. The parish priest acted rightly the first time by denying communion to Julian, because, as he himself says, holy things are not to be handed over to dogs, or to the unworthy. But Julian, a public sinner, with no prior penance and no reparation of scandal, is altogether unworthy. Therefore he had to be repelled from communion or passed over.

5. The parish priest afterward acted badly by ministering the Eucharist to Julian, compelled by fear of death. The reason is that any harm whatever cannot compensate for the supreme injury which in the Case comes upon the Most Holy Eucharist. Many contradict, however, with La Croix, book 6, part 1, no. 138, Gobat, Sporer, etc., provided that the sacrament is not sought in hatred of religion. Their reason is that, as they say, if the infamy of an occult sinner publicly asking for the sacrament excuses such administration and repairs the irreverence of the sacrament, why would death to be undergone by the minister not excuse? But the parity must be denied. For a priest cannot publicly deny communion to an occult sinner, not indeed for saving his reputation, but because of other most grave inconveniences which would follow from it, namely the scandals of others, who, although perhaps worthy, would be deterred from Holy Communion, fearing lest they be kept away by the priest out of hatred or imprudence. But these inconveniences are not had in a minister who by fear is compelled to minister communion to a public sinner. Indeed the minister who, in order to preserve reverence for the sacrament, exposed himself to danger of death, would be for edification to the people.” G. 175–177; I. M. 365, 369, 372, 374.

9. Bertha is gravely ill in the house of Caius, a rich and unmarried man, who keeps her at home with great scandal of the neighborhood, not so much as a maidservant, as he asserted, but rather as a concubine. Titius the parish priest, who had several times vainly taken care to separate them from one another, is called so that he may at once bring viaticum to the sick woman. Astonished, he goes to Bertha’s house, and first asks her whether she had already confessed. A certificate of confession made before a priest who did not enjoy the best reputation among the superiors is shown by the man himself, who was standing near the bed at the side of the sick woman. Titius asks those present to withdraw for a little while. The master refuses, and at the same time the sick woman responds that she asks this one thing: that she receive viaticum at once. Then the parish priest, with grave speech, asks them whether the confessor prescribed anything for the reparation of public scandal. The master and the woman, smiling, answer nothing. Titius tries to persuade Bertha to depart from that house, but in vain. He also takes care that Caius, at least during the danger of death, depart from the house, but in vain. Then, turning to Bertha, he begs her to bring the man to that counsel. But she says: “from this the judgments of the crowd will be confirmed.” The parish priest adds indignantly: “and I will not bring viaticum,” and having said these things he departs.

After some hours a servant runs to the parish priest, asking that he quickly bring viaticum to Bertha, who is now at the point of death. While Titius is about to enter Bertha’s house, he is warned that she is already dead. Having heard this, he returns to the church with the Most Holy Sacrament.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Titius the parish priest is altogether to be praised because he took care several times to separate Caius and Bertha from one another. But he ought not to have ceased from the work begun, as from the Case he seems to have done, because of the lack of good effect. For what is not obtained from obstinate sinners who sin from passion on one day, with the dispositions of soul having been changed, especially when illness urges and the grace of God helps, is easily obtained on another day. Wherefore, on the contrary, Titius the parish priest would be blameworthy because during the illness he did not approach Bertha and waited to be called, when her death was already imminent. But Titius truly seems to have been ignorant of Bertha’s illness; for, astonished, he goes to Bertha’s house.

But he conducted himself altogether well in procuring that those present should withdraw; yet he ought at the same time to have taken care in every way that, first of all, the master Caius himself should withdraw. For it is an evident thing that his presence was going to be a huge obstacle to Bertha’s sincere repentance. But given that there was already, as is affirmed in the Case, great scandal of the neighborhood, and that Caius and Bertha had together asked the parish priest to bring viaticum, Titius the parish priest indeed did well by seeking some reparation of public scandal. But seeing the bad dispositions both of Bertha and of Caius, since with smiles they answer that nothing of this kind had been done, instead of requiring from Bertha that she depart from the house of the master, and that the master himself depart from the house, he ought rather with all charity and zeal to have exhorted each of them to that reparation by another, more prudent manner, and especially to have exhorted Bertha, near to death, to sincere repentance, at the same time showing the ease of repentance and its salutary fruits of eternal life; for example, that, if it were possible, marriage should be celebrated, or, if that were not possible, that at least Bertha should detest her sins before him and signify her will of withdrawing from sin and of finally turning herself to God. Since nothing of this kind was done, it was altogether impossible to administer viaticum to Caius’s woman, showing signs of impenitence by laughter, without still greater scandal and without most grave irreverence of the sacrament.

Titius altogether imprudently asked Bertha to depart from the house of the master. In the most grave state of illness in which she was found, since she died after a few hours, this was morally impossible, nor was it absolutely necessary for the reparation of scandal. Still more imprudently he asked the master to depart from his own house, which also was morally impossible, nor was even this necessary to repair the scandal on the part of Bertha herself.

He acted altogether badly by indignantly denying viaticum and departing. Rather, in so urgent a necessity, he ought to have remained in the house and to have applied every effort to bringing Bertha to detest at least her sins, and to signify this detestation externally. Since Titius the parish priest came when summoned, Caius would not have thrown him out of the house; and by asking Caius to withdraw for so long, with constant and persevering charity and zeal, perhaps he would have obtained Bertha’s conversion. But since Titius did not do this, but departed, after, on the contrary, Caius and Bertha had more than sufficiently confirmed, even in the present, by their manner of acting and responding, that they truly had hitherto lived in the state of sin, Titius certainly could not consent to the bringing and administration of viaticum.

From these things it is clear that Titius the parish priest also acted badly when, summoned after only some hours, after he had departed from Bertha’s house, leaving her obstinate in sin, he returned to the house of Caius, intending to minister viaticum to the same Bertha. If he was publicly bringing viaticum, it does not appear how the manner of acting of Titius could have been made honorable because of the public scandal which certainly would have been present if, with no other sign of repentance having been given, Titius had ministered viaticum to her in the aforesaid state of things, as he seems to have been altogether prepared to do. For if Titius were asked by the neighbors, as was natural, he certainly could not respond that Bertha had given signs of repentance; and perhaps, departing indignantly from Bertha’s house, he had already manifested her obstinacy to many and narrated the whole fact of the visitation. But if he was carrying viaticum secretly and returned to Bertha’s house so that he might first try again her conversion and rightly dispose her for absolution and then for receiving viaticum, there is certainly no reason why Titius should be blamed; on the contrary, he would be worthy of praise this time.

But since Titius found Bertha already dead, can he give her ecclesiastical burial? Since there is no certainty concerning Bertha’s final impenitence, Titius will be able to give her ecclesiastical burial. For in order that ecclesiastical burial can and must be denied to public sinners, it is necessary that they be manifest and public sinners who died without repentance. Roman Ritual, Those to Whom It Is Not Lawful, etc. Wherefore it is required not only that there be certainty concerning the sin, and that the sin be public, but also that there be certainty that they died without any sign of repentance. But in the Case Bertha had a certificate of confession made, although before a priest not of good reputation; and the parish priest was called to her twice, and the second time immediately before death. Wherefore Titius will be able to grant ecclesiastical burial to unhappy Bertha. — I. M. 365, 369, 1156 ff.; G. 721–724.

10. Titius the parish priest, hearing the confession of two persons who were soon about to contract marriage, receives from the man that he had sinned lethally many times and also on the preceding night with the bride; and likewise that he had stolen a grave sum of money, which nevertheless he refuses even to promise that he will restore. The parish priest, as he is unworthy of absolution, exhorts him to abstain from communion; but in vain. And so they agree that the consecrated particle is only to be moved near to his mouth and immediately put back into the pyx; and this was in fact done. Having made the sign of the cross, as is customary, Titius dismisses the unabsolved bridegroom.

Then the parish priest hears the confession of the bride, who says not a word about the shameful things committed with the bridegroom. From the conversation had, Titius knows that she could not have confessed to another. He prudently exhorts her, in undertaking the conjugal state, sincerely to manifest the sins of her past life; but nothing results from this. Wherefore, lest sacrilege occur, in place of the sacramental form he recites some prayers in a subdued voice. Besides, in saying Mass, he by no means intends to consecrate a particle separated from the others, and he gives it to the bride.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Simulation generally is the fictitious placing of a sign. Wherefore simulation of the sacraments is the fictitious placing of a sacramental sign: of matter, form, or sacramental action. Formal simulation of the sacraments is illicit, as any other formal simulation, because it is a lie of deed, when someone uses exterior signs, whether of things or of deeds, to signify that which is not. Besides, in that formal simulation of the sacraments there is irreverence toward the sacrament itself. Material simulation, for many, is not so intrinsically illicit that it is never lawful at least because of a most grave fear of death; nor consequently does it seem to them to have already been condemned by the Holy See. D’Annibale, 264. But in truth it is intrinsically illicit because of implicit irreverence toward the sacrament, and toward Jesus Christ, the Institutor of the sacraments; since this simulation is in no way necessary in such a way that that irreverence could be excused and cease from the necessity itself. I. M. 374. It was besides condemned in proposition 29 among others condemned by Innocent XI: Urgent grave fear is a cause for simulating the administration of a sacrament. For there was never a question about the liceity of formal simulation of the sacraments; rather, only material simulation of the sacraments was disputed among Catholic doctors, and the opinion of those who stood for the liceity of material simulation was condemned in that proposition. Besides, this is also drawn from the obvious sense of that proposition, since in it there is question of grave fear influencing the very exterior administration of a sacrament, or the very exterior sacramental rite or sacramental action. Since formal simulation depends only on the interior and direct intention of deceiving, which intention is hidden, that grave fear is not referred to that interior intention, but to the exterior action, which alone appears and is seen. Furthermore, Benedict XIV, in the Epistle Postremo mense, 28 February 1747, § 21, proposes the case that certain infidels were asking baptism for their children, namely that these might be freed from sicknesses and vexations of demons, also threatening Catholic priests with death. And it was resolved by the Holy Office that in such a case one cannot at least fictitiously baptize them, applying the matter of baptism without the due form, because baptism is the gate of the sacraments and a protestation of faith, nor can it be feigned in any way. Here it openly appears that there is question of material simulation, and the reasons adduced hold, with proportionate reason, also for other sacraments; for the other sacraments, if they are not the gate of the sacraments, as baptism is, are a certain perfection and complement of baptism, or certainly all presuppose and pre-signify baptism, and are in their own way a protestation and profession of faith; whence neither can they be feigned in any way, just as faith can be feigned in no way. After reporting the case and its resolution, Benedict XIV cites the commemorated proposition condemned by Innocent XI, and therefore he himself evidently understands and interprets it not only in the sense of formal simulation, but also and especially in the sense of material simulation.

Titius the parish priest, making the sign of the cross over the bridegroom whom he dismisses unabsolved, performs no sacramental simulation, since the sign of the cross is neither a sacramental sign nor a sacramental action. Likewise he performs simply no simulation, for Titius had already suitably forewarned the aforesaid bridegroom concerning his unworthiness. Besides, Titius, agreeing with the bridegroom that, to preserve the seal of the sacrament and the reputation of the bridegroom, he should move the consecrated particle close to his mouth but immediately put it back into the pyx, commits no simulation of the sacrament. For to elevate the host over the bridegroom, and to form the sign of the cross over him, and then, instead of giving it to the same bridegroom to eat, to put it back into the pyx, is no sacramental sign and no sacramental action. Nor is there any simulation in this matter with respect to the bridegroom, for an agreement was made with him about this manner of acting. But with respect to others there is simulation in the broad sense, which, like mental restriction in the broad sense, is licit from some grave cause. — I. M. 375, 376.

Titius, hearing the confession of the bride and hearing in it no accusation of shameful sin committed with the bridegroom, indeed acts prudently by only exhorting the bride generally to manifest sincerely the sins of her past life, on occasion of the approaching marriage. Nevertheless he did not act rightly by not imparting absolution to that same bride. For in this tribunal of the sacrament of penance, the penitent is to be believed for herself and against herself. Besides, in such a case there would be use of knowledge from the bridegroom’s confession, which certainly turns into hatred of the sacrament. For if the faithful knew that their confessions could bring spiritual or temporal harm upon others, this would certainly draw them back from sacramental confession. — I. M. 824; G. 768.

Likewise he does not act rightly by reciting prayers in a subdued voice in place of the sacramental form. Indeed, there is no simulation of the sacrament, for the recitation of those prayers is not a sacramental action, nor are those prayers part of the sacrament. Nevertheless, true and strict simulation is had, and therefore a true lie. For since the bride confesses rightly and exhibits no sign of indisposition for receiving absolution, and likewise since the confessor does not warn her about the omission of absolution, secretly to recite prayers over her and to bless her with the sacred sign of the cross, in these circumstances, can signify nothing other, nor can the penitent understand anything other, than that absolution is being imparted. Casus Consc. Bonon. Dioec., year 1785, month of June, case 1.

Nor finally does he act rightly by offering to the aforesaid bride a particle separated from the others and by no means consecrated. For first he violates the seal of sacramental confession, since he abuses knowledge received through confession, both that of the bridegroom and that of the bride, in order to deny communion to the bride. Besides, the unconsecrated host is exposed to idolatry. — I. M. 376; G. 179.