62. On Non-Consummated Acts of Lust

1. Candida, seized by a grave disease, is placed in proximate danger of life unless she undergoes excision of the ovaries. Fearing for this reason to lose virginity, she refuses to undergo that surgical operation. But, opening the matter to her confessor, she asks of him whether, having undergone that operation, she herself remains a virgin. The perplexed confessor asks what he ought to respond.

R. The confessor in the case can rightly respond that virginity is not lost for this reason. "For evidence of this, it is necessary to see what is required for virginity. The first of these is principal and formal, namely the choice or intention of the will, as in all moral things; whence this is required of necessity for virginity: that there be present to someone a constant will never to experience venereal pleasure. The second is material, namely a passion of the sensitive appetite, that is, the pleasure which someone experiences in the venereal act, the privation of which is required for perfect virginity materially, for sensitive passions are the matter of moral virtues. But if this happens apart from the choice of one's own will, for instance when someone is polluted in sleep, or when a woman is oppressed by an enemy through violence, the virtue of virginity does not perish.... The third is as it were per accidens and concomitantly related to virginity, namely bodily integrity. Hence, if the barriers of modesty are corrupted otherwise than through the venereal act, for instance if a midwife or physician cuts with an iron instrument for healing, nothing is lost to virginity." St. Thomas, Quodlibet 6, a. 18; 2. 2, q. 152, a. 1.

2. Maevius often has depraved thoughts against chastity. Thinking that he is not obligated under grave obligation to resist them positively, he conducts himself merely negatively, and consequently permits those thoughts to remain longer in the mind and to represent depraved things more vividly. Hence it happens that, as the imagination of depraved things grows according to the occasion, frequently, and almost always, he experiences depraved motions and pollution. Nevertheless, because he himself refuses every consent to these depraved effects; indeed, he says, this displeases me greatly; he never made confession concerning this matter, because he thinks himself immune from every sin. Has Maevius sinned gravely?

R. Affirmatively, of itself, and with good faith, or simplicity, or rudeness, and a cause sometimes rendering honorable this manner of conducting himself negatively, being excluded. Cf. I. M. 58, 295-297. The reason is that someone is held under grave obligation to remove causes which of themselves gravely influence venereal pleasure and pollution; such certainly is a morose and long thought of shameful things. Besides, practically speaking, proximate danger of consent is present. Hence St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 7, says: "When venereal pleasure supervenes, we are held under grave obligation to resist it positively, because commotions of this sort, when they are vehement, generally, if they are not positively repelled, at least by an act of simple displeasure, draw with themselves the consent of the will." - G. 22, 143; Lig. l. 3, n. 426, 482; l. 6, n. 914; Sanch., l. 9, d. 45, n. 19, 24, 25; Lessius, De Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, dub. 14, n. 102; Billuart, De Temper., dissert. 6, art. 12. Hence you will collect long-lasting cases, Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 780.

Appositely Lessius, l. c.: "When the cause is privative, namely negligence in removing an involuntary positive cause, for example, a shameful thought, man is held to shake off that apprehension and transfer the mind elsewhere as much as he can. But if he omits this, that omission will be the voluntary cause of the effect; just as the negligence of the shipmaster is the cause of the sinking of the ship, which indeed in the physical genus is a cause per accidens; nevertheless in morals it is judged as per se, because interpretative intention lies underneath.

Yet here note: If that work, from which that shameful imagination arises beyond the intention, is licit, you are not held to omit it in order to avoid that imagination, provided danger of consent is absent.... But if it is not licit, we are held to omit it even on account of that effect arising per accidens; nevertheless not under mortal sin, unless the work is mortal and of itself pertaining to lust; but under venial sin, as when the work of itself does not pertain to lust, or, if it does pertain, is only venial.... For you are not held more to avoid such an imagination than pollution; since that is only the means and way, but this is the end and terminus. Hence, just as one is not held under mortal sin to avoid those actions on account of the danger of pollution to follow beyond the intention, so neither on account of the imagination and pleasure thence rising beyond the intention; nevertheless, danger of consent being set aside in all things.

Yet if by another reason, the prior work not being discontinued, you can easily drive away an imagination of this sort and the pleasure of the sensitive part, you are held to do it, and indeed under mortal sin. Hence you cannot then conduct yourself negatively, that is, in a middle way without consent and positive displeasure. The reason is that, by not driving it away when you conveniently can, you interpretatively consent to it. Wherefore, since the object of itself is grave, it will be a deadly sin. Nor here is there merely consent in the cause, as when the cause is not removed, but it is immediate consent in the pleasure itself, because even while the cause remains, you can easily remove or impede it.

The same must be said concerning pollution. But whether, when it cannot be removed except by removal of the cause, and we are not held to remove the cause under mortal sin, because it is a remote cause or one per accidens, we can conduct ourselves negatively concerning that pleasure, so that by this one does not sin by a new sin, or at least not mortally, can be doubted.

I respond briefly: it will not be a mortal sin if danger of consent is absent. The reason is that then to conduct oneself negatively is in no way to consent except in the cause, which consent we posit from what has been said not to be deadly. It is confirmed: because it cannot be driven away except by removal of the cause, as is supposed; therefore I am not held to try to drive it away otherwise, for I am not held to try what is morally impossible for me; therefore neither am I held to have positive displeasure of it. For this will be ineffectual for driving away the effect, and from the other side it is by no means necessary for impeding consent. In practice, however, because the frailty of man is great and easily, while pleasure lasts for a long time, he is drawn into consent, this subtlety must be avoided, and detestation of that pleasure must be excited as soon as possible."

Sanchez, l. c., also to the matter: "Fifth, it is inferred among... the unmarried... that no act has mortal malice because it is the cause of foreseen and not intended pollution, unless, with that danger of pollution set aside, it would be mortal against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. Because only such acts are a notable cause of pollution. And, when they would notably influence of themselves, and notable necessity would excuse from pollution, it would similarly excuse from fault against the sixth precept.... Except, however, unless in venereal pleasure the will conducts itself negatively, neither admitting nor rejecting. For although it is most probable that it is not mortal, when danger of consent ceases, nevertheless, if there is danger of pollution, although there is not danger of consent, it is mortal. Because man is held under mortal sin to remove causes notably concurring toward pollution; such is this. Indeed... then to resist tepidly is mortal, the danger having been foreseen. But the will is held to conduct itself more fervently, by which it may avert that cause of pollution."

3. Ioannes, a traveler, visiting the museums of the city, walking through their halls, out of mere curiosity looks at the nudes of paintings and statues that present themselves; nevertheless, when motions arise, he denies consent. Likewise, walking through the public streets, he curiously looks at women nursing infants or bearing the neck somewhat uncovered, since in his own country he had never observed anything of this sort.

Q. 1. Are immodest looks always a grave sin? 2. What must be thought concerning Ioannes?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 774, 775. - To the second. St. Alphonsus, 424, speaking of pictures, says: "To look at obscene pictures only out of curiosity is not mortal, if shameful pleasure and its danger are absent. But in practice I think that a man morosely looking at the pudenda of a depicted woman is with difficulty excused from mortal sin, because here he will with difficulty be able to free himself from shameful pleasure, or from its probable danger, unless he were looking for a very brief time and at a great distance." Hence the same seems to be said concerning the look at statues. Wherefore someone sins gravely if their nudes are total, and the looks are made deliberately, closely, and with notable delay. For then, without sufficient reason, he posits a cause gravely influencing of itself toward shameful motions and proximately exposes himself to danger of sinning. But it is otherwise, of itself, if the looks are made in passing and from afar, or also if the art in the painting or statue is not eminent.

As to the other look at nursing women, someone is not excused from grave sin if this look is so long and with commotion of the spirits that it then brings in proximate danger of pollution, or of shameful motions, or of consent. The same must be said concerning the other look at women who bear the neck somewhat uncovered, if likewise it is morose or long, with commotion of the spirits, so that proximate danger of pollution, or of depraved motions, or of consent is had, as easily happens in one looking who is very prone to venery. But it will be only a light sin if such looks are made in passing or without such danger. In practice, however, great caution must always be used to avoid especially too long looks at immodest things and even less modest things; for in this corruption of nature, it cannot be long before concupiscence sharpens its stings. L. 422, 423, 484; Sanch., l. 9, d. 45, n. 19, 20, 24; d. 46, n. 23-26; Lessius, De Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, dub. 14, n. 98-102; Billuart, De Temper., dissert. 6, art. 16; Colliges 11°, Scav., 12th ed., Milan, 1874, l. 1, n. 792-795.

As regards Ioannes, since in the case his looks are said to have been from mere curiosity, and from the other circumstances it sufficiently appears that they were made only in passing, and that he denied every consent when motions arose, he seems to be immune from grave sin. It is sufficiently established that Ioannes was led by mere curiosity from the fact that he was struck by the novelty of things outside his own country; whence he could also be moved somewhat by the diverse manner of morals.

4. Nicolinus, indeed a good Christian, but, from love of knowledge, greedy for reading, rather often reads books which, although they are not depraved in themselves, nevertheless everywhere appear somewhat less chaste. While reading, he sometimes experiences some less chaste thoughts and motions of concupiscence, which he despises; and, with consent firmly denied, he continues the reading begun. But afterward, agitated by the stings of conscience, he hastens to the confessor and asks of him whether, notwithstanding the temptations which arise, he can indulge in readings of this sort.

Q. 1. Are immodest readings gravely prohibited? 2. Has Nicolinus sinned?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 776-778. To the second. Negatively. The reason is that, although he placed a cause influencing toward depraved motions lightly at most, nevertheless he did this not from curiosity or from natural pleasure, but from an honorable and useful reason, namely from the desire of acquiring knowledge; and he at the same time studiously elicited an act of displeasure toward the depraved effect. Billuart, De Actib. hum., diss. 1, art. 1; G. 10. - But if he reads from curiosity, he indeed sins, but of itself only venially, because the cause is only venial, with danger of consent always excluded. - But if, besides, without cause he reads very shameful things, he sins gravely, at least on account of the proximate danger of complacency. Perhaps except if one reading from curiosity alone, on account of advanced age, cold complexion, or another peculiar reason, does not incur grave danger of lust. L. 1, 3, n. 426; G. 21.

5. Medardus, since from his condition as a physician he must often converse with persons of every kind and treat them, feels a greater propensity toward dealing with women and curing them than toward dealing with men and curing them.

6. Anatolia, exercising commerce, is accustomed to show herself pleasing, courteous, and familiar with customers, so that she may increase their frequenting of her shop and receive greater profit from it. Nevertheless she is anxious, because she fears lest perhaps several internally sin on occasion of her.

Q. Do Medardus and Anatolia sin?

R. Medardus must be excused from sin, provided that he acts honorably with all and resists temptations arising. "Nor does it matter that Medardus seems to himself to feel a greater inclination of nature when he understands that he is being called to succor a woman than to succor a man; both because to succor a woman also is not evil, but rather good, and if not owed from justice, at least owed from charity; and because a prurience of nature of this sort is not moral and free, but rather natural, especially after the fall of Adam. Therefore it is not formally evil, although it must be confessed that it can be rather troublesome to a chaste mind, indeed even dangerous, and therefore it must be advised to Medardus that he strive to repress it through reason as far as possible, and to strengthen his mind by contrary protestations." Elbel, De Act. hum. 15.

"Anatolia did not sin by this, that she showed herself more familiar toward the customers flowing in, provided that she did not exceed the limits of honesty or give scandal. The reason is that to show oneself familiar, indeed more familiar than others, yet within the limits of honesty, is not evil, but of itself indifferent. But a means indifferent of itself we licitly embrace in order to a good end, as was that intended by Anatolia." Elbel, l. c., 75. Hence neither does she, of herself, provide any scandal, if, as appears, that courtesy and familiarity stands within the limits of mere urbanity and honesty, nor is referred to anything else than conducting the business affairs of commerce well. G. 24, 25.

7. Livonia advised her daughter, who was aspiring to very favorable nuptials, that she show herself cordial toward the bridegroom, and flatter him, and by no means refuse conversations, kisses, embraces, or other allurements, for the end that she may capture his love and the marriage not be impeded.

Q. 1. Are kisses and embraces gravely illicit? 2. Have Livonia and her daughter sinned gravely?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 782; V. 2, n. 946-948; E. M. 765. - To the second. Livonia sins gravely both against piety and against chastity, by reason of the scandal given to her daughter, since without any discrimination she indifferently advises her daughter things honorable and dishonorable. But her daughter also sinned gravely against chastity if, therefore lest she be abandoned by the bridegroom, she in reality permitted acts gravely shameful to her bridegroom. And although perhaps she had already become pregnant, she ought altogether to abstain from these things. For one must not continue in sin, but must altogether cease from it. Let her strive by other honorable means and honorable signs of love to gain the mind of the bridegroom. Marriages obtained by illicit means generally obtain an unfortunate outcome. - Elbel 74, 76, 77, 308; G. 26.

8. Gaudentia, a mother of a family, permits, indeed commands, her daughter Honorata to be taught by a master in the art of playing various musical instruments, singing, and dancing. But it often happens that Honorata must dance at various gatherings which are held in the paternal house, even with young men of different sex who are relatives, neighbors, and friends. Honorata does this, seeing or grasping nothing evil in it. Hence her confessor, learning the matter, indeed exhorts her by way of counsel that, as much as she can, she abstain from dances, but imposes no obligation on her.

Q. 1. What must be held concerning dances generally? What as to the case?

R. To the first. Dances of themselves are not illicit, even among persons of different sex. Nevertheless they can be illicit if they are done in a less honorable manner, by reason of nudities, looks, and touches, likewise by reason of danger and scandal which can be present in them. Hence dances generally are indeed to be dissuaded, as having more or less danger; but their illicitness and grave or light sin cannot be affirmed absolutely unless the various circumstances occurring in practice are attended to. The necessity which someone can have of assisting at dances must also be attended to. For not rarely the faithful are impelled by a grave cause and moral necessity to be present at dances. Nearly the same must be said concerning spectacles, which of themselves are not evil, and therefore not illicit. Nevertheless they can be evil and illicit if shameful things are represented, if words and songs are immodest, if dress is indecent; likewise if danger of grave sin is had from various circumstances which furnish foment to vices, or scandal is had, which especially can be had in small cities, since individuals are there known by all. - I. M. 777, 782; G. 233 seqq.

To the second. Gaudentia, speaking of itself, cannot be accused of sin, especially grave sin, if she applies the means which prudence suggests in such a case, namely that the master be an honorable man, and that she herself be present, or at least watch through another prudent person. Honorata likewise is not to be blamed for grave sin especially, since there is no danger for her and she sees nothing evil in those dances; whence it must be concluded that they are only honorable. But whether she is to be accused at least by reason of cooperation in the sins of others is not established; nor can it be affirmed, since she herself places an act not evil but indifferent in itself, and she altogether does not know whether others are present who suffer scandal on occasion of her. Nor indeed does a certain necessity of dancing seem to be lacking for her from the fact that those dances are instituted in her own house by her parents. Wherefore the confessor acts well by exhorting Honorata, and by not reproving her importunately or erroneously obligating her. - G. 233 seqq.