8. On the End of the Agent

1. Caius, an ingenuous youth, indeed confesses rather often, because he knows that this is very pleasing to his directors. Likewise he is accustomed to hear Mass daily, moved by the example of his companions, lest he seem less devout than they. Moreover, he not rarely distributes among the poor money received from his father, but almost always experiences in himself a desire for vain glory. Hence, after spiritual exercises have been completed, he greatly fears lest his confessions were invalid and sacrilegious, and lest he acquired no merit from his pious works, but, on the contrary, incurred demerit and sin.

Q. 1. Do human actions take their species from the end? 2. Has Caius received the sacrament of penance invalidly, and has he lost all merit of pious works?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 79. To the second: the confessions of Caius were neither sacrilegious nor invalid. For for the validity of confession there is required, and there suffices, sincere sorrow and purpose. But Caius could well have sincere sorrow and purpose, even if he approached confession because he knew that this was pleasing to his directors. Nor indeed, since Caius is an ingenuous youth, can it be supposed that he principally intended this end, or that he confessed without due sorrow and purpose. Therefore the confessions of Caius were neither invalid nor sacrilegious, but substantially good and meritorious, although perhaps he was moved in some way by the impulse of vain glory; because such an impulse does not intrinsically affect the very substance of confession, but is related to it merely concomitantly and extrinsically. Therefore granted that such an impulse was venially evil, confession nevertheless, as having been made from a good intrinsic end, namely of reconciling himself to God and obtaining grace remissive of sins, could well remain morally good and sufficient for validity and for merit. And thus also it remains substantially good and sufficient for validity, although in confession perhaps you lie lightly, or without cause lightly defame your neighbor. For although such a lie and such defamation are morally evil, nevertheless, because they are related accidentally in order to confession, and since venial sins from elsewhere do not obstruct divine grace and reconciliation, they leave confession good in itself, and sufficient for validity and for merit. Hence the same must be said of Masses heard and of alms bestowed. - Elbel 78, 79; G. 33, 34; I. M. 77, 78, 81.

2. Sebastianus, being scrupulous, in order to abstract himself from every creature, resolved to deprive himself of every pleasure not necessary for the sustaining of life. He thought that pleasure not necessary to life could be sought only from the satisfaction of natural inclination, since pleasure is not referred to the glory of God. But in order that he might live wholly for God and seek the glory of God in all things, he resolved actually to offer all his actions to God before he did anything. Hence in a short time it happened that, gravely ill in the head, he died in an asylum of the insane.

Q. 1. Is it licit to act for the sake of pleasure? 2. Must all actions be referred to God? 3. What as to the case?

R. To the first and to the second, cf. I. M. 75, 82. To the third: Sebastianus is deceived, with grave detriment to his body and soul. In order that one may live wholly for God and seek the glory of God in all things, he does not therefore necessarily have to be deprived of every honest pleasure, not altogether necessary for the sustaining of life. Pleasure also, even only useful for restoring the bodily powers by moderate delight and recreation, is honest, and by its own nature is implicitly and mediately ordered also to the ultimate end, or to God. Hence it is altogether licit to act for the sake of pleasure and delight, and to intend it, provided that another honest end, to which by its very nature it is referred, is not excluded, namely that man may act better and may be able to persevere longer in honest operation; by which intermediate end as mediator, it is referred to God himself. Therefore, whenever one does not exclude that honest end, the pleasure or delight sought is virtually referred to God, nor is it necessary that one actually offer it to God, since a virtual offering suffices.

Indeed, honest recreations and amusements have been created by God himself for the use of men. Therefore they are naturally good in themselves and honest. Therefore, as one who intends another honest thing acts honestly, and the action is virtually referred to God without his explicitly and actually offering that action to God, so also someone acts honestly by accepting an honest recreation of mind and an honest amusement, without actually and formally offering it to God. Hence the same must consequently be said of pain and inconvenience, to be avoided and repelled by honest means. Whence it is also clear that, in order that an action be honest and be referred to the glory of God, it is not necessary actually and explicitly to offer it to God. It suffices that one intend an honest action and act honestly. It suffices that each day in the morning one offer to God all his actions to be done during the course of the day. "In this way every act, even one indifferent in species, becomes good and virtuous in the individual." L. tr. De Act. hum. XLIV. - G. 29, 30, 35, 36.