105. On the Religious State

1. Petrus and Paulus dispute between themselves concerning the more recent Institutes of Sisters. Petrus affirms that they are truly religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. For nothing else is required for the true essence of the religious state than the profession of religious vows, in an Institute approved by the Church. Paulus, on the contrary, affirms that they are nothing except pious women. For they have often been so called by the Sacred Penitentiary itself, 26 November 1852. Indeed, for very many years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars did not wish them to be called Religiosae, but Sisters. Moreover, these modern Institutes are wholly lacking solemn vows, without which the essence of the religious state cannot be had. Finally, the Church has never approved these more recent Institutes, but only tolerated them.

Question. 1. What is the Religious State? — 2. What is to be said in the case?

R. To the first. The religious state, considered as to its essence, is: A stable institute of life, approved by the Church for the faithful, who under a certain rule and common manner of living wish to tend to perfection through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, with a handing over of oneself made to God and accepted by Him.

The religious state, namely, taken strictly. For “it must be supposed,” says Suarez, “according to the common usage of the Church, that the religious state, as if by antonomasia and in strict signification, is called the perfect state of monks or regulars, who totally consecrate and hand over themselves to God, by emitting the three vows concerning the three principal counsels, poverty, chastity, and obedience. Nevertheless, in a certain broader or more general meaning, the state of religion comprehends under itself other manners of living, in which men voluntarily offer themselves to divine worship and service, by obligating themselves to some observance of the counsels. And thus it comprehends, not only proper and complete religious, but also continent persons, who by the vow of chastity alone bind themselves specially to God. For thus the interpreters of canon law, in the rubric de Regularibus, teach that the name of religious or regular, taken strictly, signifies him who has professed the three substantial vows in an approved religion; but broadly it comprehends all who by some vow and special manner of living are consecrated to the service of God.” De Rel., tr. 7, bk. 2, c. 1, n. 1; Bouix, de I. Reg., t. 1, p. 47.

A stable institute of life. For firmness or stability pertains to the essence of a state.

Approved by the Church. For it is of the essence of the religious state that it not be prohibited by the Church. And indeed it is of the essence of the religious state that it be a state of perfection. But as soon as it is prohibited, it is no longer a state of perfection, but rather of rebellion. Now there exists a law of the Church prohibiting the beginning and entrance of any religion not approved. Hence, by the very fact that a religious institute has not been approved by the Church, it must be held as prohibited by her, and therefore wholly invalid, namely lacking the essence of the religious state. This approval can be given only by the Apostolic See, as is clear from Canon Law. But today it has been introduced by custom that various Congregations are instituted by the approval of the Bishop alone, which afterwards are praised and approved by the Church, first by a Decree of praise, then by a Decree of approval of the Institute, and by a Decree of approval of the Constitutions; and consequently these Congregations, if the other requisites are not lacking, can be held as containing those things which pertain to the intrinsic essence of the religious state.

To the intrinsic essence; for, in order that there be had the religious state or true religion in the Church, or in order that there be had the religious state according to canonical institution, it is not enough that the Institute be approved by the Church and at the same time the rules or Constitutions of the Institute be approved by the same Church; but it is required that the Institute be approved by the Church, and by that approval be constituted in the state of true religion, or of a religious order. “For if,” says Benedict XIV, Constitution Quamvis iusto, prid. Kal. May 1749, § 13, “for the essence of the truly religious state it is required that a religion or order be established in such a state by confirmation of the Apostolic See, according to the canonical sanctions concerning which in c. un., de Relig. dom., in 6, nor does it suffice to have obtained from the same Apostolic See only approval and confirmation of the rules which some society of men or women has prescribed for itself to observe; if the vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity emitted by the English Virgins according to the form of the rules approved by Clement XI cannot be said to be joined with express or tacit profession in some order approved by the Apostolic See in the state of true religion, as is said above, it clearly appears both that the state of the English Virgins is not the state of true religion, and that the vows which are made by them must be judged at most simple vows, not solemn, according to the paths of the Decretal of Pope Boniface VIII, which alone exists under the title de Voto et voti redempt. in 6.” Cf. ibid., § 14.

Wherefore there is one and another approval of the Church in this matter. There is a certain inferior approval, by which an Institute is approved as an Institute of Clerics or Sisters, as a Pious Society, as a Religious Congregation. There is a fuller and more solemn approval by which an Institute is approved as a Religious Order, as a true Religion.

For the faithful; for religious neither necessarily pertain to the hierarchy of jurisdiction, nor to the hierarchy of order, but are, or can be, simple faithful in the Church, and therefore of either sex.

Under a certain rule; for the manner and grade of observing the evangelical counsels can be various, and this is determined by the rule.

And common manner of living. For although, if only the nature of the religious state is considered, common life does not pertain to its essence, nevertheless today common life is required by the Church, namely under one common head and under one approved rule. Cf. Bouix, pt. 2, s. 1, c. 2, par. 2, prop. 10.

Wish to tend to perfection. There is indeed a twofold state of life. One is of common life, which intends nothing other than the observance of the commandments of God; the other is of perfection, which adds the observance of the counsels. But perfection is in charity. For the perfection of any thing is had from the fact that it attains its proper end. The end of man is God, to whom we are united by charity. Now to exclude those things which are repugnant to charity, namely mortal sins, pertains to the state of common life. But to exclude those things which impede man from adhering totally to God pertains to the state of perfection. The former is proper to essential charity; the latter, to the perfection of charity. Wherefore the perfection of which there is question here is not in essential charity as such, but in a certain peculiar grade of charity which surpasses the common charity of Christians. But this grade does not consist in some one or some transitory acts of charity, even if they are of great or greatest intensity, but in a mind so habitually prepared that man is proximately disposed to act easily and ordinarily according to the precepts and counsels of God, obstacles having been removed, so that he tends totally to God.

Tends. For the state of perfection is twofold: one is the state of perfection acquired; the other of perfection to be acquired. The former is proper to Bishops; the latter to religious. Bouix, pt. 1, s. 1.

Through the three perpetual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. For the state of perfection to be acquired is twofold: one incomplete or begun, the other complete. For the former the three principal evangelical counsels are not required; but some counsel suffices, whether it is one of those three principal ones, or another, for the counsels are very many in number. But for the latter the three evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience are required and suffice. For through these three counsels all impediments of charity are removed, so that the affection of the mind is directed totally to God. But the religious state, strictly so called, is the complete state of perfection to be acquired. Now those counsels to be observed, in order that a state, and therefore stability, be had, must be strengthened by a vow, and that of itself perpetual.

Now, although those three vows must of themselves be perpetual, for this is required by the very nature of a state, nevertheless it is by no means truly required of itself that they be solemn, but it is enough that they be simple. This is openly clear from the Constitutions of Gregory XIII, Quanto fructuosius and Ascendente Domino, where it is established that those who in the Society of Jesus have emitted the three simple vows are true and proper religious.

The solemnity of vows is nothing other than a certain force added to them by the disposition of the Church, of constituting a religious properly and strictly such according to canonical institution, and of making certain acts of the religious concerning the matter of the same vows invalid or at least voidable, and of rendering the vows themselves wholly firm and stable. And that force is absolute, and not merely relative to the time during which the religious, free from the vows, is not dismissed by his superiors. Hence for the solemnity of vows not just any force of producing the aforesaid effects suffices; but that force must be absolute, that is, so perpetual and immutable that neither the religious nor even the religion itself can suspend or remove that force. But it is by no means required that that force cannot be removed by the Roman Pontiff; for that force is of ecclesiastical law, and therefore the Pope can dispense both from the effect of the solemnity of vows, the solemn vows remaining, and from the solemn vows themselves, and indeed validly, although no reasonable cause is present, with which, if it accedes, he will also dispense licitly. Bouix, t., p. 444 ff.; Decree of the Sacred Congregations for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, 31 July 1878; Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques, 1879, p. 191.

Wherefore Busembaum very well says, bk. 3, n. 195, that a solemn vow “is that which is accepted as such by the Church. ... But simple is every other one, which does not have such solemnity.” Therefore a solemn vow is a vow which has this annexed force; a simple vow is one which lacks that force. Consequently the solemnity of a vow is an all-embracing dependence and subjection and plenary approval and confirmation of the vow made by the Church herself, or by the Supreme Pontiff, as to the being of the vow, as to its force of constituting in the Church a truly religious state, and as to the other aforesaid effects of invalidation.

And hence it appears why the Church does not approve in the state of true Religion, or as Religions or truly religious Orders, except Institutes which have solemn vows. For these perfectly display the nature of state and the nature of perfection, since through them man altogether totally and immovably tends to God and adheres to Him. But since this is wanting in simple vows from the limited acceptance of the Church herself, namely not to all the aforesaid effects, therefore Institutes with only simple vows, but not solemn vows, are approved by the same Church as Pious Institutes and also as Religious Congregations, but not as true Religions and true Religious Orders. Indeed, the essence or substance of the state of perfection, and consequently of the religious state, is also found in these Institutes, but in an inferior grade, as compared with true Religions and Religious Orders. Hence the pupils of these Institutes are truly and properly religious, but less strictly than the pupils of true Religions and Orders. Less strictly, namely as regards the very essence of the religious state, and as regards canonical institution. But in order that there be had a Religious Congregation, it is not enough that the vows have been approved by the Apostolic See; but they must be approved in such a way that the vows which are emitted in such a Congregation are accepted by someone in the name of the Congregation or of the Apostolic See.

For in order to have a formal Religion of solemn vows, or to have a true Religious Congregation of simple vows, it is altogether required that the vows emitted in it be not private, but public, accepted in the name of the Church by a legitimate Superior. S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889. If the vows are only private and accepted by no one, there is had only a pious Sodality, S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1889, or a secular Congregation, such as therefore is the Congregation of the Mission, Alexander VII, Brief Ex Commissa, 22 September 1655. I. M. 248.

With a handing over of oneself made to God. In the pronouncing of the three vows, considering their nature, there is had a total handing over of oneself to God. But this handing over of oneself, if the vows are solemn, is far more perfect and is truly a certain handing over and donation of oneself. But if the vows are simple, that handing over is less perfect, and is not an altogether total handing over of oneself; and since it is not altogether firm and immovable, it is rather a simple promise. Through the former handing over of oneself, made by authority of the Church, there is had a certain consecration of the person devoted and bound to God; but through the latter promise there is had rather a simple blessing of the person.

And accepted by Him; namely accepted by God through the Church and through proper superiors, because from the approval of the Church they receive this power and authority through the canonical approval itself of the Institute; “because God, according to ordinary providence, does not undertake the peculiar care of governing a private person immediately by Himself, nor does He need these sensible things so as to use them immediately and without the intervention of secondary causes. And therefore a donation thus made to God would either be vain and idle, or as if tempting God by demanding immediate rule from Him; and for that reason it does not please Him, nor is it immediately accepted by Him.” Suarez, de Relig., bk. 2, c. 4, nn. 7, 8; Bouix, pt. 1, s. 2.

R. To the second. That which Petrus says concerning the Sisters of the more recent Institutes, that they are true religious, taken simply, is simply true. For they themselves judge themselves to be such; all Bishops judge them to be such, as is clear from their testimonial letters for the approval of these Institutes; and the Supreme Pontiff himself holds them as such, as is gathered from several Briefs of Approval, in which those Sisters are praised and approved as Religious. But Petrus seems to say and signify more. For he says that they are true Religious, as are Dominican nuns and Poor Clares. And this is false, since Dominican nuns and Poor Clares are not only truly, but also strictly Religious; for they have solemn vows, and consequently their Institute has been constituted and confirmed by the Church, as a Religion or Order in the truly and strictly Religious state, by the Approval of the Apostolic See. More recent Institutes, on the contrary, since they have only simple vows, are by no means approved and established by the Church in the state of strict and true Religion, although they are approved as Religious Institutes. That is, the Sisters of these Institutes are indeed Religious, but in an inferior grade, not in that superior and nobler grade in which nuns are truly and strictly religious. To the reason added by Petrus, the answer is that, in order that the essence of the religious state be had in some way, the profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church indeed suffices; but for the essence of the religious state true and strictly such, there is altogether required the solemn profession of religious vows in an Institute approved by the Church in the state of true and strict Religion or Order.

But it is altogether false what Paulus says, that the Sisters of the more recent Institutes are nothing except pious women, and in no way are religious. When the Sacred Penitentiary, 26 November 1852, and at other times, called them pious women, it declared its mind more than sufficiently by denying of them that they were nuns strictly such, since they did not emit solemn vows. By that expression “pious women” it wished to deny this only, by no means that they were not even true religious. And if for several years the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars denied to these Sisters the denomination Religious, it did this only so as to deny them the character of Religious true and strictly such. Later, however, when the signification of the words had been better established, to these modern Institutes was conceded that denomination of Religious Institutes, and to their pupils the denomination Religious men and Religious women. And by the Decree of 11 August 1889, the Sacred Congregation openly recognizes in these modern Institutes true Religious Congregations, expressly distinguishing in the same Decree between formal Religions of solemn vows and true Religious Congregations of simple vows. Therefore without solemn vows there is not had the essence of the strictly religious state; but with merely simple vows the essence of the truly religious state is indeed had. Here note that that word “truly” is sometimes for increasing and restricting the signification, and is equivalent to “strictly,” as in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV; sometimes it is merely for determining the correct signification, as in the cited Decree. Finally, it is altogether false that the Church does not approve these more recent Institutes but merely tolerates them, as is openly clear from the same cited Decree, and as is proved by the very fact of the various Decrees of Approval, first by praising and then by positively approving.

2. “Cunegunda, a nun, determined with firm mind to avoid all mortal sins, but no venial sin. Nor does she make it a matter of conscience not to induce another companion to lie venially.

Question. 1. Whether for religious there is an obligation of tending to perfection? — 2. Does Cunegunda sin mortally in each case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 249. — To the second. In the first case, they affirm who, with Sanchez, bk. 1, in decalog., c. 5, and Bonacina, de peccatis, q. 3, p. 5, n. 13, contend that the will of committing, as the thing and occasion may allow, all venial sins, is not free from mortal sin. Many others deny this with Cajetan, Sylvester, Granados, Palão, Machado; to whom I myself willingly subscribe, led especially by this reason, that to commit in fact whatever venial sins occur is not mortal sin. And it pleases me to confirm this by the authority of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 88, a. 4: all the venial sins in the world cannot have so much guilt as one mortal sin, which is precisely to say that even all venial sins do not make one mortal sin, nor are they equivalent to it. Therefore to will to commit them all is neither mortal, nor equivalent to mortal. The consequence holds, because the malice of the act is taken from the object; therefore, if to commit them all in fact, or to avoid none, does not involve mortal malice, neither does the will of committing them all, or of avoiding none, involve it.

Master Petrus de Tapia, Archbishop of Seville, says that the mortal malice which he contends a will of this kind involves must be drawn, not from the object, which he himself also admits is not infected according to itself with mortal gravity, but from the proximate danger of sinning lethally, which he judges to be contained in that universal will. Truly, either actually to commit all venial sins, precisely according to itself, brings with it such a proximate danger of sinning lethally, and then actually to commit all venial sins will be mortal, which is false, and the adversary himself denies it; or, precisely according to itself, it does not bring such a danger, and then neither can the will of committing them bring it, since an act morally takes its species from the object.

Convinced by this reason, others contend that venial sins so proximately dispose to mortal sins, that he who brings his mind to multiplying venial sins must be judged altogether to will to sin mortally. This response I undertake briefly to refute under multiple heads. And first, if we consult St. Thomas, cited q. 88, in one case alone can that which is venial from its genus become mortal: namely insofar as an end is constituted in it, or insofar as it is referred to mortal sin as to an end. But the will of committing all sins, but only venial sins, with the exclusion of all mortal sins, is borne toward venial sins insofar as these are contained within the limits of venial sins; so that consequently it neither constitutes in them the notion of an end, nor refers them to mortal sins. Therefore venial sins do not pass into mortal sin from that intention alone.

To these things, yield to me: where do you place that formal and proximate danger? Namely, in the collection of all venial sins? But all cannot be committed by one person. Namely, in some from the collection of all? But among some of these there is none which, if it is venial, would according to itself cast one sinning venially into this destructive danger. Besides, if all according to themselves imply this danger, then we are bound to avoid some of them, otherwise we would sin mortally; from which this other thing absurdly, yet necessarily, follows: that for eternal salvation it is not enough if someone observes all precepts obliging under mortal sin, but it is further required that he also observe those which oblige under venial sin. For all are bound under grave obligation to that which according to itself is necessary for avoiding mortal sins; therefore, if the avoidance of all venial sins is necessary in itself for avoiding mortal sin, all are bound to avoid some venial sin in order to attain eternal salvation. But if you say that this holds true by reason of danger, it remains that you define what venial sin in species someone can commit without falling into this danger, lest, if you affirm that by any venial sin in species one falls into this danger, you must swallow this absurdity: all venial sins, each and every one, by reason of this danger, are so many mortal sins.

I certainly think thus: as long as malice is confined within the bounds of light sin, it less affects and less strikes the mind of him whom the malice of the object is accustomed strongly to urge and terrify when it transcends to grave sin, so that consequently there can stand together both the will of committing all sins that are only venial and the detestation of any mortal sin whatever. Thus it is not wonderful if we know several who are little or not at all solicitous about avoiding venial sins, yet shudder at the very name of mortal sin, much less flee its sight; whence they can join in the same seat of the will the intention of avoiding all mortal sins with the intention of committing all venial sins.

For answering objections, diligently observe first that these two things fight against each other: that a sin bring with it a formal danger, or a proximate danger, of sinning mortally, and that it be contained within the bounds of venial sin. Wherefore, if Cunegunda in the collection of venial sins apprehended some sin as bringing such danger with it, or if in practice she doubted whether it could bring this danger, she would without doubt sin mortally; and that intention of avoiding all mortal sins would destroy itself, just as it would destroy itself if she apprehended that this very intention of committing all venial sins induced a formal and proximate danger of sinning mortally. Observe moreover that, in order that that intention truly exclude every mortal sin, it ought to be such that she does not will to commit those venial sins which, if they are increased in number, grow into mortal sin, either by reason of matter, as several light thefts which, multiplied, finally constitute grave matter of theft, or by reason of effect, as moderate draughts of wine which, more often repeated, bring grave harm to health and cause drunkenness.

Finally, observe principally that a nun, by reason of her state, ought to tend toward perfection; nevertheless she is not therefore bound under mortal sin to avoid venial faults. For she sufficiently tends toward the perfection of her state if, besides the precepts gravely obliging every Christian, she also observes those things which gravely bind a religious under a special title. For it cannot happen that she observes the grave precepts which are either contained in the rule, or imposed by superiors, and by which she has bound herself by the bond of vows, without aspiring to the perfection proper to the religious state as much as is enough for avoiding mortal sin. And just as the other faithful, who also ought to aspire to the perfection proper to a Christian, are not said to sin gravely against an obligation of this kind as long as they commit only venial sins, so also religious, as long as they commit only venial sins, cannot be said to offend gravely against the perfection of their proper state. I would not deny that it can happen that those things which are judged venial in a secular person become mortal in a religious, indeed also in any ecclesiastic who ought to go before others by example, by reason of scandal; and thus certain scurrilous words and indecent trifles, which in the mouth of seculars lightly offend pious ears, in the mouth of a religious, or of anyone else dedicated to God by a special title, can easily in a certain way become blasphemies, which gravely strike the ears of hearers, not without great contempt and disgrace of the religious and ecclesiastical state. But if Cunegunda decided to commit sins of that kind, she would splendidly deceive herself if she thought that she willed no mortal sin.

Meanwhile let the priest inculcate this again and again to Cunegunda: that venial sins, although remotely, nevertheless certainly dispose to mortal sins, so that it is altogether to be feared lest venial sins little by little pave the way by which she may finally be hurled into the abyss of eternal damnation. “He who despises small things will fall little by little,” Ecclesiasticus 19. “Those who rush into the greatest things begin from the smallest,” St. Bernard. “Let him beware the fever of venial sins who wishes to avoid the death of graver sins.” Through venial sins the fervor of charity is diminished; and although God denies to no one, as long as he has lived both physically and morally, when the precept urges, sufficient graces by which, if he wills, he may be saved through fulfillment of the precept, nevertheless in punishment even of venial sins He can deny efficacious graces. Hence it happens that, although he can, he does not will to be saved, since, succumbing to the weight of some grave temptation, he finally falls into mortal sin, to be assigned to eternal punishments. If the priest places these things before Cunegunda’s eyes, she, the grace of God breathing upon her, will extend the will of avoiding mortal sins to venial sins, placing her eternal salvation more and more in safety.

Coming to the later case, Master Corradus, pt. 1, Respons., Response 89, § Sequitur, with Master Soto as guide, teaches that it is graver to induce someone to one venial sin than to commit homicide, because it is a greater damage and a greater loss to commit one venial sin than is the death of the body; for which reason it is said that one must not sin venially even for the life of the whole world. Therefore, in the judgment of Master Corradus, Cunegunda, who induced her companion to lie lightly, is guilty of mortal sin. But I pronounce that she is to be absolved from mortal sin, with the Angelic teacher as guide, who, treating of scandal in II-II, q. 43, teaches in express words thus: If active scandal is per se, for example, when someone intends to lead another to sin, if indeed he intends to induce his neighbor to sin venially through an act of venial sin, it is a venial sin. I do not see what could be said more clearly against Corradus for Cunegunda.

But what if she did not induce the companion to that light lie in just any way, but with the direct design that the companion herself suffer that ruin which results from a light lie? Not even then would she sin mortally, according to the opinion of St. Thomas in IV, dist. 38, q. 2, a. 2, q. 3, where, treating of formal scandal, namely the special sin by which one intends to scandalize another, or by which one intends the harm of one’s neighbor, he openly teaches that he sins only venially who intends to induce another to some venial sin. This seems hard to Father Vasquez, who judges that an intention of this kind of the spiritual ruin of one’s neighbor, however light it is posited, is a mortal sin contrary to charity; and in this sense he thinks the opinion of Corradus and Soto true, because spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, gives a special malice to the act, and there is no doubt that this damage is greater than any temporal evil. Thus Father Vasquez, whose reasoning I cannot approve; because damage to one’s neighbor, if it is grave, infects the act with mortal malice not only when it is directly intended, but also when it is indirectly intended, as no one denies. And therefore he becomes guilty of mortal fault who, compelled by no necessity, shoots an arrow at a wild beast, even if he does not directly intend it, provided he foresees that from it the killing of his neighbor, or some other grave evil, will follow. Wherefore either let Vasquez affirm with Corradus that he sins mortally against charity who in any way induces his neighbor into venial sin, from which spiritual ruin is certainly going to follow; or let him deny with the Angelic Doctor that he sins mortally who directly intends that spiritual ruin. It is added that the reason on which Father Vasquez relies, if it proves anything, proves that it is a mortal sin against charity, by which each one ought to love himself more than his neighbor; I say, that it is a mortal sin if someone himself sins venially, willing also in himself the light spiritual ruin which follows venial sin, and which certainly does not cease to be greater than any temporal damage from the fact that each one intends it for himself rather than for another. But the consequence seems absurd; therefore the principle from which it follows is also absurd.

But is not spiritual damage, if it is directly intended, a thing which gives the act a special malice? Either grave or light, I concede; necessarily grave, I deny, with St. Thomas openly supporting us. But is not the damage inflicted by venial fault truly greater than any other temporal loss?

Father Sanchez (de Matrim., bk. 1, disp. 5, n. 25), with whom Fagundez agreed (in Eccles. Praecept., precept 1, bk. 3, c. 8, n. 18), responds that, in judging the gravity of damage, spiritual is not to be compared with temporal, or temporal with spiritual, but spiritual with spiritual, and temporal with temporal. But that response, although true, does not remove the difficulty, unless an efficacious reason is given why spiritual damage ought not be compared with temporal, so that from that comparison we may weigh its gravity. Therefore this reason seems to me to be that the spiritual ruin inflicted on the soul by venial sin is free, since it could altogether be avoided by the very person who freely allows himself to be induced into venial sin, and furthermore can easily be repaired. Hence it is not wonderful if, although it is of a superior order and in itself a graver evil, nevertheless it is estimated less in relation to the subject than the evil of homicide, which is not free to the neighbor and is altogether irreparable. And truly, if the difficulty taken from the reason of greater evil in itself ought to terrify us, it would be a greater sin, even without express and direct intention of spiritual loss, to induce someone to venial sin than to kill, because the former is a greater detriment than killing; and it would be a greater sin to lie venially than to amputate one’s own hand or another member of the body, which no one would say. Therefore let it stand that Cunegunda, in the species of the case, the nature of the thing being considered, did indeed sin, but venially, not mortally.

Unless perhaps accidentally she induced the companion to lie through an act of mortal sin, as if from hatred toward God or toward the companion herself, or if from envy of the perfection to which the companion was applying herself more zealously, she induced her by force or deceit to commit this or any other venial sin. For just as in the matter of money it can happen that a theft in itself most light, of one iulius, becomes a mortal sin by reason of grave harm inflicted upon a very poor man; and in the matter of reputation, although falsely to impute to someone that he is vain or a liar is light, it can become mortal by reason of infamy derived upon a religious man of good reputation and known probity; so, according to Cardinal de Lugo (de Iust. et Iur., disp. 9, sect. 2, n. 20), if you induce a perfect and holy man by force or deceit into venial sins, by reason of the harm which you bring, you can be made guilty of mortal fault.

I admit that he whom you would induce to venial sin does not sin gravely; but neither does he sin gravely who throws his money into a river. Yet truly you would sin gravely if by force or deceit you induced him to throw his money into a river. Therefore, although Cunegunda’s companion would not sin gravely in the case, you badly conclude from this that neither would Cunegunda sin gravely, when by force or deceit she would cast down, unwilling, from the state of most excellent perfection to which the companion is applying herself. Let priests take care to keep this doctrine before their eyes, so that they show themselves severe judges with those who are accustomed craftily to draw young people outstanding in purity and integrity of morals into vain and impure conversations; and even if I unwillingly permit that such conversations can be free from mortal fault, so that they are only venial, nevertheless “this very thing,” says the cited Lugo, “is a grave harm which is inflicted upon these young people in that state and purity of life.” And with stronger right and reason I would extend this to those who have undertaken the charge of imbuing young people of this kind with piety and doctrine.” Ithur., case 35; I. M. 249, 250.