106. On the Novitiate and Profession

1. Caius, a novice, having obtained dismissal, put off the habit and the intention of remaining in religion. But at night, while still sleeping in the monastery, led by repentance, he asked again to be admitted into religion, which he immediately obtained.

Question. Was the novitiate interrupted in the case?

R. Many deny this because of the brevity of the time and the smallness of the matter; others more probably affirm it, because the continuity of the annual time according to the Council of Trent is no longer had. La Croix, bk. 4, n. 18. “But if Caius was not dismissed, although, having put off the habit and the intention of remaining, he hid in the monastery while awaiting an opportunity of going out, Suarez and Castropalaus rightly say against Diana that no interruption was made; as also not then, if the superior had wished first to dismiss him clothed in secular dress. For in these cases he is judged still to have remained in the order, since he was not dismissed by the will of the superiors; and at least by this there is not judged to be a full interruption, unless it was at the same time completed by actual departure.” Thus La Croix, loc. cit., n. 20.

And Ferraris, v. Annus probationis, n. 10 ff.: “The year of probation or novitiate ought to be continuous, so that a novice interrupting the year of probation with the intention of deserting the religion, and going out, although for only two hours, is bound to begin the year of novitiate anew from the Decree of S. C. C. ... If, however, says Fagnanus, the novice had not gone out from the monastery, but with the intention of fleeing had hidden for a little while within the cloister, the year of probation would not on that account be judged interrupted. ... Indeed the year of novitiate is not interrupted even if the novice, retaining the habit, goes out secretly for the sake of hiding himself, provided that he has the intention of returning. And concerning one who remained for the space of twenty hours outside the monastery without the habit, S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1626, declared that it could be tolerated concerning departure with the habit and with the intention of returning.” — I. M. 268, 269.

2. A certain novice, after nine months of novitiate, from the error of a physician thinking that he was laboring under a grave infirmity which rendered him unfit for the ministries and discipline of religion, was dismissed by the superiors. Nevertheless, a more accurate examination being applied, the error of the former physician appeared, and the young man was free from suspicion of such a disease; and therefore after six days he was again admitted to the novitiate.

Question. Was the novitiate interrupted in the case?

R. In the affirmative. For there is no doubt that interruption of the novitiate for six days interrupts the required continuation of the novitiate. It is added that, in the case, although from a false cause, that is, from the physician’s error, the novice was truly dismissed by the superiors, and the dismissal was accepted by the novice, and therefore the novice went out from the religion. Wherefore, the dismissal given and accepted in the case, and the departure of the novice standing, the novitiate was altogether interrupted. Hence the aforesaid novice, having again entered religion, will not be able to be admitted to profession after three months; but it is necessary that he again begin the novitiate and complete an entire year of novitiate. Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 4, d. 3; I. M. 269.

3. Benedictus, after six months of novitiate, is compelled to depart from religion because of military service. Three years having been spent in the military in a very praiseworthy manner, the master of novices judges that Benedictus can be admitted to vows after another six months have elapsed, since, he says, with that necessity standing of a wholly involuntary departure, the year of novitiate has not been morally interrupted.

Question. What is to be said in the case?

R. It does not seem that the master of novices judges rightly. For although the departure of Benedictus was altogether necessary and compelled, and Benedictus conducted himself well and laudably during the whole three years of military service, nevertheless the year of novitiate is truly interrupted, and the novitiate is at present to be continued for an entire year. The reason is first, because that new condition of Benedictus in military service renders him altogether secular, and therefore the novitiate is altogether interrupted. For as surely in that new condition of a soldier the novitiate does not endure, nor is it continued, so neither consequently, with this new condition and notable change of state standing, can the novitiate afterwards be continued; rather it must be begun anew. Moreover, the space of three years is altogether notable, and morally speaking it truly cannot be said that the former six months of novitiate are continued with the later six months, that notable intervening space of time having elapsed. And each reason holds even if the military service had lasted for only one year. Likewise each reason remains wholly intact, although the departure in the case was not voluntary, and although Benedictus conducted himself very praiseworthily.

Indeed, from the common opinion, even a much shorter time in the present matter is held to be notable and sufficient for interruption of the novitiate. And thus Cardinal Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 3, d. 2, n. 3, says: “although some judge that a brief interruption does no harm, nevertheless Suarez and Sanchez reject this, and in our case the matter is beyond controversy, since the interruption was for seven days, which is judged a small interruption by no one.” And the same Cardinal Lugo, loc. cit., bk. 4, d. 2, n. 1, speaking of an interruption of six days, says, “there seems no doubt that in every opinion it interrupts the required continuation.” The resolution of the case set forth can be confirmed from the resolution to the fifth doubt of the following case proposed by the praised Cardinal Lugo, loc. cit., bk. 3, d. 2.

4. “A certain novice, after 21 days from his entrance, having left the habit, departed with the intention of not returning; but when seven days had elapsed he returned, and, having again obtained the habit, pursued the novitiate. And when eleven months and ten days had elapsed, which with those 21 days made a whole year, in good faith he emitted profession, and afterwards remained in the order for fifteen other years. ... It was asked: 1. Whether the profession was valid? — 2. Whether at least afterwards tacit profession intervened? — 3. Since he doubts that the convent will not now easily give new consent, whether, without new consent being required, he can now ratify the first profession at least before the prelate and witnesses? — 4. What finally shall he do, so that he may profess validly? — 5. Whether for this it is necessary to put forward again an entire year of probation, or whether without a new year of novitiate the prior profession can be ratified immediately?

To the first. The response was that that profession without doubt was invalid ... since the interruption of the novitiate was for seven days, which is judged a small interruption by no one.

To the second. It also seems certain that that profession was not yet healed and made valid, because for the value of profession the positive consent of the one professing is required; for this it is necessary either that the one professing know the defect of the profession and will to bind himself anew, or at least that he have a conditioned will, by which he says: if perhaps I am not truly professed, from now I will to bind myself anew. However, mere perseverance in religion, and the exercise of acts which professed do, does not suffice; for one who thinks that he is professed, by persevering in religion, does not will to profess, but to fulfill the profession which he thinks he has emitted.

To the third. Although Suarez says that in this case new consent is required on the part of the religion, knowing that the prior acceptance was invalid, which also Sanchez followed and confesses to be more probable, nevertheless the same Sanchez says that it is safe and probable that new knowledge and consent are not required on the part of the prelate or convent, as long as its prior consent was not revoked. ... And it seems to be gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., where after five years a protest against profession is not admitted, because at that time it is supposed to have been ratified, and therefore by the consent of the one professing alone, even without any new acceptance standing on the part of the religion. Therefore the religious in our case could embrace this opinion; this indeed would proceed well insofar as only the revalidation of profession is considered. Yet it can with difficulty be sustained in order to the novitiate, or to supplying a part of it, as will be clear from what is to be said.

To the fourth. It is clear from what has been said that this religious, by embracing this last opinion, can ratify the profession either alone or before the prelate or some witness; which ratification, as Suarez notes, ought to be made by some external sign, explicitly, or at least implicitly, signifying the will to bind himself, such as remaining in the habit and obedience with the intention of binding himself, which permanence endures for the time required for inducing tacit profession. ... Or, if according to the other opinion he wishes to have new consent of the prelate and convent, he may secretly disclose the whole matter to the prelate, and the prelate, the name of the petitioner being kept silent, may propose it to the convent; or he may seek a dispensation from the Pontiff for ratifying the profession. ... These things, however, proceed insofar as the discussion is about the revalidation of profession. But in our case there is a peculiar difficulty concerning the time of probation, as will be able to be clear from the response to the fifth point.

To the fifth. Therefore concerning repeating the novitiate it must be known that some think that the entire year of novitiate ought to be repeated, because the prior novitiate was morally interrupted by the invalid profession. Once it had been made, that religious already thought himself professed, and therefore he was not in probation; for probation requires the liberty of remaining or departing, which liberty he did not have while thinking himself professed. And although afterwards, when the defect of profession has become known, he begins now to have liberty and is constituted again in the state of novice, nevertheless this time is not continued with the prior novitiate, which was interrupted by the profession thought valid. Since therefore the year of probation ought to be continuous, the consequence is that an entire continuous year of probation ought to be made anew. Thus Suarez. He thinks it probable, however, that the preceding time can be counted, the days which are lacking to the year being afterwards added, because a moral interruption does not seem to occur, since the state and religious habit were always continued. ... He warns, however, that it is necessary that the defect of the past profession be known to the prelate himself and to others to whom it pertains to admit to profession, and this before the time of novitiate begins to be continued. ... For the same knowledge is required on the part of each, so that the novice may prove the religion, and so that the religion itself may be able to prove the novice.

Yet it does not easily appear how consistently this was said by Father Suarez, who, as a reason of doubting against the obligation of manifesting it to the religion, objects the Tridentine Decree (sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., in which it is established that those are not to be heard who after five years allege the nullity of their profession because of force or fear, or because of defect of age, or something similar), in which, without a preceding manifestation of this kind, the profession is supposed to have been validly ratified in the subsequent five years. Yet to this objection he confesses that in that Decree the discussion is about alleged nullity of profession made through force and fear, or before due age, or something similar, that is, such causes that afterwards the profession could be tacitly ratified by the will of the religious himself, without new consent of the religion. And therefore our case is not comprehended, in which knowledge and will on the part of the religion itself were necessary, except only with a certain accommodation, so that even in these cases the religious is not heard after five years, except when the presumption of ratified profession ceases on the part of the religious and also on the part of the religion; or certainly he is not heard unless he wishes to prove that the profession could not have been ratified during that time, from whatever source this impossibility proceeded. And thus it seems to me that one must consistently speak.” Lugo, loc. cit.

It must be noted here: 1. that Suarez, tom. 3, de Relig., bk. 7, c. 1, n. 20, requires on the part of the monastery new knowledge and consent for accepting the ratification of invalid profession, precisely because he is speaking of profession invalid from a defect holding on the part of the religious professing and of the religion itself, namely when the year of probation was lacking. But when the defect holds only on the part of the one professing, and especially when the defect was because of fear, he expressly admits, nn. 6 ff., that new consent is not required on the part of the religion, because the prior consent always remains as long as it is not revoked. Cf. Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 3, d. 16, n. 21.

2. Although some essential thing is lacking for the validity of profession, nevertheless if during the whole immediately following five years the professed, knowingly and willingly, did not protest, from Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., he is presumed to have had the profession ratified. He is presumed, namely by a presumption of law and concerning law, Benedict XIV, Constitution Si datam. But in the internal forum the truth is to be inspected. Suarez, de Relig., tom. 3, bk. 7, c. 4, n. 6. For the Church cannot supply consent. Fagnanus on c. Si quis, n. 32, de Regul.

3. At present, for validly emitting solemn vows after simple vows, express profession is required; and therefore tacit profession has been altogether abrogated.

4. As regards the consent of the monastery at present, from the Decree of Pius IX, Regulari disciplinae, 25 January 1848, the conventual Chapter of the Convent or House must be convoked, “so that the capitulars may declare by secret votes whether the novice can be admitted to profession.” Then an examination must be made by the Provincial and by at least three Provincial examiners, that “they may define whether the novice is furnished with the necessary qualities so that he can safely be admitted to profession.” And the Superior General “can never permit the profession of a novice who has been rejected by the Provincial examiners.” Moreover, from the Decree of the same Pius IX, 7 February 1862, where there is question of admission to solemn profession, in the aforesaid Chapter those professed of simple vows do not have a voice. And “for admission to solemn vows after the completion of the three years of simple vows, the conventual Chapter indeed must be heard for the instruction of the mind of the superiors; but the Superior General, or his subdelegate, by no means will have to stand by the resolution of that Chapter.” I. M. 268, 269, 277, 278.

5. Norbertus committed an occult homicide. Sincerely converted to God, he enters religion, remaining silent about the homicide committed. Hence, after simple vows have been completed, he then solemnly professes.

Question. Did Norbertus emit profession licitly and validly?

R. Norbertus indeed emitted simple and solemn vows illicitly and invalidly, if he entered a religion in which a homicide previously committed is a substantial impediment according to the Constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, as in fact it is in the Society of Jesus. Exam., c. 2, § 2, 6; Const., pt. 6, c. 3, § 4, and C.

But if he entered another religion in which an impediment of this kind is not had, he professed validly. For Sixtus V, by the Bulls of the year 1587 and of the following year, rendered homicides and others guilty of certain crimes incapable of religious profession. But Clement VIII in the year 1602 moderated the aforesaid Constitutions of Sixtus and restored the value of profession. Wherefore there is no doubt that the profession of Norbertus was valid.

But did Norbertus act illicitly by saying nothing about the occult homicide? He indeed acted illicitly, generally speaking, if some grave detriment could come to the religion from it. He also acted illicitly if, when interrogated by the prelates about impediments of this kind, he said nothing. For then fraud and deceit intervened in a grave matter. For it cannot be denied that homicide according to itself, even if it was not brought into judgment, even if it is altogether occult, is a matter of such moment that the religion could prudently be wholly unwilling to accept one who labors under such a defect. If finally Norbertus was incautiously not interrogated about this matter, perhaps he can be excused, because the aforesaid homicide is not of itself an invalidating impediment impeding entrance into religion and profession in it; and since it is altogether occult, Norbertus is not bound to defame himself, nor does grave damage seem thence to threaten the religion. Nevertheless it must not be denied that, although the homicide is occult, there always remains the danger that sometime it may be manifested with grave disgrace to the religion itself. Wherefore Norbertus will be able to be excused only when the circumstances are such that a danger of this kind is wholly improbable. — Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 1, d. 1.

6. Euphemia, from grave fear of her father, well known to her relatives, entered religion and emitted solemn profession. But after some years Euphemia’s father died. Then her relatives, in order that they might obtain the inheritance through her, protested against the validity of the profession. The Ordinary of the place, in order to take cognizance of the litigation that had been moved, sent to Euphemia his Vicar General with two witnesses, so that they might examine her. But Euphemia, lest she stir up scandals, told the Vicar General to abstain from any examination whatever, because she herself of her own accord yielded to any litigation, and “if before,” she said, “I was not a nun, today I wish to be a nun.”

Question. Is the aforesaid ratification of Euphemia’s profession valid?

R. The ratification of Euphemia’s profession could seem invalid, because profession, in order to be made validly, ought to be made into the hands of the abbess or of a prelate able to accept profession. But that ratification of Euphemia was not made into the hand of anyone able to accept it, but before a certain delegated judge, to whom it did not pertain to grant or accept profession. But in the case the ratification of profession did not need for its value some new acceptance, but only the consent of the same nun, wishing validly to profess. The reason is that for the value of the preceding profession, invalid because of fear, only the free consent of the nun herself professing was lacking; when that accedes at any time whatever, the profession becomes valid, even if the ratification is not made with a new solemnity into the hands of the abbess or prelate. Nor does this seem able to be denied, given the doctrine of the Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., where, after five years have elapsed from the day of the profession made, a regular alleging the nullity of his profession because of fear is denied a hearing, because, namely, tacit ratification is presumed, and one sufficient for the value of profession, even without new solemnity or acceptance of the prelate or Chapter, whose acceptance had already preceded and was not revoked. How much more, therefore, in the case, will express ratification before a delegated judge and witnesses suffice?

But again the ratification in the case could seem invalid from those words of the nun: “if before I was not a nun, today I wish to be a nun.” For those words do not seem to signify present profession, but the will and intention of ratifying the profession afterwards. But first, those words, in those circumstances in which there was question of examining the nullity of the profession, and in which they were uttered to impede this examination, cannot be understood in another sense except of profession to be revalidated in the present. Besides, those words, “today I wish to be a nun,” signify the intention of ratifying the religious profession in the present. For the word “I wish,” with another verb of the infinitive tense, e.g., “I wish to sell,” “I wish to buy,” can indeed signify only an intention disposed toward doing, but it can also signify the intention of doing in the present; and thus by the aforesaid words, “I wish to sell,” “I wish to buy,” the contract of sale and purchase can well be perfected in the present. Indeed, if to the verb “I wish” there is joined a verb signifying the very exercise and execution of the thing, then it signifies the intention of doing in the present, as, e.g., “I wish to have you as wife,” because for having as wife marriage is necessarily presupposed. But that nun did not say, “I wish to make profession,” but “I wish to be a nun,” for which profession is necessarily presupposed. Nor could it be understood of a novice nun, since the doubt to be examined was not this, but whether she was a professed nun. Accordingly those words, “if before I was not a nun, today I wish to be a nun,” signified nothing else than, “if up to now I have not been professed, now from this moment I wish to be professed.” And that word “today” must also be weighed, opposed to the past time, “if before,” by which the present ratification of the profession is openly manifested, as if she were saying: if up to this day I was not a nun, from this same day henceforth I wish to be a nun; by which locution a present will and consent is certainly signified. — Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 3, d. 16; I. M. 277, 278.

7. Brother N., a cleric religious, petitioned for dispensation from the simple vows emitted on 6 March 1887, asserting that, because of weak health, he could not remain in the order. On 4 September 1888, the Sacred Congregation on Regular Discipline benignly granted the Father Minister General for the effect concerning which in the prayers; and he, on 8 September 1888, by these words, “We dispense, and from every bond and obligation of the said vows we restore him free to secular life,” committed the Rescript to execution. Meanwhile, however, on 4 September, Brother N. had written to the Minister General that, deceived by the devil, he had set forth a false cause in the petition, and that therefore he wished to die in the order, and he begged that the dispensation from simple vows not be intimated to him. The Provincial Minister heard his prayers, informed the Minister General of his repentance, and on 6 April 1890, the three years having elapsed, admitted him to solemn vows.

Question. Whether Brother N., notwithstanding his petition of 4 September, really was dispensed from simple vows by the Rescript of 4 September, or by its execution on 8 September 1888, and whether his solemn profession must be judged invalid?

R. In the negative as to each part. S. C. EE. et RR., 15 March 1892; M. E., vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 75.

8. Benedictus, his religious profession having been pronounced invalid, asks doubtfully whether at least now he is still bound by the vow of chastity. For the confessor told him so, namely that the solemn vow of chastity passed into a simple vow of chastity. But Benedictus, not greatly trusting that confessor, goes to another and sets forth his doubt to him, asking its solution.

R. When religious profession has been pronounced invalid, regulars return to their former state, as if profession had never been issued. Wherefore the solemn vow of chastity does not remain, nor does it pass into a simple vow of chastity. How indeed can a vow pass into a simple vow when it never existed? And, if there is question of profession of simple vows, not solemn vows, the vow of chastity simply is not, because it was not, whence that which never began cannot continue. The reason is that the acts of agents do not operate beyond their intention. But a restrictive clause is not accustomed to be added, nor can it be, when religious profession is declared null, e.g., from defect of consent or from defect of prior novitiate; for then no vow was truly present. That clause is accustomed to be added only as regards the vow of chastity, the vow of chastity remaining, when those vows are dispensed; for then the vow was present and consequently can remain. That confessor perhaps made a confusion between dispensation and declaration of invalid profession. I. M. 262.

9. A religious Provincial granted dispensation from simple vows emitted by a certain nun in a community under the rule which that religious himself professed. Hence the Bishop asked whether the said Provincial could validly dispense from the simple vows of the nuns of whom there is question.

R. The preceding case was proposed to the Sacred Congregation, and, a report on it having been made to the Supreme Pontiff, “His Holiness ordered that it be rescribed that the Father Provincial could not dispense from the aforesaid vows, although simple, emitted in the said monastery, according to the things handed down by Benedict XIV in the Bull Convocatis, 27 November 1749, § 32.” Bizzarri, Collectan., ed. 1885, p. 133.

Now Benedict XIV, loc. cit., has these things: “As regards vows, let them know that they [the Penitentiaries] must abstain from their commutation in those cases in which there is question of prejudice to a third party. Wherefore in that which pertains to vows, although simple, whether of perseverance, or others customarily emitted in some Congregation or Community and into vows obligatory accepted by a third party, let them not involve themselves.”

Hence it appears that simple vows which are emitted in some Institute or Congregation or House approved by the Holy See are reserved to the same Holy See, because those vows are received by the Institute or by the Congregation or by the House, and they assume the nature of a contract and reciprocal obligation. Whence dispensation of those vows introduces prejudice to a third party, and therefore is to be granted only by the Supreme Pontiff.

From these things the distinction is clear between private simple vows, which are emitted privately and by which one is obligated to God alone, and public vows, which are accepted by an Institute or Congregation or House by the approval of the Church. By these vows one is obligated to God; and, the same vows having been made into the hands of the prelate, one is at the same time obligated to the Congregation, or Institute, or House. These vows properly constitute the religious state in the face of the Church. Hence Suarez, de Relig., tr. 7, bk. 2, c. 9 ff., says: “For the proper bond of the religious state, when it is assumed in a religious community, besides the three substantial vows made immediately to God, a peculiar human obligation is necessary by way of a reciprocal pact, by which the man himself both gives himself to religion and is obligated, and in turn religion accepts him and is obligated to him ... for governing.”

Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have granted to certain Superiors General the faculty of dispensing from these same vows only in the act of dismissal, as to the Superior General of the Congregation of the Passion, and to the Praepositus General of the Society of Jesus, in which, however, by the very fact that someone is dismissed, the simple vows emitted wholly cease. The faculty of dispensing, in the act of dismissal, from simple vows of this kind has generally also been given to the Superiors General of those Orders in which solemn vows are then emitted, although the same simple vows on the part of those vowing, if namely they themselves wish to depart, are reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. Cf. D’Annibale, Summ., ed. 3, pt. 1, n. 103, note 7; Bizzarri, Collect., ed. 1885, pp. 153–154. Yet the aforesaid acceptance of simple vows, and their public promise before the prelate, is not the only reason for the reservation of those vows; but there is also a special privilege by which, in order to prevent damages which could occur in some Congregation from too great facility of dispensing, the Holy See reserves the aforesaid vows to itself. And thus in the Congregation of the Mission, the simple vows which are emitted in it can be dispensed only by the Supreme Pontiff and by the Superior General from a special faculty, although “in the emission of those vows no one is present who accepts them, whether in the name of the Congregation, or of the Holy See, and in the name of the Roman Pontiff existing for the time.” Benedict XIV, Brief Quo magis, 18 December 1742.