107. On Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience

1. Theodore, a religious, with a general permission of his superiors for spending money, applies to his own use money given to him for this purpose by friends; he spends some things upon objects not indeed necessary, yet useful or proper; other things, on the contrary, upon matters wholly superfluous and useless, and even sometimes unlawful. Hence it is asked:

Whether Theodore sins against the vow of poverty in these expenses?

Response. 1. An abundant use of things, provided it is had by permission of the superiors, is not of itself opposed to poverty. The reason is, first, because a poor man does not cease to be poor because at times he is somewhat more abundantly supplied by the charity and liberality of others; for he does not use those more abundant things by his own right, nor does he cease habitually to suffer want of all things. The reason is, secondly, because religious poverty is not to be understood so strictly, according to the manner of certain very timid persons, that it contains only the use of things strictly necessary, with permission of the superior; otherwise there would be no end of scruples and anxieties. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, nos. 32, 33, and chapter 15, nos. 3, 4. Therefore Theodore is not to be disturbed with regard to things simply abundant beyond strict necessities, as far as concerns the vow of poverty. Nevertheless a fault can perhaps be present by reason of scandal, or danger of relaxing regular discipline; indeed, there can also be so notable and excessive an abundance as to bring an indecency upon the state of poverty contrary to the vow itself. St. Alphonsus, book 4, no. 30.

2. Expenses in things wholly useless and unlawful are plainly illicit. But whether the permission of the prelate for such uses is invalid in itself is a question of no small moment. The first and more common opinion affirms that it is; because the prelate is not the owner, but only the administrator, of the goods of the monastery, and therefore he cannot validly permit useless or unlawful expenses, since he has not this power either from religion or from the canons. The second opinion denies this; for otherwise these purchases would be invalid, and no law declares that they are invalid. St. Alphonsus adheres to the first opinion, but says that he does not dare to reject the second. And certainly the reason for the first opinion is not entirely demonstrative, at least when the question is not about goods of the monastery, but about things received from outsiders in order to be spent. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, no. 33; Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 6, no. 8; Liguori, book 4, no. 28.

3. As concerns Theodore, he did not receive a faculty to spend money on useless and unlawful things, but only a general permission to spend money. St. Alphonsus asks: if a prelate grants to a religious a general permission to spend some sum at his pleasure, and the religious spends it on base and vain uses, whether the religious sins against poverty, and whether both he and the receiver are bound to restitution? The holy Doctor reports two opinions. The first affirms it, on account of the reason given above. The second denies it, because the fact that the superior is not the owner does not stand in the way. For, at least, the monastery is the owner in such a way that it can dispose of its goods for all uses; and in the case it is presumed to consent, lest the reputation of the subject, of the superior, and of the monastery itself be endangered. Lugo, after reporting this opinion, says:

In truth, although the superior is a simple administrator, still no law is known by which his power is restricted to licit uses alone. For it must not be judged that the superior, when he gives a license, limits it only to licit uses; but, giving a general license, he removes the impediment which arose from the defect of license. In the same way, if the Pope dispenses with relatives so that they may marry, he does not merely grant that they may lawfully have the conjugal act, but he also removes the malice of incest; so that even if afterward they were to sin with one another outside the use of marriage, there would not be the malice of incest. Likewise, if the Pope dispenses with someone for eating meats, even if that man eats meats harmful to his health, he will sin against temperance, but not against the precept of fasting, which has been taken away by the dispensation.

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus says again that he embraces the first opinion, but does not dare to reject the second. Therefore we abstain from charging Theodore, in the proposed case, with a grave sin against the vow of poverty. See Lugo, Responses, as above; La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

2. Francis, a religious, hesitates whether he can ask the superior for permission to spend, in favor of a Marian Congregation of workers, whose Director he has been appointed by the superiors, various alms received for this purpose from devout persons, and the proceeds of various pious books which he has published. These expenditures would be necessary for promoting the Congregation. But it seems to him that he would thereby possess a peculium contrary to poverty.

Response. There is no reason why he should hesitate. This is, in fact, done even by holy religious, as we read concerning St. Francis de Hieronymo. Nor should Francis fear that he possesses a peculium, if he asks and obtains permission from the superior, and if he acts always dependently on him; much more, if he deposits the money with the superior for the destined pious use, and, as often as there is need, asks money from him.

For a peculium is properly that which individual religious have in order to provide for their necessities and useful needs. If they use this according to the need of the state of poverty, with the permission of the superior, and therefore by precarious use, that is, by a use revocable at the superior’s will, it is not against the vow of poverty. See I.M. 288. But in the proposed case the money is not destined for the proper uses of Francis, but for a pious work plainly conformable to his Institute, as is evident from the fact that the superiors have appointed Francis director of that same Congregation. Therefore, since it is used in a pious work exercised by the Institute according to Constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, it is wholly outside the notion of a peculium.

3. Ferdinand, a religious, obtained from the superior permission to dispose of a sum of money. The following day that superior was removed from office, and another was appointed in his place. It is asked:

Whether Ferdinand is obliged to ask permission again?

Response. No. The permission given by the superior also regards the future time, when he will have been removed from the office of superior. For the power or grace once granted is complete and perfect. La Croix adds:

Although a superior can licitly accept something for himself while he is superior, and can retain it after he has ceased to be superior, nevertheless he cannot spend it without the permission of the present superior; because he could delegate or entrust to others, not to himself, the power of spending for the following time, since there must be a distinction between the one delegating and the one delegated.

La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

4. Theodosius, a religious, while his parents were still living, before solemn profession renounced every present and future hereditary right in favor of his nephew Antonius. After the profession, his parents died intestate. The brothers of Theodosius, succeeding their parents, ask whether in conscience they are bound to give a part of the inheritance to Theodosius, or whether they can retain it for themselves. For Theodosius claims the inheritance, invoking the modern laws which favor him, and he thinks of disposing of it in favor of another nephew, Augustinus. Antonius also claims the inheritance by virtue of the renunciation made in his favor. But the steward of the convent says that it is owed to the convent, which succeeds in place of the religious by the principle: “Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery.”

Response. 1. Theodosius invokes the modern laws in vain. For by solemn profession he was made canonically incapable of possessing anything. Nor can he recover this habilitas in a particular case by dispensation of a regular prelate, or even of a bishop. Therefore he cannot dispose of the paternal inheritance in favor of Augustinus, even with the permission of the superior or of the Ordinary; nor in any other way, even in favor of pious causes.

2. Antonius cannot claim the inheritance by reason of the renunciation made in his favor. For that renunciation has no force, since no one can give what is not, and will not be, his own. At the time when the renunciation was made, the inheritance did not belong to Theodosius, since his parents were still living; nor did it belong to him afterward, since a professed religious is incapable of being an heir. Therefore this inheritance was not included in the general renunciation of present and future goods and rights. It was not a present right, and neither was it a future one, since by reason of his incapacity it could not pertain to the professed man. Besides, either civil or canon law prohibits any disposition of an unopened inheritance in favor of a determinate third person, and makes it invalid.

3. The steward has no right, if by the Constitutions of the Order the convent is not capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, as happens in the Society of Jesus, which does not succeed its professed members, nor are the professed capable of hereditary succession. In that case, the brothers of Theodosius claim the inheritance by right. But if the convent is capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, the inheritance belongs to the convent, and the brothers of Theodosius have no right to it.

4. Cardinal Lugo, Responsa Moralia, doubt 5, no. 9, thinks otherwise. He concedes that it is impossible to renounce, by transferring to another and to the prejudice of another, namely the convent, a right which one does not yet have, nor ever will have, if the inheritance is not owed, for example, from a collateral relative. But he says that it is otherwise concerning the renunciation of the legitime; because, although the son does not actually possess it while the father is living, nevertheless he has a right to it, and it is owed to him. Therefore he says that he would not deny that the son could, before profession, renounce it in favor of another, to whom he now gives it. But this does not persuade us. For the son has no strict right to the legitime until the father dies, from the goods then left. Therefore, if the father dissipates the goods during life, although he sins, nevertheless he does not sin against commutative justice, nor is he bound to restitution. Furthermore, such a disposition of an unopened inheritance is prohibited and made invalid by positive law, even in the legitime. See I.M. 1034. Indeed Lugo himself, in the immediately preceding doubt 4, no. 7, says that if a novice or scholastic of the Society after the vows of the biennium renounces the inheritance of a living father in favor of a relative, then if the parent dies and the one renouncing has already been professed, the inheritance does not pertain to the one in whose favor he renounced, unless it is otherwise left to him by intestacy or testament; rather, it is deferred to those who would have to succeed according to the testament or intestacy, because from the renunciation they could acquire no right to the inheritance deferred at that time.

5. John, a professed religious of the Society, before profession renounced, in favor of a certain college of the Society, all his present and future goods and rights. Afterward, when he was already professed, his brother left him a legacy; and a doubt arises whether this legacy is valid notwithstanding the profession, and whether it is acquired by the college in whose favor John had renounced, or by another college in which, at the time of his brother’s death, John was permanently living.

Response. The universal clause of renunciation of all present and future goods and rights is usually added by notarial style, in order to signify the universality of the renunciation; nor is it without every effect. For if, between the renunciation and solemn profession, some goods and rights come to the religious, they are included under that clause. It is otherwise harmless, because it is conditional: if I shall have goods and rights in the future. But that condition cannot be verified after profession, since the professed man is incapable of having any good or right.

There is no doubt about the validity of the legacy. For the professed of the Society cannot be heirs, whether by testament or by intestacy; but they can be legatees. See Sanchez and Lugo. Thus, whether John had renounced or had not renounced, he remained capable of the legacy, although he could not be instituted heir.

But the legacy does not belong to the college in whose favor he had renounced before profession, but to that in which he was living when the legacy devolved. For, if there had been no renunciation, it is certain that the legacy would belong to the house or college in which he was living, according to the principle: whatever a monk acquires, he acquires for the monastery. And when it is said that the Society is not capable of succeeding its professed members, this is to be understood in this sense: that the goods of the professed do not pass by profession itself, by force of law, to the Society, but to the testamentary or intestate heirs. It is not to be understood as meaning that after profession the Society can acquire nothing through the professed. Therefore, if a devout person gives an alms to a professed religious, that alms is acquired wholly by the Society, or by the house and college in which he lives. Although the professed man cannot be heir, and if an inheritance devolved upon him the Society could not acquire it, nevertheless the same professed man is capable of a legacy, which he acquires not for himself, but for the Society, that is, for the house and college in which he is. Therefore, just as an alms given to a professed religious would not be acquired by the college in whose favor he made the renunciation before profession, so neither is the legacy acquired by it. For he cannot transfer to another what he does not have and to which he has no right. But he does not have, at the time when he renounces, things given to him afterward by donation or by legacy after profession, nor does he then have a right to them; nor does he have such a right after profession, since he is incapable of dominion and of right. The whole right, therefore, then belongs to the house and college in which he is. Therefore only this house and college acquires the thing given or left to him. Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 5.

6. Pius, a testator, ordered that from his goods there be erected, in a parish church and at a fixed altar, a perpetual chaplaincy with the burden of daily Mass, the revenue assigned being 6,000 lire. Sempronius, a regular dispersed after the violent suppression of religious orders, in order to provide for his own support and that of another religious living with him in the same private house, asked for and obtained this chaplaincy from the bishop, although the parish priest was displeased.

Response. Sempronius acted by right. For first, a chaplaincy with a simple burden of Mass has the nature of a simple pious legacy, and, according to the Doctors, religious are not incapable of such chaplaincies. Indeed the Sacred Congregation of the Council, in Meliten., decreed that with the authority of the superiors religious can obtain such chaplaincies not only in their own churches, but also in secular churches, 23 November 1694, 11 June 1695, and 1 December 1691. Moreover, in the Letters of the Sacred Penitentiary by which the faculties already granted to dispersed regulars are enlarged, paragraph 16 grants to solemnly professed regulars that they can legitimately obtain and retain in administration chaplaincies, or even one ecclesiastical benefice, whether residential or with cure of souls, with the consent and at the will of the Ordinary, with the superiors also agreeing; yet they are obliged to leave it immediately when they are recalled by their superiors to the cloisters. Finally, the resolution is made certain from the affirmative response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 21 August 1869, in Acta Sanctae Sedis, volume 5, page 82 and following.

7. Brother Francis of the Passion, a lay brother of the Congregation of Discalced Clerics of the Most Holy Cross and Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, before he emitted profession, renounced the usufruct of his goods conjointly to his parents, retaining for himself the right of ownership, as the Constitutions of the Society permit, chapter 13. His father having died, his mother survived with twin unmarried daughters, who were in want of all things. There were also two brothers who had withdrawn from the maternal home, and were placed in such a condition that they could support and nourish themselves and their family. Now these brothers were asking that the part of the usufruct which previously the father enjoyed should be granted to them; the mother, on the contrary, claimed it for herself.

Question 1. To whom does the aforesaid usufruct devolve: to the mother, to the sons, to the daughters, to all, or finally to Francis himself?

Question 2. To whom does the whole usufruct devolve when the mother also has died?

R. To the first question: the usufruct devolves to the mother by right of accretion. To the second question: the usufruct devolves to the owner himself, for the purpose of disposing of it according to the Constitutions. Thus S. C. EE. et RR., 15 September 1837, in Bizzarri, Collect., p. 75, ed. 1885.

8. “Titius by testament established a certain and perpetual revenue for a chaplaincy in the Church of a professed house of the Society of Jesus; and he enjoins the chaplain, to be appointed for the time by the superiors of the Society, that, retaining for himself a determined sum, namely one suitable as an alms for the daily Mass to be celebrated, he should give what remains each year as an alms to the Church of the same professed house.

Question. Whether this is an obstacle to the poverty of the professed house, or of its Church?

R. It is not an obstacle, provided that there is in the hands of the Society no disposal of those revenues, and no civil right is acquired by the same Society for petitioning in court for annual alms of this kind.

All these things are had expressly in the Constitutions of the Society, part 6, chapter 2 and 1, § 6, where it is said thus: ‘No one of the Society ought, nor can he, induce anyone to leave perpetual alms to houses or churches of the same Society; and if any should leave them of their own accord, let no civil right be acquired for petitioning for them in court. But when charity on account of God has moved them to this, then let them bestow them.’ Again, that there can be no disposal of those revenues in the hands of the Society is had in the same chapter, § 2: ‘No revenues can be held as applied to anyone, not even to the sacristy or the Fabric; nor in any other manner, so that there is in the hands of the Society any disposal of them.’ And in the Declarations of the same chapter, letter B, these things are had: ‘If one of the founders of houses or churches should wish to leave certain revenues for the use of the Fabric, provided that neither the disposition of them pertains to the Society, nor there is anything from which an action concerning them belongs to it, although it would be its care that the one to whom such a duty has been committed should do his office, and so in similar matters, this would not be alien to the poverty of the Society.’ From these things the truth of this proposition is manifestly gathered: it is not against the poverty which the Constitutions of the Society require in professed houses and Churches, if these use revenues spontaneously established by benefactors, provided that the disposition of them is not in the hands of the Society, nor a right to petition for them in court.

“It is said, that the disposition ought not to be in the hands of the Society, so that care may be taken lest even colleges have revenues which they perpetually expend, whether from an obligation imposed by benefactors, or from a disposition left free to themselves, for the support of professed houses and their churches. For this is held to be against the poverty of the Society in canon 12 from decree 61 of the Seventh General Congregation. With this caution having been applied, the Society is now understood to have done whatever it can on its part for guarding the purity of its poverty against revenues spontaneously left for its benefit. It has rendered itself incapable of any right whatever in the revenues themselves; it has furthermore willed no right whatever for petitioning and exacting them. What remained for it to perform? Was it that it should not petition in any way whatever? or that it should not accept, when they were given each year? But these two things do not stand in the way of poverty. But you will say: they would be owed each year; therefore they would be like a true revenue. But the response is manifest: for they would not be owed from any right residing in the Society, but from the right of him who disposed of his goods. Thus, one who receives money from another, in order to distribute it to the poor, owes it to the poor, not from a right existing in the poor, but in the owner, especially since the poor either are incapable of right, or are unwilling to have that right. Rome, 26 June 1723. Christopher Rassler, Edward De Vitry, Antonius De Gaizenrode, John De Ulloa, John James Ghezrius.” A copy of this Resolution is preserved in the Archive of the Father Procurator General of the Society of Jesus.

9. Boniface, a regular superior, whenever his subjects ask from him permission to give some alms to the poor, or to spend something on pious causes and on pious works proper to the Order, never exceeds the quantity of a few solidi. For he says that since religious are poor, they cannot, whether in giving alms or in doing pious works, exceed the quantity proper to the poor.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Boniface’s reason, considered in itself, is true if there is question of money and other things, in great quantity, to be expended for uses wholly superfluous, vain, and unlawful. Expenses of this kind in superfluous matters, in notable quantity, are opposed to the state of religious poverty. Hence it is that, although they are made with the superior’s permission, this indeed not improbably prevents the religious from being a proprietor, since he usurps nothing without the consent of the superior; but it does not prevent there being an illicit use opposed to the vow of poverty. I say in notable quantity; otherwise the aforesaid expenditures, although unlawful from another source, are not specially opposed to poverty. Cf. Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, d. 3, 127 ff., n. 134 ff.

But what things are called notably superfluous in this matter cannot be handed down by one general rule. For it depends on prudent judgment, with attention to the circumstances of persons, place, custom, and similar things. Hence, in an observant religion, it would be a grave sin against poverty to have, for example, gold or silver furnishings, silk garments, silk coverlets or ornaments of the bed, forty or thirty linen shirts for one’s private use, etc. For these and similar things are not fitting, but gravely unbecoming to the state of poverty which an observant religion professes. Therefore a subject having these things, even with the superior’s license, sins against the vow of poverty, not indeed because of defect of license, but because that vow is not only about not using any thing without the prelate’s license, but also about preserving the state of a poor man, and not making expenditures which do not befit the poor. Lugo, loc. cit., n. 131, 183.

With these things premised, it is clear first that, although Boniface’s reason is true considered generally, nevertheless it is applied erroneously by restricting the legitimate faculty of the superior and the legitimate use of the subject to a few solidi. Besides, it is also applied erroneously to the giving of alms and to the performing of other pious works. For these are not expenses and expenditures which are unbecoming to religious poverty. And as regards alms for the poor and needy, there is indeed no precept for religious, as there is for beneficiaries, that the superfluous be expended upon the poor and pious causes; but this is so because it is exceedingly clear that religious, who profess poverty, expend the superfluous in alms and other pious causes, which in fact is done by religious even very poor and most observant of poverty. Hence it is that they often feed even many poor daily, and build churches and Altars of great price, and establish public works of piety and mercy.

In this matter Boniface can take the rule, both for himself and for others, from the doctrine of Cardinal De Lugo, loc. cit., n. 129, 184, 185, 186, 188. 1. “A local prelate can grant a subject license for the whole of that sum which the prelate himself can spend; this is understood according to common law.” 2. For a thing not to be judged superfluous and unbecoming to the state of poverty, the rule “ought not to be that the expenditures are made about necessary or pious things. For there can be a pious matter upon which expenditure is made, and yet it is not according to religious poverty ... Nor, on the contrary, is it required that the thing be necessary, in order that it can licitly be expended upon it; for it is enough if it is useful.” 3. “The prelate is not the owner of the common goods, nor can he dispose of them as owner; but he is as it were a curator and steward, although he can do something more than a mere curator or steward ... regarding the common goods of the convent, that is, regarding revenues and fruits,” yet according to due prudence and the fittingness of the religious state. “But what expenditures are judged to be made prudently must be estimated from the circumstances, and the measure of revenues, necessity, burdens, usefulness, etc. There must also be considered what is according to the formal or interpretative will of the founders, who gave those goods to the convent for preserving, nourishing, and fostering religion; wherefore they can prudently be expended for those ends. From this, however, it does not follow that they cannot be expended except for the food of religious; for it also pertains to preserving and fostering the community that it be preserved with due decorum, honor, and esteem, for which it is sometimes necessary to spend on things pertaining to ornament and splendor, provided that all these things do not exceed the limits of the religious state.” 4. “A regular prelate can, indeed must, give alms from the common goods, more or fewer according as greater or lesser necessity occurs; and this not only from superfluous things but even from necessary things ... A regular prelate can also, from other honest titles and causes, make some moderate donations from the common goods, whether from gratitude, or for conciliating seculars or outsiders; yet not for ostentation of liberality, and much less for enriching his own blood relatives, or on account of his own private regard, unless perhaps from private goods and moderately, as other subjects could with his license. But I speak always according to common law, and prescinding from the Bull of Clement VIII concerning the largition of gifts (afterward declared by Urban VIII) and from the statutes of individual religions, by which the faculty of prelates is customarily limited even in granting licenses ...” 5. “In those things which pertain to the food and clothing of subjects, the decency and obligation of religious poverty always being retained, the prelate ought to incline even more to liberality than to parsimony, since that saying of Bernard is most true: Where there is no abundance, there is no observance.”

10. Boniface, before solemn profession, renounces all his goods in favor of his brother. But in that renunciation he reserves for himself a return into the goods renounced, if perhaps it should happen that he leaves the monastery, from whatever cause this may occur.

R. The aforesaid restriction cannot be attached in solemn profession of vows without a special faculty of the Sacred Congregation. For by the solemn vow of poverty a religious becomes incapable of the right of dominion or ownership. But by that restriction the religious in truth keeps for himself radical and direct dominion in his own goods. For without this dominion a return will be impossible; for example, if the renouncee, as absolute owner of them, alienates them. And if it is said that in reality he yields even this dominion, but only with the condition of return, and consequently with the condition for the renouncee of not alienating them, even so, and in any other similar manner, there is had a true right to the thing from strict justice; and the solemnly professed religious is deprived even of this right.

11. Titius, a secularized religious, by a Rescript of perpetual secularization, obtained a canonry in a cathedral church. Doubting about the validity of the collation, he asks:

1. Whether religious perpetually secularized, by a simple Rescript of perpetual secularization, have authority to accept and retain ecclesiastical benefices, whether residential, or even with care of souls, without habilitation from the Apostolic See?

2. Whether the institutions of parish priests and canons who are ex-religious, only perpetually secularized and not habilitated for benefices, are invalid, although performed in good faith?

3. Whether finally they themselves can remain in possession of the benefices as legitimate possessors?

“R. To the first: Negative. To the second: the investitures of which there is question in the Case are null in the root. To the third: Negative, and let them have recourse to the Holy See for sanation, revalidation, habilitation, and faculty.” S. C. Reg. Disc., 31 January 1899, M. E., vol. 12, p. 242.

12. Pachomius, a regular prelate, on the occasion of the solemn procession on the feast of the Most Holy Body of Christ, permits women to enter the cloisters of the monastery and to accompany the procession. He says that this can be done both by reason of custom and because it is expressly granted in the Constitution of St. Pius V.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Pachomius does not act rightly. This case has often been proposed to the Sacred Congregation of Rites, and it has always returned a negative response. And thus, with the use of women accompanying in the processions of regulars through the cloisters of monasteries having been set forth, on 30 September 1628, no. 506, the Sacred Congregation responded: “It is not licit, nor is it to be permitted, except by express license of the Apostolic See.” And on 11 June 1629, no. 506, it responded: “The Decree made on 30 September 1628 is to be observed, since the revocatory Bull of Gregory XIII is present, and is later.” But by the Decree Urbis et Orbis, 5 July 1631, no. 564, “the Most Eminent Lords, the Fathers, commanded: Let a prohibitive Decree be drawn up, after consultation with the Most Holy Lord, that women henceforth cannot, on occasion of any processions whatever, enter the enclosures of monasteries of regulars, and that under the same penalty are comprehended the regulars themselves permitting women to enter the enclosures of their monasteries.” And on 24 November 1635, no. 627, the Sacred Congregation responded: “In no way is it licit for women to enter the enclosures of monasteries of regulars on the occasion of any processions whatever, notwithstanding any contrary custom whatever.” The same is clear from many other Resolutions of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. Wherefore Pachomius legitimately invokes neither custom nor the Bull of St. Pius V.

13. Rufinus, the superior of a religious house in which schools are held for external pupils and for internal boarders, without any difficulty admits women into all the interior places of the whole house and into his own room itself; and the other fathers of the house do this also. Indeed, he even places women over the kitchen and the wardrobe; and if at any time the boarders fall ill, he permits mothers, sisters, and maidservants to remain day and night in the infirmary, which is common to the religious and to the students. For he says that canonical cloister obliges only Monks, Friars, and Canons Regular, and their Monasteries, Cenobia, and Convents, not Clerks Regular, to whom that Religious House belongs, and their Colleges, Boarding-schools, and Houses.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. If the Religious House of which Rufinus is superior is truly a Religious House of Clerks Regular, who truly and properly are a Regular Order, Rufinus and all the women violating the cloister of regular men of this kind, as in the Case, incur the excommunication of article VII of the second series of the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis. The same excommunication is also incurred by those other fathers of the house admitting the aforesaid women within the cloister. It is otherwise, however, if it is a secular house and not religious, or if the house is of religious clerics of some Pious Congregation. But even in this hypothesis there is great imprudence on the part of Rufinus, and grave danger of scandal is present.

Nor does Rufinus’s reason have any force. For St. Pius V, Constitution Regularium personarum, Constitution Decet Romanum Pontificem, Gregory XIII, Constitution Ubi gratia, and Benedict XIV, Constitution Regulares disciplinae, do not speak only of the cloister of monks, canons, and friars; but they also speak of the cloister of regular persons, of others professing regular life, of any other Regular Orders, EVEN MENDICANT, of men OF WHATSOEVER Orders, etc. Likewise they do not speak only of Abbots and Priors, but also of Provosts, of other Presidents, BY WHATEVER NAME THEY ARE CALLED, of other Superiors and persons BY WHATEVER NAME THEY ARE CALLED, etc.

Moreover, they adduce the general reason, and they draw it from religious quiet, which surely pertains to all religious orders, and not only to Monastic Orders; and from the disturbance of this quiet, because cloister has not been rightly observed, which disturbance indeed, as regards the dangers and scandals which it begets, does not pertain only to Monastic Orders, but also and much more to the Orders of Clerks Regular. For because in those Orders conversation with women is easier and more frequent, there is without doubt a far greater danger of scandal.

But although in the aforesaid Bulls monastery is the same as religious house, and the distinction which Rufinus makes in the present matter between monastery and house is a vain subtlety, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiffs do not speak only of monasteries, but they also speak of houses; indeed also of regular places, of the cloisters of a monastery and of regular places, of houses and places of men of any Orders whatever, etc. And, what is the principal point, the cited Supreme Pontiffs in the cited Constitutions openly speak of cloister which constitutes a part of the observance of regular discipline; and therefore they speak of cloister not only as proper to monastic men and monasteries, but as common to regular men and regular houses.

Hence, absolutely, entirely, and universally it is said in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis, concerning Censures, of Pius IX, that women “violating the cloister of regular men, and Superiors or others admitting them,” incur excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff. The aforesaid Constitution speaks universally of regular men. Who then would dare, after so clear a law, to make some exception of certain truly regular men? And so Joseph Pennacchi, in his Commentaries, in which he treated this matter most broadly, vol. 1, p. 778, raises the question: “who are indicated in the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis under the name of regular men?” And he responds: “With the greatest and most distinguished part of the Commentators we say that those Regulars are understood who belong to some Religious Order properly so called, and in it by solemn profession emit the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.” And Joseph D’Annibale, in his Commentary on the same Constitution, raising no doubt about this matter, says: “Regulars here also we take as those who pronounce solemn vows; not those who are enrolled in Religious Congregations, nor Tertiaries, even if they live collegially.” 4th ed., no. 127.

The preceding doctrine is confirmed from the Resolution of S. C. EE. et RR., 27 April 1883. There was question of the approval of certain modifications which the General Chapter of the Military Order, namely, of the Crucigers with the red star, had carried out, among which was the non-strict cloister of the hospital convent and parish, since in that Order there are hospitals for the poor and parishes or curacies. Now the Sacred Congregation was unwilling to approve those modifications, and ordered that “cloister be observed according to the sacred canons, the holy Council of Trent, and the Apostolic Constitutions.” Cf. Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 16, p. 292.

14. Bernard, a religious, easily transgresses the rules and constitutions of his order, and has no scruple. For he says that they are not contained under religious obedience. Besides, he adds that they of themselves bind neither under grave nor under light sin, as is declared in the rules and constitutions themselves. But the aforesaid rules and constitutions are a mere counsel, and no one can be obligated to counsel.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Bernard is in error, and he acts altogether badly by so easily transgressing the rules and constitutions of his order. A religious is bound to obedience both from the vow and also from the pact implicitly entered into with the religion. By force of this pact he is bound to observe all things which are contained in the rules and constitutions, and which oblige under sin. In such a case the rules and constitutions are contained under religious obedience. But if the rules and constitutions of themselves do not oblige under sin, it does not therefore follow that one can transgress them freely without sin. For, practically speaking, by accident and from another source, fault is ordinarily not lacking in the aforesaid transgression. Nor does it follow that the rules and constitutions are a mere counsel. For although the rules and constitutions do not oblige in conscience immediately to doing or omitting that which is established in them, nevertheless they oblige mediately in conscience insofar as they subject the transgressor to some penalty, and insofar as they subject the religious to regular discipline, for observing and sustaining which in conscience one is obligated by natural law itself, by the very fact that he has entered religion, so that in it he may tend to perfection through regular discipline. — Suarez, de Relig., tome 3, book 10, chapter 7, no. 16; I. M. 249, 250, 302.

15. St. Ignatius, in the sixth part of the Constitutions, chapter 1, declaration 6, speaking of obedience of the intellect, says that it is then rendered when the one who obeys “1. thinks the same thing as the one who commands; 2. and judges that what is commanded is well commanded.” But now Theotimus, a religious, greatly fears lest at some time he himself lack this perfection of obedience, because, when in some particular case it is evident that the superior commands badly, although at least by a reflex judgment he himself thinks what the superior commands, insofar as he judges that nothing is better for him in the present than to obey, nevertheless he certainly cannot judge that that thing is well commanded.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. There is no reason why Theotimus should be disturbed. For in the case his obedience is perfect. And St. Ignatius wholly excepts this case, and comprehends it in that express exception placed in the text itself, paragraph 1: “by a certain blind obedience denying every opinion and judgment of ours to the contrary; and this indeed in all things which are disposed by the superior, where it cannot be defined that SOME KIND OF SIN intervenes.”

16. In a certain diocese there exists a house of a Religious Institute, recently approved by the Holy See, and having Constitutions approved by the same See, destined for the Christian education of orphan girls. The primary house of the Institute, in which the superior general of the whole Institute is accustomed to reside, is in another diocese. Now the bishop of the place where the aforesaid house exists requires from the local superior that she exhibit to him the books of revenues and expenses of the house, and that she render to him an account of the temporal administration of the goods. He requires besides that, when the orphan girls go out from that house, there be handed over to them a certain sufficient dowry in a designated sum of money and a determined quantity of furnishings. When the local and provincial superior refused to do either thing, the bishop required from the superior general that the local and provincial superior be removed from her office.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. “As regards the burden imposed on the nuns of exhibiting the books of administration to the Ordinary, the aforesaid nuns cannot be bound to exhibit books of this kind, because the superiors of the individual houses render accounts each year to the superior general of the respective houses; after these have been approved by the Ordinary of the principal house, they are transmitted at the fixed times prescribed by the Constitutions to S. C. Episc. et Regular. But as regards the removal of the superior of the monastery and of the provincial superior, it is not possible to accede to the bishop’s wishes; for since there is question of a matter which regards internal governance, one cannot proceed to the requested removal unless a formal inquiry concerning their manner of acting has preceded. Nor must one think otherwise concerning the obligation to be imposed on the nuns, namely, of handing over with furnishings some sum of money to the orphans and other girls about to go out from the monastery; for there is question of a burden to which they cannot be obligated, since they are bound to it neither by the Constitutions nor by custom.” S. C. EE. et RR., 27 April 1894. Therefore the reason is one thing for monasteries of solemn vows, another for monasteries of more recent nuns. Monasteries of nuns of solemn vows are autonomous and independent from one another; but more recent institutes, which have a superior general and a principal house, are not so. The former indeed are subject to the vigilance of bishops as regards the administration of goods; the latter depend only on the superior general and on the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars. But although the more recent Institutes are subject to the Ordinaries of places according to the path of the sacred canons, according to the form which the Sacred Congregation itself is accustomed to use in approving these Institutes, nevertheless from this subjection there is excluded, as is fitting, the internal governance of those same Institutes. But removal from domestic offices, as also the transfer of the same nuns from one house to another, pertains altogether to their internal governance. Finally, that some sum of money by title of dowry be supplied to orphan girls about to depart from the pious house, together with furnishings, would certainly bring it about that the aforesaid girls would already presume to arrogate to themselves a right of this kind; and this would certainly be liable to many inconveniences, and would be harmful to the institution of the pious work and to the girls themselves. Hence the Sacred Congregation again rejected the bishop’s requests. S. C. EE. et RR., 27 March 1896, A. S. S., vol. 28, p. 622 ff. Cf. Constitution Conditae a Christo of Leo XIII, VI Id. Dec. 1900.